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KENTUCKY IN A 
NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
T H E  AMERICAN political and electoral system is characterized by 
diversity and change. Every state is different, with its own unique political 
history, traditions, leaders, and partisan loyalties. Political scientists often 
use the termpoliticalculture to define the dominant beliefs and attitudes in 
a state that are shaped by its political history (Patterson, 1968; Rosenthal 
and Moakley, 1984). Kentucky has its own style of politics, its own history 
and political culture. 
State political systems, however, are not immune from national politi- 
cal forces, and changes in the politics of a state cannot be understood 
without a knowledge of national trends. Shifts in the power of national 
political parties directly affect the fortunes of state political parties. T h e  
regeneration of the national Democratic party during the New Deal years 
gradually transformed the politics of northern states, fostering the de- 
velopment of competitive two-party systems throughout the region. 
T h e  successful presidential candidacies of Dwight Eisenhower, 
Richard Nixon, and Ronald Reagan reshaped the political system of 
southern and border states, bringing about the demise of the Solid Demo- 
cratic South. In these states the Republican party became competitive in 
presidential, congressional, and most statewide races, though it lagged 
behind in legislative and local contests. Kentucky is a border state, and 
since the 1950s it has been significantly affected by these national trends. 
Most of the research done by students of state political parties and 
elections has been centered on the questions raised and the hypotheses 
advanced by V.O. Key, Jr., in his classic work entitled Southem Politics 
(1949) and his pioneering study, American State Politics: An Introduction 
(1956). In more recent years there have been several valuable studies of 
southern states (Bass and DeVries, 1977; Lamis, 1984; Black and Black, 
1987). More detailed studies of individual states are needed to develop 
generalizations about state politics as well as to identify the factors that 
cause variations in state political systems. Contemporary studies that fill 
this need are in short supply (one good example is Bryan, 1974). 
Political Parhrtzes €3 Primaries 
This book is a study of politics and elections in the commonwealth of 
Kentucky, a state whose politics is in many ways typical of that in southern 
and border states where traditional Democratic control has been under- 
mined by national political forces. This is a study of the changes in 
Kentucky politics over the last two decades and more particularly a study 
of the characteristics of parties and elections in the last decade. T h e  
emphasis is on state, rather than on national, elections because these are 
central to an understanding of the Kentucky political system. Much of our 
attention is devoted to the most important election in any state, the choice 
of a governor. 
Primary Election Campaigns 
In most Kentucky gubernatorial elections, the Democratic primary is more 
significant than the general election: there are more serious candidates and 
there is closer competition, the campaigns are longer and more expensive, 
and there is more public interest in the campaigns. In at least four out of 
five cases, the winner of the Democratic primary is elected governor. For 
these reasons the main focus of this book is the Democratic gubernatorial 
primary. 
State primary elections have been neglected by the political scientists 
who specialize in state politics. One recent study (Jewell, 1984) analyzes 
gubernatorial primaries in northern states, giving particular attention to 
those political parties that attempt to influence the outcome of primary 
elections by endorsing candidates at preprimary conventions. The  major 
purpose of such endorsements is to select the strongest possible candidate 
and to avoid or minimize the divisive effects of primary contests. Most 
southern Democratic party organizations have made no efforts to influence 
the outcome of primaries, partly because these organizations have been 
relatively weak and partly because, until recently, Republican guber- 
natorial candidates have not constituted a serious threat. The  Republican 
party in Louisiana, however, has informally made preprimary endorse- 
ments, and both parties in Virginia have recently used state conventions 
instead of primaries in an effort to gain greater unity and prospects for 
victory in the general election. 
T h e  definitive study of Democratic primaries in southern states from 
the late 1920s through the 1940s was V. 0. Key's Soudern Politics (1949). T h e  
focus of that study was on various patterns of factionalism in primary 
elections. Some state Democratic parties were dominated by a single 
faction; some were split between two factions over a prolonged period; 
others were splintered among a variety of short-term factions, each associ- 
ated with a particular candidate. Key paid particular attention to bifac- 
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tionalism in the Democratic party because it offered an imperfect 
substitute for competitive two-party politics. T h e  best detailed study of a 
bifactional system was Allan Sindler's (1956) analysis of Louisiana. 
Political scientists have continued to analyze southern primaries using 
Key's model of factionalism. T h e  most systematic work, by Earl and Merle 
Black (1982a), measuring changing patterns of southern primaries, has 
drawn the conclusion that traditional factionalism has declined. Now that 
governors in most southern states can succeed themselves, the incumbent 
is usually able to maintain his personal organization to be used in a bid for 
renomination. But there are few examples of factional continuity from one 
administration to the next. T h e  Blacks have also measured the slow 
growth of competition in Republican primaries (1982b). 
What is lacking from the study of southern primaries is in-depth 
examinations of the primary system over a period of years in individual 
states. If primary competition is no longer organized along factional lines, 
we know very little about what has replaced factions, how campaigns are 
organized, and how voters make choices in primary elections. Yet Demo- 
cratic primaries remain important in most southern and border states. 
They are often more competitive than general elections for statewide 
office. Turnout in Democratic primaries is much higher than in Republi- 
can primaries and sometimes higher than in the general election. In most 
southern and border states, as in Kentucky, the winner of the Democratic 
primary is usually elected governor. 
T h e  last comprehensive study of Kentucky politics (Jewell and Cun- 
ningham, 1968) analyzed the factionalism that pervaded Democratic pri- 
maries for state offices. This factional system was based not on regional, 
economic, or ideological differences but on personal loyalties. T h e  leaders 
of the two factions, Earle Clements and A.B. "Happy" Chandler, formed 
alliances with other state political leaders and with the leaders of rival 
factions at the county level. T h e  two factions often ran slates of candidates 
for the major statewide offices. Many active political workers at the local 
level apparently remained loyal to one faction over an extended period of 
time. In the absence of survey data, it was impossible to determine 
whether substantial numbers of voters had similar loyalties to a faction. 
That book was hardly in print before the bifactional system began to 
fade away. No longer did state political leaders play the role of kingmaker. 
At the county level there was a gradual decline of political leaders who 
were able to dominate local politics and control votes and similarly a 
decline in local factionalism. 
In our research on Kentucky politics, we have tried to determine what 
has replaced the bifactional system. What determines the outcome of 
Democratic gubernatorial primaries? To answer that question, we begin by 
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examining the role of political activists, the persons who staff the organiza- 
tions of candidates in Democratic gubernatorial primaries. Hundreds of 
Democrats who played significant campaign roles in one or more of the last 
three gubernatorial primaries (1979, 1983, and 1987) have been surveyed, 
using an extensive mail questionnaire. 
In recent years political scientists have rediscovered local political 
activists as a valuable source of information about party organizations. 
Specifically, they have surveyed local party leaders and also delegates to 
state party conventions in a number of states (though there are not 
comparable studies of persons active in gubernatorial primaries). These 
studies in other states provide a base of comparison to determine whether 
the characteristics and attitudes of Kentucky political activists are typical 
of those in other states (Conway and Feigert, 1968; Hofstetter, 1973; 
Costantini and King, 1984; Rapoport, Abramowitz, and McGlennon, 
1986). 
In Kentucky we find that, though new political workers are recruited 
in each campaign, a large proportion of the active workers in primaries are 
veterans who work consistently from one election to the next. It  is impor- 
tant to determine what kinds of persons these are, what are their attitudes 
and motivations, and-most importantly-how they choose a candidate 
for whom to work. We believe that the best way to understand modern 
political organizations in Kentucky is to understand the men and women 
within them. 
Traditionally in Kentucky, candidates for statewide office have spent 
months touring the state, meeting with local political leaders, and, as the 
campaign progresses, speaking at rallies and meeting the voters. This is 
still a major component of the primary campaign. But in Kentucky, as in 
the rest of the country, the campaign on television has assumed greater 
importance because candidates can reach a much larger proportion of the 
voters more often. T h e  Democratic gubernatorial primary attracts consid- 
erable attention on television, and the debate on Kentucky Educational 
Television has an impact comparable to the impact of presidential debates 
on the national campaign. T h e  success of candidates for governor depends 
heavily on their ability to package their message effectively in "sound 
bites" for the evening news and their skill in answering questions in 
debates. 
It  is also essential that a winning candidate use campaign advertising 
effectively. He  or she needs skil!ed professionals to create the advertising 
campaign that will present a positive image of the candidate and will 
package the candidate's message well. This requires, of course, that the 
candidate have a message or a theme that will appeal to the voters. T h e  
candidate may also have to take the risk of using negative advertising to 
undermine a front-running opponent. 
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A large-scale television advertising campaign is expensive, and a 
serious candidate for governor has no choice but to raise the necessary 
funds. T h e  candidate who falls far behind in the money-raising marathon 
must either drop out of the race or be relegated to the role of a minor player 
in the campaign. This means that much of the candidate's time in the early 
phases of the campaign must be devoted to raising money and that the 
most important component of the candidate's organization is the fund- 
raising apparatus. It means that in the early stages of a campaign the 
credibility of a candidate is judged largely by his or her ability to raise 
funds. 
To understand the dynamics of these primary campaigns for major 
office, we will examine in some detail the campaigns for governor and 
lieutenant governor in 1987. To demonstrate the role that money had come 
to play in Kentucky politics, we have collected facts and figures on 
campaign financing, particularly in the Democratic primary. 
Ideally, we should use this study of primary elections in Kentucky to 
test hypotheses developed in other studies of state primary elections, 
particularly in the southern and border states where the primary still 
surpasses or equals the general election in importance. Unfortunately, 
these hypotheses have not been developed, and these studies have not 
been made. 
T h e  traditional system of Kentucky primary elections was typical of 
those in many southern states, though not all of them had such strong 
factionalism and most of them had the runoff election that Kentucky 
lacked. We suspect that trends in Kentucky primaries are similar to some 
of those occurring (but not adequately studied) in most southern states. 
T h e  changes in primary campaigns-the growing costs and the increasing 
importance of television-reflect a national trend, one that has been more 
publicized in presidential races but is occurring in the states as well 
(Jewel], 1984). We hope that our study will be replicated and our findings 
tested in other border and southern states so that it will be possible to draw 
some generalizations about modem primary campaigns. 
Two-Party Competition 
T h e  trend toward the Republican party that has swept through most 
southern and border states has been felt in Kentucky elections, except at 
the gubernatorial level. Republican presidential candidates have been 
increasingly successful in appealing to Kentucky voters. Kentucky voters 
are not as conservative as those in some southern states (at least as 
measured by the voting record of their congressmen), nor were they as 
critical of desegregation policies and civil rights legislation when these 
issues dominated southern politics. But Kentucky voters have been sus- 
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picious of northern liberal candidates running on national Democratic 
tickets. Dwight Eisenhower almost carried Kentucky in his first race and 
carried it in his second. Kentucky voted for Richard Nixon in all three of 
his presidential races. The  only two Democratic presidential candidates it 
has supported since 1952 have been southerners: Lyndon Johnson in 1964 
and Jimmy Carter in 1976. Kentucky voted twice for Ronald Reagan and 
supported George Bush in 1988. Kentucky has also frequently elected 
Republicans to the Senate in the last forty years, starting with John 
Sherman Cooper in 1946. In House races, in addition to the traditionally 
Republican Fifth District, Kentucky has consistently elected Republicans 
in two other districts since 1978. 
In most southern and border states, the national Republican trend has 
extended to state politics, enabling the state Republican party not only to 
elect members to Congress but to win a larger number of gubernatorial 
elections and to make gradual gains in the state legislature and local 
offices. The  Kentucky Republican party has not made comparable prog- 
ress in state elections, despite the fact that throughout the twentieth 
century the party has been a significant force in Kentucky politics. It has 
rarely failed to win at least 40 percent of the vote in races for governor and 
senator, and it has usually held at least 20 to 25 percent of the seats in the 
legislature. By contrast, in most southern states until the 1960s, the 
Republican party did not consistently run candidates, or at least serious 
candidates, for statewide office, and legislatures in the deep South had 
few if any Republican members. 
In the last thirty years, the Republican party in most southern and 
border states has made significant gains in state as well as national elec- 
tions, while the Kentucky Republican party has stood still or slipped 
backward. There has been only one Republican governor elected in the 
last forty years. The  Republican party had more difficulty recruiting a 
credible candidate for governor in 1983 and in 1987 than it did in the 1950s 
and 1960s. The  Republican contingent in the legislature has been smaller 
during the 1980s than it was in the 1960s. 
We will examine the Kentucky Republican party, its leadership and 
organization, in some detail in an effort to determine what has gone wrong 
and why it is so difficult for the party to capitalize on the successes that 
national Republican candidates have had in Kentucky. We will also de- 
scribe the 1987 Republican primary and general election campaigns for 
governor as a case study that illustrates the party's difficulty. 
While Republican electoral successes in southern states have been 
described and analyzed by political scientists (Lamis, 1984), little atten- 
tion has been paid to the development of Republican party organization in 
these states or the successes and failures of the party in gubernatorial and 
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legislative races (but see Kemple, 1980; Theodoulou, 1986). Thus,  we are 
not able to draw many comparisons between the Republican experience in 
Kentucky and in other border and southern states. 
There has been considerable scholarly attention to voting patterns in 
the South, much of it based on voting survey data. We know that over the 
last two decades the proportion of southerners splitting their votes in 
national and state elections has increased dramatically. T h e  proportion of 
southern voters identifying with the Democratic party has declined, while 
the proportion of independents has increased and the proportion of Re- 
publicans has increased more gradually (Beck, 1977; Campbell, 1977; 
Hadley and Howell, 1980; Stanley and Castle, 1988). Survey data are not 
available in every state to measure trends in party identification. T h e  
state-level data that are available show that the proportion of Democratic 
identifiers has been declining and there is considerable variation among 
states in the relative gains in Republicans and in independents (Swans- 
brough and Brodsky, 1988). 
When we examine Kentucky voters, we find that there has been a 
large increase in split ticket voting, that large proportions of voters have 
voted often for Republicans for national office while continuing to support 
most state Democratic candidates. Data on party identification in Ken- 
tucky (reported in chapter 12), however, fails to show evidence of the party 
realignment that has been occurring to various degrees throughout the 
southern and border states. Kentuckians have remained relatively stable in 
their professed party identification as well as in their party registration at 
the same time that they have grown much more independent in their 
voting behavior. In recent years students of voting behavior have raised a 
number of substantive and methodological questions about the meaning 
of party identification and the conventional ways in which it is measured 
(for a summary, see Shively, 1980). These questions are pertinent to 
Kentucky where the traditional concept of party identification fails to 
adequately explain the current behavior of Kentucky voters. 
Kentucky is more rural than the average state, and in the last half 
century it has had weaker two-party competition than the average state. 
Both of these differences help to explain why politics in Kentucky is not 
typical of politics across the country. Kentucky also differs from the typical 
southern state; it is more rural, it has fewer black citizens, and it has a 
larger bloc of voters with a long tradition of voting Republican. T h e  trend 
toward greater two-party competition is weaker in Kentucky than in most 
southern and border states. But many of the changes in campaign styles 
that are occurring across the country can be found in both the primary and 
general elections in Kentucky. 
DEMOCRATIC PARTY 
ORGANIZATION 
T h e  Role of the Governor 
Tradition and Change 
In Kentucky the governor is usually recognized as the most important 
leader in the Democratic party. The  governor has traditionally been strong 
in Kentucky-as a legislative leader and as a politician-even though the 
constitution prevents his or her serving two consecutive terms. Demo- 
cratic control of the governorship has been so common in the last sixty 
years that party leadership has not gravitated to other elected officials or to 
the party chairman. There is very little precedent for determining who will 
exercise party leadership in periods of Republican gubernatorial control 
(Jewel1 and Cunningham, 1968: 39). During the only Republican guber- 
natorial administration in recent years, that of Louie B. Nunn, 1967-71, Lt. 
Gov. Wendell Ford, a Democrat, laid claim to party leadership. 
T h e  factions that dominated Kentucky politics from the mid-1930s to 
the late 1960s, which were identified with A.B. Chandler and Earle 
Clements, are described in some detail in chapter 3. They had their origin 
in Chandler's victory over Thomas Rhea in the 1935 gubernatorial primary. 
Chandler and Clements were strong party leaders who built statewide 
networks of followers among local officials and party activists. When he 
became governor, Bert Combs succeeded Clements as leader of one 
faction. After their terms as governor, all tried to pick their successors and 
continued to make endorsements in Democratic primaries. 
The  dominant role of the governor in factional politics of the 1950s and 
1960s has been described as follows: 
T h e  governorship is the major prize sought by the rival factions in the party, and 
the outcome of the gubernatorial primary and general election determines which 
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faction will dominate the party for the next four years. When a governor takes 
office, he is both a factional and a party leader, and he inherits the support of three 
groups of Democrats. First are those who have a sense of loyalty to the faction that 
the governor represents and who have supported its candidates over a period of 
years. . . . A second group of voters consists of those who identify themselves 
more strongly with the party than with a faction and who tend to support any 
Democratic governor. A third group, consisting mainly of local politicians and 
office-seekers, are those who support the governor-whatever their prior alle- 
giance-because they respect his political power and his ability to dispense various 
kinds of favors. [Jewell and Cunningham, 1968: 391 
T h e  disappearance of factions in the 1970s coincided with the trends 
that weakened the close relationship between the Democratic party and 
state government. Changes in state and federal laws and practices, pur- 
chasing and accounting procedures, and public records all made it difficult 
for the party to operate directly in state government. Operating under the 
new rules of the game, Governors Wendell Ford and Julian Carroll 
(1971-79) continued to maintain a strong interest in and influence over the 
state party organization but transferred to that organization day-to-day 
responsibility for various forms of patronage. In each case they selected a 
party chairman, J.R. Miller and Sonny Hunt respectively, to whom they 
delegated extensive authority. 
T h e  next two governors, John Y. Brown and Martha Layne Collins, 
did not fully utilize the political resources available to a governor nor did 
they employ many of the tactics perfected by their predecessors. Brown, 
elected on an antipatronage platform, was totally unconcerned with party 
affairs; at times he even thwarted party efforts. Governor Brown failed to 
see how the party organization could help him, and he was defeated on the 
gubernatorial succession issue partly because party leaders failed to help 
him out. Unlike her predecessor, Collins, a grass-roots organizer and 
campaigner, had ambitious goals about rebuilding the state party appara- 
tus. She was much more active in party affairs than Brown had been, but 
her impact on the party organization appears to have been limited. 
Wallace Wilkinson, Collins's successor, has taken a strong interest in 
the party organization, making a vigorous effort to establish his control of 
the party machinery. H e  brought in a contingent of loyal supporters who 
worked diligently to assure that the county organizations were controlled 
by persons loyal to the governor. 
T h e  governor can exercise several major functions as party leader: 
selecting chairmen and thus controlling organization and restructuring the 
party apparatus; controlling patronage; recruiting and campaigning for 
candidates, with possible involvement in legislative primaries; and party- 
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building efforts, such as raising money, speaking, staying in touch with the 
counties. 
Controlling the State and Local Party Oqanization 
A Democratic gubernatorial nominee's first important task is the naming of 
a state party chairman-usually his or her primary campaign chairman- 
and gaining control of the state party organization. In the Kentucky 
Democratic party, as in most state parties, it is assumed that a governor is 
entitled to select the state party chairman. The  priority that a governor 
gives to that selection is often a good indication of the importance the 
governor attaches to his or her role as party leader. Wendell Ford selected 
J.R. Miller, widely regarded as one of the most skillful and experienced 
party leaders in the state. John Y. Brown had a series of four chairmen 
during his term, most of whom were close friends and supporters of Brown 
but who had little experience or interest in party affairs. 
On paper the Democrats have a large and elaborate party structure. 
The  state convention meets during presidential election years, its mem- 
bers chosen at county mass meetings. As of late 1988, the Democratic State 
Central Committee (DSCC) contained fifty-five voting members and 
eight ex officio members. The  DSCC selects its members in a variety of 
ways, with some members elected at the state convention, some elected at 
congressional district meetings, and some appointed by virtue of holding 
other party or elected offices. T h e  DSCC includes the president of the 
Kentucky Democratic Women, plus four members of the state legislature. 
The  governor's control of the party depends on his ability to organize 
the forces loyal to him to dominate the state convention and select 
delegates to the national presidential convention and members of the 
central executive committee. The  reorganization of locallstate party or- 
ganizations occurs every four years in a presidential year. In 1956, when 
factional divisions were deepest, Governor Chandler had to battle with 
Senator Clements to win control of the state convention, but normally 
there is little or no opposition to gubernatorial control over the party 
machinery. The  state convention meets about six months after the gover- 
nor takes office, when his or her prestige and power are usually high. The  
constitutional ban on a second successive term for the governor tends to 
erode his or her political influence as the term progresses (Jewell and 
Cunningham, 1968: 39-41). 
A state party convention under Governor Carroll illustrates the power 
of a governor to restructure the state party apparatus. When the conven- 
tion met in 1976, he had been in office for a year and a half (having 
succeeded Ford when he moved to the Senate). The  governor filled every 
position in the party, top to bottom. For example, one of Carroll's key 
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county contact persons was designated chair of the nomination committee 
for the state convention. The  state party chairman, Sonny Hunt, gave the 
governor's appointee a list of the nominees for all positions. T h e  chair 
selected by the governor convened the meeting and announced whom the 
governor wanted chosen. The  meeting lasted less than a minute. T h e  
designated chair then put the names in nomination as nominees of the 
committee, and each election was without opposition. In county and 
precinct elections, occasionally some group would offer a challenge, but it 
rarely had the strength to win. Any serious threat would be isolated, and its 
members usually soon co-opted. 
One of Governor Wilkinson's priorities was to establish control of the 
Democratic party machinery. According to a seasoned party loyalist, 
"There is a party organization, and parallel to that there is an organization 
very loyal to the governor-the two are often separate at the local level. 
You have that today, with Wilkinson having a strong following among 
activists, separate from the party organization; that is one of the weak- 
nesses of the party." 
T h e  governor's efforts began on April 23, 1988, when precinct elec- 
tions were held. T h e  following Saturday there were elections of the county 
party executive committees and delegates to the state convention. T h e  
Wilkinson forces worked very hard to take over the local party organiza- 
tions, to take charge of the Democratic party. They began at the precinct 
level, recruiting Wilkinson campaign activists to be elected precinct lead- 
ers. To find these persons, the Wilkinson state organization worked with 
its former county campaign chairmen across the state. T h e  organization 
held workshops for Wilkinson gubernatorial supporters to educate them as 
to how to capture their respective precinct elections-how to get enough 
Wilkinson people out in each precinct. 
On June 4, 1988, two thousand delegates attended the state conven- 
tion, which was orchestrated by the Wilkinson leadership. On the morning 
of the state convention, seven congressional district conventions were 
held, and the delegates in each district elected five people (two men, two 
women, one youth) to serve on the state central committee. T h e  Wilkin- 
son forces had to make sure that a majority of these people elected from 
each district would be Wilkinson supporters. Each district convention also 
elected a presidential elector and an elector alternate. In the afternoon the 
delegates met as the state convention and elected seven at-large members 
to the state central committee. Also, three National Democratic Commit- 
tee members and two at-large presidential electors (and two alternates) 
were chosen. A highlight of the convention was the routine selection of 
Wilkinson's candidates for party chairman and vice-chairman: state repre- 
sentative Jerry Lundergan and Sue Carroll Perry, the county clerk from 
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Shelby County, where she had chaired Wilkinson's primary and general 
election campaigns. 
In order to find people to run for the local party offices, the state 
Wilkinson forces had to work within the constraints and politics of the 
individual counties. T h e  goal was to capture the party organizations in all 
120 counties. In the local reorganization the Wilkinson forces had good 
control over all the congressional districts except the Third. In every 
district, the five elected people were Wilkinson supporters, except in the 
Third District, where the governor won only two out of the five. 
Occasionally, the Wilkinson forces were not able to wrest control of a 
county organization. Such clashes occurred across the state; and they were 
of central importance, since they would determine the leadership of the 
local party for four years. One such conflict occurred in Clark County (a 
rural county in central Kentucky) where Wilkinson supporters challenged 
supporters of Senate president pro tem John "Eck" Rose (a frequent critic 
of the governor) for control of the county executive committee and lost. 
Rose intended to use the local organization in his 1990 reelection bid. 
Furthermore, Rose's credibility in opposing Wilkinson's legislative pro- 
posals, particularly his opposition to the governor's succession amend- 
ment, was at stake. T h e  Rose forces' victory-by a margin of 33 to 28- 
reflected the intensity of the battle. "In terms of registered Democrats 
represented, tallies showed that delegates for 18,375 voters voted for the 
pro-Rose slate, and delegates for 12,646 favored the Wilkinson slate." In 
the aftermath of the election, a new executive committee was formed in 
Clark County which in turn selected James Coleman as its chairman. It is 
not without importance that Coleman had served as county chairman for 
Brereton Jones's 1987 lieutenant gubernatorial race, suggesting that the 
impact of an election for executive committee membership will carry 
forward into yet another gubernatorial race. T h e  impact was not lost on the 
Wilkinson faction, which challenged the election before the state Demo- 
cratic party. "Eck" Rose won again, as presumably did Brereton Jones 
(Coun'e~Joollmal (C-J), May 1, 1988, pp. B1, B6). 
Controlling Patmnage 
Patronage can be a major tool of gubernatorial leadership, and thus it is 
essential that the governor control patronage, directly or indirectly. Under 
Governor Ford, most questions of patronage were left to his party chair- 
man, J.R. Miller, and party executive director, H.K. Taylor, at state party 
headquarters. But Ford made certain decisions in his office, such as those 
regarding regulatory matters. T h e  moving of most state patronage to the 
party headquarters coincided with J.R. Miller taking over the party for 
Governor Ford-and Miller, who made the Kentucky Democratic party 
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into a nationally recognized institution, probably insisted on having these 
functions. 
Governor Carroll participated in certain patronage decisions within 
the governor's office-especially involving appointments to various boards 
and commissions. Carroll left local job patronage primarily to the Demo- 
cratic party headquarters, where Mike Templeton and Sonny Hunt han- 
dled it. Much of the business patronage was handled by Sonny Hunt at 
state party offices. 
In contrast to Carroll, Governor Brown, a party outsider, passed 
decisions on jobs, personal service contracts, and regulatory matters to his 
cabinet secretaries and their executive departments. Some persons ac- 
cused Brown of substituting cronyism for patronage. Lists of potential 
appointees to commissions and boards were coordinated by a young 
administrator in the governor's office, and then decisions were made by a 
tight, intimate circle including the governor. 
Governor Collins, a seasoned party supporter, came into office intend- 
ing to restore total control of patronage to the governor's office but was not 
completely successful in doing so. During the Brown administration, the 
executive agencies had been given so much control over appointments 
that it was difficult for the governor's office to regain full control. More- 
over, concerning local patronage, Governor Collins did not devote as much 
personal attention to the local parties as she had said she would. According 
to one political expert, "Maybe she should not-she had a lot of things to 
do, and too much involvement in patronage might have been a problem." 
Under Collins, however, the governor's office did take over much of the 
responsibility that had previously been handled by the state party head- 
quarters. Her staffers worked directly with the contact people in each 
county on matters involving employment or state business. State party 
chair Coleman was involved in the extent he was able to make appoint- 
ments for contributors to see Collins about patronage matters. 
Governor Wilkinson has taken control of patronage as much as possi- 
ble, centralizing matters in his office and state party headquarters. Wilkin- 
son wants qualified people who are loyal to him. Though much of the 
detailed patronage work is done in party headquarters, the final decision is 
made by Wilkinson and his inner circle in the governor's office. Wilkinson 
has insisted on being heavily involved in these decisions; it is clearly his 
style of governing. Within the governor's office, the director of the Office 
of Constituent Services works closely with the executive director of the 
party on details of the county patronage process. 
Inflaencing Elections 
During Ford's administration J.R. Miller and H.K. Taylor at party head- 
quarters were involved in targeted local, state, and national races. Al- 
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though Governor Ford had little direct involvement in state legislative 
races, his party leaders had his blessing to help legislative candidates who 
strongly supported the administration. 
During Governor Carroll's term his office and state party headquarters 
were involved in a number of elections. But, according to Carroll, he rarely 
participated in recruiting candidates and rarely intervened in a legislative 
primary. T h e  former governor does not recall much personal involve- 
ment-such as that carried out by Chandler, Combs, and Breathitt. Of 
course, local supporters would use the governor's name. A person who 
agreed to provide support (including contributions) to a candidate en- 
dorsed by Carroll's local leaders understood that he or she was doing a favor 
for the governor. It was usually clear who were the local Carroll leaders, 
and they often supported candidates. But the local Carroll organizations 
did not target legislators opposed to the governor, presumably because 
there were few, if any. 
For example, Carroll allowed the influence of his office to be used to 
enlist support from Democratic sources for James Amato's mayoral race. 
Carroll's political friends in Lexington would say, "The governor would 
like you to be for Jim." No promises were made or asked for, and there was 
never a quid pro quo. Carroll was not personally involved in this effort. 
In keeping with his "nonpolitical" stance, Governor Brown did not 
directly engage in influencing local, state, and national races. If his county 
party chairs and loyal supporters became active in elections, they were 
working entirely on their own. 
Governor Collins did not become actively involved in candidate re- 
cruitment, but she endorsed Edward Coleman's efforts with the state 
legislative Campaign Coordinator Program (described below). Collins 
dealt with organization matters only upon Coleman's infrequent requests. 
She dealt with local party leaders when Coleman needed her input or the 
governor's personal contact with them. 
In the 1988 state legislative primary, Governor Wilkinson did make 
some financial contributions to incumbents. Wilkinson's county contacts 
did assist with candidates who were friends of the governor and the 
governor's loyal coterie. Obviously, there are risks to being involved in 
campaigns, as Wilkinson has been doing, but if one raises money more 
quietly, it may be possible to have some impact with less risk. 
T h e  governor can be very important in helping the election of a 
congressman, senator, or president in the state. Ford was instrumental in 
Huddleston's first successful U.S. Senate campaign; the governor traveled 
the state on behalf of Huddleston's candidacy. Carroll was very active in 
carrying Kentucky for Jimmy Carter-and this helped Kentucky. Gover- 
nor Collins was a staunch supporter of Walter Mondale in 1984; she was 
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chosen one of the cochairmen of the national presidential convention. In 
late 1987 Wilkinson at first leaned toward supporting Governor Dukakis, 
but he discovered that some of his major supporters were for Sen. Al Gore, 
Jr. In January 1988 Wilkinson invited all the local party chairmen to the 
mansion, and they said they wanted to be for Gore in the Democratic 
presidential primary contest; so newly appointed party executive director 
Kim Kearns became involved in Gore's campaign-she helped orchestrate 
and coordinate it in Kentucky. After the primary Wilkinson was asked to 
become Dukakis's Kentucky state party chairman, and he campaigned for 
the Massachusetts governor. 
Paq-Building Activities 
Governor Ford was a preeminent party supporter; he helped strengthen 
the party apparatus around the state, building on the framework of his own 
organization. According to one longtime party activist, "Ford wouldn't 
have missed a party function." The  governor attended party fund-raisers, 
organization meetings, local county rallies, and other campaign affairs. 
Ford was in daily communication with his party leaders about the party 
organizational matters. 
Carroll did a lot of work for candidates and local parties by going 
around the state attending functions and making speeches; he gave more 
than 800 speeches in his term. He helped local as well as state and 
legislative candidates by going to campaign affairs. The  state headquar- 
ters' finances were a major concern; the building would have been fore- 
closed without the contributions that Carroll helped raise. Carroll took a 
strong interest in assisting and promoting the state Democratic party and 
its 120 county party organizations. 
Governor Brown had disassociated himself from the party. He was not 
interested in any party-building activities. He was an antiparty, anti- 
patronage chief executive. Governor Collins came into office with party 
experience, promising to play a more active role in party affairs, to deal 
with party leaders, in a way that Brown had not. Depending on her time 
constraints, Collins took a lot of day-to-day or week-to-week interest in 
party affairs. Her two state party chairs had as much contact with Collins as 
they needed to run successfully the state party apparatus. 
According to Edward Coleman, Collins was the best political governor 
he has ever seen. "She did not forget where she came from. She is a great 
grass roots person-rain or shine." Large fund-raising events had to 
revolve around her demanding schedule. She attended all the Century 
Club affairs and held parties at the mansion and Churchill Downs. She 
attended all the Jefferson-Jackson dinners and the populist Grass Roots 
Club's picnics. Coleman had excellent access to Collins when he needed to 
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talk to her, and he was able to arrange meetings for those county politicians 
who felt it necessary to talk to her. Coleman usually contacted her about 
two times a week and communicated with her office much more fre- 
quently than that. 
Collins assisted Coleman in money raising in various ways. She at- 
tended the important fund-raisers, including various functions she hosted 
at the mansion. She gave her advice on naming individuals who could help 
Coleman in fund-raising in the different counties and statewide; and she 
knew a lot of the right people to contact and gave Coleman the leverage to 
use her resources. She encouraged her staff to assist Coleman in any 
- 
matters pertinent to fund-raising. 
Wilkinson came into office with a commitment to rebuild the party, 
precinct by precinct, and he has constructed an organization whose mem- 
bers will demonstrate a fierce personal commitment to him. Many of these 
are persons who had never been active in politics before Wilkinson's 
gubernatorial candidacy. T h e  Wilkinson organization has sought to pro- 
mote a high level of grass-roots party involvement. Wilkinson has been a 
very visible, enthusiastic governor who has taken a hands-on approach to 
party leadership. 
Veteran party leaders often argue that once the political party lost a 
major portion of its patronage because of the increase in merit jobs and 
campaign reforms, interest in the party faded considerably. T h e  Demo- 
cratic party also suffers when there is a governor in office who pays little 
attention to the organization and fails to attend party functions. That  has 
been lacking, definitely under Brown and even under Collins. Although 
Collins intended to follow the example set by Ford and Carroll, and 
attended many party functions, she did not have time to become heavily 
involved in local party-building activities. Wilkinson has been actively 
involved in party-building activities, with a vision of the party as a person- 
alistic, loyal following. 
State Party Chairman 
Huckshorn (1976) delineates three different types of party chairs: the chair 
who has been selected by the governor and performs those tasks assigned 
by the governor; the chair of the administration party who gains that 
position independent of-or in opposition to-the governor and thus has 
considerable freedom of action; and the chair of the opposition party. As 
we have made clear, the Democratic chairman in Kentucky falls into the 
first category. 
In Kentucky a single four-year gubernatorial term undermines state 
party organizational continuity; a new chair is selected right after the 
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primary election by the winning gubernatorial candidate. During several 
recent administrations there has been considerable turnover in the chair- 
manship; over a nine-year period from mid-1979 to mid-1988, nine dif- 
ferent persons held the position. This lack of continuity obviously makes 
it difficult for any single chairman to accomplish very much or have any 
lasting impact on the state party. 
When Ford was elected governor, he chose a skillful, powerful political 
leader and party builder to run the Democratic party-J.R. Miller from 
Owensboro. Miller was recognized widely for his grass-roots organiza- 
tional, fund-raising, campaign, and mobilizing skills. It was during his 
term, and that of party executive director H.K. Taylor from Morehead, 
that most of the responsibility for patronage decisions was moved from the 
governor's office to state Democratic party headquarters. Miller was well 
enough known in national Democratic circles that he succeeded in making 
the Kentucky Democratic party into a nationally recognized institution. 
Nearly halfway through Ford's administration, Miller and the governor 
parted ways; supposedly, Miller wanted to succeed Ford as governor, but 
Ford would not give him his early support. Also, Miller was upset with the 
governor's strong involvement in Huddleston's Senate race and then with 
Ford's decision to run for the other Senate seat himself. After Miller 
relinquished the party chairmanship, William Sullivan was selected to 
chair the party apparatus. 
Howard l? "Sonny" Hunt, Carroll's handpicked chair from Danville, 
worked hard with the counties to take care of patronage from state party 
headquarters. Hunt was a very forceful party chair who kept in regular 
communication with the governor's county contact people, but he was not 
as concerned as some chairmen with party-building activities. Hunt was 
also concerned with helping deserving Democrats to do business with the 
state, and his handling of insurance premiums eventually led to his convic- 
tion and a jail sentence. 
Governor Brown was responsible for selecting four party chairmen 
during his tenure-Larry Townsend, Robert Cobb, Tracy Farmer, and 
Paul Patton. T h e  first three were men who had worked very closely with 
Brown, and each was selected because of his organizational and fund- 
raising abilities. But because Brown had very little interest in party affairs 
and refused to follow traditional patronage practices, most of his party 
chairmen were unable to be effective in maintaining the effectiveness of 
the party organization. One experienced Democratic politician described 
party headquarters under Brown as "a toothless tiger" because of the 
governor's lack of interest in party organization. If the Kentucky Demo- 
cratic organization had had a tradition of chairmen who won office on their 
own and acted independently of the governor, the party organization 
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might have remained strong despite Brown's inattention. But he followed 
the Kentucky tradition of appointing the chairmen and then largely ig- 
nored them and the organization. 
Townsend, a Louisville business executive, ran Brown's last-minute 
media-blitz primary campaign and the general election campaign. Town- 
send recognized the need for the party to have operating funds, and he 
established the Century Club as a funding mechanism for the party. Early 
in Brown's administration, Townsend had much influence and took charge 
of certain patronage matters. But Townsend, a strong individual, soon 
became discredited because he often lost objectivity in dealing with party 
and administration matters. Brown's second party chair, Louisville busi- 
nessman Robert Cobb, was subjected to tremendous abuse because the 
party faithful expected patronage and could not believe that Brown really 
was not going to dispense it-except to his cronies. Even after he vacated 
the party chair's office, Cobb was often besieged by people to help them in 
gaining favors from the administration. Brown's third party chair, Lex- 
ington banker Tracy Farmer, tried to exert influence on Brown's behalf but 
was handicapped by Brown's lack of interest in party affairs. 
Paul Patton, an eastern Kentucky coal executive and judge executive 
of Pike County, was the only one of the four who had held elective office. 
By the time he took the chairmanship, local political leaders had recog- 
nized that the Brown administration was not going to follow traditional 
patronage practices, and Patton was subjected to less pressure from local 
leaders than his predecessors had been. 
Patton, while recognizing his lack of power, believes he had a good 
reputation "as best chairman since J.R. Millet" On the average he spent 
two days a week on the job. He spent much of his time developing contacts 
and trying to provide assistance to people, without having many resources. 
Patton had the least authority of all Brown's party chairs because, unlike 
the others, he seldom had contact with Brown. In fact, in the eighteen- 
month period of his chairmanship, Patton talked to Governor Brown about 
the Democratic party only twice and once about Pike County. Patton 
believed that he had two main responsibilities: to try to elect Democrats 
and to help Democratic leaders. He was sometimes able to help deserving 
Democrats get state jobs because of his personal contacts in state govern- 
ment, not because he had authority to speak on behalf of the governor. 
As state party chair, Patton assisted Democratic congressional candi- 
dates who were in competitive races; the party headquarters gave priority 
to the campaigns of incumbent Rep. Ron Mazzoli and challengers Don 
Mills and Terry Mann. T h e  Mann race was given particular attention 
because Mann was perceived as having a chance to win. Patton helped 
some state legislative candidates to carry out media campaigns and direct 
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mail operations. He also tried to involve the state party central committee, 
the governor's handpicked group, more than his predecessors had done. 
Governor Collins's first party chair was state senator Joe Prather, 
president pro tem of the Senate, who had served as her primary campaign's 
cochairman and who served as party chair for only a year, beginning with 
Collins's primary victory (May 1983-May 1984). Prather found it difficult to 
do both his Senate and his party job at the same time. During the 1984 
legislative session, Prather spent nearly all of his time on the Senate job; at 
other times he divided his time roughly in half. For assistance with both 
jobs, he relied heavily on one aide, John Cooper. Ex-chairman Paul Patton 
proved to be very helpful with the complex business of implementing a 
national convention delegate selection process that would meet the stan- 
dards of the national Democratic party. He had developed the plan and 
followed through on it, even handling the hearings around the state. 
As party chair, Prather had as much contact with Collins as he needed 
on party matters. She would be available and accessible to his requests. 
Prather did not get involved much with local contact men who handled 
patronage. T h e  county patronage was mostly handled in the governor's 
office. After Prather left, the state party headquarters was involved some- 
what in contracts; in isolated cases Prather would become involved. 
Edward Coleman was party chairman for much of the Collins adminis- 
tration-approximately from May 1984 to May 1987. Collins chose Cole- 
man because of their close association during her campaign; he not only 
was in charge of organizing and running Collins's campaign in Franklin 
County but also assisted in directing some other Collins campaign county 
organizations. When Coleman, a resident of Franklin County, was chair- 
man, 100 percent of his time was devoted to the task. During any spare 
hours he attended to his horses and other farm responsibilities. He had to 
give up his real estate and appraisal businesses in order to devote full time 
to party activities. Officially, he had no executive directors, but Brenda 
Frank assumed that title in order for her to attend certain national party 
functions (e.g., seminars given by the national party that were strictly for 
state executive directors and state chairmen). 
Coleman was involved in patronage more than Prather, but basically 
patronage was handled through the governor's office. At the Century Club 
functions (the horse races, cocktail parties, gatherings at the mansion), 
Coleman would always invite the top heads of all the state departments, 
the individuals who make the state's decisions, to socialize and mingle 
with the contributors. For example, contributing engineers could socialize 
and become friendly with the cabinet secretary and other representatives 
of the Highway Department or Finance Department. Insurance company 
contributors could mingle with representatives of the Insurance Department. 
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Coleman has described his term as a time of growth, in which head- 
quarters adopted new political techniques, installed computers, and, 
through the surplus from Collins's 1983 campaign, paid off the nearly 
quarter-million dollar debt on the headquarters building. One of Cole- 
man's innovations, the Campaign Coordinator Program for state legislative 
candidates, will be discussed in more detail later in the chapter. 
In May 1987 Danny Briscoe, a former state insurance commissioner 
under Governor Brown, was named to head the Democratic party. It was 
Wilkinson's first official appointment after winning the party's guber- 
natorial nomination. It is traditional for the state party chief to step aside so 
the Democratic nominee can put his own person in the job. Briscoe, a 
lawyer, served in the administrations of Louisville mayors Frank Burke 
and Harvey Sloane and had worked in several state and local campaigns. In 
the late summer of 1984, Briscoe became one of the first people to go to 
work for Wilkinson, coordinating media and polling. After organization 
chairman J.R. Miller (state party chairman under Governor Ford) left the 
campaign early in spring 1987, Briscoe took over the campaign. 
Briscoe was Wilkinson's closest and most influential adviser, and he 
had orchestrated the successful primary and general election campaigns. 
These qualifications could have made him a strong state chairman. But he 
was not particularly involved in party-building activities; his efforts were 
largely focused on helping to set up the new administration. He main- 
tained only a skeletal crew at state party headquarters. 
Danny Briscoe resigned as party chairman in February 1988, but he 
was not replaced until the state party convention in June 1988. He wanted 
to spend more time on his law practice and his activities as a lobbyist. In 
the interim Wilkinson asked Kim Kearns of Lexington, his director of 
constituent services in the governor's office, to assume the full-time 
position as executive director of the state party apparatus; Kearns did not 
want to be designated party chairman. During Wilkinson's primary cam- 
paign, she had worked with her mentor, J.R. Miller, in running the 
statewide county organization campaigns and had stayed on after he 
departed, becoming the district coordinator of four of the seven congres- 
sional districts. 
At first Kearns assisted with party operations from her constituent 
services' desk in the governor's office; her constituent directorship in- 
cluded participating in the dispersal of the governor's patronage and 
projects in selected congressional districts-helping favored constituents 
with roads, nonmerit jobs, and contracts. She also helped to plan the 
presidential delegate selection process. 
Upon becoming full-time state party executive director in March 1988, 
Kearns set out to accomplish two important tasks: selecting the national 
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convention delegates and reorganizing the local/state party organization. 
T h e  presidential delegate process consumed a lot of Kearns's time; in the 
end a total of sixty-five delegates and eighteen alternates were selected, 
along with ten super delegates. Kearns was responsible for overseeing 
details of the Kentucky delegation's participation in the Atlanta presiden- 
tial convention. 
Rep. Jerry Lundergan, one of Wilkinson's chief allies in the General 
Assembly, was chosen his second state party chairman. Lundergan repre- 
sented the Seventy-sixth District in Fayette County, the district in which 
Wilkinson lives. H e  had been in the legislature since 1980, except for one 
two-year term. His election surprised no one; he was Wilkinson's chosen 
candidate before the state Democratic convention opened on June 4,1988. 
As chair, Lundergan said he would not draw a salary but would reimburse 
himself for his expenses. Usually, the chairmanship is a full-time job with a 
salary; but in March 1988 the party had hired Kearns as executive director 
to run the day-to-day activities of the party. 
During his very brief tenure, Lundergan established the political 
department of headquarters, and he hired a fund-raiser. H e  was the main 
spokesman for the party and official overseer of the party machinery. H e  
had regular contact with the governor's office. Although Lundergan lacked 
extensive contacts in the counties, he was interested in strengthening the 
local county party organizations. Lundergan was state party chair for only 
three months. H e  stepped down because of a controversy that had arisen 
concerning his catering company, which allegedly had done business with 
the state in violation of a state law that prohibits legislators from receiving 
state contracts without competitive bidding. 
At the urging of Governor Wilkinson, state Democratic leaders unan- 
imously chose former Powell County judge executive Bill Patrick to be 
Wilkinson's third party chairman on August 29, 1988. Patrick had been 
Wilkinson's commissioner of local government since January 1988. Wilkin- 
son decided on Patrick for the job because of his longtime involvement 
with the party (as former head of the Young Democrats), his willingness to 
make it a full-time job, and his popularity with state legislators and other 
public figures (such as Sen. Wendell Ford). Wilkinson appeared before the 
party's fifty-five-member central executive committee to recommend 
Patrick. 
Functions and Activities of the  Democratic State  Party 
T h e  responsibility for developing organizational strength, supporting local 
parties, raising funds, recruiting and assisting candidates, and registering 
and mobilizing voters rests in the state party organization. When a party 
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has controlled the governorship for the last two decades, the resources for 
carrying out these duties and rewarding party workers are plentiful. Are 
there some functions that individual party chairmen consider particularly 
important or that they give greater priority than in the past? We can draw 
some conclusions by focusing on the party organization during the admin- 
istrations of Collins and Wilkinson. 
Staf and Budget 
During Edward Coleman's term the permanent state headquarters' staff 
included six individuals; in addition to Coleman these included a quasi- 
executive director, an accountant, a computer specialist, Coleman's secre- 
tary, and a telephone receptionistJtypist. The  average monthly basic 
budget of approximately $30,000 covered not only salaries but building 
maintenance, computer costs, and miscellaneous expenses. 
During Wilkinson's administration the average monthly basic budget 
of party headquarters has remained at about $30,000. The  money is used 
for staff salaries, consulting fees, building maintenance, computer ex- 
penses, and travel in the state for the deputy political directors. Early in 
the administration the staff at headquarters included ten persons: the 
executive director, an accountant, three members of the political depart- 
ment, four support receptionists/secretaries, and a fund-raiser. After the 
1988 general election, the political department was disbanded in order to 
save money. 
Money Raising 
Kentucky has a tax check-off system for political parties. For each taxpayer 
who designates funds for a party, $1.50 is paid to that state party and 50 
cents is given to the local party. T h e  amount received by the state 
Democratic party from these funds fell from about $130,000 in 1983 to 
$93,000 in 1987. Legally the state party may use the funds for salaries and 
upkeep of state headquarters; they cannot be paid out to candidates. T h e  
proportion of taxpayers participating in the tax check-off has been dwin- 
dling (from 16 percent in 1977 to barely 5 percent in recent years), a decline 
that implies fading public interest in political parties (Goldstein, 1989). 
T h e  Democratic party has made an extensive, but apparently unsuc- 
cessful, effort to persuade more party activists to use the tax check-off. 
Every year Coleman contacted CPAs and other tax preparers, and the state 
party sent selected news articles about the check-off for every county 
newspaper and county party newsletters. 
A major responsibility of the state chairman, perhaps his biggest job, is 
to raise funds for the party. It is a never-ending task. Historically, Demo- 
cratic candidates and elected officials have been poor contributors to the 
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state party. A state chair has to raise money for the party and also for 
selected candidates (e.g., Terry Mann for Congress and targeted state 
legislative candidates in 1986). In addition to funds from the state tax 
check-off system, the state Democratic party has recently been getting 
about $50,000 to $60,000 yearly from the national party's Dollars for 
Democrats mass-mailing fund-raiser. T h e  chairman must raise funds 
through personal direct contact with numerous potential and current 
contributors across the state. In doing so, the chairman must compete with 
Democratic candidates who are raising funds for both the primary and the 
general election. 
Governor Brown started the Century Club with annual membership 
dues of$1,000. The  funds, which go to the state party, come from a couple 
of hundred members, mostly vendors with the state. There are two to 
three functions annually for Century Club members-usually a black tie 
party at the governor's mansion and an outing at Churchill Downs. Another 
annual fund-raiser is the Jefferson-Jackson Day Dinner. Usually around 
$150,000 is raised from the occasion. 
The  party is somewhat successful in maintaining a base of regular 
contributors. There is a master list maintained on the state party's com- 
puter. These lists are shared generally with statewide general election 
party candidates. The  lists are not shared with statewide candidates in the 
primary. 
Coleman also established another group of small contributors-the 
Grass Roots Club. Coleman's goal was not so much to obtain funds for the 
state party as to create an organization of ardent party-oriented workers 
who wanted to make some small financial contribution to their party. T h e  
Grass Roots Club is made up of party faithful who cannot afford to give 
large sums of money. Many of the members hold county executive com- 
mittee positions or precinct jobs. Membership in the Grass Roots Club is 
$15 for an individual or $25 for a family. The  state party holds pot luck 
picnics, by congressional districts, for the members, which Governor 
Collins attended faithfully during her term. During Coleman's term the 
Grass Roots Club had about four thousand to five thousand members. 
During the Wilkinson administration the state party headquarters has 
continued to use these fund-raising mechanisms. During his brief term as 
chairman, Lundergan hired Dale Emmons as a full-time fund-raiser; but 
Patrick, who succeeded him, has assumed most of the party fund-raising 
responsibilities. 
Relations with the NationaI Party 
T h e  state Democratic party has benefited from the increased assistance 
given by the national party to state party organizations, helping them to 
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professionalize their operations and providing services to Democratic 
party hopefuls at all levels. Because some state party organizations were 
unable to finance their own operations, the national party undertook 
national fund-raisers for states. These included Dollars for Democrats, a 
national mailing program, and a national phone bank to raise funds; the 
national party returned to the state parties almost 90 percent of the funds 
raised. T h e  national party also holds seminars for state administrators, 
field workers, and candidates on organizational and campaign techniques. 
For its part, state party headquarters assists national candidates when they 
come to Kentucky, particularly during presidential campaign years. 
Sewices to Candidates and Local Paflies 
Because of her experience in party organization and campaigns at the 
grass-roots level, Governor Collins supported Coleman's efforts to provide 
a broader range of services to party organizations and candidates at the 
county level. During Coleman's term the party invested $150,000 in a 
sophisticated Honeywell computer. Using the computer resources, Cole- 
man sought to upgrade and update the party's lists pertaining to registra- 
tion, voting, and campaign contributions and to make these available to 
candidates. Since most counties did not have headquarters or any com- 
puter resources, Coleman supplied lists or labels to the county party 
groups. A few counties had computer modems permitting direct access to 
the state party computer. T h e  headquarters' budget was increased sub- 
stantially because of his efforts to computerize the operation and assist a 
greater number of Democratic local, statewide, and national candidates. 
Of course, Coleman had to raise considerably more funds than his prede- 
cessors in order to pay for this expanded operation. 
During the Wilkinson administration the party continued to maintain 
sophisticated computer files: lists of contributors, county leaders, regis- 
tered voters, political activists, and frequent voters. However, the state 
party headquarters sold the large-scale computer purchased by Coleman 
during Collins's administration. T h e  new party leadership felt that it had 
become too expensive to maintain and required a skilled person to operate 
it. T h e  state organization began to rely on professiorial political vendors to 
provide the lists, labels, and phone numbers that it needed. 
Although the Democratic party held registration drives, particularly in 
presidential election years, this was not one of the higher priorities of the 
party headquarters during either the Collins or Wilkinson administration. 
Coleman was more interested in making maximum use of the com- 
puterized registration records available from the secretary of state's office, 
records that include the frequency of voting over a five-year period. 
Coleman purchased lists of telephone numbers for all voters from a Texas 
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phone bank company. Coleman wanted to identify the frequent voters and 
compile as much information as possible on this group. 
Public opinion polling has not normally been a function carried out by 
state party headquarters. Under Coleman's direction the party began 
conducting polls as part of the plan to aid legislative candidates in 1986 and . 
also in support of Terry Mann's unsuccessful congressional race that year. 
In 1987 the state headquarters conducted polls every two weeks a few 
months before the primary on the popularity of various statewide candi- 
dates running in the primary. After the results leaked out, Coleman 
received a lot of criticism for this policy, particularly from candidates who 
ranked low in the polls. Coleman believed that the party headquarters 
should gain experience in polling and that the information would be useful 
to primary candidates, particularly those who could not afford to conduct 
their own polls. T h e  party supplied all the Democratic candidates with 
information on their specific contests. During the Wilkinson administra- 
tion the state party has not run its own polls but has hired professional 
pollsters, who obviously have much more polling experience than the state 
party headquarters. 
During the Wilkinson administration the state party headquarters has 
tried to rebuild and revitalize local party organizations. Governor Wilkin- 
son was committed to rebuilding the party, starting at the precinct level. 
Kim Kearns, who had been trained in local organization by the legendary 
J.R. Miller, was particularly interested in party-building efforts at the local 
level. Early in Wilkinson's term his supporters, many of whom had never 
before been active in party politics, moved into positions of power in the 
county organizations. Some of them became very involved in the 1988 
legislative races, supporting candidates who were committed to Wilkin- 
son. Not all the people in the local organizations are Wilkinson people; in 
some counties there are combinations of Wilkinson supporters and others. 
In those eastern Kentucky counties where the parties are often frag- 
mented, the Wilkinson forces represent one of the factions and control 
state patronage. In most of the counties, however, the Wilkinson forces are 
firmly in control of the party organization. 
T h e  state party headquarters has worked closely with the governor's 
office in implementing his Capital to the Counties Program, under which 
Wilkinson makes two- or three-day trips to the different congressional 
districts with his entire cabinet. On the first night of each of these trips, 
there is a Democratic party function-Martha's Picnic-somewhere in the 
district. T h e  picnic is for the benefit of both the governor and the party. 
T h e  remaining part of the two-day program is spent meeting with inter- 
ested citizens, who attend office hours with the governor and his cabinet 
officials. 
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Legislative Races 
Edward Coleman developed and implemented a plan to help legislative 
candidates in some marginal seats-providing interns, polling help, and 
assistance in targeting key precincts in the district. Coleman gave priority 
to this program despite the rather large Democratic margin in the legis- 
lature and the fact that a large proportion of seats are safe for one party or 
the other. Coleman created the Campaign Coordinator Program, with 
Collins's wholehearted support, to ensure the party's continued domina- 
tion in the legislature with good, party-oriented legislators and to make 
legislators more responsive to the needs of the state party. 
In 1986 Coleman employed for the summer twenty-two political sci- 
ence student interns to assist in the state legislative races and also in Terry 
Mann's congressional race. Coleman met with the House and Senate 
leadership, and together they targeted incumbents who might be in 
trouble. They selected about eighteen races that they felt were critical. In 
half of these races, Democrats were challengers against incumbent Repub- 
licans or open seat contests. Coleman worked with other legislators and 
local county Democratic executive leaders to recruit the strongest candi- 
dates. The  student interns were given an intensive instructional training 
program under the auspices of a political scientistlprofessional consultant 
who had been holding yearly training seminars for candidates at all levels 
under Coleman. Along with the student interns, some of the legislative 
candidates and their staffers also attended the two-week briefings. T h e  
consultant tried to teach them how to run a successful campaign, how to 
use computer analyses about frequent voters and public opinion polls in 
their areas. In order to get assistance from the program, targeted candi- 
dates had to promise that they would conduct a door-to-door campaign. 
T h e  targeted candidates were given assistance with whatever they 
needed, such as designs for brochures, radio spots, and mass mailings. 
Using the state party computer and other hired student pollsters, they 
polled in the targeted legislative district areas in order to provide the 
candidates with valuable information for their races. Using targeting tech- 
niques, they were able to provide the candidates with past statistics 
(looking at frequent voters) on the most important precincts in their 
districts. Besides paying for the student interns, the state party was able to 
channel limited funds to some of the targeted legislative races. T h e  
Democrats won about 60 percent of the targeted races; some others they 
recognized were not winnable because incumbent Republicans were 
strong. 
A somewhat similar effort was made by Democratic headquarters in 
the 1988 legislative races, but it was focused on candidates who were strong 
supporters of Governor Wilkinson. The  headquarters' staff sought to 
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provide assistants to advise targeted electable candidates, helping them 
with advertising, pamphlet making, yard signs, speech writing, door-to- 
door skills, fund-raising, and use of direct mail. They also provided these 
candidates with statistical information about voters and public opinion in 
their districts. A special event was held to raise funds for these activities. In 
the 1988 legislative primary, Wilkinson did make some financial contribu- 
tions to incumbents. Wilkinson's county supporters did assist with candi- 
dates who were friends of the governor and the governor's loyal coterie. 
Patronage 
"Patronage is the currency of politics in Kentucky, and to be effective as a 
political leader the governor must spend it wisely" (Jewell and Cun- 
ningham, 1968: 43). One of the few certainties in a campaign for governor 
is that nobody wins without making commitments. Some are made on 
issues, but many involve some form of patronage. In Kentucky the basic 
types of patronage include traditional jobs, appointments to boards and 
commissions, and opportunities to do business with the state, or to avoid or 
influence regulation. Once a candidate wins the office of governor, he or 
she must respond to campaign contributors, and it is expected that the new 
governor will allot his or her patronage to friends and to those who helped 
get him or her elected. It is a traditional practice for a gubernatorial 
candidate to promise a prospective supporter a position or a contract in 
exchange for a campaign contribution, with greater or lesser specificity. 
The  description by Jewell and Cunningham (1968) of the structure of 
patronage more than two decades ago is still accurate: 
In each county the governor chooses a contact person (in some cases the county 
party chairman) for the administration. H e  or she is usually someone who sup- 
ported the governor actively during the primary, often as hislher campaign man- 
ager. He  or she is selected carefully and, once chosen, is rarely replaced during the 
administration except in the case of death or illness. Although county leaders may 
make suggestions, the choice is the governor's. T h e  administration communicates 
with the contact person on patronage matters, and he or she is its major source of 
information about developments in the county. There are others in each county 
who have access to the governor's office and state party headquarters, including 
the county chairmen, some county officeholders, and other individuals who have 
provided valuable support to the governor's organization. [pp. 42-43] 
T h e  role that the governor can play in patronage remains essentially 
the same as what was described in the previous study (Jewell and Cun- 
ningham, 1968): 
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Although there are many kinds of patronage available to the governor, his or her 
freedom in dispensing it has been steadily declining as a result of the merit system 
and state and national legislation restricting the use of governmental funds. As 
these resources have declined in sheer volume, however, the governor's effec- 
tiveness as a political leader has not declined. Even though the governor has less to 
offer, the favors that he can dispense continue to be valued by local politicians. A 
promise to conduct a feasibility study concerninga park may be worth as much as a 
promise to build a park a few years ago. The fact that these patronage resources are 
declining, however, makes it all the more important that they be expended with 
great care and skill. [pp. 44-45] 
Governor Ford began the practice of leaving most patronage decisions 
to the state party headquarters. Ford felt very strongly about moving most 
patronage from the governor's office, especially decisions involving local 
patronage. Ford remembered, with horror, the long patronage lines inside 
and outside the governor's office during the administrations of Combs, 
Breathitt, and others. Maintaining liaison with the leaders of 120 counties 
requires a vast amount of information about the personalities, rivalries, and 
recent political history of these counties. In contrast to earlier Democratic 
administrations, under Ford the state party headquarters became the 
major channel of communications between the state and county party 
organizations. County political leaders would bring their problems and 
their requests to J.R. Miller, and subsequently William Sullivan and 
executive director H.K. Taylor, who would confer with the governor's 
office. 
Personal service contracts were handled by the secretary of finance in 
coordination with Miller and Taylor at state party headquarters. T h e  final 
decisions generally lay with the finance executive; the party leaders had 
much input but not veto powers. Insurance patronage-the division of 
insurance premium income among insurance companies whose owners 
were supporters of the administration-was generally handled by the 
commissioner of insurance and state party headquarters. T h e  governor's 
office was kept informed through the insurance commissioner, who also 
served during Carroll's administration. 
Appointments to commissions and boards were usually coordinated by 
Miller and Taylor at party headquarters, William Wester in the governor's 
office, and the secretary of finance. Ford kept certain patronage functions 
primarily in the governor's office; for example, his political adviser, 
William Wester, handled most regulatory matters. 
As governor, Carroll maintained the Ford practice of leaving most 
questions of patronage to state party headquarters and chairman Sonny 
Hunt. Carroll persuaded the legislature to change the law to give the 
administration greater discretion in filling civil service jobs; it could choose 
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among the persons with the top five test scores (instead of the top three) in 
hiring. In practice it is cumbersome for a governor to hire someone because 
bureaucrats want to make their own choices; they will not publicize a job 
opening until a person has been found to fill it, giving that person a chance 
to take the exam before other potential replacements or the governor can 
react. To deal with this problem, Governor Carroll's office adopted a rule 
that vacancies had to remain open for thirty days, a change that opened up 
those jobs to patronage. T h e  bureaucratic system is not always easy for 
even a governor to master, particularly because of the limiting four-year 
gubernatorial term. Appointments were handled by Carroll's staff, which 
maintained "blue jackets" on each board or commission, showing vacan- 
cies and including letters recommending persons and a checklist of who 
was supporting whom. Carroll would go through this information himself 
and make the appointments. 
Much of the business patronage was handled in Democratic headquar- 
ters by Sonny Hunt. Carroll made it a rule not to engage in this area at all; 
he thought it was risky because of potential investigations. During the 
Carroll administration the Courie~Joumal (and particularly its top inves- 
tigative reporter, Livingston Taylor) was watching very closely for cases of 
abusing patronage and contracts in state government. Carroll was sensitive 
to this problem and tried to avoid talking to anyone who wanted to discuss 
doing business with the state, but he made exceptions for a few close 
friends who insisted on seeing him and tried to explain the limits of what 
he could do. Regulatory requests were often handled through the gover- 
nor's office. Examples of regulatory requests included a certificate of need 
for a hospital or an entrance way to be approved by the Highway Depart- 
ment. 
Fayette County provides a good illustration of how county patronage 
operated during Carroll's administration. T h e  two Fayette County contact 
men dealt with fewer daily problems and requests than contact people in 
other counties. Requests involving roads, sewers, and traffic lights were 
passed to the mayor's public works administrator. T h e  contact men told the 
natural resource officials in Frankfort, for example, that when Lexington's 
commissioner of public works asked for something it was as if they were 
making the request. Since small jobs were not of major importance in 
thriving Fayette County and since most Frankfort politicians considered 
themselves experts on Fayette County, the local contacts had little to do 
with jobs. From time to time, they would receive calls from Frankfort to 
find out if a potential appointee was loyal to the governor. T h e  contact men 
advised Frankfort on some personal service contracts, for example, for 
young lawyers, many of whom had walked precincts and made small 
contributions and the rest of whom, it was assumed, would help later. 
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Occasionally, the contact men would get a direct call about a job or 
project such as a traffic light and would pass it along with more or less 
enthusiasm, depending on the role a suitor had played in campaign work or 
in the local power structure. On government issues they would call the 
governor's office; on job patronage and contracts they would contact party 
headquarters. 
T h e  large contributors in Fayette County were usually interested not 
in jobs but rather in legislation, regulation, contracts, permits, or public 
improvements. But on occasion the relatives of contributors wanted to be 
janitors at the horse park or assistant director of an agency. The  contact 
men would give Sonny Hunt a list of job requests and an indication of 
priorities because there were always more applicants than openings. T h e  
county contact people did not participate in the process after sending the 
list to the party chairman. 
Lexington's acquisition of Triangle Park is a good example of a contact 
person's involvement in receiving a type of patronage for a metropolitan 
community. The  contact man received a call from a member of the Civic 
Center Board; the board member ran a company for a powerful community 
gatekeeper. T h e  board member told the contact person what the board 
wanted-a lot for parking to be purchased from the L & N Railroad to 
satisfy the Civic Center's bond requirements, so that the board could 
change a central triangle of land from paved parking to an open, planted 
park. T h e  Civic Center Board had learned that the contact man would play 
some role in the decision of the governor about providing the more than $4 
million that was needed. The  contact man met with the governor, before 
Carroll's meeting with a committee of the Civic Center Board, to discuss 
the members of the board and the economic strength they represented. 
T h e  committee representing the board made its presentation and an- 
swered some questions about needs and costs of the project. After a brief 
discussion the governor turned to the contact man and said, "Should we do 
it, Bobby?" T h e  contact man said yes. T h e  governor said, "Okay, let's do 
it," and the commitment to the project had been made. 
During Carroll's administration the insurance contracts were an open 
and important part of patronage. The  rapid escalation of the cost of 
insurance policies, especially the workers' compensation coverage of state 
employees, turned a small-scale patronage practice into a major scandal. 
For many years insurance agents who backed the winning candidate for 
governor got small shares of the state's insurance business. When court 
decisions, black-lung awards, and the burgeoning state payroll sent work- 
ers' compensation costs skyrocketing in the 1970s, the Ford and Carroll 
administrations created one big policy and issued it to one agency for 
dispersal. 
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"Suddenly, there was a huge pool of commission money to distribute 
to political allies." Since insurance licenses could be owned by companies 
not controlled by insurance experts, commissions could be paid to com- 
panies owned by friends and relatives who were not truly in the insurance 
business and who did not perform any real services. "During Carroll's 
1974-79 tenure, more than $85,000 in such commissions were dis- 
tributed." After a prolonged federal investigation of the Ford and Carroll 
administrations, it was the insurance scheme that was targeted in the 
prosecution of Sonny Hunt and two other persons: Charles J. McNally, a 
longtime friend of Hunt, and James E. Gray, cabinet secretary in the 
Carroll administration (C-4 July 5, 1987, p. Dl). 
Sonny Hunt pleaded guilty and went to prison for nearly two years 
because of his involvement with the insurance commission distributions. 
T h e  convictions of McNally and Gray were eventually overturned by the 
U.S. Supreme Court in McNally v. UnitedStata, which "rebuked federal 
prosecutors across the country for stretching the federal mail-fraud statute 
to the breaking point in trying to put allegedly crooked politicians and 
their pals behind bars" without a clear mandate spelled out in the statute. 
T h e  federal investigation did have impact on state policy: "There are now 
laws requiring that most state insurance policies be subject to competitive 
bidding" (C-J, July 5, 1987, p. Dl). 
Governor Brown's brand of patronage, "cronyismw-rewarding your 
friends-brought about stark changes in the dispersal of jobs, personal 
service contracts, and appointments to commissions and boards. T h e  
governor's cabinet secretaries and their departments were given wide 
discretion in regulatory matters and in the awarding of jobs and personal 
service contracts. There were county contact people, former local cam- 
paign chairs, but they were not generally used in making patronage 
decisions. Some cabinet secretaries were more involved than others in 
patronage matters. For example, Secretary of Transportation Frank Metz, 
Secretary of Human Resources Grady Stumbo, and Secretary of Finance 
George Atkins were powerful handlers of their respective departments' 
patronage. 
T h e  governor's office was directly involved in appointments to com- 
missions and boards. Brown and his inner circle of friends would consider 
lists (from department secretaries, state party headquarters, and others) of 
potential appointees that were coordinated by an assistant in the governor's 
office. Usually friends of the governor would be the recipients of the 
appointments. Sometimes appointments were made at the whim of the 
governor, such as a college acquaintance whom he recalled but who had no 
personal or political ties to the governor who was appointed to the Work- 
man Compensation Board. 
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During the Collins administration much of the patronage was handled 
by a group of four: Bill Collins, the governor's husband; Secretary of Public 
Protection Earl Wilson; Secretary of Finance Mac Thompson; and Secre- 
tary of Transportation Floyd Poore. These men met on a regular basis at 
the mansion to make strategic patronage decisions. Toward the end of her 
administration, due to adverse publicity and attacks in the press, Collins 
reduced the influence of this group, and Larry Hayes became more 
important in the dispersal of patronage. 
In chapter 8 we focus on the role of individual contributors in guber- 
natorial campaigns and provide several illustrations of how patronage in 
the form of jobs, personal service contracts, and appointments to boards 
and commissions was distributed to campaign contributors during the 
administration of Governor Collins. T h e  act of giving as a prerequisite for 
getting is traditionally and particularly prevalent in the case of architects, 
engineers, accountants, attorneys, and others who do business with the 
state under personal service contracts. 
During the Wilkinson administration much of the jobs patronage has 
been handled by a small coterie within the administration. Rogers Wells, 
the secretary of finance, and Dr. Floyd Poore, the public liaison for 
Wilkinson, direct the patronage operation, aided by the governor's 
nephew Bruce Wilkinson, the appointments secretary; David McNally, 
the chief of staff; and Carol Angel, the director of constituent services. 
State party chair Bill Patrick and executive director Kim Kearns participate 
in some county jobs and summer placement decisions. Of course, the final 
decision on all forms of patronage remains with Governor Wilkinson. T h e  
rule of thumb that governs any dispersal of patronage is "only take care of 
those people who supported Wilkinson in the gubernatorial primary." T h e  
patronage stipulation of 1987 primary support severely limited the poten- 
tial applicant pool and, according to many observers, lowered the quality of 
gubernatorial appointees. 
T h e  dispersal of personal service contracts has primarily been guided 
by Poore, Wells, John Kelly (assistant to Wells), and Milo Bryant, the 
secretary of transportation. Wells and Poore are the chief participants in 
dealing with regulatory matters. Bruce Wilkinson has major responsibility 
for appointments to commissions and boards, but these recommendations 
also are channeled through Wells and Poore. Since the governor is deeply 
involved in patronage appointments, decisions have been made slowly, 
and positions have often remained vacant for long periods of time. 
Local Party Organization 
During the late 1980s there has been a reasonably well-organized Demo- 
cratic party organization in at least two-thirds of the counties. There are 
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some noticeable gaps in the heavily Republican Fifth Congressional Dis- 
trict. T h e  real strength in each county is the executive party committee, 
and three to four members are the prominent leaders. Usually, the precinct 
committee people are an inactive group except for party reorganization 
purposes. A key figure in each county is the contact person, designated by 
the governor to handle patronage. We will focus on the local party organi- 
zations in Jefferson County and Fayette County and summarize some of 
the characteristics of rural organizations. 
According to Jewell and Cunningham (1968): 
At one time the "regular organization" in Jefferson County had achieved a degree 
of political control that was unmatched in the urban parties of Kentucky. The 
Jefferson County organization was built by Michael J. Brennan, who nurtured the 
party while it was out of power during the 1920s and developed it into an effective 
machine from 1933, when the Democrats captured office in Louisville, until his 
death in 1938. . . . After Brennan's death, the organization was dominated by the 
mayor of Louisville for several years. . . . From 1947 until the early 1960s the 
Jefferson organization was run by the triumvirate of McKay Reed, Mrs. Lennie 
McLaughlin, and John Crimmins. Mrs. McLaughlin (known as "Miss Lennie") 
was in charge of a highly efficient organization of loyal precinct workers. [pp. 
71-72] 
For many years the county executive committee endorsed candidates 
in state, legislative, county, and city races, a process in which Reed and 
McLaughlin played a very important part. Democratic precinct workers 
spread the word about endorsements to voters, frequently handing out 
sample ballots in the precincts and at the polls. T h e  organization had a 
nucleus of more than two thousand patronage employees who could be 
counted on to work on election day (Jewell and Cunningham, 1968: 73-74). 
In 1963 the party organization abandoned the practice of endorsing 
candidates in gubernatorial primaries; while the purpose was to maintain 
harmony in the party, the consequence was greater disunity, as precinct 
leaders worked for different candidates. After Breathitt's nomination and 
election, those local leaders who had supported him challenged the county 
leadership for control of the party. After Breathitt intervened, both sides 
agreed on a new chairman, Thomas Carroll, who was not tied to any local 
faction. In 1967 the Jefferson County organization united behind Henry 
Ward, Breathitt's candidate for governor. Despite Breathitt's efforts, the 
Jefferson County Democratic organization remained fragmented into at 
least five groups: old-line precinct workers, the new generation of political 
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amateurs, remnants of the Chandler-Waterfield faction, labor unions, and 
black political leaders (Jewel1 and Cunningham, 1968: 74-76). 
The  Jefferson County Democratic party of the 1980s has operated 
somewhat differently than in the past. There is the marked influence of 
the cooperative relationship between the mayor and county judge. There 
has been a proliferation of personal organizations-those of county of- 
ficials and legislators; the elected county officeholders, in particular, are 
able to develop independent fiefdoms. 
Since 1969 the Democrats in Jefferson County have had an open 
primary, that is the party organization has not made endorsements in the 
primaries. This practice, which occurred at the time when the Democrats 
regained control of the city and the county, has opened up the party and 
weakened organizational control. Although incumbents would prefer the 
endorsement system, the open system is here to stay and has allowed a 
strong group of political amateurs to gain entry into the party. 
Today there is a fairly strong and vigorous organization at the precinct 
and legislative district levels. It  is still important to have the personal 
support of the organization people. If these people are against a candidate 
in a primary contest, they can make it very difficult-particularly in the 
working-class areas. Although the importance of the media in metro- 
politan campaigns has grown dramatically in the last two decades, the 
organization is still a significant factor in Jefferson County in getting out 
the vote. A lot of organizational work is necessary in the Third District to 
generate large turnouts. 
T h e  Democratic party has been able to engender a high level of unity 
among its major elected officials. When Harvey Sloane was elected mayor 
in 1973, he was able to pull in only three aldermen with him, but in 1975, in 
midterm, he endorsed a whole slate that won. When Sloane became 
county judge executive in 1985, he was able to develop a close working 
relationship with the new Democratic mayor, Jerry Abramson, that con- 
tributed to greater unification in the county party. 
Candidates in Jefferson County, particularly the elected county of- 
ficials and some legislators, usually build their own campaign organization. 
In his first campaign for mayor, Sloane found that he had better success in 
those legislative districts where he had created his own organization of 
loyal workers than in those where he relied heavily on ward and precinct 
leaders. Gradually, he has integrated his own followers with the party 
organization. He picked up additional local supporters in his two unsuc- 
cessful runs for governor in 1979 and 1983. 
Patronage is less important to Democratic politics in Louisville and 
Jefferson County than it used to be. Neither the office of mayor nor that of 
the county judge executive controls large patronage resource's. Much of 
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the county patronage is controlled by other elected county officials. Today 
there are many limitations on exercising patronage, partly because of the 
merit system and influence of unions. Party leaders find they cannot get 
much political work out of their employees. To some extent this shortage 
of patronage workers does weaken the party. Patronage workers are said to 
be more committed in elections for city and county offices than for 
contests at other levels because they see that their jobs are at stake. But, 
according to Sloane, "I am not convinced that patronage workers are that 
effective." Enthusiastic, committed political workers are needed for suc- 
cessful campaigns. 
In recent years there has been more unity in the local Democratic 
party than was true when a rivalry existed between Mayor Sloane and 
county judge executive Todd Hollenbach. All of the major party officials 
and elected leaders, for example, have played a role in selecting the county 
party chairman. The  local organization worked effectively in recruiting 
legislative candidates in 1988, and they succeeded in having a strong group 
of candidates. 
Candidates for statewide office frequently seemed to be puzzled 
about how to campaign in Jefferson County because it is so large with its 
forty two legislative districts and because the party structure is strong and 
diverse. Individual officeholders in Jefferson County often act quite inde- 
pendently of each other in political matters. Statewide candidates do seek 
the support of the mayor and the county judge; it gives them some 
visibility, but the public leaders have been trying to minimize endorsing 
candidates. 
One political expert notes that Mayor Abramson's involvement in 
county party politics seems more subtle than that of the other of- 
ficeholders; yet he is the most popular figure in Jefferson County. In 1988 
the Louisville mayor became quite involved in the general election of 
several state legislative candidates and the presidential nominee Dukakis; 
he energetically walked the area tleighborhoods on behalf of Democratic 
candidates. 
Lexington 
Jewel1 and Cunningham (1968) described the Fayette County Democratic 
organization of the 1960s in the following terms: 
From the turn of the century until his death in 1937, Fayette County and Lex- 
ington had a political boss, William "Billy" Klair. . . . Within a few years after 
Klait's death, R.P. "Dick" Moloney became the dominant figure in Fayette Coun- 
ty, while he served the Clements, Wetherby, and Combs administrations as a 
highly effective legislative leader until his death in 1963. Today there is neither a 
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dominant Democratic leader nor a strong party organization in the county. The 
lower income precincts in the center of the city, which were the base of the Klair 
and Moloney organizations, have become heavily outnumbered by the suburban 
preci~lcts. State patronage has been handled by the administration's contact man, 
and county patronage is controlled by individual officeholders in the courthouse; a 
system of nonpartisan elections isolates the urban county from the Democratic 
party. The county executive committee lacks finances and patronage; it makes no 
endorsements in primary elections; and as a result, control of the committee is not 
hotly contested [except by the ruling state administration]. [pp. 76-77] 
T h e  Fayette County organization was even more fractionalized than the 
organization in Jefferson County. While the Chandler-Waterfield forces 
were strong enough to carry Fayette County in the gubernatorial primaries 
from 1955 through 1967, most of the party leaders and the formal party 
organization were allied with the Combs-Breathitt faction during the 
period from 1960 to 1967, and several leaders served in those administra- 
tions (Jewell and Cunningham, 1968: 77). 
Although factionalism has faded away, the Fayette County Democratic 
party in the 1970s and 1980s has been more of a holding company for 
individual politicians than a powerful or cohesive organization; the organi- 
zation has lacked a real function. Party loyalties are not of major impor- 
tance to voters; many Democrats vote Republican, especially in con- 
gressional and presidential elections. T h e  formal party structure is much 
less important than in Jefferson County. T h e  precinct leaders and those 
who chair the legislative districts do not wield power by endorsing candi- 
dates in primaries. Job patronage is a less important factor in the Fayette 
County organization than in most counties, because the local economy is 
strong and incomes are relatively high. 
T h e  local officeholders all control some patronage from their own 
centers of power-the sheriff, circuit clerk, and county clerk; but they are 
not a strong part of the Democratic party organization, as they are in the 
smaller rural counties. Democratic members of the state legislature build 
their own personal organizations of workers. T h e  long-term practice of 
nonpartisan city elections decentralized political power; and the merger of 
Lexington and Fayette County, with nonpartisan elections, eliminated the 
partisan elections to the fiscal court and stripped the county judge of his 
power. As a consequence of these factors, many local public officials in 
Fayette County who are Democrats play no active role in the county 
Democratic party. For example, according to some local party members, 
Mayor Scotty Baesler (a longtime Democrat) often appears quite distant 
and disengaged from the local party apparatus. 
School board politics has not been associated with the Fayette Demo- 
Democratic Pany Organization 37 
cratic party organization in recent years, contrary to the pattern in many 
other counties where the school superintendent is a key Democratic 
politician. For example, most people do not even know to what party 
either former superintendent Guy Potts or present superintendent Ronald 
Walton belongs. 
T h e  l~cal~or~anization has tended to be manned by people who are 
really interested in Democratic party politics; of course, they relish the 
fruits of patronage too. For the most part, many of the active Fayette 
County party leaders under Ford, Carroll, and Collins were longtime 
committed Democrats. T h e  Fayette chairmanship has traditionally been 
controlled by the governor. Under Governor Ford, Don Webb, a young 
lawyer from an eastern Kentucky political family, was selected county 
chairman; Webb later became a millionaire business leader. During Car- 
roll's administration cattle farmer Mike Molloy ran the party apparatus as 
an avocation. Political activist Ree Caribou, who was originally brought 
into the organization by Molloy, joined because of Democratic loyalties; 
she was later chosen to run the Fayette organization by Governor Brown, a 
close family friend. During Brown's administration Caribou's husband, 
Lou, served as commissioner of parks, and she was employed by state 
party headquarters in Frankfort. Under Collins the county chair was Don 
Wallace, an architect and real estate developer, who believed in limited 
levels of party organization. When he took office, Wallace had already 
been involved in Fayette politics for some time. He had been one of the 
loyal troops-organizing precincts and contributing and raising funds. 
When Wallace Wilkinson took office, he selected a new county chair- 
man: George Ewen, who had been an ardent Wilkinson supporter in the 
primary and also a member of county attorney Norrie Wake's team. T h e  
Fayette County organization was reorganized with members loyal to 
Wilkinson. Members of the party committee who had supported Lex- 
ingtonian Steve Beshear in the primary were not reelected. T h e  party has a 
headquarters in property owned by Wilkinson and has a part-time secre- 
tary. T h e  meager budget to maintain a party headquarters is financed with 
an annual dinner honoring deserving party workers. 
An Assessment of Democratic Party Organization 
T h e  Kentucky Democratic party organization is no longer divided into 
factions, but it is still dominated by the governor. T h e  nomination of a new 
governor results almost instantly in the reorganization of state Democratic 
headquarters. Because governors serve only one term and because they 
frequently change chairmen one or more times during a term, there is very 
little continuity in leadership of the state Democratic organization. Few of 
the chairmen in recent years have been major political leaders, and few of 
them have stayed in office long enough to have any significant impact on 
the party organization. 
Recent governors have differed in the interest they have shown in 
party affairs. Governors like Ford, Carroll, and Collins have devoted some 
time and attention to party-building activities, including raising funds and 
providing assistance to the party's candidates and to county organizations. 
In contrast, Governor Brown had no interest in strengthening the party 
organization or making use of its resources. 
When the Democratic party was divided into factions, a major task 
facing any new governor was to gain control of the state organization and to 
help his supporters control local party organizations, a task that was 
occasionally difficult, as Chandler discovered in 1956. Most recent gover- 
nors have been able to assume control without any difficulty. Governor 
Wilkinson, who had been an outsider in Democratic politics, has followed 
a strategy reminiscent of factional governors, trying with considerable 
success to place his supporters in complete control of state and county 
organizations and to eliminate those Democrats who had supported other 
candidates in the primary. 
When John Y. Brown took office in 1979, there was some reason to 
believe that the governor's role in patronage would decline in importance. 
Brown's immediate predecessor, Julian Carroll, had been severely dam- 
aged by mistakes made by his administration and his party chairman in the 
handling of patronage. Brown was committed to "running government like 
a business," a policy that seemed incompatible with patronage. But, after 
a four-year hiatus, Governor Collins restored most of the traditional pa- 
tronage practices. And Wallace Wilkinson, despite his business back- 
ground, has continued these practices. Some governors, such as Ford and 
Carroll, have preferred to have patronage matters (particularly jobs) han- 
dled primarily at state party headquarters while others, such as Wilkinson, 
have assigned these chores largely to state officials. It does not seem to 
matter much where the work is done. The  significant variable is the 
governor's attitude toward, and direct interest in, patronage. 
Though the party organization may play a role in administering pa- 
tronage, the system is not designed to strengthen the organization itself 
but to reward those who have supported the Democratic gubernatorial 
nominee. Increasingly, that support is measured more by financial contri- 
butions than by organizational work. Those who are rewarded are less 
often the loyal political activists and more often the major contributors of 
campaign funds, because modern campaigns are more dependent on 
expensive media advertising than on local organization. The  nature of 
patronage has changed. Low-paying state jobs (highway crews and sum- 
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mer jobs in parks) are less important because they are limited in number 
and because they are, of course, unattractive to major financial contrib- 
utors. Of greater importance are appointments to major positions in the 
executive branch and various boards and commissions (such as university 
boards of trustees) because these do interest major contributors. Despite 
the restrictions in state and federal laws (such as requirements for open 
bidding on state jobs), many of those making campaign contributions do so 
in an effort to gain an advantage, or at least to ensure they will be 
considered, when their firms seek to do business with the state. We will 
examine the link between this form of patronage and financial contribu- 
tions in greater detail in chapter 8. 
The various changes in the Democratic party have loosened the 
linkages between the state organization and the organization in major 
urban counties such as Jefferson and Fayette. With the demise of fac- 
tionalism, there is less reason for a governor to take an interest in the party 
organization of those counties, although this continues to be the pattern in 
Fayette County. The  nature of patronage has also affected these counties. 
Residents of Jefferson and Fayette seeking rewards in Frankfort are not so 
much the party activists as the wealthy business and professional persons, 
who may not play any role in the local party organization. 
DEMOCRATIC 
GUBERNATORIAL PRIMARIES, 
PAST AND PRESENT 
OVER A forty-year period, from 1947 through 1987, with only one excep- 
tion, the winner of the Democratic primary has been elected governor. For 
that reason the most interesting and important state political battles have 
been fought in the Democratic party. From the mid-1930s to the late 1960s, 
Kentucky politics was dominated by two factions, named after their 
dominant leaders, Earle C. Clements and A.B. "Happy" Chandler. Since 
1971, however, these factions have faded away, to be replaced by a shifting 
pattern of personal alliances. At the same time, strategy for winning a 
primary election has changed, with local organizations declining in impor- 
tance and the mass media-particularly television advertising-becoming 
central to the campaigns. 
Traditional Democratic Factionalism 
T h e  term factionalism has often been used to describe Democratic politics 
in southern and border states, since V.O. Key, Jr., called attention to its 
importance in his study of Soathem Politics (1949). Key classified southern 
Democratic parties and primaries into three groups: multifactional, bifac- 
tional, and unifactional. Because the term is often used loosely, we will 
define exactly what we mean by a bifactional system. 
T h e  bifactional system in the Kentucky Democratic party from 1935 
through 1967, as it applied to the gubernatorial primary, had the following 
characteristics: (1) There were usually only two serious candidates in the 
primary, and the winner seldom had much more than half of the vote. 
(This was a prerequisite established by Key in defining a bifactional 
system.) (2) T h e  winner of the primary was always a candidate identified 
with either the Clements or Chandler faction, though there was not always 
a direct conflict between these two factions in the primary. (3) T h e  
governor (who could not succeed himself) usually tried to dictate the 
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Table 1. Outcome of Democratic Gubernatorial Primaries 
Number of Candidates Percentage of Vote Received 
With 5% or Winning Top two 
Year Total more of vote candidate candidates 
1935 5 3 45.1 87.2 
1935' 2 2 52.7 100.0 
1939 4 2 52.5 98.3 
1943 4 3 53.6 85.6 
1947 3 2 54.9 98.3 
195 1 3 2 75.1 97.1 
1955 3 2 51.4 99.2 
1959 4 2 52.3 98.6 
1963 4 2 53.8 97.0 
1967 10 3 52.2 80.4 
'Runoff election 
choice of his successor. (4) There were alliances between the leaders of 
statewide factions and local factions that existed in many of the county 
Democratic organizations. (5) There is limited and inconsistent evidence 
about whether significant numbers of voters had a continuity loyalty to one 
or another of the factions and its leaders. In the absence of survey data on 
voters, this possibility must be measured by county-level aggregate voting 
data. 
If we examine the nine gubernatorial primaries from 1935 through 1967 
(table I), we find that nearly all of them meet the criteria for bifactionalism 
defined by YO. Key, Jr. In 1935 (but not thereafter) the law provided for a 
runoff election, and this helps to explain the larger number of candidates 
in that election. In 1951 Lawrence Wetherby was running as the incumbent 
(having succeeded Clements when he became senator), and this helps to 
explain why he had no serious challenger. T h e  1967 primary was an 
aberration because it had so many candidates, at least three of whom were 
major and two of whom (Chandler and Waterfield) were associated with 
the same faction. 
T h e  modern Democratic factions had their origin in the administra- 
tion of Gov. Ruby Laffoon (1931-35) (table 2). Laffoon, of Madisonville, 
and Tom Rhea, of Russellville, had built a factional organization, primarily 
in western Kentucky, that was strong enough to get Laffoon elected in 
1931; and Laffoon supported Rhea for the gubernatorial nomination in 
1935. But Rhea was challenged by the lieutenant governor, A.B. Chandler, 
who criticized the Laffoon administration for its efforts to adopt a sales tax. 
Earle Clements served in the Laffoon administration and was Rhea's 
campaign manager in the 1935 race against Chandler. 
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Table 2. The Pattern of Factionalism in Democratic Gubernatorial Primaries 
Clements-Combs Other major 
Year faction Chandler faction candidates 
1935 Tom Rhea A.B. CHANDLER 
1939 John Y. Brown, Sr. KEEN JOHNSON 
1943 LYTER DONALDSON Ben Kilgore 
(lost election) 
1947 EARLE CLEMENTS Harry Lee Waterfield 
195 1 LAWRENCE WETHERBY 
1955 Bert Combs A.B. CHANDLER 
1959 BERT COMBS Harry Lee Waterfield 
1963 NED BREATHITT A. B. Chandler 
1967 HENRY WARD A.B. Chandler Harry Lee Waterfield 
(lost election) 
1971 WENDELL FORD 
Bert Combs 
Note: Winners are capitalized. 
Before 1935 the direct primary was optional under state law, and the 
administration's plan was to win the nomination for Rhea in a state conven- 
tion, which it expected to be able to control. But a number of Democratic 
leaders favored a primary, and Lieutenant Governor Chandler found a way 
to bring it about. When Governor Laffoon left on a trip to Washington, 
Chandler waited for word that the train had actually left the state and then 
called a special legislative session to adopt a compulsory primary law. 
Laffoon hurried back and tried to cancel the call but was overruled by the 
courts. T h e  legislature adopted the compulsory primary, and it took effect 
in the 1935 election. T h e  Laffoon forces were able to amend the primary 
bill to require a runoff if no candidate won a majority, but the strategy 
backfired. Chandler was a close second in the primary and won the runoff; 
subsequently, he persuaded the legislature to end the runoff feature. 
In 1938 Chandler lost a highly publicized primary campaign to unseat 
Sen. Alben Barkley; but when the other senator (Marvin Logan) died the 
next year, Chandler resigned and was appointed to the Senate by Keen 
Johnson, who succeeded him as governor. In the 1939 primary Keen 
Johnson had the advantage of incumbency and the support of the 
Chandler faction; these enabled him to defeat John Y. Brown, Sr., who had 
the support of both Earle Clements and the Rhea organization. Johnson's 
choice as his successor, Lyter Donaldson, had little difficulty being nomi- 
nated in 1943 but was defeated by a Republican in the general election. 
Chandler had been elected to the Senate in 1940 and to a full term in 1942, 
but in 1945 he resigned to become baseball commissioner. 
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Donaldson's defeat and Chandler's shift from politics to baseball ap- 
peared to spell an end to the Chandler faction and created a vacuum in 
Kentucky politics. Earle Clements emerged to fill that vacuum. He  had 
been elected to the state Senate in 1941 and to the U.S. House in 1944 and 
had built a strong organization in western Kentucky that had some of its 
roots in the Rhea-Laffoon organization. In 1947 he forged an alliance with 
the Jefferson County organization and won the gubernatorial nomination, 
defeating Harry Lee Waterfield, another western candidate who at that 
point was not directly linked to either of the factions. 
In 1950 Clements won election to the U.S. Senate and was succeeded 
by Lt. Gov. Lawrence Wetherby, whose political base was in Jefferson 
County. In 1951 Wetherby was nominated to a full term by a lopsided 
majority. Clements continued to play a vigorous and skillful role in Ken- 
tucky politics from Washington, and it appeared that the Clements- 
Wetherby faction was in command. 
But Happy Chandler reappeared on the scene. When his term as 
baseball commissioner ended in 1951, he returned to Kentucky and began 
to rebuild his political career. He  remained strong in central Kentucky, and 
he forged an alliance with Harry Lee Waterfield, who remained popular in 
the western counties. In 1955 Clements selected a relatively obscure state 
judge, Bert Combs, to run for governor. Chandler, with Waterfield as his 
running mate, waged a vigorous personal campaign and narrowly defeated 
Combs. 
T h e  Clements-Chandler conflict rose to new heights of intensity in 
1956, when Clements and Wetherby refused to turn over control of the 
Democratic party organization to Governor Chandler. Clements won re- 
nomination to the Senate over a candidate supported by Chandler. T h e  
Democratic state central executive committee nominated Wetherby as the 
candidate to run for the Senate seat of Alben Barkley, who had died 
suddenly. In the summer of 1956, thousands of voters met in county 
conventions all over the state to choose delegates to a state convention, 
where (after much dispute and battles over credentials) Chandler forces 
won control of the party. When both Clements and Wetherby were defeat- 
ed by Republicans in November, they blamed Chandler for failing to 
support them. 
Four years later, in 1959, Chandler threw his support to Harry Lee 
Waterfield as the gubernatorial nominee. There were two potentially 
strong challengers to Waterfield: Bert Combs and former Louisville mayor 
Wilson Wyatt. After prolonged negotiations, Earle Clements persuaded 
Combs and Wyatt to run as a team: Combs for governor and Wyatt for 
lieutenant governor. Combs and Wyatt were nominated and elected, and 
Clements appeared to be in control once again. Clements was appointed 
44 Political Parties d Primaries 
highway commissioner in the Combs administration, but a serious split 
developed between the two men, Clements resigned, and Bert Combs 
became the de facto leader of the faction. 
In 1963 Combs selected Ned Breathitt, a former legislator and mem- 
ber of his cabinet, as his choice for governor. He  was challenged by Happy 
Chandler, who once again had Waterfield as his running mate. Although 
Breathitt was widely perceived as the underdog, he defeated Chandler. 
Combs was highly popular in eastern Kentucky, had firm support from the 
Jefferson County organization, and was able to win broad support from 
younger, liberal voters without factional loyalties; Breathitt, in turn, had 
strength in western Kentucky. Despite Chandler's defeat, Waterfield was 
elected lieutenant governor and fought unsuccessfully to win control of 
the Senate. 
In 1967 Breathitt picked Henry Ward as his choice to run for governor. 
Ward was a highly respected administrator, who had been highway com- 
missioner during much of the Combs and Breathitt administrations, 
though he was not a particularly effective campaigner. Both Chandler and 
Waterfield sought the gubernatorial nomination, along with two other 
serious candidates and five minor ones. The  primary appeared to be an 
enormous victory for the Combs-Breathitt-Ward forces; Ward gained an 
absolute majority, Chandler had only 28 percent, and Waterfield less than 
11 percent. But in the fall election Ward was defeated by Republican Louie 
Nunn, who had the open support of Happy Chandler. 
T h e  1971 primary marked the end of the traditional Democratic 
factions. Bert Combs, who had been serving as a federal judge, resigned 
and returned to the campaign trail as a candidate for governor. He hoped to 
rebuild the old organization that had been so successful for him and for 
Breathitt. But Wendell Ford, elected lieutenant governor in 1967, had 
taken control of the party machinery and was building his own political 
organization, utilizing many of the skills that he had learned in the 
Clements-Combs organization. Ford had been a top aide to Governor 
Combs and had been elected to the senate in 1965 with the endorsement of 
Governor Breathitt. In short, the battle for the 1971 gubernatorial nomina- 
tion took place within the Clements-Combs faction, and it was won by 
Wendell Ford. There was no Chandler-faction candidate in the primary, 
although Chandler ran a highly unsuccessful campaign (winning 4 percent 
of the vote) as an independent in the general election. 
This capsule history of Democratic factional politics over a third of a 
century simplifies what was actually a complex pattern of shifting alliances 
among political leaders. While we have concentrated on gubernatorial 
politics, other battles were fought out over congressional and other offices. 
Clements and Chandler were the most prominent and enduring politicians 
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of their generation, and gradually their names became attached to the two 
major factions in the Democratic party. But it would be a mistake to 
assume that most state politicians remained attached to a single faction 
throughout their political careers. 
A few examples will illustrate the fluidity of factional Democratic 
politics. Keen Johnson had been elected lieutenant governor in 1935 on 
the Tom Rhea slate but ran for a full gubernatorial term with the support of 
Chandler forces. His opponent in 1939, John Y. Brown, had the support of 
Rhea and Clements but at other times ran for high office as an indepen- 
dent. Lyter Donaldson, picked by Keen Johnson to succeed him in 1943, 
had been associated with Rhea and had Clements's support when he ran 
for governor. Clements and Waterfield had been allies for some time 
before they ran against each other in 1947, long before Waterfield became 
associated with Chandler. Chandler supported Clements in his bid for 
governor in 1947. Although the Clements-Chandler rivalry reached its 
most intensive level from 1955 through 1959, Clements broke with Combs 
and actually supported Chandler in the 1967 race. 
Kentucky politics from the 1930s to the mid-1960s was not only 
bifactional but also highly personal. There were a relatively small number 
of politicians who operated at the state level and who remained prominent 
in politics for remarkably long periods of time. Chandler's last run for 
governor in 1971, for example, occurred forty years after he was elected 
lieutenant governor; and he was still endorsing gubernatorial candidates in 
the 1987 primary. Clements was a major figure in state politics for about 
forty years. Waterfield's first and last campaigns for governor were twenty 
years apart. 
These and the other major political leaders developed their political 
strength first at the county level and then became significant players in the 
state Democratic game. They became experts in the art of political 
maneuvering, in cutting deals in the traditional "smoke-filled rooms." 
When an ambitious politician undertook a run for the gubernatorial nomi- 
nation, he did not begin by barnstorming across the state or hiring a media 
expert to develop sophisticated advertisements. He started out by trying 
to mobilize support from state and local political leaders. There were 
usually only two major candidates running in the gubernatorial primary, 
partly because of the strength of bifactional loyalties, but also partly 
because candidates seemed reluctant to stay in the race unless they would 
win commitments from a significant proportion of the state's political 
brokers. 
Chandler's strength as a factional leader was his personal style as a 
campaigner, his lively oratory, his folksy manner, his legendary memory 
for names and faces, and his skill in grabbingonto issues-such as the sales 
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tax-that would have popular appeal. His political strength in the primar- 
ies from 1955 through 1963 was also based heavily on his alliance with 
Harry Lee Waterfield. 
Clements's political strength was based very heavily on his skill as an 
organizer. He was never a skillful orator and would hardly be described by 
anyone as folksy, but he was a man of great determination and loved to 
build organizations and exercise power. From 1947 to 1960 he had main- 
tained more control over the Democratic primary game than anyone else. 
After eight years of the Clements and Wetherby administrations, it was 
Clements alone who determined that Combs would inherit the mantle. 
For the first few months of the Chandler administration, he actually 
prevented Chandler from gaining control of the party machinery, and he 
almost succeeded in renewing his power at the 1956 state convention. In 
1959 it was Clements who mediated the Combs-Wyatt rivalry and decided 
that Combs would head the ticket and Wyatt would take second place. 
The  Combs and Breathitt administrations (1959-67) served as a transi- 
tion from the traditional factional system to a newer style of politics. 
Combs was initially elected with the support of the Clements administra- 
tion and during his term demonstrated mastery in negotiations with local 
political leaders, particularly in the eastern counties. But Clements re- 
signed as highway commissioner during the first year, leaving Combs fully 
in command of the administration and ushering in a new Combs faction. 
Combs was able to enlist supporters on the basis of his programs: edu- 
cators, union members, liberals and reformers, and many residents of the 
larger metropolitan areas-activists who did not have strong loyalties to 
the traditional factions. Breathitt relied less on the traditional factions than 
on modem media techniques to win the nomination over Chandler and 
then won a narrow victory in the November election. T h e  Breathitt 
administration continued the programmatic thrust of the Combs adminis- 
tration, while developing new programs for civil rights and the regulation 
of strip mining (Pearce, 1987). 
Tip  O'Neill, the former Speaker of the U.S. House, was fond of 
saying, "All politics is local." Though he was speaking from a lifetime of 
experience in a very different state, his conclusion is applicable to Ken- 
tucky. As we have said, politicians who operated at the state level got their 
start and maintained a base of support in the county. Moreover, for 
factional leaders and candidates to win gubernatorial primaries, they had 
to have local organizational support. They often gained that support by 
developing alliances with local politicians, particularly in those counties 
where local factions prevailed. 
A study of county Democratic organizations (Jewel1 and Cunningham, 
1968) carried out in the mid-1960s concluded that "most county organiza- 
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tions are characterized by factions clearly recognizable by those familiar 
with politics in the county" (p. 47). A sample of forty counties was 
examined in some detail. In almost half of the counties, there were local 
factions that were oriented toward state rather than courthouse politics. 
Some of these were counties where Democratic officeholders stayed out of 
state factional conflicts, and others had only Republican officeholders. In 
about one-third of the counties (primarily Democratic and marginal ones), 
there were two distinct factions that played a part in both state-level and 
courthouse politics. There were a small number of counties having court- 
house factions with few if any ties to state factions, and there were a few 
counties dominated by a single faction that might be allied with one of the 
other state factions. It should be noted that in some eastern counties, 
characterized by large extended families, factions were often based in part 
on family ties. 
The variety of local factional politics and the sheer numbers of local 
political leaders made it difficult for state factional leaders to maintain 
strong links with local organizations; and over a period of time there were 
often shifting alliances between the state and local level. But the linkages 
between state and local factions helped to maintain factionalism at both 
levels. Because the state Democratic party was divided into two factions, 
local politicians competing for patronage or other benefits from state 
leaders were likely to be rivals at the local level. T h e  existence of local 
factions forced candidates for statewide office to choose sides in recruiting 
local supporters. They were dependent on local leaders to provide organi- 
zational help, manpower, and voting cues to voters in state primaries. 
In those counties where the leading faction had a stable alliance with a 
state faction, the organization was often able to provide consistent major- 
ities for the candidates endorsed by the state faction. This, of course, 
enhanced the bargaining power of local leaders in dealing with state 
leaders. It also created the impression of stability in state factional align- 
ments. In reality, the linkages between state and local factional leaders 
were not highly stable over a period of several elections in many counties. 
The  linkages of state and local factions also affected slating for state- 
wide office. During the period when the traditional factions were strong- 
est, the gubernatorial candidates often endorsed a slate of candidates for 
some or all of the other statewide offices. The  slate of candidates some- 
times campaigned together, and the slate was identified in some news- 
paper stories and advertising; but it is not evident that many voters were 
familiar with the makeup of slates except for the pairing of candidates for 
governor and lieutenant governor. The  effectiveness of statewide slating 
depended almost entirely on the willingness of county leaders allied with 
the state faction to endorse the same slate of candidates and work for it in 
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the campaign. Frequently, the county leaders made changes in the slate, 
particularly if they believed that other candidates were more popular in the 
county (Jewell and Cunningham, 1968: chap. 4). 
It is impossible to measure accurately how much effect slating had on 
the voters. Rarely did an entire slate of candidates win nomination, and 
there were several cases of candidates for governor and lieutenant governor 
from opposing slates being nominated, including Breathitt-Waterfield in 
1963 and Ford-Carroll in 1971. At the county level, if a candidate who was 
dropped from the slate ran poorly, that could not be attributed to nonslat- 
ing because the local popularity of another candidate was usually the 
reason for nonslating. 
T h e  most interesting question about the traditional Democratic fac- 
tions, and the most difficult to answer, is whether significant numbers of 
voters during this period had long-term loyalties to factions or factional 
leaders, comparable to the loyalties that many voters have toward political 
parties. To answer this question with any precision, we would need survey 
data on the voters' perceptions of, and attitude toward, the factions and 
also panel survey data to determine whether voters actually voted for 
candidates of the same faction over a period of several elections. In reality, 
we have absolutely no survey data on voting behavior in Democratic 
gubernatorial primaries during the period when the factions were strong. 
By examining county-level aggregate voting returns for a series of 
elections,we can determine whether a majority of voters in some counties 
consistently voted for candidates of the same faction. If this proved to be 
true, it would suggest that the local organizations allied to the faction were 
consistent and effective in delivering votes. It would not prove what 
percentage of voters were consistent in voting for the same faction over 
time. Even if the majorities for one faction were so strong as to suggest that 
many voters were voting consistently, we could not tell what their reasons 
were. Some voters might simply be following the advice of the local 
organizations, some might be voting regularly for a candidate-such as 
Chandler-without being conscious of factionalism, while some others 
might be deliberately supporting those candidates they identified with a 
faction. 
A previous study (Jewell and Cunningham, 1968: 138-47) measured 
the voting patterns in counties for the three gubernatorial elections 
(1955-63) in which there was a clear choice between candidates of the two 
factions, as well as the 1967 race, in which Ward, representing one faction, 
and Chandler and Waterfield, representing the other, all ran for governor. 
(For the purpose of this analysis, we combined the Chandler and Water- 
field votes in 1967.) Out of a total of 120 counties, there were 25 won by the 
Clements-Combs candidate in all four elections; there were 28 counties 
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won by the Chandler candidate in three races, and in 12 of these the 
combined Chandler-Waterfield vote had a plurality in 1967. In other 
words, there were 53 relatively consistent counties out of 120. Most of the 
consistent Clements-Combs counties were found in eastern Kentucky, but 
there were a few in Western Kentucky, and Jefferson was in this category. 
T h e  counties won by the Chandler-Waterfield coalition in at least the first 
three elections were mostly in the Bluegrass and southcentral areas. 
A closer examination of county voting patterns (including some non- 
gubernatorial contests), however, suggests that there was more consistency 
of voting for individual candidates than for factions. Most of the counties 
where Chandler won the most consistent support were in or near the 
Bluegrass area. Waterfield was strongest in the far west (his home base) 
and in some southcentral counties. T h e  counties carried by the Chandler 
and Waterfieid faction in the 1955-63 primaries were largely a combination 
of the ones where each was strong. There was suprisingly little continuity 
between the counties where Clements ran strong for governor or senator 
and those where Combs and Breathitt were strongest. There was even 
very little overlap between Combs's race for governor in 1955 and Clem- 
ents's race for the Senate the next year. Clements ran best in parts of 
western Kentucky, and Combs ran best in eastern Kentucky. 
V.O. Key, Jr. (1949), in his examination of southern primaries, con- 
trasted bifactionai patterns with what he called "friends and neighbors" 
voting: the tendency of voters to support the candidates who came from 
their own or nearby counties. T h e  county-level voting patterns in Ken- 
tucky Democratic primaries appear to reflect a combination of friends- 
and-neighbors and factional voting. Candidates were likely to get the 
largest share of votes in counties close to home; they often won a plurality 
of the vote in which their factional partners were strong; and they picked 
up additional strength in counties that had a strong local organization with 
which they had been able to establish an alliance. 
Democratic Registration and Turnout in Primary Elections 
To understand patterns of turnout in Democratic primaries, we must first 
examine patterns of partisan registration. In recent years approximately 
two-thirds of registered voters have been Democrats. In the last four 
gubernatorial years, 1975-87, the proportion of Democratic registration 
was remarkably stable: 67.3, 68.8, 68.8, and 68.3. 
But there is great disparity in party registration from one part of 
Kentucky to another. In 1987 there were 34 counties, mostly in western 
Kentucky, in which the Democratic proportion of registration was 90 
percent or higher (ranging as high as 98 percent in Elliott County) (table 3). 
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Table 3. Democratic Patterns of Registration and Turnout 
in 1987 Gubernatorial Primary 
Dem. prim. Dem. prim. Total Dem. Total Dem. Dem. gen. vote as vote as % of 
regis. prim. vote elect. vote Counties % of Dem. Dem. gen. 
- 
(N) (OOOs) (%) (000s) (%) (000s) (%) regis. elect. vote 
Jefferson 
69% Dem. 
regis. 230 17.6 108 17.1 77 15.0 47.0 141.7 
Fayette 67% 
Dem. regis. 52 4.0 34 5.3 22 4.3 64.5 155.1 
Campbell & 
Kenton 68% 
Dem. regis. 64 4.9 23 3.7 32 6.3 36.6 73.5 
Major metro 
69% Dem. 
regis. 347 26.4 167 26.3 130 25.6 48.0 128.0 
Dem. regis. 
over 90% 
(34) 250 19.0 137 21.6 85 16.7 57.7 161.0 
Dem. regis. 
80-89% 
(24) 299 22.7 146 23.0 106 20.7 48.8 138.2 
Dem. regis. 
50-79% (29) 326 24.8 146 23.0 123 24.1 44.7 118.7 
Dem. regis. 
under 50% 
(29) 94 7.1 39 6.2 66 12.9 42.1 60.1 
Source: Calculated from data compiled by the State Board of Elections. 
There were 24 others with Democratic registration in the 80 to 89 percent 
range. At the other extreme, there were 29 counties with less than 50 
percent Democratic registration (dropping as low as 14 percent in Jackson 
County). In the middle are 29 counties in the 50 to 79 percent Democratic 
range, in addition to the four major metropolitan counties (Jefferson, 
Fayette, Campbell, and Kenton), which range from 65 to 70 percent 
Democratic. 
Over 40 percent of the total Democratic registration is found in the 
overwhelmingly Democratic counties (80 to 98 percent); half is in the 
moderately Democratic counties (50 to 79 percent); and only 7 percent is 
in the counties with a majority of Republican registrants (table 3). 
In 1987 the distribution of the primary vote approximated the distribu- 
tion of registration, but there were some significant differences. Demo- 
cratic voters were most likely to vote in the primary in those counties with 
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the heaviest Democratic registration. In the state as a whole, 48 percent of 
registered Democrats voted in the gubernatorial primary. That figure was 
almost 58 percent in the counties registered over 90 percent Democratic 
but only 42 percent in the counties less than 50 percent Democratic. 
Among the major metropolitan counties, the proportion was highest (65 
percent) in Fayette and lowest in Kenton and Campbell. 
What this means is that statewide Democratic candidates must con- 
centrate much of their effort in these overwhelmingly Democratic coun- 
ties. Relatively small counties can obviously have a disproportionate influ- 
ence on the Democratic primary if they are registered heavily Democratic 
and have a heavy turnout in the primary. 
There are two pragmatic reasons for a voter to register as a Democrat: 
to vote in statewide primaries or to vote in local primaries. It is clear that 
the huge disparities in the proportion of voters registered as Democrats 
result from variations in local politics. In those counties where local politics 
is dominated by the Democratic party, an overwhelming proportion of 
voters is registered as Democrats. There is little reason for persons in- 
clined to the Republican party to register that way because the Republi- 
cans have few statewide primary contests. In counties that are more closely 
competitive (including the four major metropolitan counties), the Demo- 
crats have a more modest majority of registrants. T h e  Republicans have a 
majority of registrants generally in counties where they have local control. 
The  Republican advantage in registration in such counties is less over- 
whelming because persons who are inclined to vote Democratic have some 
incentive to register Democratic in order to take part in statewide primar- 
ies. 
One way of illustrating the importance of local primaries is to examine 
registration and primary turnout in a year when only local elections were 
held, such as 1985 (table 4). In that year, in the strongly Democratic 
counties, the turnout in local Democratic primaries, as a percentage of 
registration, was about ten percentage points higher than in the 1987 
gubernatorial primary. By contrast, it was more than ten percentage points 
lower than in 1987 in the major metropolitan counties where there was less 
Democratic primary competition than in the more rural Democratic coun- 
ties. 
The  number of persons voting in the Democratic gubernatorial pri- 
mary is frequently greater than the number who vote for the winning 
Democrat in the November election. In the 1979 Democratic primary, 
turnout was slightly higher (102 percent) than in the general election; and 
in 1983 and 1987 it was considerably higher (117 percent in 1983 and 126 
percent in 1987). There are several reasons for this difference. When the 
general election is perceived to be lopsided, public interest may fade and 
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Table 4. Democratic Patterns of Registration and Primary Turnout 
in Local Races, 1985 
Counties 
Dem. prim. Total Dem. Total Dem. 
vote as 
regis. prim. vote % of Dem. 
Jefferson 64% Dem. regis. 
Fayette 64% Dem. regis. 
Campbell & Kenton 
65% Dem. regis. 
Major metro 
64% Dem. regis. 
Dem. regis. over 90% (33) 
Dem. regis. 80-89% (25) 
Dem. regis. 50-79% (29) 
Dem. regis. under 50% 
(29) 
Source: Calculated from data compiled by the State Board of Elections. 
turnout may drop. This seems to have been the case in 1987 when only 48 
percent of registered Democrats voted in the general election. In some 
cases, the supporters of Democrats who lose in the primary may stay home 
or vote Republican in November. This may have happened in some 
metropolitan counties in 1987. 
There is a more important reason for the disparity between Demo- 
cratic primary turnout and Democratic votes cast in the general election. 
Substantial numbers of voters who are "closet Republicans" and who 
expect to support the Republican candidate in the fall are registered 
Democrats and frequently vote in the Democratic primary. 
In the 1987 gubernatorial election, this disparity was greatest in the 
counties with over 90 percent Democratic registration; the ratio of Democratic 
primary to general election votes was 161 percent. The ratio was also relatively 
high in Fayette (155 percent) and Jefferson (142 percent). On the other hand, 
in counties with less than 50 percent Democratic registration (where Republi- 
cans usually register Republican), the comparable ratio was only 60 percent. 
Patterns of Competition in Recent Gubernatorial Primaries 
T h e  modern, postfactional gubernatorial primaries have been charac- 
terized by close competition and, increasingly, by large numbers of candi- 
dates (table 5). The  only lopsided primary victory occurred in 1975, when 
Julian Carroll was the incumbent, having succeeded Ford as governor 
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Table 5. Results of Democratic Gubernatorial Primaries, 1971-87 
Year Candidates 
1971 Wendell Ford 
Bert T. Combs 
6 others 
Total 
1975 Julian Carroll 
Todd Hollenbach 
2 others 
Total 
1979 John Y. Brown, Jr. 
Harvey Sloane 
Terry McBrayer 
Carroll Hubbard, Jr. 
Thelma Stovall 
4 others 
Total 
1983 Martha Layne Collins 
Harvey Sloane 
Grady Stumbo 
3 others 
Total 
1987 Wallace Wilkinson 
John Y. Brown, Jr. 
Steve Beshear 
Grady Stumbo 
Julian Carroll 
3 others 
Total 
Vote 
237,815 
195,678 
15,174 
448,667 
263,965 
113,285 
20,739 
397,989 
165,158 
139,713 
131,530 
68,577 
47,633 
14,175 
566,786 
223,692 
219,160 
199,795 
15,807 
658,454 
221,138 
163,204 
114,439 
84,613 
42,137 
8,187 
633,718 
Percentage Plurality 
53.0 42,137 
43.6 
3.4 
when the latter was elected to the Senate in 1974. Although the Ford- 
Combs race in 1971 was not a continuation of the bifactional contests, it 
resembled earlier races in being a close, two-man race. 
Collins's victory in 1983 was by far the closest gubernatorial primary in 
many years, providing a margin of only 4,500 votes, less than one percen- 
tage point. The  1979 and 1987 races had much in common. Each had a 
much larger number of serious candidates than had been common in 
gubernatorial primaries. Each was a very close race, won by much less than 
a majority. And each resulted in an upset victory for a newcomer in 
electoral politics. Although Wilkinson's eventual margin, 58,000 votes and 
nine percentage points, was substantial, no one anticipated such a large 
margin until the votes had been counted. 
The  one characteristic of bifactional politics still found in some pri- 
mary contests has been the attempt of the incumbent governor to choose 
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his successor. In 1971 there was no Democratic incumbent, and in 1975 
Julian Carroll was seeking election to a full term. But in 1979 Carroll used 
the full political resources of his office in an unsuccessful effort to get 
McBrayer nominated. Four years later, Governor Brown's preference for 
Grady Stumbo was well recognized, but it was not until the closing days of 
the race that Brown publicly endorsed Stumbo and actively campaigned 
for him-an effort that was too little and too late. In 1983 Governor Collins 
made no effort to select the nominee, though many of her political allies 
were working for Beshear. 
What are the stepping-stones to a gubernatorial nomination? What are 
the most common backgrounds of serious candidates for governor? In the 
five primaries from 1971 through 1987, there were eighteen serious candi- 
dates (including George Atkins who dropped out and endorsed Brown late 
in the 1979 campaign). Three of these-Combs in 1971 and Brown and 
Carroll in 1987-were former governors, and they were all unsuccessful. 
T h e  most common pattern followed by candidates has been to run for 
one or more statewide offices. Carroll was elected lieutenant governor 
(after serving as Speaker of the House) and succeeded to the governorship. 
Ford, Stovall, Collins, and Beshear were all serving as lieutenant governor 
when they ran for governor, and all except Ford had been elected to 
another statewide office previously. George Atkins made his abortive run 
for governor while serving as auditor. Four candidates ran after winning 
local or congressional office. Sloane had been mayor of Louisville, Hollen- 
bach had been county judge of Jefferson County, and Carroll Hubbard was 
serving in Congress. McBrayer and Stumbo had both held appointive 
positions in the administration of the governor who endorsed them; 
McBrayer had earlier served in the legislature. Stumbo, like Sloane, was 
considered a serious candidate in his second race largely because of his 
strong showing in the first primary. 
John Y Brown (in 1979) and Wallace Wilkinson were the only major 
candidates who ran for governor without having previously run for elected 
office or having held an appointed office; and they were both elected. Both 
men were successful business persons, with some practical experience in 
working on statewide campaigns of other candidates. This may be the 
beginning of a trend, with a larger proportion of gubernatorial candidates 
being political amateurs who are wealthy enough to finance a large share of 
their campaigns. 
TAe Ford-Combs Contest in 19 71 
T h e  two leading candidates in the 1971 primary had much in common and 
disagreed about little except who would make the better governor. Ford 
had served as Combs's chief administrative assistant during much of his 
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administration, had been elected to the state senate in 1965 with the strong 
support of Governor Breathitt, and was completing a term as lieutenant 
governor, the highest Democrat in the state administration. 
The  two men were political moderates, skillful political organizers, 
and capable administrators. The  campaign was relatively dull, because 
there was little serious disagreement on issues and because both candi- 
dates were moderate in their oratory. The  sharpest area of disagreement 
concerned support for education and higher taxes. Combs had the strong 
support of the Kentucky Education Association (KEA); Ford charged that 
Combs was therefore committed to the tax increases supported by KEA. 
Ford may have benefited from public resentment at the teachers, who had 
staged an abortive strike for higher pay the previous year. 
Perhaps the most important difference between the two candidates 
was their organizational bases of support. Combs relied heavily on the 
traditional county organizations, particularly in rural areas, that he had 
been so successful in recruiting and nurturing during his administration. 
Ford was familiar with these organizations and their leaders because of his 
role in the Combs administration. But he recognized that most of these 
local leaders were still loyal to Combs and that some local organizations 
were becoming less powerful. For these reasons Ford built his own organi- 
zation, made up largely of younger leaders. He started early and estab- 
lished an organization in every county. Some of his contacts had been 
made in the insurance business and the Kentucky Junior Chamber of 
Commerce, which he had headed. Many leaders had worked in his 
campaign for lieutenant governor. 
Ford recognized that a population shift was occurring from rural to the 
larger urban counties; without neglecting rural Kentucky, he made a 
particular effort to win votes in the larger urban areas. He apparently gave 
priority to northern Kentucky and to Jefferson County, which had been a 
Combs stronghold but which Combs neglected in the 1971 campaign. 
Ford's strategy paid off. He won more than 60 percent of the votes in 
Jefferson County, and he had an even larger margin in northern Kentucky. 
Ford, from Owensboro, had a strong appeal in both urban and rural 
sections of western Kentucky, winning more than 60 percent in the First 
and Second districts. Combs was strongest in the eastern counties. He had 
almost a 2 to 1 lead in the Seventh District and a majority in the Republican 
Fifth District. 
Caflol'/s T?i#mph in 19 75 
In 1975 Julian Carroll was nominated with two-thirds of the vote and a 
majority of 150,000, the most lopsided victory since 1951, the last time that 
there had been an incumbent running who had succeeded from the 
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lieutenant governorship. After serving four years as Speaker of the House 
during the Nunn administration, Carroll had run for lieutenant governor 
on a slate with Combs in 1975, winning while Combs lost to Ford. During 
his three years as lieutenant governor, Carroll had had an uneasy relation- 
ship with Ford. At one point during this period, Ford appeared to be urging 
Carroll to run for the Senate in 1974 against Republican Marlow Cook, who 
was perceived (correctly) by many Democrats as vulnerable. If successful, 
this maneuver might have enabled Ford to play a role in the choice of his 
successor. Ultimately, however, Ford ran for the Senate and won; Carroll 
became governor with a huge head start on the 1975 nomination race. 
Carroll's only significant opponent was Todd Hollenbach, the Jeffer- 
son county judge. While Carroll had been planning his campaign ever 
since becoming lieutenant governor, Hollenbach entered the race only 
four months before the primary. He had little name recognition outside of 
Jefferson County and little ability to raise campaign funds. Hollenbach 
was outspent by Carroll by more than a 2 to 1 margin. 
There were few issues in the campaign. Hollenbach proposed a tax 
cut, a position that Carroll described as irresponsible. Carroll said little 
about specific issues but promised to continue the kind of administration 
that he had run for the first year. 
There was never much doubt about the outcome of or interest in the 
race; consequently, the turnout was very light, about 38 percent of the 
Democratic registered vote. Carroll carried his home county of Mc- 
Cracken by a margin of 15 to 1 (over 11,000 votes); Hollenbach carried 
Jefferson County by 54 percent (about 4,500 votes); and Carroll won 117 of 
the remaining 118 counties. 
Brown? Upset Victory in 1979 
In the 1979 gubernatorial primary, Democratic voters were offered a wider 
range of serious candidates than at any time since the beginning of 
bifactional politics. (The 1967 race had had more candidates, but only 
three had gained more than 5 percent of the vote.) 
T h e  Carroll administration strongly supported Terry McBrayer, forty- 
one, a former legislator (1965-75) and majority floor leader, who had served 
as commissioner of commerce during part of Carroll's term. Carroll had 
built a strong organization at the local level, and this was fully mobilized on 
McBrayer's behalf. The  administration's backing helped McBrayer to 
finance the most expensive race in the campaign, almost $1.9 million. 
Moreover, Governor Carroll, one of the best stump speakers in modern 
Kentucky history, campaigned tirelessly for McBrayer across the state. 
There were some disadvantages to the endorsement, however. McBrayer, 
who was not well known across the state, was sometimes seen as simply a 
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tool or "puppet" of the Carroll administration, and he was handicapped by 
charges of scandal and corruption leveled at the Carroll administration and 
rumors of federal investigations that were repeated by most of the other 
gubernatorial candidates. 
Harvey Sloane, forty-three, was a physician who had served a very 
successful term as mayor of Louisville. He was generally perceived as a 
liberal and reform candidate who had some support from labor unions as 
well as from the well-organized teachers of the state. He had been the first 
candidate to enter the race, and his campaign was also well financed. Late 
in the race he collected endorsements from major urban newspapers. One 
of Sloane's handicaps was not being well known outside of Jefferson 
County. McBrayer and Sloane appeared to be the front-runners for much 
of the campaign. 
Carroll Hubbard, Jr., forty-one, of Mayfield, was serving his third term 
as congressman from the First District. He was well known in the district 
as a specialist in constituent services and communication, but beyond 
western Kentucky he was not a particularly familiar figure. He had a 
conservative record that was better suited to the First District than to a 
statewide electorate. A major theme of his campaign was a series of charges 
against alleged waste and corruption in the Carroll administration. 
Thelma Stovall, sixty, was serving as lieutenant governor after twenty 
years of practicing "musical chairs," winning election alternately as secre- 
tary of state and treasurer. Her strongest base of support was in the labor 
union movement in Louisville, where she had first become active in 
politics. A few months before the primary she had attracted public atten- 
tion by calling a special session of the legislature to make some tax 
reductions. She had won the primary for lieutenant governor in 1975 
against ten opponents (beating the closest one by 36,000 votes), although 
four of them were better financed. Once again, in 1979, she had much less 
financial support than most of her opponents, spending only $217,000 of 
the $5.8 million that was spent in the campaign. 
George Atkins, elected state auditor in 1975, had been able to use his 
office quite effectively to spotlight examples of waste and political favor- 
itism in the Carroll administration, and this was naturally a major theme of 
his campaign. Twelve days before the primary he dropped out of the race 
and threw his support to Brown. 
Two months before the primary election, barely in time for the filing 
deadline, John Y. Brown, Jr., forty-five, entered the race. He was a familiar 
figure in Kentucky, but he had never before run for political office. His 
father, John Y. Brown, Sc, had run repeatedly for statewide office over a 
period of many years; he rarely won, but he was always a serious candidate, 
and he did serve for some time in the state legislature. John Y. Brown, Jr., 
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made his fortune when he bought out Colonel Sanders and built Kentucky 
Fried Chicken into a highly successful fast food chain. He had been a 
sports entrepreneur, owning the Louisville Colonels in the American 
Basketball Association. He  had dabbled in politics, working in political 
campaigns and learning how they were run. And, shortly before entering 
the primary, he had married Phyllis George, the former Miss America and 
television personality. 
All of the gubernatorial candidates except Brown used traditional 
organizational techniques in building their campaigns. They began by 
developing a network of local organizations in as many counties as possi- 
ble, utilizing the individuals who had worked with them in previous 
campaigns. McBrayer had the obvious advantage of inheriting the organi- 
zation that Julian Carroll had built and nurtured during his two statewide 
campaigns and during his five years as governor. This organization was 
presumed to be particularly strong in rural counties and through western 
Kentucky. In addition, McBrayer, an experienced politician-though 
never before a statewide candidate-had considerable organizational suc- 
cess in parts of eastern Kentucky. Harvey Sloane began with a strong, loyal 
organization that he had created in Louisville while running for and 
serving as mayor. He  had considerable success in attracting liberal political 
activists in the other large urban areas. 
Carroll Hubbard's strongest base of organizational support was ob- 
viously in western Kentucky, in the First District where he had served as 
congressman after several terms in the state legislature. He  had to compete 
with Julian Carroll, however, for organizational support in the west; and 
the geographical base of his support was obviously much narrower than 
those of McBrayer and Sloane. While she had to compete in Louisville 
with Sloane, Thelma Stovall had considerable organizational help there in 
working-class districts and in the labor movement. Across the state she had 
a personal organization developed from a quarter-century of campaigns for 
statewide office as well as considerable union support. George Atkins's 
organizational strength was relatively thin, although he had run one suc- 
cessful statewide race. 
Having started their organizations, most candidates devoted months 
to touring the state, meeting voters, giving speeches, raising money, and 
expanding their organizations. Kentucky voters, it was assumed, wanted 
to meet their candidates firsthand and not merely read about them in the 
press or see their television commercials. This was particularly important 
for those candidates who lacked high name recognition. Harvey Sloane, 
for example, tried to get attention and improve his image outside Jefferson 
County by conducting 1,200 miles of "walks" across the state. 
John Y. Brown largely ignored the traditional techniques of campaign 
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organization and made no effort to win the support of courthouse politi- 
cians. Not only did he lack the time to follow this traditional path, but he 
also considered it a waste of time and effort. He did not enjoy the prospect 
ofwooing the courthouse politicians, and he chose not to do it. Neither did 
he look forward to the prospect of shaking tens of thousands of hands and 
making stump speeches all over the state; but he recognized that personal 
contact with the voters was necessary. Brown solved this problem by 
traveling around the state in a helicopter, usually accompanied by Phyllis 
George Brown and sometimes by othercelebrities. He would emerge from 
the helicopter long enough to greet local supporters, shake a few hands, 
make a brief speech, and then take off. This unorthodox technique 
seemed to work. He  was able to cover a lot of ground, and he created 
excitement wherever he went. 
Television also played an important part in the 1979 primary campaign. 
The  three candidates who made the most use of television advertising 
were the three who could afford it: McBrayer, Sloane, and Brown. In 
retrospect, it is Brown's television campaign that is remembered and often 
credited with winning him the election. He had several advantages over 
Sloane and McBrayer in the use of television. Because Brown was largely 
financing his own campaign and had almost unlimited resources, he could 
plan the advertising campaign well in advance and could afford the best 
television specialists. But Brown's advantages in using television were not 
entirely financial. He  proved to be a more skillful performer than either 
McBrayer or Sloane. One of his more effective techniques was to film 
thirty-minute commercials, in which he answered questions from a small 
audience, aided by his wife who moved through the group with a micro- 
phone. Brown's skill as a television performer was evident not only in 
commercials but in debates with the other candidates. As is usually the 
case, the debates were more important for what viewers learned about the 
candidates' styles than what they learned about issues. 
Throughout the campaign voters were treated to a heavy dose of 
charges and countercharges, many of them focusing on the Carroll admin- 
istration. Hubbard and Atkins were most outspoken in their allegations of 
wrongdoing by members of the Carroll administration. Atkins's position as 
auditor gave both visibility and credibility to his charges. Carroll not only 
defended his administration but launched counterattacks on the other 
candidates. He criticized Sloane, for example, for the abortion policies of 
Louisville General Hospital and for Sloane's handling of school busing in 
the city. Hubbard was criticized by a number of candidates for his practice 
of deluging constituents with congratulatory notes for such accomplish- 
ments as graduating from high school. 
Late in the campaign, as other candidates began to realize that Brown 
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was gaining strength, more of their attacks focused on him. There were 
criticisms of his life-style, particularly his penchant for high-stakes gam- 
bling. When Atkins pulled out of the race and endorsed Brown, there were 
inevitable charges that Brown had paid Atkins's campaign debts. But 
criticisms of Brown's life-style did not appear to stick or do him much 
damage. 
Most of the time, Brown appeared to be above the political fray. T h e  
voters were evidently tired of negative advertising and appreciated the 
positive tone of Brown's campaign. T h e  insults and charges being ex- 
changed by other candidates supported Brown's theme that it was time to 
abandon old-style politics in Kentucky. While others led the attack on the 
Carroll administration, Brown profited from these charges because he was 
the candidate promising to avoid favoritism and cronyism and "run Ken- 
tucky like a business." While McBrayer had the support of the old 
factional leaders (including both Combs and Chandler), Brown was prom- 
ising a new style of politics that was not dominated by factions. While 
candidates such as McBrayer, Stovall, and Hubbard were perceived as old- 
style politicians, Brown was a fresh face on the political scene, with an 
unorthodox style, a fresh approach, and a glamorous wife. 
Brown won only 29 percent of the vote, but he finished 25,000 votes 
ahead of Sloane and more than 33,000 votes ahead of the administration's 
candidate, Terry McBrayer. At the end of the primary campaign, he clearly 
was the candidate with the greatest momentum. 
In geographical terms Brown won the election by finishing first or 
second in every congressional district. He won the Second and Sixth, 
finished behind Sloane in the Fourth and far behind him in the Third, 
finished behind McBrayer in the Fifth and Seventh, and finished behind 
Hubbard in the First District. Brown was a statewide candidate; he had no 
particular regional base, although he was strongest in Fayette county and 
the Sixth District. He won at least one-fourth of the vote in every district 
except the Third (which contains most of Jefferson County), and even 
there he had twice as many votes as any candidate except Sloane. Sloane 
got at least one-fourth of the vote in four districts; McBrayer did so only in 
the Fifth and Seventh districts in the east, which he won by at least 40 
percent; Hubbard did so only in the First District; and Stovall got no more 
than 13 percent in any district. Brown was a statewide, rather than a 
regional, candidate because his television campaign reached most of the 
state, and he did not rely on local organizations concentrated in only parts 
of the state. 
T h e  lesson of the 1979 campaign seemed to be that you can win a 
gubernatorial primary election without an organization but you cannot win 
it without television. To be more precise, traditional techniques of organi- 
zation appeared to be declining in importance, but a candidate must have 
the financial resources to buy extensive television advertising and the 
personal skill to make good use of it. Carroll Hubbard, Thelma Stovall, 
and George Atkins never had a serious chance at the nomination in large 
part because they could not afford to buy much television time. The  low- 
budget, high-name-recognition campaign that had worked for Stovall in 
the 1975 lieutenant governor's race was totally inadequate in the 1979 
governor's race. 
There were also other factors explaining the outcome. None of the 
other candidates had strength throughout the state. Terry McBrayer and 
Harvey Sloane were the only two candidates with enough financing to be 
competitive, but each of them had significant liabilities. Neither of them 
generated much excitement as campaigners, either in person or on televi- 
sion. While Sloane dominated Louisville, Stovall drained some support 
from him in this city; a more serious problem was his lack of support in 
rural counties. McBrayer was strong in eastern Kentucky but was depen- 
dent on Carroll's organization for support in the west, but Hubbard com- 
peted with the Carroll organization in that area. McBrayer's biggest asset- 
the support of the Carroll administration-was his biggest liability. 
In the last analysis, however, Brown won because of his own strategy, 
skills, and resources. When he joined the race, none of the candidates who 
had been campaigning for so long had captured the public's imagination, 
but all of them had enough support so that the race could be won by 
gaining a third of the vote or less. Brown used television to bring his image 
and his message to public attention quickly and forcefully across the state. 
His style and issues appealed to an electorate that was tired of old politics 
and jaded with negative campaigning. He was the right candidate at the 
right time with enough resources. 
Matrha Layne Collins: A Photo-Finish in 1983 
One lesson learned from the 1983 gubernatorial race was that all primary 
elections are different; in other words, one election does not constitute a 
trend. The  1983 election proved that organization politics was still impor- 
tant, but it also confirmed the growing importance of television advertising 
and of large-scale financing to pay for it. 
There were three significant candidates in 1983: Harvey Sloane, 
Grady Stumbo, and Martha Layne Collins. Harvey Sloane was the only 
loser who emerged from the 1979 race without serious damage to his career. 
He had finished that race a strong second, and many observers believed he 
would have won if Atkins had stayed in the race or been willing to support 
Sloane. In 1981 he won reelection as mayor of Louisville, maintaining his 
power base. He was able to begin the 1983 race with much greater name 
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recognition than he had enjoyed at the start of the 1979 campaign. He 
entered the 1983 race as the front-runner. 
Grady Stumbo was a doctor, running a rural clinic in eastern Kentucky 
when Governor Brown selected him to run the human resources cabinet. It  
was a difficult job because resources were scarce and programs had to be 
cut, but he handled it with skill and received favorable attention in the 
press. Despite his lack of political experience, Stumbo decided to enter 
the governor's race. He expected to run well in the eastern counties, and 
he hoped to have labor union support for his populist campaign. He also 
counted on support from the Brown administration, though a public 
endorsement did not come until very late in the campaign. Throughout 
the campaign Stumbo was viewed as the underdog, particularly as it 
became obvious that he was falling behind in the effort to raise campaign 
funds. 
Martha Layne Collins of Versailles, a public schoolteacher and the 
wife of a dentist, started out in politics working in Wendell Ford's cam- 
paign. Gradually, she developed skill and experience in organizational 
politics, and in 1975 she decided to run for statewide office. T h e  job she 
sought, clerk of the court of appeals, was relatively obscure and was 
abolished as an elective position a few years later. She won with one-third 
of the vote, against four opponents. Four years later she ran for lieutenant 
governor, against six male opponents. At least three of her opponents were 
better known or more experienced. William Cox, a former legislator and a 
key aide to Governor Carroll, had the full support of the Carroll adminis- 
tration. Todd Hollenbach, the Jefferson County judge, had run for gover- 
nor in 1975. Joe Prather was a veteran legislator and a leader in the Senate. 
But Cox, perceived as the front-runner, was damaged by some of the 
accusations against the Carroll administration. Collins won the primary, 
gaining 23 percent of the vote and beating Cox by some 3,300 votes. She 
entered the 1983 primary with years of experience in organizational pol- 
itics, the advantage of two successful statewide races, and the visibility 
enjoyed by the lieutenant governor. She also had the advantage-or 
disadvantage-of being a woman candidate. 
There were three keys to the success of Collins's campaign: fund- 
raising, local organization, and effective use of television. T h e  Collins 
campaign spent nearly $2.5 million to win the primary election. The  
Collins fund-raising effort, in which her husband played a major role, had 
produced over $1 million by early January, more than either of the other 
candidates. T h e  fact that her campaign was able to raise so much money so 
quickly had two consequences: it made possible the planning of an 
extensive television advertising campaign, and it established her cred- 
ibility as a candidate at a time when many observers assumed that Sloane 
was the front-runner. 
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The  Collins organization made the decision early in the race to run a 
statewide race, to make an effort in every county. Local organizations were 
established throughout the state, building on the individuals and groups 
who had worked in Collins' previous campaigns. She campaigned in every 
county, even those with relatively few Democratic votes, and repeatedly 
emphasized that she had visited and understood the needs in all 120 
counties. A particular effort was made to organize the counties surround- 
ing Jefferson, rather than conceding them to Sloane. Collins was also very 
successful in attracting support from local officeholders and activists who 
were frustrated by Governor Brown's policy of benign neglect of the party 
organization and local leaders. Collins concentrated as much as possible on 
personal campaigning at the local level and sometimes passed up forums 
and opportunities to debate the other candidates. 
The  Collins media campaign was extensive and skillfully prepared. 
Although Collins was not a strong debater in forums, she was an effective 
performer in televised advertisements. These stressed her experience in 
government, her familiarity with the state (all 120 counties), her use of the 
lieutenant governor's office as a kind of ombudsman to deal with problems, 
and her concern-as a former teacher-with education. She clearly was 
not running on a feminist platform, but a major purpose of her advertising 
was to convince voters that a woman could be a strong and effective 
governor. In the closing weeks of the campaign, her organization ran some 
negative advertising targeting Harvey Sloane, an attack that her advisers 
felt had some impact. 
Her television campaign was not heavily issue oriented, and she did 
not develop bold new programs to deal with state problems. While she 
emphasized the need for improving education and raising standards of 
teaching and learning, she avoided commitments for expensive education 
programs. She consistently emphasized that she would avoid raising taxes. 
Harvey Sloane started the campaign with the same organizational base 
in Jefferson County that he had had in 1979. He also succeeded in picking 
up considerable support from established political leaders around the 
state, at least in part because he was perceived as the front-runner. He 
made an effort to appeal more to business persons, stressing his efforts to 
attract and keep business in Louisville. Sloane had the necessary resources 
to run a large-scale television campaign, and he did so. However, Sloane is 
not a very dynamic campaigner, and his low-keyed speaking style may 
have damaged him in personal appearances, debates, and television com- 
mercials. 
With regard to issues, Sloane tried to broaden his base of support and 
moderate his liberal image. But he made two strategic decisions on issues 
that alienated some of his natural constituencies and probably cost him the 
nomination. T h e  question of a right-to-work bill became an issue in the 
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campaign because of recent efforts by some groups to enact it in the 
legislature. Sloane refused to take a stand against the bill (without actually 
advocating it), and this neutral position cost him much of his support from 
labor unions, who shifted to Grady Stumbo. He also chose to fully endorse 
the right-to-life position on abortion, a position that damaged his standing 
among more liberal women. 
Grady Stumbo had considerable strength in eastern Kentucky, but he 
did not develop a real statewide organization at the county level. Stumbo 
explained one reason for his difficulty in attracting organization support. 
T h e  practical politicians he met with told him, "I'd be for you if you could 
win." Throughout the campaign Stumbo was hurt by his difficulties in 
raising money. This handicapped his advertising campaign and also under- 
mined his credibility. Eventually (with help from Brown's supporters and 
some personal loans), he was able to spend almost $1.2 million. But his 
television campaign was less extensive and effective than those of his 
opponents. Stumbo is an effective stump speaker, and he made the most 
of that skill and of his image as a fresh face in state politics. His campaign 
themes were heavily populist. 
Eight days before the primary election, Governor Brown publicly 
announced his endorsement of Stumbo and said, "I could no longer stand 
by and watch my state not have the very best." He started a whirlwind 
campaign across the state. Phyllis George Brown taped television shows 
with Stumbo, patterned after the successful ones she had done with Brown 
in 1979. At the time when Brown made his endorsement, Stumbo was 
believed to be eight to ten percentage points behind the two leaders; he 
finished the campaign less than four points behind Collins. 
It appears that Brown's endorsement and campaign provided Stumbo 
with important momentum and made the campaign closer. But political 
observers wondered why Brown had not joined the campaign earlier, 
helping Stumbo to raise money and mobilizing support for him. Brown was 
unpopular with many persons, including local officeholders and politi- 
cians, and his endorsement was not an unmixed blessing for Stumbo. But 
the endorsement may have been an unintended blessing for Collins. 
Because Stumbo and Sloane were competing for the labor and liberal vote, 
the last-minute gains made by Stumbo were probably largely at Sloane's 
expense. Brown's late decision to enter the race in 1979 destroyed the 
possibility of a Sloane victory that year. Brown's last-minute decision to 
actively endorse Stumbo in 1983 probably cost Sloane his second chance 
for the nomination. 
Martha Layne Collins won the primary by about 4,500 votes over 
Harvey Sloane. It was the smallest margin of victory in a Democratic 
gubernatorial primary victory in at least sixty years, though Collins's 
percentage of the vote was higher than Brown's in 1979. 
Democratc Gubernatorial Primaries 65 
Collins ran strongest in the central part of the state. She won the 
Bluegrass Sixth District with 46 percent. She won the northern Fourth 
District by 43 percent, including about 45 percent of the vote in Kenton 
and Campbell counties. She carried the Republican Fifth District by 46 
percent. She led the Second District by a narrow margin over Sloane. 
Sloane finished behind Collins in every district except the Third, which 
he carried with 55 percent and a 32,000 vote margin over the third-place 
Collins. Stumbo won the Seventh District with an impressive 52 percent 
and surprisingly won the First District by a narrow margin over Collins. 
Techniques of Modern Primary Campaigns 
Modern Democratic primary campaigns for governor are very different 
from those of thirty years ago. Factionalism is dead, and the day of the 
kingmaker is over. No longer can a handful of leaders decide which 
candidates can run for office and which should step aside and wait their 
turn. Most of the political leaders who dominated their counties have 
faded away. At one time, it was essential for candidates seeking statewide 
office to meet and bargain with these local leaders, many of whom were 
believed to control substantial numbers of votes. 
Despite the example of John Y. Brown's campaign in 1979, most of the 
successful candidates for major state offices have given a high priority to 
building local organizations. One of Sen. Wendell Ford's sources of long- 
term political strength in Kentucky is his organization of local supporters. 
Local organization was a major asset for Martha Layne Collins in her 1979 
and 1983 campaigns and an asset for Wallace Wilkinson in 1987. Stumbo's 
ineffectiveness in organization building was a significant liability. 
But organization has taken on a new meaning. While it is still impor- 
tant for gubernatorial candidates to visit officeholders in the courthouses, 
it is more important to enlist the support of larger numbers of experienced 
political activists across the state. Their role is described in more detail in 
the next chapter. Candidates who have a limited base of support among 
the more experienced political activists have learned how to recruit tal- 
ented persons who are political amateurs but have developed organiza- 
tional skills in businesses and organizations. In his 1971 campaign for 
governor, Wendell Ford relied heavily on contacts he had made during 
years of activity in the Kentucky Junior Chamber of Commerce. In their 
1987 campaigns both Wallace Wilkinson and Brereton Jones relied heavily 
on business persons and other political amateurs to fill the ranks of their 
organizations. 
Organization is still important in a political campaign, but candidates 
today have a wide range of options in constructing an organization. T h e  
range of organizational work to be done has also changed, with much 
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greater attention being paid to fund-raising, because the costs of cam- 
paigning have escalated. 
The  most important change in primary campaigns, of course, is the 
new importance of television advertising. Contrary to popular myth, John 
Y. Brown, in 1979, was not the first politician to discover the potential of 
television advertising. Television advertising and coverage were important 
ingredients in Edward Breathitt's successful campaign against Happy 
Chandler in 1963. But the victories of Brown in 1979 and Collins in 1983 
resulted in large part from the fact that their television appearances and 
advertisements were more effective than those of their opponents. 
In the 1987 gubernatorial campaign (described in detail in chapter 4), 
television assumed even greater importance. In the closing weeks of the 
campaign, the debate among the top three candidates-Brown, Beshear, 
and Wilkinson-was largely carried on through commercials. T h e  in- 
ability of Stumbo and Carroll to raise enough funds for frequent advertis- 
ing practically excluded them from this debate. And the late surge of the 
electorate to Wilkinson is largely explained by the effectiveness of the 
message delivered in his commercials. In Kentucky, as in the rest of the 
country, television has become the central forum of political campaigns. 
Candidates must not only learn how to gain favorable coverage of their 
campaigns but be able to purchase television time and media experts to 
shape and package their message most effectively. 
THE 1987 DEMOCRATIC 
GUBERNATORIAL 
PRIMARY 
ON MAY 26,1987, Wallace Wilkinson won the Democratic gubernatorial 
primary with 35 percent of the vote; he finished nine percentage points 
and 58,000 votes ahead of his nearest competitor, John Y. Brown. Two 
weeks earlier Wilkinson's own poll had shown him trailing Brown by 
fourteen points; a Cotlrie~-Jouma~poll in early March had shown Wilkinson 
running fifth, with only 7 percent of the vote. 
How did Wilkinson come from so far behind to win the race? How did 
the campaigns of the front-runners, Brown and Steve Beshear, collapse? 
What made the race so volatile and the voters so unpredictable? In an effort 
to answer these and other questions, we will examine the 1987 campaign in 
some detail: the candidates, their campaign strategies and resources, the 
development of issues, and the use of television. 
T h e  1987 campaign deserves attention because it was one of the most 
interesting in recent years and because Wilkinson's victory was a major 
upset. But it also deserves attention because in many ways it was typical of 
recent gubernatorial campaigns. In 1987 there was a large field of major 
candidates, as in 1979. There were major shifts in voter sentiment during 
the campaign, as in both 1979 and 1983. Television debates and advertising 
had a significant effect on the outcome, as in both previous primary 
elections. Finally, in both 1979 and 1987 the election was won by a wealthy 
political amateur who could afford extensive television advertising and 
made effective use of it. 
T h e  Candidates 
Each of the five candidates brought significant political strength to the 
campaign. John Y. Brown had been elected governor in 1979 and could 
claim a number of achievements during his administration. Steve Beshear 
was completing eight years in high office, as attorney general and then as 
lieutenant governor. Grady Stumbo, a cabinet member in the Brown 
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administration, had finished a close third in the 1983 gubernatorial pri- 
mary. Julian Carroll had served a previous five-year term as governor from 
1975 through 1979. Wallace Wilkinson had never held or even sought 
political office, but he was a wealthy businessman with considerable 
experience in raising campaign funds. 
John 2: Brown, Jx, first became known in Kentucky as the owner of 
Kentucky Fired Chicken and the Louisville basketball team, but he 
established his reputation as a politician during his whirlwind campaign in 
the 1979 Democratic gubernatorial primary. While he won the primary 
with only 29 percent of the vote, he defeated former governor Louie Nunn 
in the general election by a more comfortable margin. 
In many respects, Governor Brown's administration was a success. As 
promised, he did run government like a business. He streamlined state 
government, reducing full-time positions by about 20 percent and dismiss- 
ing several thousand workers. He sharply curtailed the patronage system 
and the use of personal service contracts for political purposes, and he 
reformed state investment practices. In the face of economic recession and 
severe revenue shortfalls, he avoided a tax increase by curtailing programs. 
But his repeated assertions that he had made the cuts without reducing 
essential services were widely criticized by those concerned about cut- 
backs in education and social services. Many state workers who were 
dismissed sued successfully to get their jobs back. His personal efforts to 
attract new business to Kentucky failed to prevent a net loss of jobs and a 
growth in unemployment. 
Some of Brown's most serious problems were personal rather than 
governmental. During his last year in office, serious questions were raised 
about his personal finances and his gambling debts, and one of his promi- 
nent friends pleaded guilty to a drug charge. Moreover, Brown was crit- 
ically ill for some time because of complications following by-pass heart 
surgery. A few months after his term ended, Brown's political reputation 
was damaged when he entered the senatorial primary against Senator 
Huddleston and then dropped out for health reasons after polls showed 
him far behind. 
As the 1987 primary campaign grew closer, political observers began to 
believe that Brown would run again and that he would be the front-runner. 
Brown was only fifty-three years old; he had lost weight and regained his 
health; and he seemed to be bored with dabbling in business. It was 
generally believed that his record of clean government and no new taxes 
had been popular. After dropping numerous hints about running and 
testing the political waters, he filed for office on February 20, shortly 
before the deadline. 
Lt. Gov. SfmeBeshearhad enjoyed the role of front-runner until Brown 
entered the race. Though only forty-two years old, he had extensive 
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experience in politics and government. After three terms in the legis- 
lature, representing Fayette County, he was elected attorney general. Four 
years later he was elected lieutenant governor. He entered both races as an 
underdog, but in both he demonstrated his skill and experience in build- 
ing a statewide political organization, though he was not at his best as a 
personal campaigner. Beshear also benefited from his clean image and 
reputation for integrity. 
As attorney general he succeeded in building a reputation as a protec- 
tor of consumer interests and an opponent of utility rate increases, but he 
alienated more conservative Kentuckians by some of his actions on social 
and religious issues, notably his ruling that the Ten Commandments must 
be removed from classroom walls to comply with a U.S. Supreme Court 
decision. As lieutenant governor he worked hard to strengthen his political 
position and gained some media attention by establishing a Kentucky 
Tomorrow Commission to survey the state's needs and recommend broad 
policies for the years ahead. 
Grady Stumbo ran third in the 1983 gubernatorial primary, but his 
ability to win 30 percent of the vote, despite his lack of financing and his 
status as an underdog, had impressed many politicians. Some felt he could 
have won if Governor Brown had supported him more effectively and 
earlier in the campaign. Stumbo entered the 1987 primary with greater 
name recognition and more political experience than in 1983. But he faced 
one major drawback. Instead of having the support of the incumbent 
administration and benefiting from some of Brown's popularity, he faced 
John Y. Brown as one of his opponents. Moreover, as a candidate without 
much personal wealth, he faced two millionaires among his opponents in 
1987. 
Julia# Carroll brought to the campaign both assets and liabilities that 
were unique. He had a record of public service and political success 
unmatched by any other candidate. First elected to the Kentucky House 
from Paducah in 1961, he served four years as speaker and three years as 
lieutenant governor, before succeeding to the governorship (after Gover- 
nor Ford's election to the Senate) in 1974 and being elected to a full term in 
1975. During his five years as governor, he had an extensive record of 
accomplishments, particularly in education; and the state enjoyed a level 
of economic growth that made possible expanded budgets without tax 
increases. He was unusually successful in leading the legislature from the 
governor's office. 
But the Carroll administration was plagued by scandals, particularly 
insurance-fee kickbacks. Questions were raised about some of Carroll's 
financial transactions, and he was subjected to a grand jury questioning 
during a prolonged federal investigation. 
Carroll's decision to enter the 1987 gubernatorial race surprised and 
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puzzled most political observers. They were sure that he could not win and 
did not understand why he did not share that political judgment. Carroll 
brought to the campaign a wealth of experience and knowledge and 
unmatched skill as a traditional political orator. At age fifty-six, he was 
vigorous and energetic. But he entered the campaign perceived by nearly 
everyone as a certain loser, a perception that would make it very difficult to 
attract funds and recruit campaign workers. 
Wallace Wi/Rinson grew up in Casey County, one of the poorest and 
most Republican counties in Kentucky. He got his start in business in the 
mid-1960s by opening a college bookstore in Lexington and then develop- 
ing a highly successful national business buying and reselling used college 
textbooks. During the 1970s he started buying and selling farms. In the 
1980s he became a developer of office buildings, a hotel, and subdivisions; 
a bank owner; a coal mine operator; and a multimillionaire. T h e  range and 
diversity of his business enterprises and the boldness of his business deals 
attracted attention throughout the state. When he ran for governor, the 
major newspapers examined his financial dealings and holdings in great 
detail. 
When Wilkinson entered the gubernatorial primary, it was his first 
effort to gain public office, though he had been finance chairman of 
Harvey Sloane's gubernatorial campaign in 1983 and had chaired John Y. 
Brown's abortive race for the Senate in 1984. He ran for governor on his 
record of achievement in business, and he brought to the campaign a 
reputation for hard work and determination. When Wilkinson announced 
for governor in September 1986, at age forty-five, he had already been 
building his organization and campaigning across the state for many 
months. 
The Brown Campaign 
John Y. Brown entered the campaign as the acknowledged front-runner, 
and this was an important asset. He had little difficulty raising large sums 
of money. Although he had been distrusted in the past by many party 
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activists, in 1987 he was able to enlist the support of many Democratic 
activists who believed he could win. Polls showed substantial approval of 
his record as governor, his fiscal conservatism, and his honesty-though 
there was some concern about his life-style and gambling. 
There were some liabilities, though the Brown campaign did not seem 
to recognize them. Some voters wondered about Brown's motivation for 
running again; did he have goals he wanted to achieve, or was he simply 
bored? There was a substantial bloc of voters, apparently, who were 
strongly anti-Brown and who were prepared to support whatever candidate 
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seemed most likely to defeat Brown. While Brown's 1979 primary victory 
had been remarkable in many respects, it was based on only 29 percent of 
the vote. Finally, there was the inherent disadvantage of the front-runner 
status-the fact that it can lead to complacency. 
In 1979 Brown had won the nomination by using television, a heli- 
copter, and centralized phone banks, but without relying on traditional 
local organization. In 1987, however, the Brown campaign set up an 
organization in every county. These organizations included a number of 
local and legislative officeholders and other activists who expected him to 
be a winner; they also included a number of business and professional 
persons, perhaps attracted by his governing style. Despite this organiza- 
tional base, the Brown campaign appeared to attach less importance to 
organization than to the media campaign and the personal campaigning of 
the candidate. 
The  Brown campaign spent almost $3.5 million during the primary, 
second only to the Wilkinson campaign. These financial resources were 
entirely adequate, enabling Brown to buy all of the television advertising 
time that he needed. The  remarkable thing about the Brown campaign 
fund was that it came almost entirely from outside sources rather than from 
Brown himself. While John Y. Brown could have afforded to make a large 
investment in his campaign, as he had done eight years earlier, he found it 
to be unnecessary. In the first two months after he filed, from February 20 
to April 21, the Brown campaign raised $2 million, setting a new record in 
Kentucky politics for concentrated fund-raising. When the Courie~Jounzal 
analyzed the sources of the first $2 million, it found that the average 
contribution was nearly $1,200 and that large proportions came from 
business and professional persons. The  explanation for Brown's remark- 
able success in raising funds seems clear: most everyone expected him to 
win, and there are many people who want to support a probable winner. 
T h e  basic strategy of the Brown campaign was that of a front-runner. It 
was important to foster the widely held belief that Brown was going to win. 
It was unnecessary to take risks, to-attack other candidates, to make 
expensive policy commitments. Brown's own strategy seemed to be to run 
like an incumbent, to tell the voters: "If you liked my first administration, 
you'll like this one even better." The  implicit motto of the campaign 
seemed to be: "Four More Years! " In debates he often ducked specific 
questions about public policy by promising to govern as well as he had 
done in the past. One of the weaknesses of his strategy was a failure to 
make clear to the voters why he was running for governor. 
Until the last few weeks, it seems fair to say that Brown dominated the 
campaign, at least as a celebrity and the front-runner. He campaigned 
harder than he had in 1979 but less intensively than most of the other 
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candidates. He  reached about 100 counties, traveling more often by auto- 
mobile and less by helicopter. He  attracted good crowds, but those who 
came to see him often seemed more curious than committed. One reporter 
who covered Brown extensively said that his campaign visits followed a set 
routine. He would usually arrive in a van and move through the crowd 
trying to shake every hand but paying no attention to what people said. He  
would often give a ten-minute speech, talking about what a good governor 
he had been in tough economic conditions and how he would do even 
better in more prosperous times. 
In late May, under the headline "Brown's campaign style frustrates his 
opponents," the Courier-Journal (May 21, 1988, p.1) reported on Brown's 
visit to a picnic in Warren County. Brown arrived late with his wife Phyllis, 
shook hands for a few minutes, gave a short interview to a local television 
crew, passed up the chance to make a speech, and drove away. Steve 
Beshear's wife Jane had been working the crowd for two hours before the 
Browns arrived. But, despite the brevity of their appearance, "the people 
in the line and at the tables talked of the Browns, the Browns, the Browns. 
And little else." 
T h e  Beshear Campaign 
Steve Beshear started the campaign as the front-runner, but he lost that 
status quickly when Brown entered the race. He  had the support of some 
leading figures in the Collins administration, though Collins herself took 
no stand and there was no concerted effort by her administration to 
support him. He had the support of a number of officeholders and activists 
around the state, though this was not an unmixed blessing. One reporter 
commented that the crowds attending Beshear rallies were often small and 
were made up largely of "political hacks," persons who had a stake in a 
Beshear victory. 
Beshear had the support of the state AFL-CIO, though some unions 
were supporting Grady Stumbo. Terry Turner, who managed the AFL- 
CIO campaign, told CourierJoumal political columnist Bob Johnson that 
labor organized its largest campaign ever to mobilize labor voters, "and the 
result was the efforts were just literally meaningless. Our efforts just pale 
in comparison to what can be done on television today if you've got the 
money" (C-.J June 14, 1988, p. Dl). Beshear also had the endorsement of 
the Kentucky Education Association (KEA), which provided about 
$90,000 worth of cash and political services at all levels. T h e  political 
director of KEA shared Turner's belief that the messages of his organiza- 
tion were drowned out by the much more extensive political messages on 
television. Beshear agrees with the viewpoint that television advertising 
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has undermined the influence of organizations on their members. Beshear 
was also the target of some organized groups, notably antiabortion and 
fundamentalist groups, but it is difficult to judge their effectiveness. 
Beshear has always had a reputation as a strong organizer, and he 
believes that he had the best county organization in the race, with nearly 
all of the counties organized. H e  attempted to keep the support of those 
who had worked for him in the first two statewide races, many of whom 
had been inexperienced in politics when they first supported him. Some 
observers felt that Beshear had not worked effectively enough to maintain 
the organization that he had created in the first two races. In some counties 
he relied heavily on local officeholders; in Jefferson County, for example, 
the county sheriff provided the core of the organization. In putting to- 
gether his county organizations, he tried to combine these established 
Beshear supporters with some of the traditional courthouse workers who 
were now joining his camp, as well as other activists who were primarily 
interested in issues. There were some doubts about whether this blend of 
supporters produced effective county organizations. 
T h e  Beshear campaign spent about $2.9 million, more than a million 
behind Wilkinson and some $600,000 behind Brown, but a substantial 
sum for a Kentucy political campaign. Beshear, who lacks the personal 
wealth of Brown and Wilkinson, ultimately loaned his campaign $130,000. 
Beshear's ability to raise that much money was impressive. H e  got a head 
start in the fund-raising race; he had raised $1 million by the end of 1986. 
- 
During most of that time Beshear was perceived as the front-runner, and 
there was uncertainty about whether Brown would enter the race. In the 
last month of the campaign, as Beshear began to lose ground in the polls, 
he raised only half a million, compared to $1.4 million raised by Brown. 
Beshear believed that he was significantly handicapped in the television 
advertising campaign because Brown and Wilkinson had more resources. 
But the Beshear campaign ran a great deal of television advertising, and it 
is unlikely that the discrepancy in funding was crucial to the outcome of 
the campaign. 
I t  is difficult to define the underlying strategy of the Beshear cam- 
paign, and this may have been one of Beshear's fundamental problems. 
T h e  Beshear campaign never defined a clear theme or gave the voters a 
reason to vote for him. As lieutenant governor, Beshear had organized the 
Kentucky Tomorrow Commission tohevelop long-range plans but made 
little use of its findings. H e  prepared a number of position papers on 
issues, but they had little impact on the voters. Once Brown had entered 
the race, the Beshear campaign became obsessed with the necessity of 
knocking Brown off his pedestal, and it eventually decided that this could 
only be accomplished through negative advertising. We will examine the 
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consequences of that decision later in the chapter when we look at the 
media campaign. 
Steve Beshear was not a natural born campaigner. He campaigned 
tirelessly because it had to be done, but he never seemed to be enjoying it. 
Beshear told us that, while he enjoys meeting people, a statewide cam- 
paign is too long, too frantic, and too tiring. Beshear can be an effective 
public speaker, but in this political campaign he was too often on the 
offensive, making snide comments about his opponents. Perhaps because 
of this, he succeeded in personally antagonizing a number of others in the 
race. 
The Stumbo Campaign 
Grady Stumbo began the 1987 gubernatorial campaign with a number of 
assets. He had gained name recognition, political experience, and wide 
respect from his strong showing in the 1983 campaign. H e  was the only 
candidate from eastern Kentucky. He had a chance to capture labor's 
endorsement. He had some well-defined issues as part of the populist 
theme in his campaign. But he no longer had the support of John Y. Brown 
or the incumbent administration. He was running against two millionaires, 
and he had neither personal resources nor skill in money raising. 
Stumbo had not had an extensive county organization in 1983 but had 
relied on help from the Brown administration and the United Mine 
Workers. Four years later he still lacked an effective local organization, 
though he received some help from organized labor. He did not have staff 
members at the state level who had the skill and experience to build a 
county-level campaign. Most local Democratic officeholders and activists 
were seeking a candidate who seemed to have a better chance of winning. 
Stumbo's campaign was severely limited by the shortage of financial 
resources, a problem that had plagued him in the 1983 campaign. Then he 
had been criticized for borrowing money in order to make personal loans to 
his campaign. In 1987 he was more cautious. Stumbo spent a little more 
than $750,000 in the campaign, with $150,000 coming from a personal 
loan. His campaign fund was $2 million less than Beshear's and over $3.5 
million less than Wilkinson's. As a result he was able to use television 
commercials only sparingly. On several occasions during the campaign, he 
ran thirty-minute commercials on local channels in less expensive time 
periods, gearing these to his fund-raising efforts. Apparently, he raised 
enough from these commercials to pay for them, but they seemed to have 
little impact on the campaign. What he lacked in 1987, of course, were the 
fund-raising efforts of John Y. Brown and his friends, who had helped in 
1983. 
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The  Stumbo campaign strategy was apparently designed to broaden 
Stumbo's base of support. His speeches continued to be populist in tone: 
attacking the vested interests and the high cost of campaigning, speaking 
up for the working man, urging greater attention to health care and the 
needs of eastern Kentucky. But he made a conscious effort to appeal more 
to urban areas and to business and professional people. His campaign style 
was more conservative, and he dressed more conservatively as he cam- 
paigned across the state. As one observer put it, "Stumbo's campaign never 
found a groove and never got moving." He failed to generate the enthusi- 
asm among many voters that he had enjoyed four years earlier as a fresh 
face in politics. 
He spent less time on the campaign trail in 1987 than he had four years 
earlier. He was not particularly effective in working the crowds and making 
small talk. One feature of his campaign that worked well was working 
briefly at various jobs, such as a waiter in a diner or a grocery store clerk. 
His campaign was chronically underfinanced and understaffed, and it was 
often poorly organized. One example of poor organization was a speech on 
a flatbed truck in a Bowling Green parking lot late on a Monday afternoon. 
There had been no advance work for the speech. He had a small band to 
help attract a crowd, but no one could find an electrical outlet to plug in the 
instruments and speakers. And so Stumbo spoke to the band members, his 
driver, the local campaign chairman, and a "crowd" of sixteen. One 
Saturday afternoon a five-county Stumbo rally in West Liberty, complete 
with free food, attracted only about seventy people. Whatever message 
Stumbo was preaching, it could not have much impact if he could not reach 
the voters in person and could not afford much television advertising. 
The Carroll Campaign 
When Julian Carroll began to drop hints that he was considering another 
run for the governorship, most observers were puzzled and surprised. 
They did not know why he would want to undertake such an effort; and 
they did not understand why Carroll, a skilled and experienced politician, 
thought he had a chance of winning. Despite his knowledge of state 
politics and government, his skill as an orator and debater, and his heavy 
commitment of time and energy, Carroll faced one overwhelming obsta- 
cle. Because almost no one believed he could win, there were few who 
were willing to commit their time and resources to his campaign. 
Carroll's geographic base of support was in western Kentucky. A native 
of Paducah, he was the only true western Kentuckian in the race. He also 
sought to build a political base on the Christian vote, located primarily in 
the western counties. For years Carroll had been a lay preacher and had 
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cultivated ties with church organizations. He had been strengthening 
these ties for several years before the 1987 primary, and he hoped that he 
could mobilize this bloc of church people to work actively in his campaign. 
Carroll was disappointed in the campaign and electoral support that he 
actually got from these groups. He was surprised to find that Christian 
groups were particularly unforgiving of the scandals that had plagued his 
administration. He also found that some of the church groups were strong- 
ly anti-Beshear, because of Beshear's position on abortion and on the Ten 
Commandments in the schools. They wanted to support whichever candi- 
date had the best chance of beating Beshear and did not perceive Carroll to 
be that candidate. 
When he ran successfully for statewide office in 1971 and 1975, Julian 
Carroll had a strong county-level organization, consisting of local of- 
ficeholders and active Democratic workers. But twelve years later, most of 
that organization had faded away. In the intervening elections the Carroll 
loyalists had transferred their loyalties to the other candidates for whom 
they had worked. Like all pragmatic political workers, they wanted to 
support a winner in 1987, and few of them saw Carroll as a potential 
winner. Carroll recruited a few of his old supporters and some of his 
Christian allies to organize counties for him in 1987, but the results were 
disappointing. There were a relatively small number of counties-mostly 
western and southern-in which he had a modest organization. Carroll 
told someone that the person running his campaign in Louisville was "the 
only one left" of his supporters. In a few counties in western Kentucky, he 
was apparently able to trade support with one or another candidate for 
statewide office, to supplement the efforts of his own organization. 
The  Carroll campaign had a major problem: the shortage of resources. 
His campaign spent a little less than Stumbo's, just under $750,000. In 
April Carroll borrowed $250,000 to loan to his campaign, but he eventually 
raised enough money to repay the loan. He resisted the temptation to loan 
more to the campaign late in the race when it was obvious that he was not 
going to win. Carroll had difficulty raising money for the obvious reason 
that few expected him to win. The  consequence was that he did not run 
any advertising statewide and was limited to some advertising on televi- 
sion stations covering western Kentucky. Whether he would have won a 
significantly larger number of votes if more television viewers had been 
able to see and hear his message we will never know. 
It is difficult to define a consistent, coherent strategy that guided the 
Carroll campaign. Before launching the campaign, Carroll held a lengthy 
press conference in which he tried to deal with the issue of scandals in his 
administration, admitting some mistakes and denying other charges. Per- 
haps as a consequence of this, and perhaps because he was not perceived 
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as a serious challenger, other candidates did not discuss these problems 
during the campaign. It might be said that Carroll's basic strategy was to 
use whatever resources he had. He built county organizations where he 
could. In his speeches he tried out a variety of issues-moral, economic, 
educational-looking for something that might work. Aside from his 
criticism of Beshear on moral issues, he rarely attacked the other candi- 
dates. He  reminded voters of what had been accomplished in his adminis- 
tration and tried to present an image as the most knowledgeable, exper- 
ienced candidate in the race. 
Carroll campaigned personally in about half of the counties, the most 
limited of all the gubernatorial campaigns. He campaigned the old-fash- 
ioned way, shaking hands, greeting old friends, reminding those he met of 
what he had done for them during his administration. And he gave old- 
fashioned stump speeches in his unique manner, combining the styles of 
preacher and politician. 
At the Fancy Farm picnic in August 1986, his emphasis on moral and 
family issues suggested that these would become the main focus of his 
campaign. But in succeeding months he largely ignored these issues, 
talking instead about his proposals for economic development, educa- 
tional reform, and curbing drug abuse. When he was campaigning in 
Frankfort, he claimed to be the state workers' best friend. Because he only 
ran a few television commercials, on western stations, he had little oppor- 
tunity to test the effectiveness of these various themes in advertising. 
The Wilkinson Campaign 
When Wallace Wilkinson began traveling around the state to enlist sup- 
port, he was a well-known businessman, at least in the Lexington area, but 
he was totally unknown as a political candidate. In December 1986, after 
many months of campaigning, only 44 percent of voters polled by the 
Courie~Joun?al had heard of Wilkinson (while other candidates ranged 
from 72 to 91 percent), and only 4 percent supported him for governor. 
Wilkinson's major asset was his wealth, which he was willing to spend 
generously in the campaign. Another asset was his own personality-his 
unflagging energy and determination. 
I t  was in 1984, after the collapse of John Y. Brown's campaign for the 
Senate, that Wilkinson began to build a statewide organization. He began 
developing the contacts that he had made in the Sloane campaign. He 
started hiring a few staff members to help with organizational work. One of 
these was Donna Moloney, who had extensive experience in state and 
national campaigns; she joined his firm as a public relations expert in 
August 1984 and was quickly put to work coordinating contacts with 
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supporters and planning meetings and events, including a series of politi- 
cal dinners. Later in the campaign she took on the job as office manager 
and shared much of the responsibility for scheduling. 
Over a period of three years, the Wilkinsons held dinners at their home 
about once a week, to which they invited ten to twenty people. They 
would have a chance to listen to Wilkinson, ask him questions, and discuss 
the governorship. Staff members took notes of issues and questions raised 
at these dinners. Most of those invited on a particular evening came from a 
single county, and about eighty counties were covered over the three 
years. At first, most of those invited were persons he had met in the course 
of business, but the lists grew to include more of the prominent leaders 
and political figures in the counties. Wilkinson also utilized the contacts of 
key staff people who had been more active in politics. T h e  staff would 
follow up these dinners, contacting those who had attended and collecting 
more names of potential supporters from them. This method of operating 
enabled Wilkinson to build a county-level organization that was more 
broadly based than the traditional Democratic party workers at the court- 
house level. Reporters covering the campaign were surprised by Wilkin- 
son's ability to build such a strong local organization in a nontraditional 
mold. 
Wallace Wilkinson spent almost $4.3 million in the primary campaign. 
When the postprimary financial report was filed, it showed that Wilkinson 
had loaned his campaign more than $2.3 million; but by the beginning of 
October, enough money had been raised to repay the entire loan from 
Wilkinson. Obviously, the Wilkinson campaign had enough resources to 
maintain a large state organization and to buy all the television time that it 
wanted. He outspent Brown by some $800,000, but the battle of the 
millionaires was not decided by the difference in spending levels. Wilkin- 
son and Brown each had all of the resources needed, and each could have 
provided more money if necessary from personal funds. Wilkinson's ad- 
vantage over Beshear was greater, some $1.4 million. But Wilkinson's 
major financial advantage over Beshear was his personal wealth. This 
enabled Wilkinson to plan an expensive organizational and media cam- 
paign from the beginning, secure in the knowledge that he could spend 
whatever was necessary. Beshear had to plan his media spending more 
cautiously because funds were not unlimited. 
His extensive financial resources enabled Wallace Wilkinson to start 
building an organization early and to create a large campaign staff. Early in 
the campaign he utilized several persons already working in his business 
enterprises; later on more of his campaign staff were working full time. By 
the time the campaign reached its climax in May 1987, the staff totaled 
thirty persons. 
One of the key figures who served on the staff for more than a year was 
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Danny Briscoe, who had particular responsibility for media, issues, and 
polling. He had run Harvey Sloane's campaign for mayor and John Y. 
Brown's brief campaign for the Senate, as well as serving in state govern- 
ment. Bruce Wilkinson, the candidate's nephew who had worked in his 
business enterprises for twenty years, was another who started working on 
the campaign early. Doug Alexander was hired as the campaign press 
secretary early in 1986. He was a public relations consultant, with no 
previous experience in political campaigns. In the summer of 1986, two 
field representatives were hired, one for the eastern part of the state and 
one for western Kentucky. John Kelly, a young investment banker with 
political experience in Louisville, worked throughout the campaign as the 
advance man. 
Although Wilkinson initially financed most of the campaign himself, 
as the campaign progressed fund-raising became an increasingly important 
part of the enterprise. Wilkinson picked as his chief fund-raiser Roger 
Wells, a longtime friend from Glasgow. A number of other persons played 
major roles in campaign funding, including Floyd Poore, who was respon- 
sible for raising funds in northern Kentucky. He had been a fund-raiser for 
Martha Layne Collins and had served for a time as transportation secretary 
in the Collins administration. 
One other staff member played a key role in the campaign for a time, 
starting in September 1986. J. R. Miller was a veteran political leader in his 
mid-seventies from Owensboro, with decades of experience in organizing 
political campaigns, particularly at the local level. He had played a key role 
in Wendell Ford's campaigns and had served as state Democratic chairman 
when Ford was governor. Miller's major responsibility was organization at 
the county level. He had more extensive contacts, particularly in western 
Kentucky, with local officeholders and activists than did anyone else on 
the staff. Because of his personality and experience, Miller also wanted to 
play a major role as a strategist in the campaign. Eventually, this led to 
conflicts with Danny Briscoe; at stake were questions of strategy and the 
more basic question of who was running the campaign. Early in 1987 Miller 
left the campaign. 
The  Wilkinson campaign had ample financial resources, a large staff, 
an extensive county organization, and an energetic candidate; but four 
months before the May primary the campaign was making little headway 
and could accurately be described as "dead in the water." Polls showed 
Wilkinson getting only 4 or 5 percent of the vote and not gaining. Of 
course, there was reason to hope that Wilkinson would gain strength when 
the television advertising campaign was in full swing, but that would be 
possible only if the campaign was able to develop themes and strategies 
that appealed to the voters. 
The  major problem facing the Wilkinson campaign early in 1987 was 
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lack of agreement on basic strategy for the media campaign. In some 
respects the campaign had a clear strategy. It began with the assumption 
that the major asset of the campaign was the candidate: Wallace Wilkin- 
son. He was willing to invest unlimited time and energy in personal 
campaigning, and he was very effective in dealing with people one-on- 
one. There was also consensus that a successful campaign required both a 
strong county-level organization and a large-scale media campaign. In that 
sense, the Wilkinson strategy resembled Collins's successful game plan in 
1983 more than Brown's winning strategy in 1979, which relied primarily on 
television. But the campaign did not yet have a central theme that could be 
developed in television ads. Wilkinson needed a theme that would distin- 
guish him from the other candidates; he needed to explain why he was 
running for governor. As one staff member said at the time, "I'm not sure 
they know what our message is out there." The voters did not know what 
the Wilkinson message was because the campaign leadership was still 
searching for a message. 
In January 1987 Danny Briscoe called Peter Hart, the veteran cam- 
paign consultant in Washington, for the name of someone who might be 
hired to rescue the campaign and, more specifically, to serve as a strategist 
and to develop the major themes for the media campaign. Peter Hart 
recommended James Carville, and on February 1 he arrived in Frankfort to 
begin the rescue operation. 
Carville, a native of Louisiana now working out of Austin, Texas, is a 
relative newcomer in the consulting field. In 1984 he ran Lloyd Doggett's 
successful Texas primary and unsuccessful general election campaign for 
the Senate and in 1986 managed the upset victory of Bob Casey for 
governor in Pennsylvania. He is a colorful character, who calls himself a 
"cowboy" and dresses appropriately. One journalist described him as "a 
political Clint Eastwood. He rides in alone, blows away the bad guys, then 
rides out of town again-for a fee." Carville is also a thoughtful and 
articulate professional who can make a convincing case for his theories 
about how to win media campaigns. Carville had managed the previous 
campaigns in which he had participated. His role in the Wilkinson cam- 
paign was more specialized. After diagnosing the problems afflicting the 
campaign, he was to develop strategies and major themes. In practice, he 
dealt with every aspect of communications, writing speeches, composing 
questions for polls, designing the television ads. His responsibilities over- 
lapped those of Danny Briscoe. In theory that should have led to conflict; 
in practice they worked closely together. We will discuss Carville's contri- 
butions to the campaign in more detail when we examine the role of issues 
and media in the gubernatorial campaign. 
Reporters who covered Wallace Wilkinson on the campaign trail were 
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amazed by his performance, particularly his effectiveness in meeting 
voters one by one. Ferrell Wellman, the television journalist who has been 
covering campaigns for twenty years, told us, "I have never seen a candi- 
date so single-minded, so determined, so aggressive, and with such an 
ability to campaign long hours." At any gathering where he appeared, he 
shook every hand in sight; someone said, "You can't just walk by him when 
he is campaigning." 
Wilkinson once described his campaign style as "hand-to-hand com- 
bat." He  was a very physical campaigner, grabbing, hugging, and even 
slapping voters. One observer said that Wilkinson "has this great touchy- 
feely thing on the campaign trail." One reporter described him as "a great 
grabber, like Wendell Ford." Someone else claimed that Wilkinson has "a 
very meaningful handshake." (This was the campaign in which Beshear 
was criticized publicly for having a "weak handshake.") One veteran 
observer compared Wilkinson's one-on-one style to that of Chandler in his 
prime. He was particularly effective campaigning in the rural areas, where 
his personal style of campaigning may be most appreciated. Wallace 
Wilkinson's wife Martha campaigned much of the time on her own and 
matched him in vigor and enthusiasm if not in grabbing and hugging. 
T h e  Wilkinson campaign style was more than just a physical phe- 
nomenon. He  created the impression that he genuinely enjoyed cam- 
paigning and meeting people, even when he had been doing it for hours on 
end. He  was egalitarian in his approach, spending as much time with 
someone who was unemployed as with a banker. He  is a great salesman, 
and one of his major accomplishments in one-on-one conversations was 
convincing people that he had a chance to be elected and that he would 
make a great governor. 
Wilkinson was less effective as a stump speaker than he was as a 
handshaker. T h e  substantive content of his speeches was not memorable, 
but he delivered the message well. He  talked about his personal back- 
ground, growing up in rural Casey County, his experience as a busi- 
nessman, and some of the themes of his campaign: the charge that state 
government was ignoring many rural counties, the need to end "business 
as usual in Kentucky politics," and the need for new ideas in Frankfort. 
The  Media Campaigns 
T h e  conventional wisdom among politicians and reporters is that the 1987 
gubernatorial primary was decided by the media campaign and particularly 
by the television ads of the major candidates, and there is no reason to 
doubt this thesis. 
All of the gubernatorial candidates had a full array of professional 
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campaign consultants, particularly media advisers and pollsters. Brown's 
media consultant was Robert Squire, one of the best known and most 
successful in the country. There was some criticism by other members of 
the campaign staff that Squire had too much control over the campaign but 
did not devote enough personal attention to the race and was slow to 
recognize that Brown was in deep trouble. Beshear's media consultant was 
the Doak-Shrum firm; his pollster was Hickman-Maslin; and Tommy 
Preston, a veteran political consultant from Lexington, handled local 
aspects such as relations with the press. There were reports of friction 
between the Preston organization and the national consultants; and after 
Beshear's defeat both his state and national consultants, perhaps inevita- 
bly, came under criticism. Wallace Wilkinson hired Sawyer-Miller as 
media consultant and Mark Mellman as his pollster but relied very heavily 
for strategic planning on James Camille, who worked in headquarters for 
the last four months of the campaign. Wilkinson also hired a Lexington 
governmental firm, State Research Associates, to carry out research and 
help him develop positions on a variety of issues. 
Most voters learn about the candidates and issues in a statewide 
campaign, not by personal contact with candidates or campaign workers, 
but by the newspaper, radio, and television coverage of what the candi- 
dates say and by paid political advertising, primarily on relevision. We will 
examine each of these in turn. 
Free Media Coverage 
During the campaign the media reported occasionally on what candidates 
were saying in their speeches, particularly those delivered to organized 
groups (labor, business, education), and on what they said in televised 
debates. There were two debates televised live on Kentucky Educational 
Television (KET), the first on April 13 sponsored by the Prichard Commit- 
tee and devoted to education issues and the second on May 13 following 
the normal KET format and covering all issues. 
T h e  first KET debate gave the candidates a chance to demonstrate 
that each was committed to improving education in the state, including 
the continuation of the educational reforms adopted by the legislature in 
1985 and 1986. Clearly, the Prichard Committee, which sponsored the 
debates, was hoping for such commitments from the candidates. For the 
most part, they complied. Wallace Wilkinson, however, made it clear that 
he was dissatisfied with these approaches and that he wanted to try new 
methods of improving education, including benchmark schools and incen- 
tive pay to teachers in schools that had outstanding records. 
The  reporters inevitably raised questions about educational reforms, 
such as how smaller classes and higher teachers' pay could be funded; and 
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the answers to these questions had a significant effect on the campaign. As 
might be expected, the candidates were most reluctant to promise higher 
taxes. John Y. Brown indicated that local units of government should pay 
more of the cost of education, and he favored repealing House Bill 44, 
which places severe limits on the levels of local property taxes. His 
opponents, particularly Beshear and Wilkinson, were to use this statement 
in weeks to come as proof that Brown would be a "high tax" governor. 
(Beshear ducked the issue of H.B. 44 by saying the legislature would never 
repeal it.) Wilkinson made clear his opposition to a tax increase and 
announced that he would raise revenue instead through a state lottery- 
the issue that was later to become the keystone of his campaign. 
Taxes and revenue, not surprisingly, played a major role in the May 13 
debate on KET, though by that point in the campaign each of the candi- 
dates was repeating positions that had been emphasized both in speeches 
and in advertising. Wilkinson repeated his proposal for a lottery and 
insisted that it could be implemented by the end of 1988 if approved by the 
voters in November of that year. Stumbo pledged to find the necessary 
resources to pay for educational reform, increasing taxes on corporations 
and the wealthy if necessary. Brown, Beshear, and Carroll each indicated 
that changing the state income tax system to conform to the new federal 
law might be a reasonable way to raise revenue if that proved necessary, 
while Wilkinson flatly opposed such a step. Under questioning from 
Beshear, Brown changed his position and opposed the repeal of H.B. 44. 
The  debate was enlivened by some interchanges between candidates. 
Several of the candidates made personal attacks on Beshear. Beshear 
predicted that Stumbo would drop out of the race in return for a promise of 
a job by Brown. Brown refused to disclose more about his personal 
finances. Beshear repeated his standard line about the importance of 
integrity. Carroll criticized Courier-journal reporter Bob Johnson for asking 
him why he entered the race since no one expected him to win. 
The  debate revealed once again the casual approach that John Y. 
Brown was taking to the campaign and his apparent failure to prepare for 
the debates. Brown continued to avoid specific commitments about what 
he would do as governor, saying at one point about his first administration, 
"It'd be more of the same, but better." At one point he said that he favored 
limiting state employees to 30,000 and seemed surprised to be told the 
present total was 34,000. When asked why he had not been actively 
involved in promoting educational reform since his first administration, he 
said, "I've been waiting for this job to turn up." When given a good 
opportunity to explain what motivations had led him to run again, he said 
(probably very accurately), "I dabbled around some in business but really 
didn't find that that interested me. I really miss being governor." 
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T h e  two televised debates were important not only because of the 
coverage given to them by the media but also because the positions taken 
by the candidates-particularly on taxes-became the themes of tele- 
vised commercials. T h e  debates were particularly important to Wilkinson, 
as an underdog, because they attracted attention to his position on the 
issues and provided him with a platform to launch his campaign for a 
lottery. Candidates for office are always competing for coverage in the 
media, and some do this more successfully than others. Perhaps the best 
example of this is the tactics used in the last ten days or so by the Wilkinson 
campaign. Wilkinson, using a helicopter, moved from one part of the state 
to another, making speeches and attending rallies. By repeated visits to 
various counties, he was able to get continuing attention in the local 
media. Because his extensive travels coincided with polls showing he was 
gaining, the media gave particular attention to his campaign. 
In the last week before the election, the Wilkinson organization 
launched a twenty-five-hour marathon. While obviously an atypical exam- 
p!e, it illustrates the intensity and enthusiasm of the Wilkinson campaign. 
Wilkinson flew from one stop to the next. T h e  trip started in Casey 
County in the morning, moved on to Elizabethtown for a visit to a senior 
citizens' center, then to a restaurant in Fulton, and to Louisville for a press 
conference. There was a visit to Maysville, a trip into Ohio to talk about 
the lottery used there, and a return to Maysville for an evening rally. Back 
in Louisville late in the evening, Wilkinson visited a bowling alley, a 
restaurant, a grocery store, and the United Parcel Service headquarters 
that operates all night. Then he went to a shop to buy T-shirts with the 
slogan "25 hour day" for everyone in the entourage. Early in the morning 
Wilkinson was in Lexington to meet with the early shift of Lextran bus 
workers and ended the marathon with a press conference in Frankfort. 
Television Advertising 
T h e  television advertising campaign was fought out largely among Brown, 
Beshear, and Wilkinson. Because of his limited budget, Stumbo ran a 
smaller number of ads that attracted less attention. His advertising did not 
have enough impact either to help his campaign or to damage any of the 
others. For these reasons we will concentrate on the advertising battles of 
Brown, Beshear, and Wilkinson. 
During the early weeks of the television campaign, in March and early 
April, each of the major campaigns ran "feel-good" ads to try to develop a 
positive image about its candidate. Wilkinson was the first entry into the 
television commercial derby. One of his ads attacked old-style politics and 
urged a fresh approach to state problems; another summarized his back- 
ground and his rise from poverty. They had no appreciable impact. T h e  
1987 Democratic Givbernatorial Primary 85 
early Brown ads focused on the candidate's personality and his return to 
politics. One critic described their theme: "I was a great governor. Now 
I'm back. Aren't you lucky! " There was no effort by Brown to articulate 
his reasons for running again or to establish any theme to the campaign. 
T h e  Beshear ads were also focused on the candidate and were rather 
bland. Some emphasized his record of office. Another commercial showed 
him at home with his kids, talking about the importance of education, and 
ended with him shooting a basket (successfully, of course). 
Wilkinson and Beshear each ran an ad that stirred up some controversy 
without having much immediate impact. Late in March Wilkinson held a 
press conference to attack the deal made by the "Collins-Beshear" admin- 
istration to bring the Toyota plant to Kentucky. H e  charged that the 
administration had paid too high a price and repeated his criticisms in a 
commercial. While most observers considered the attack on Toyota a 
mistake, the Wilkinson campaign believed it had been successful in 
making voters pay attention to Wilkinson for the first time. 
In an effort to dramatize the importance of keeping industry in the 
state, the Beshear campaign ran an ad showing the candidate swinging a 
bat in an empty lot in front of an abandoned factory; in the background was 
a sign with the name of the company that makes the "Louisville Slugger" 
bat, a sign partly covered by a "CLOSED" sign. T h e  campaign had failed to 
get permission from the company, which filed suit against Beshear, point- 
ing out that it had not closed but just moved across the river into Indiana. 
Onlookers debated whether the Beshear campaign had been hurt by its 
mistakes or helped by the attention being given to its ad. 
Early in April Brown appeared to have a comfortable lead in the race. 
His own polls showed that he had about 40 percent of the vote and a 15 
percent margin over Beshear. There seemed to be no reason to change the 
advertising tactics of the Brown campaign. Beshear's situation was entirely 
different. T h e  polls showed that he had a favorable image with voters, but 
he seemed to be locked into second place. In early April Beshear's advisers 
suggested that the only way to overtake Brown was to launch a negative 
campaign against him. They recognized that it was a gamble, because a 
negative campaign might seem to be out of character for Beshear and 
might hurt his image and his standing in the polls. But they believed it was 
the only way that Brown's strength could be undermined. 
Based on polling data, the Beshear advisers believed that Brown's life- 
style was his greatest vulnerability. If this was true, a negative campaign 
that was personal in nature would be the most effective; it would also carry 
the greatest risk of hurting Beshear. By mid-April it became clear that 
Brown might also be vulnerable on policy questions, particularly taxation. 
T h e  decision was made to run a series of negative ads, attacking Brown's 
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life-style and his policies, and the campaign was launched at the beginning 
of May. One typical commercial, which was run frequently, included a 
series of news reports and headlines: "Governor Brown called today for 
deep cuts for the poor, the sick, and public schools. . . . Abandoning the 
state budget debate, Governor Brown left for Florida. . . . In a breaking 
scandal, Governor Brown admitted losing more than $1 million in one bad 
night at Vegas. . . . Brown admits gambling, denies use of cocaine. . . . 
Governor Brown was closely linked to the principal target in the yearlong 
gambling and narcotics investigation. . . . This was the sixth tax increase 
of Governor Brown's four years in office." 
T h e  Beshear campaign also ran a commercial poking fun at the Brown 
life-style, using the format of the well-known television program "Life- 
styles of the Rich and Famous" and a Robin Leach clone as narrator. A 
couple of excerpts will capture the flavor of the ad: "Living in grand style 
in New York, Florida, California, Las Vegas, and occasionally, even Ken- 
tucky. . . . But, out of office, the fab couple isn't on the A-list anymore. So 
they're running for governor a second time. . . . From fried-chicken 
franchise to one of the world's most high-rolling life-styles. Financed not 
simply with his money, but with yours." The  humorous approach, even if a 
little heavy-handed, might have been the most effective and perhaps least 
risky for Beshear. The  tactic had worked in the 1984 "hound-dog" com- 
mercials that Mitch McConnell used against Senator Huddleston. But the 
"life-styles" commercial was a sixty-second spot, and it is difficult to buy 
sixty seconds of political advertising on many stations. One consequence 
was that the commercial ran infrequently and was seen less often than the 
other negative ads. 
The  Beshear advertising campaign seems to have had several effects. 
It damaged Brown, it hurt Beshear's positive image, and it forced Brown- 
however slowly and reluctantly-to launch a counterattack. Brown and 
Beshear launched a series of television commercials attacking each other 
but focusing primarily on policy questions and particularly taxes. Each was 
trying to pin the "high-tax" label on the other. Brown's commercials 
claimed that Beshear was an irresponsible politician whose many promises 
to special interests would inevitably lead to higher taxes. Beshear focused 
on the property tax issue. In one commercial, Beshear sat in front of a 
television set on which Brown was shown in the April 13 debate urging 
repeal of the cap on property tax; Beshear punched the button on his 
remote control and ran the clip again. 
Inevitably, this debate played into Wallace Wilkinson's hands. A 
Wilkinson adviser saw a Brown and a Beshear commercial run back-to- 
back one day and was inspired to capitalize on them. One Wilkinson 
commercial used the Brown and Beshear ads on taxes and said: "Aren't 
1987 Democratc Gubernatorial Primary 87 
you fed up? Then speak up. Vote for Wallace Wilkinson." Another com- 
mercial ran a graphic saying, "Steve Beshear says John Y. Brown will raise 
taxes," and then reversed the names on the screen, while the announcer 
said, "They're both right, and that's wrong. Brown and Beshear would 
fund their programs by raising your taxes." T h e  ad concluded with Wilkin- 
son saying, "We have a choice: higher taxes or a lottery." 
T h e  choice between higher taxes and a lottery became the main 
theme of the Wilkinson campaign, but it did not emerge until the last few 
weeks before the primary. When James Carville joined the campaign as 
chief strategist in February, he emphasized the importance of developing a 
single, consistent theme for the campaign, one that would distinguish 
Wilkinson from the other candidates. In his speeches and commercials, 
Wilkinson stressed the sense of optimism in the state, the need for 
fundamental change, the belief that Wilkinson could make a difference. A 
paragraph in a Wilkinson brochure summarized this often repeated theme: 
"Kentuckians are proud. They're winners. T h e  people here can do any- 
thing but their leadership has failed them. We can't continue to watch our 
kids leave Kentucky for better opportunities. They do not go because they 
want to, but because they think they have to. We owe them more than 
that. We're better than that. On our worst day, we're better than that." 
A more specific theme of Wilkinson speeches and ads was the need for 
jobs and economic growth: "We need jobs in Kentucky, and I know how to 
build them. I know how to attract business development. I've been doing 
it my whole life. We need new ideas. That's how I built my success here. 
We need to jump-start this state's economy! We can't be competitive 
following leaders who've never known how to compete." 
While these themes appeared to strike a responsive cord among many 
voters, particularly in rural areas, they were not powerful enough to put 
Wilkinson in front. By mid-April, the polls suggested he had no more than 
10 percent of the vote, and by early May he was in the 13 to 15 percent 
range. All the experts agree: T h e  issue that turned the election around was 
the proposal of a lottery instead of taxes. 
T h e  lottery made Wilkinson's stand against higher taxes credible. 
Most candidates running for governor in Kentucky promise no new taxes, 
and those who are elected often find it necessary to ignore these promises. 
Voters are familiar with this pattern, and they have learned to be suspicious 
of these promises. But Wilkinson offered the lottery as an alternative, one 
that seemed both realistic and attractive to many voters. When his oppo- 
nents charged that a lottery could not raise enough money to fill the 
revenue gap, Wilkinson simply claimed that they were wrong; and the 
voters had no reason to doubt his assertions. T h e  lottery also provided 
Wilkinson with an effective vehicle for attacking his opponents. As we 
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have seen, Wilkinson capitalized on the Beshear and Brown commercials 
that accused each other of favoring higher taxes. He ran ads saying that 
both accusations were correct and that he offered a choice between higher 
taxes and a lottery. 
The  Wilkinson themes are illustrated by one ad that ran late in the 
campaign: "John Y. Brown and Steve Beshear call for higher taxes and 
oppose a state lottery. But that means you pay for the same old programs 
the same old way. Well, Kentucky's got a choice. New Leadership Wallace 
Wilkinson says no to new taxes. He proposes a state lottery, new ideas to 
get Kentucky moving again." 
The  other advantage of the lottery issue is that it appealed to large 
numbers of Kentuckians who wanted an opportunity to play the lottery. 
After Wilkinson began stressing the lottery, one reporter traveling with 
Beshear heard lots of factory workers asking Beshear if he was for a lottery, 
and he waffled on the issue. One voter was asked why he had switched 
allegiance from Brown to Wilkinson. He said that he and four of his friends 
had been driving to Cincinnati every Friday night to buy lottery tickets, 
and they were tired of making the drive. There were examples of persons 
who paid little attention to the campaign but who told friends they were 
going to vote for "that guy who wants a lottery." 
The  lottery issue was a valuable one for Wilkinson because it appealed 
to his natural constituency. Wilkinson was at his best among rural voters, 
and he also did well among working class voters in the cities. Neither 
Beshear nor Brown had a personal style that appealed to these groups, and 
some of them obviously resented Brown's wealth and celebrity status. But 
they liked Wilkinson's style, they disliked the idea of tax increases, and 
many of them welcomed the chance to play the lottery. The  lottery also fit 
Wilkinson's theme of being antiestablishment. As Carville explained it, all 
of the "right people" said that we didn't need a lottery, that it would be bad 
for people; but the people knew what they wanted. 
The  lottery was not, of course, a new issue. It had been around for a 
long time, and there had been unsuccessful efforts in the legislature to 
adopt a constitutional amendment to permit a lottery. The  conventional 
wisdom was that a lottery could not be passed because of opposition by 
religious groups in the Bible Belt. Julian Carroll told us that the church- 
oriented voters in western Kentucky, whom he knew best, were strongly 
opposed to both a lottery and higher taxes; but forced to make a choice, 
many of them decided that the lottery was the lesser of the two evils. 
The  Wilkinson campaign staff did not recognize the potency of the 
lottery issue early in the campaign. In the first KET debate on April 13, 
Wilkinson proposed that the state raise revenue for education through a 
lottery instead of higher taxes. The  next day Martha Wilkinson and two 
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other women spent the day campaigning in rural sections of Clark County. 
They were surprised to find voters much more enthusiastic about Wilkin- 
son, primarily because of the lottery. Martha Wilkinson described a typical 
voter's comment about Wallace Wilkinson: "I watched that forum last 
night on TV, and he was the only one that made sense, and I love the 
lottery." Back in Lexington, the women reported their findings to Wilkin- 
son, Danny Briscoe, and James Camille. T h e  result was a decision to 
produce a commercial that contrasted the other candidates' support for 
taxes with Wilkinson's "new idea," a lottery instead of higher taxes. T h e  
commercial, which aired on April 21, launched the new phase of the 
advertising campaign. As the television advertising campaign progressed, 
it became clear to the Wilkinson staff that the commercials offering a 
lottery instead of higher taxes, in contrast to the "high-tax" stands of other 
candidates, were working, and this became the dominant theme of the 
campaign-both in commercials and in Wilkinson's speeches. 
In the closing days of the campaign, Beshear and Brown began to 
attack Wilkinson's plan for a lottery. They argued that it would not raise 
enough revenue and would raise it too slowly to meet the state's immediate 
needs. Brown vacillated on the issue. He criticized it on the same grounds 
that Beshear used, said that he was not opposed to its being put on the 
ballot, and proposed a sweepstakes on the Kentucky Derby as an alter- 
native. It was not a clear alternative to the simple theme of the Wilkinson 
campaign. 
T h e  Brown campaign had been very slow to react to the Wilkinson 
initiatives, but a few days before the election, Brown began running 
commercials directly attacking Wilkinson. Their theme was that no one 
really knew anything about Wilkinson and that he was promising expen- 
sive new programs that would inevitably lead to higher taxes. T h e  com- 
mercials were not only too ineffective and too late to have any impact but, 
by directing an attack on Wilkinson, they may have reinforced the impres- 
sion that Wilkinson was the only candidate who might beat Brown. 
In the closing days of the campaign, Wilkinson ran a commercial 
described by one of Brown's staffers as the best commercial he had ever 
seen. It was simple and direct. Wilkinson stands on a flatbed speaking to a 
crowd. He asks, "Do you want higher taxes?" and the crowd shouts, 
"No." "Are you for a lottery?" and the crowd shouts, "Yes." 
Polling the  Volatile Voters 
T h e  1987 gubernatorial primary was unusual because the preferences of 
voters changed dramatically in the closing weeks of the campaign. At least 
one-fifth of the voters remained undecided a week or two before the 
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primary. John Y. Brown lost about ten percentage points in the last month 
of the campaign. And Wallace Wilkinson's support rose from less than 10 
percent in late April to about 25 percent in the last week of the campaign to 
35 percent on primary election day. 
Public opinion polls played a more important role in this election than 
in any previous Kentucky election. For the first time, the Courie~-Journal 
carried out three statewide polls on the governor's race, from mid-Novem- 
ber to late April. More polls were carried out by the major candidates, 
including several one-day polls late in the race; and several of these polls 
were released to the media. The  release of media and candidate polls late 
in the campaign appears to have had a significant impact on the race. By 
demonstrating that Wilkinson was gaining ground and had apparently 
overtaken Beshear, the polls convinced a number of anti-Brown voters that 
Wilkinson had the best chance of beating Brown. This led to late shifts of 
support from other candidates to Wilkinson. 
A number of the candidates and campaign staff members whom we 
interviewed criticized the CourierJournal for conducting and publishing 
polls and also criticized the media for paying so much attention to polls 
released by candidates. Obviously, polls showing a candidate far behind 
can have a devastating effect on his campaign and his ability to raise money 
and mobilize workers. In reality, of course, most major newspapers in most 
states publish the results of their own and other polls; and this situation is 
not likely to change. 
The  Courier-Journal released the results of three statewide Bluegrass 
polls, on December 7, March 15, and May 3 (table 6). All of the polls 
showed Brown comfortably ahead and Beshear in second. The  poll re- 
leased on May 3 was perhaps the most important because it suggested 
there had been little change over a six-week period. Brown still held more 
than one-third of the votes, Beshear was making little progress toward 
catching him, and Wilkinson was still back in the back with Stumbo and 
Carroll. 
T h e  Bluegrass polls can be criticized in one important respect. Each 
was conducted over a ten- to-twelve-day period and was released six days 
or more after it was completed. This leisurely approach to polling resulted 
in the release of results that were out of date by the time they were 
published. T h e  Couriet=Journal did not conduct a survey during the last 
four weeks of the campaign, and therefore it was unable to report the large 
shifts of opinion that took place. This is probably fortunate, because if a 
survey had been conducted as slowly as the earlier Bluegrass polls, the 
Courie~Journal would have been reporting a few days before the primary 
voting predictions that were seriously out of date. 
On May 14 the press reported the results of polls released by Wilkin- 
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Table 6. Polling Results in 1987 Gubernatorial Primary (in Percentages) 
Source Bluegrass Beshear Wilkinson Brown Wilkinson Primary 
Polls Poll Poll Poll Poll Outcome 
---
Date of Nov. Feb. 26 Apr. May May May May May 
polling 13-22 -Mar. 9 17-28 6-7 9-11 22 21 26 
Date of 
release Dec. 7 Mar. 15 May 3 May 14 May 14 - - 
Candidates: 
Wilkinson 4 7 9 13 15 21 25 35 
Brown 20 35 36 31 29 3 1 27 26 
Beshear 11 17 20 24 14 16 18 
Stumbo 10 11 8 9 7 6 x x  13 
Carroll 11 10 9 7 7 6 7 
Other 12* - - - - - 1 
Undecided 31 20 18 16 28 20 - 
Total 99 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: The Bluegrass polls were published in the Courie~JoumaI; the candidate polls were 
reported in the same newspaper. 
*Harvey Sloane was listed in the first Bluegrass poll and got 12 percent. 
**Data unavailable. 
son and Beshear (table 6). Both showed that Brown was losing ground; 
Beshear's poll showed him gaining on Brown with Wilkinson far behind; 
Wilkinson's poll showed that Beshear was losing ground and that Wilkin- 
son had overtaken him and was now in second place. T h e  difference 
between the polls was largely a question of timing. In the closing days of 
the campaign, Wilkinson's pollster was conducting surveys almost continu- 
ously; his data showed that Wilkinson was still running behind Beshear on 
May 6 and 7 (the dates of the Beshear poll) but had moved ahead of him by 
May 9-11. 
A major reason why the poll results shifted so drastically in the closing 
days of the campaign was that a large proportion of voters, one-fifth to one- 
fourth, remained undecided. Wilkinson's data (and to some extent 
Brown's) showed that the proportion of undecided was growing as late as 
the last week of the campaign. T h e  Wilkinson staff argued that their 
candidate was likely to be the beneficiary of the large undecided vote; if 
these voters were going to support Brown or Beshear (the better-known 
candidates), they would have done so by that time. 
T h e  Brown organization continued to do polling in the last week of the 
campaign, and on Friday the 22d the results showed Brown leading 
Wilkinson by a 31 to 21 margin. T h e  Brown staff members were confident 
that the lead would hold up, despite the fact that their survey showed 20 
percent still undecided. 
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T h e  Wilkinson pollster completed a final poll on Thursday the Zlst, 
showing that Brown's lead over Wilkinson had narrowed to 27 to 25. When 
we asked Wilkinson staff members when they were convinced that they 
had the primary won, they pinpointed the time as 3:00 A.M. on Friday 
before the primary, when they examined these results. Although they 
were still behind, they clearly had the momentum and fully expected to 
win. (The next day Wilkinson publicized these results, but the credibility 
of his claim was damaged when he made a mistake and claimed a lead of 27 
to 25 percent.) 
Though there are variations in the details of the various polls, they all 
describe losses by Brown and by Beshear and large gains by Wilkinson in 
the last three to four weeks of the campaign. Wilkinson's gain is well 
documented and dramatic: he polled 10 percent or less in late April; 15 
percent by May 9-11; 25 percent by May 21; and 35 percent on May 26 at 
the polls. 
Explaining the Outcome of the Primary 
How do we explain the rapid shifts in voter support during the closing 
weeks of the campaign? Why did Brown lose his comfortable lead late in 
the campaign? What went wrong with Beshear's campaign? Most impor- 
tant, how did Wilkinson succeed in more than doubling his strength 
during the last two weeks of the campaign? 
It is important to remember that at least 15 to 20 percent of the 
potential electorate remained undecided until the last few days of the 
campaign. For some reason, substantial numbers of voters were unwilling 
to make a commitment to any of the candidates. There are some observers 
who claim that voters never pay much attention to a primary campaign 
until after Derby Day (the first Saturday in May). If many voters had been 
inattentive, this could explain both the undecided vote and the softness of 
the support that did exist. 
Failure of the Brown Campaign 
There are several explanations for Brown's loss of support from about 36 to 
26 percent. Brown was undoubtedly hurt by the attacks in the commercials 
run by both Beshear and Wilkinson in late April and May. T h e  attacks on 
his life-style may have been damaging, and the charges that he was a 
"high-tax" governor were clearly damaging. T h e  Brown campaign was not 
well prepared for these attacks. It  was unable to cope with the "high-tax" 
charges. T h e  belated Brown commercials attacking Wilkinson may have 
backfired by identifying him as Brown's most serious challenger. Brown 
could never decide how to handle the proposal for a lottery or even what 
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stand to take on it, and his staff lacked polling data on the lottery issue. 
Also, Brown was never able to answer the questions about why he was 
running for governor. 
Brown was further handicapped by the fact that there appeared to be 
an upper limit on his potential support, a limit that was perhaps as low as 36 
percent; and at the same time there appeared to be a large bloc of voters 
who were strongly anti-Brown, many of whom were willing to support 
whatever candidate seemed to have the best chance of beating Brown. If 
Brown was unlikely to get more than 30 to 33 percent of the vote and if 
Wilkinson was gaining strength, Brown's best chance of winning would 
occur if Beshear and Wilkinson ran about even, perhaps each getting about 
25 percent of the vote. 
T h e  attacks on Beshear by the Brown commercials (along with Wilkin- 
son's attacks) were very damaging to Beshear. A collapse of the Beshear 
campaign was not in Brown's interest, and the Brown staff fully understood 
this; but they were unable to prevent it. T h e  Brown campaign staff (along 
with everyone else) underestimated the Wilkinson surge. Until the last 
few days, they did not believe that Wilkinson posed a serious threat. And 
they had no plan to deal with this threat, no campaign theme that Brown 
could use in the closing days. 
At the end, Brown remained confident and insisted on demonstrating 
his confidence in public. Over the Memorial Day weekend preceding the 
election, Brown played golf in a celebrity tournament in Louisville and 
went to a Reds game in Cincinnati. While Wilkinson was still touring the 
state, shaking hands and seeking votes, Brown was on the golf course and 
at the ball game. It is impossible to tell whether this display of confidence 
cost him votes, but it at least symbolized an air of unreality in the Brown 
camp at the end of the primary. 
Collapse of the Beshear Campaign 
Steve Beshear, on the other hand, for the last two weeks of the campaign 
knew he was beaten. He continued to run commercials and to campaign, 
but those who covered his campaign perceived the atmosphere of defeat 
that pervaded it. Beshear had been damaged by the advertising attacks of 
both Brown and Wilkinson, and his own image had been damaged by the 
anti-Brown campaigns he had run. Polls showed that voters blamed him 
more than others for running a negative campaign. 
Beshear was also seriously damaged by the polls and the stories in the 
media demonstrating that Wilkinson was making rapid gains in popularity 
and had apparently taken over second place and thus become the only 
serious challenger to Brown. Bob Johnson, the respected political corre- 
spondent of the Cozlrie~Joumal, wrote a story on the Friday before the 
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election saying that the campaign had become a two-man race between 
Wilkinson and Brown and describing Brown's last-minute advertising 
campaign against Wilkinson. 
One important consequence was that a number of local officials and 
activists who had been working for Beshear shifted their support to 
Wilkinson because they wanted to defeat Brown and support a winner. 
Some of them had originally told Beshear that they would support him as 
long as he was the strongest alternative to Brown. It also appears that some 
of Carroll's active political supporters made the same shift. 
Ordinary voters who were anti-Brown and who read the newspapers 
followed the same course, defecting from Beshear, or in some cases 
Carroll, to support Wilkinson. One important group of voters who appar- 
ently made a late shift to Wilkinson was state workers who were deter- 
mined to prevent Brown's renomination. 
If there had been few polls or little attention in the press to the polls, it 
seems unlikely that such a major shift in voting support would have 
occurred. In any primary election with a substantial number of candidates, 
voters do not want to waste their vote but to support someone who has a 
chance of winning. In states with a runoff primary, this is a less important 
consideration, because voters get a second chance even if the first vote is 
wasted. The  opinion polls in Kentucky almost served as the first step in a 
two-stage primary; they demonstrated who the two top leaders would be, 
giving the voters a chance to choose between them. 
Reasons for the Wilkinson Suqe  
Wallace Wilkinson won for the same reasons that the other candidates lost; 
he succeeded in doing what they failed to do. By late April, when Wilkin- 
son's advertising campaign began to capture attention, there was a large 
proportion of voters who were either not satisfied or at least not enthusi- 
astic about any of the other candidates. There was, in other words, a large 
number of potential Wilkinson voters. 
Wilkinson's campaign had a clear message, and in the last few weeks 
the central focus of that message-a lottery instead of higher taxes-was 
one that appealed to a large majority of voters. Wilkinson had the resources 
necessary to deliver that message, in a series of well-executed television 
commercials, again and again in the closing weeks of the campaign. 
In the last two weeks before the primary, Wilkinson made a concerted 
effort to capture as much free media attention as possible. He was con- 
stantly on the move, visiting important cities every few days to get more 
local media coverage, staging a twenty-five-hour day of campaigning to 
attract attention. (As an example, he visited Owensboro four times in the 
last nine days.) While Wilkinson intensified his personal campaign efforts, 
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Brown continued to work at a leisurely pace before his weekend of golf and 
baseball; and the steam was going out of the losing Beshear campaign. 
Consequently, Wilkinson dominated the "free media" in the closing days 
of the campaign. 
T h e  release of media and private polls late in the campaign helped 
Wilkinson just as they hurt Beshear. They demonstrated that Wilkinson 
had a chance and that a vote for him was not a wasted vote. Anti-Brown 
workers and voters defected from Beshear and Carroll to support Wilkin- 
son. Moreover, the undecided voters who liked Wilkinson's televised 
messages or who liked him when they met him on the campaign trail now 
knew that he was a serious candidate, the only one with a chance of 
catching Brown. 
Wilkinson won because he had all the resources that were needed; 
because he campaigned longer, harder, and better than anyone else; 
because he found a campaign theme that appealed to many of the voters; 
because he had four serious opponents and needed only about one-third of 
the voters for a victory; because his major opponents damaged each other 
with negative advertising; and because he alone had momentum in the 
closing days of the campaign, and every voter who was following the 
campaign knew it. 
T h e  1987 gubernatorial primary demonstrated once again the impor- 
tance of television advertising in elections and the advantage enjoyed by a 
candidate who can afford lots of ads and can package a message with appeal 
to voters. It  showed how important television can be to a candidate who is 
not well known to voters before the campaign. It  proved how rapidly 
public opinion can change when large numbers of voters are uncommitted 
and when they gain much of their information about issues and candidates 
from television. And it showed how much attention voters pay to pub- 
licized polls in primary elections when they are trying not to waste their 
votes. 
THE 1987 DEMOCRATIC 
PRIMARY FOR 
STATEWIDE OFFICES 
WHILE PUBLIC attention is focused on the gubernatorial primary, 
candidates are running for seven other statewide races. Most of these 
candidates start the race with low visibility and limited resources, but they 
must gain the attention of the same set of voters who participate in the 
gubernatorial race. 
In the past many of these campaigns have been relatively low-keyed, 
low-cost affairs, using traditional organizational techniques. But these 
campaigns have begun to acquire some of the characteristics of a guber- 
natorial campaign, with greater expense and greater use of television. In 
this chapter we describe in some detail the best example of this new style 
of campaigning, the 1987 primary for lieutenant governor, and we describe 
more briefly some of the other contests for statewide office in that year. 
T h e  1987 campaign for lieutenant governor deserves special attention 
because it was Kentucky's first high-powered and most well-financed 
lieutenant gubernatorial race and because Jones's victory surprised so 
many observers. But it also deserves attention because in many ways it was 
typical of recent gubernatorial campaigns. In the 1987 lieutenant guber- 
natorial race, there was a large field of candidates, as there were in the 1987 
and 1979 gubernatorial races. There were major shifts in voter sentiment 
during the campaign, as in the 1987, 1983, and 1979 gubernatorial pri- 
maries. Television advertising had a significant effect on the outcome, as 
in the last three gubernatorial primary races. Finally, in the 1987 lieutenant 
gubernatorial race (as in both the 1987 and 1979 gubernatorial races), the 
election was won by a wealthy political amateur who could afford extensive 
television advertising and who used it effectively. 
On May 26, 1987, Brereton Jones won the Democratic lieutenant 
gubernatorial primary with 33 percent of the vote; he finished seven 
percentage points and 40,000 votes ahead of his nearest competitor, David 
Armstrong. Three weeks earlier the Bluegrass state poll had shown him 
trailing the front-runner Armstrong by nine points, with 39 percent of the 
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likely voters still undecided. Another Courie~-Journal poll in early March 
had shown Jones running last, with only 3 percent of the vote. How did 
Jones come from so far behind to win the race? Why did the campaign of 
the front-runner, Armstrong, never gain momentum? What made the race 
so volatile and the voters so unpredictable? 
Each of the five candidates brought significant political strengths to 
the campaign. David Armstrong, Alice McDonald, and David Boswell 
were all completing four years in high office-as attorney general, superin- 
tendent of public instruction, and commissioner of agriculture, respec- 
tively. Paul Patton, a former state chairman of the Democratic party under 
Gov. John Y. Brown, was completing a second term as Pike County 
(Kentucky's richest coal county) judge executive. Brereton Jones had 
served in state Republican legislative politics in West Virginia almost 
twenty years earlier, but he had never held or sought political office in 
Kentucky. Jones was a wealthy Kentucky thoroughbred horse farmer with 
considerable experience in raising charitable and political campaign funds. 
The Armstrong Campaign 
DavidAmstrongbegan his political career as a southern Louisville precinct 
worker and used those connections to receive low-level political appoint- 
ments, including assistant police court prosecutor and juvenile court 
judge. Only fours years after completing law school, Armstrong nearly 
upset incumbent Jefferson County Attorney J. Bruce Miller in the Demo- 
cratic primary. In 1975 he successfully turned back Republican Common- 
wealth Attorney Ed Schroering's bid for reelection. 
In 1983 Armstrong easily captured the nomination for state attorney 
general. Armstrong supporters frequently noted his office's aggressive, 
though unsuccessful, prosecution of state treasurer Frances Jones Mills on 
campaign-abuse charges. It generated headlines and controversy and rein- 
forced a "tough on crime," faintly populist image, but it did not win points 
with Democratic politicians. Armstrong, age forty-five, brought to the 
lieutenant gubernatorial campaign a clean image, a reputation for integrity 
and hard work, and a record of action on child abuse, victims' rights and 
protection of the elderly. 
David Armstrong's acknowledged status as the front-runner was both 
an asset and a liability. As attorney general with a commendable record, he 
had statewide name recognition. But his status appeared to lead to compla- 
cency. The Louisville resident counted on a strong grass-roots effort to get 
more than half the vote in Jefferson County. He had been endorsed by 
U.S. representative Ron Mazzoli, Louisville mayor Jerry Abramson, and 
some other Louisville-area officials. His friends and supporters also in- 
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cluded lawyers, judges, local public officials, some labor groups, teachers, 
and consumer groups from around the state. In fact, Armstrong had hoped 
to receive significant endorsements from both the AFL-CIO and the 
Kentucky Education Association. 
Armstrong was also able to capitalize on the advantages of incumbency 
during the campaign. For example, his office had a booth at the state fair in 
the summer of 1986 (his campaign paid for another "political" booth). 
There were also frequent public service announcements on radio, "infor- 
mational" state-paid brochures that mentioned his "distinguished career," 
and press conferences to unveil programs. There was an increasing num- 
ber of press releases issued by his office during the campaign (C-4 May 22, 
1987, p. A12). 
Although the Armstrong campaign professed to believe in the value of 
organization, the campaign was not extensively organized outside of 
Jefferson County. Because of miscalculations and limited financial re- 
sources, the campaign did not hire field representatives and other staffers 
to work the diverse counties in eastern, western, and northern Kentucky. 
Armstrong, who lacked personal wealth, had difficulty raising funds. 
By September 30,1986, he had only solicited $77,000; and in the last three 
months of the year, he collected another $114,000. Late in the campaign, 
he loaned his campaign almost $63,000. His total spending in the primary 
was $582,000, compared to the $2.2 million and $1.6 million spent by 
Jones and Patton, respectively. 
T h e  campaign primarily relied on billboards and limited mailings to 
maintain Armstrong's name recognition and support throughout the state. 
T h e  campaign not only lacked the resources for an extensive television 
advertising campaign but underestimated the impact that it could have. 
Armstrong's personal campaign was less extensive than any of the other 
candidates. He is not a natural born campaigner; he does not inspire his 
supporters; and he lacks charisma and excitement, though he projects 
sincerity and engages people easily. 
The McDonald Campaign 
Alice McDonald spent her childhood in Chalmette, Louisiana, a small 
farming community just outside New Orleans. After several years as a 
teacher in her hometown, in 1967 she moved to Louisville after marrying 
Glenn McDonald, a Kentucky lawyer and now a Jefferson County district 
judge. McDonald's entry into state politics started in 1975 with Julian 
Carroll's gubernatorial campaign and in 1976 she cochaired Jimmy Carter's 
state campaign. Subsequently, she held appointive positions in local gov- 
ernment. 
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After one term in Frankfort as deputy superintendent of public in- 
struction, in 1983 she was elected superintendent of public instruction. 
During her term in that office, she was accused by her critics of politicizing 
the Department of Education by hiring and giving contracts to people with 
political connections and by efforts to get campaign contributions from 
department employees and local school superintendents. She also de- 
veloped a reputation as a tenacious promoter of primary, secondary, and 
adult education programs. 
Although Alice McDonald had a smaller campaign budget than most 
of the others, she had the advantage of holding statewide office. Mc- 
Donald expected to get the votes of many teachers and women, as well as 
her neighbors in Jefferson County. She had a statewide network of political 
connections, both from the earlier Carroll administration and from her 
successful campaign for superintendent of public instruction, on which 
she hoped to capitalize. 
She had the highest name recognition of any candidate, but much of it 
was negative-apparently because of political controversies in the Depart- 
ment of Education. Alice McDonald was constantly under attack for using 
her office for political purposes. Her accusers pointed to numerous exam- 
ples of self-promotion. She sent out huge numbers of certificates of 
recognition, bearing her name, to students with records of high atten- 
dance. For many years she had followed the practice of having herself 
photographed with individual teachers at statewide meetings and making 
the pictures available to each teacher's hometown press. Her photograph 
was also prominent in several Department of Education publications, 
including a booklet that featured a list of recent educational reforms (C-4 
May 22, 1987, p. A12). 
McDonald's organizational efforts were limited. She was counting on 
support from women and teachers, powerful county school superinten- 
dents, her past political friends, and a broad base of support statewide. She 
did not have a large paid staff or an ardent volunteer apparatus to establish 
formal county organizations throughout the state. McDonald, whose ad- 
vertising did not start until the week of May 11, emphasized direct mail. 
She targeted voters with her materials, tailoring her message to the inter- 
ests she had identified. Besides "general voters," McDonald's targets 
included women, minorities, teachers, and Catholic educators. She often 
included photographs of herself with powerful Democrats, including for- 
mer lieutenant governor Thelma Stovall and Sen. Wendell Ford (Lexington 
Herald-Leader (H-L), May 18, 1987, p. Bl). 
In the 1983 race, she was assailed for seeking contributions from state 
education workers. As she raised money for the lieutenant gubernatorial 
race, the same complaints surfaced again. In fund-raising efforts, Mc- 
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Donald, like her fellow state officeholders, trailed the millionaires Patton 
and Jones throughout the race. By the end of 1986, she had raised a total of 
$68,168; and by the end of the campaign, McDonald had spent $341,517, 
which included a $90,000 personal loan. 
McDonald is a friendly and energetic personal campaigner. She knows 
how to work a crowd and has her picture taken with everyone. Throughout 
her travels, she courted women and teachers. By mid-May, McDonald had 
visited all 120 counties. 
The Boswell Campaign 
DavidBosweIIgrew up in western Kentucky, principally in Sorgho, a small 
farming community west of Owensboro. H e  traces his interest in politics to 
his grandfather, Erle A. Mulligan, who was a political power broker in 
Daviess County for four decades, most of that time sitting on the local 
school board. Boswell won his first campaign as an underdog, running 
against an incumbent state legislator in 1977, when he was only twenty- 
seven and was an assistant planner for Owensboro's Metropolitan Planning 
Board. He won a reputation in the legislature as competent but not 
outstanding. His legislative initiatives include measures to help farmers 
and antiabortion measures. 
In 1983 Boswell won a competitive race for agriculture commissioner, 
defeating two better-known opponents, a more experienced legislator and 
a previous agriculture commissioner. During the campaign Boswell sought 
more than the farm vote. "Our strategy was to appeal to the voter as a 
whole, rather than target people with a particular interest in agriculture," 
according to his campaign manager, Gay Dwyer (C-4 April 13,1987, p. B6). 
Boswell claimed as his successes as agriculture commissioner the battle 
against the horse disease equine viral arteritis, his spirited defense of the 
tobacco production-quota program, and his efforts to promote farm pro- 
duce cooperatives. 
As the youngest lieutenant gubernatorial competitor, at age thirty- 
seven, Boswell entered the campaign without personal wealth and with 
limited name recognition but with a record in legislative and statewide 
office and with a reputation as a hard worker who was accustomed to being 
the underdog in elections. Although he had the smallest campaign budget, 
he did have the advantage of being commissioner of agriculture. Boswell 
was hoping for help from farmers, labor, and his fellow legislators, led by 
House Speaker Don Blandford, especially in his native western Kentucky. 
Boswell picked up one key endorsement from the United Mine Workers. 
Although the AFL-CIO did not endorse a candidate, state representative 
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Ron Cyrus, the executive secretary of the state AFL-CIO, said Boswell 
"came very close." 
Boswell's campaign was chronically underfinanced and understaffed. 
His organizational efforts were very ineffectual. There was no statewide 
organizational apparatus; labor and legislative friends were able to provide 
little assistance in establishing county organizations manned by hardwork- 
ing volunteers. Boswell's own poll, taken in February 1987, showed that he 
trailed Armstrong and McDonald in name recognition. On the campaign 
trail, Boswell is personable and pleasant but lacks charisma and is not an 
inspiring speaker. 
Media criticism of Boswell for his political use of his office was not as 
feverish as in the case of McDonald. But he did draw criticism in 1986 for 
printing and distributing $35,000 worth of yardsticks bearing his name. 
One month before the primary election, 39,000 copies of his department's 
quarterly publication were mailed out, containing twelve pages which 
mentioned him forty times and included four photographs of him (C-4 
May 22, 1987, p. Al). During the month of the primary election, Boswell 
appeared on $39,000 worth of broadcast advertising to promote a Depart- 
ment of Agriculture program-a new marketing service for farmers. Sever- 
al stations refused to broadcast the thirty-second radio and television 
announcements, however, and other stations added a disclaimer (C-J, May 
1, 1987, p. B1, B5). 
Boswell was severely limited by a shortage of campaign funds and was 
the most poorly funded candidate in the race. He  had solicited $131,081 
through September 30,1986, and by the end of the year had raised a total 
of $162,070. At the close of the race, Boswell's total spending amounted to 
$315,434, including a $10,100 personal loan. 
Boswell's strategy was to build on support from labor groups and state 
house members and his friends and neighbors in western Kentucky. He 
targeted farmers by using the advantages of his statewide office. However, 
the strategy proved ineffective; his base of support was too narrow, and he 
lacked the resources to broaden it with a television campaign. 
The Patton Campaign 
Paul Patton grew up in eastern Kentucky, weaned on factional politics. A 
graduate of the University of Kentucky, he became a well-respected, 
wealthy coal operator and a seasoned Pike County politician. Patton 
worked his way up the political ladder and earned a reputation as an astute, 
fair, but tough political leader. As the last of the four state Democratic 
party chairmen in the early 1980s (1982-83) during Governor Brown's 
administration, Patton became one of Kentucky's most able professional 
political administrators. He developed his own contacts, tried aggressively 
to help Democratic leaders and their constituents, and especially (and not 
typically) brought the state party's machinery into the effort to elect local 
Democrats. 
In 1981 Patton was elected Pike County judge executive, after an 
expensive and competitive factional battle. As county judge, Patton uti- 
lized his political, administrative, and business skills to enhance the 
quality of life of his constituents, whose income by any standard is well 
below the poverty level. He won high marks from his fellow county judge 
executives and some local politicians, if not from his factional enemies. 
Among his accomplishments were better roads and other public services. 
When Patton announced for lieutenant governor in November 1986 at 
age forty-nine, he brought to the campaign extensive experience in pol- 
itics and government and a strong base in eastern Kentucky. Patton's 
victory formula was based on two foundations: a strong organization built 
from the political resources of his fellow judge executives to supplement 
his own contacts made as state party chairman, together with a solid, 
unwavering, large vote from his native mountains. The  Pike County judge 
executive was the only true eastern Kentuckian in the race for lieutenant 
governor. 
The  Patton campaign concentrated very hard on building a statewide 
organization. Out of a budget of about $1.6 million, at least $600,000 was 
geared toward what he called the "political" vote. Patton had a big staff, 
eleven full-time people, most of them working to maintain contact with 
local leaders. The  campaign had chairmen in about sixty-five counties but 
no more than twenty or twenty-five counties with a really effective organi- 
zation, and these were spread out all over the state. 
Patton hoped to run best in rural Kentucky. His campaign sent out a 
high volume of direct mail, concentrating on about 125,000 voters, based 
on geography and how often they voted. Most of the mailing went to about 
eighty counties. The  staff ignored some eastern Kentucky counties where 
it seemed unnecessary to send mailings and for the most part ignored 
Daviess County and most of Jefferson, along with Fayette. The  campaign 
sent out nearly a million pieces of direct mail in all. Patton ran television 
spots the last six weeks of the campaign and concentrated on radio in the 
last two weeks. 
Patton's campaign style is very folksy; his political rhetoric is tinged 
with a mountain accent, and he projects a very sincere, caring image. H e  is 
a tenacious, hardworking campaigner. He crisscrossed Kentucky's 120 
counties several times during the race. 
T h e  former coal operator had ample financial and political resources 
with which to conduct a very expensive, ambitious campaign. By the end 
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of December 1986, floating on a wave of money from eastern Kentucky, a 
good bit of it his own, Patton had taken the fund-raising lead among 
candidates for lieutenant governor with a total of $760,661. An accounting 
of spending following his defeat showed that Patton had spent $1,586,581, 
including a $556,000 loan and a $220,000 candidate contribution. Patton's 
premise going into the campaign was that about 20 to 25 percent of people 
would vote based on geographic loyalties, 20 to 25 percent would vote 
based on politics (the advice of local officials), and 50 to 60 percent would 
vote based on the information they got through the media. The  geographic 
factor was important; Patton and Armstrong both carried their areas, with 
Boswell third. In retrospect, Patton probably overestimated the effec- 
tiveness of support by local leaders. He believed that his experience as 
party chairman and contact through the county judges would give him a 
large advantage in winning local officeholders and that voters, lacking 
interest in the lieutenant governor's race, would be inclined to follow 
political leaders. In reality, i t  appears that many local leaders who endorsed 
Patton did not work effectively for his nomination. 
T h e  Jones Campaign 
Bmreton ChandlerJones grew up on a dairy farm in West Virginia, the son of a 
state senator who for decades was the most powerful politician and busi- 
nessman in the county. At age twenty-five Jones won a West Virginia 
House seat as a Republican, the political party of his parents. In his second 
term he unseated the House minority leader. But Jones soon lost his taste 
for politics, was uncomfortable with the direction of his party, and decided 
against becoming a professional politician. He quit politics in 1968 to 
concentrate on his Huntington real estate development business, which 
was making him wealthy (C-4 April 6, 1987, pp. B1, B3). 
Jones began another career in 1972, when he came to Kentucky with 
his wife, Elizabeth Lloyd, to her childhood home, Airdrie Farm in Wood- 
ford County. Jones leased a portion of the farm from his father-in-law and 
began to work with horses. Airdrie Stud, now a large and successful 
thoroughbred operation, has grown to 2,700 acres and almost 300 horses, 
including the winners of European and American classic races (H-L, 
March 2, 1987, pp. C1, C3). 
On December 31,1975, Jones registered as a Democrat. In response to 
criticisms during the campaign that he was a former Republican and not a 
native Kentuckian, Jones had a light but controlled reply: "I was and am 
very fond of my mama, and when I was born she happened to be in West 
Virginia. I got to Kentucky as quickly as I could" (H-L, March 2, 1987, p. 
C12). 
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Before initiating his political career in Kentucky, Jones worked as 
fund-raising chairman for the McDowell Cancer Research Foundation, 
chaired Governor Collins's task force on the state Medicaid program, and 
served on the University of Kentucky Hospital Board and the U.K. Board 
of Trustees. His highest profile of public activity was as head of the 
Kentucky Health Care Access Foundation. Overcoming pervasive dis- 
belief from the medical community at its outset, the foundation has 
enlisted 2,300 doctors to provide free health care for more than 25,000 
Kentuckians below the poverty level who are not poor enough to qualify 
for Medicaid. 
Jones entered politics with the race for lieutenant governor, making 
his decision almost exactly ten years after his change of party affiliation. 
He made his decision on a Florida vacation, in some part because of a 
chance meeting with William H. May of Frankfort, one of Kentucky's 
classic power brokers. Until May died the next year, he was an acknowl- 
edged expert on the politics of highway and political finance. May was so 
impressed with Jones's incredible success in getting Kentucky doctors to 
give free medical care that he urged Jones to run for governor-but first for 
lieutenant governor. Jones's other godfather in Kentucky politics, the late 
Edward Prichard, Jr., also encouraged him to run for office. 
When Jones announced for lieutenant governor in October 1986 at age 
forty-seven, he had already been building his organization, raising funds, 
and campaigning across the state for many months. Jones ran for lieutenant 
governor on his record of achievement in business and his leadership skills 
from his diverse charitable endeavors and had large personal financial 
resources. Jones was the only major candidate who had not sewed in 
Kentucky statewide elective, appointive, or party office. 
All of Brereton Jones's opponents were elected officials, with the name 
recognition and political networks that are usually essential in winning a 
race. Jones's counterstrategy was simple: Spend a lot of money-much of it 
his own-on television and direct mail to get name recognition and 
support and build a political network from those who knew him from his 
work in health care and education. 
The  voting public of Kentucky perceived Brereton Jones as the classic 
amateur candidate, a considerable feat of conscious production on Jones's 
part and unconscious cooperation on the part of the press, since he was, in 
fact, an experienced veteran of two terms as a West Virginia Republican 
legislator. Both the designed advertising and the first several paragraphs of 
each newspaper and television story portrayed one piece of reality: Jones 
had come to Kentucky from West Virginia, made himself into a millionaire 
in the prestigious thoroughbred horse business, and used his hard-won 
wealth and influence to develop a program of free health care for indigent 
Kentuckians that did not rely on government support. 
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Jones started with a limited geographic base-the central Kentucky 
Bluegrass region. As a "private citizen running against politicians," he had 
no name recognition among voters. He won the endorsement of former 
governors Breathitt, Chandler, and Wetherby and by the eild of the race 
practically swept newspaper endorsements in the Bluegrass region and 
northern Kentucky. T h e  three governors played a very useful role. All 
three of them appeared at a news conference on October 24, 1986, and 
they were featured in an effective television ad that provided early respec- 
tability to Jones's candidacy. Breathitt was also very useful in working the 
phone at state headquarters, in calling people and asking them to work for 
Jones, and in setting up contacts. 
Although unable to gain organized group support, such as AFL-CIO 
and KEA, the Jones campaign was able to neutralize these groups so they 
would not support anyone else, especially the front-runner Armstrong. 
Jones was willing to talk issues with them; he was perfectly willing to tell 
KEA he is against collective bargaining for teachers and thinks teachers 
make a big mistake emphasizing that issue. 
Jones picked a famous Kentucky sports figure to be his state campaign 
chairman-his key media actor. Dan Issel, the highest male scorer in 
Kentucky basketball history, was used to deliver Jones's central message. 
Sports figures are always credible in Kentucky politics, and Jones picked 
the best of all. In his first political role Issel, also a former Republican, 
promoted an absolutely clean, noncontroversial image; he extolled Jones 
as the successful horseman and well-respected businessman who wanted 
to serve his fellow Kentuckians. This celebrity state chairman was excel- 
lent on the campaign trail-a good introduction to people. Issel broke 
down barriers because he is warm, articulate, and popular with crowds. 
This "political amateur" had very able and experienced people run- 
ning his state organization. His campaign manager, Steve Miller, was 
effective in organizational planning and in developing campaign strategy. 
He worked closely with Jones's Washington pollsters and media consul- 
tants. 
Jerry Anglin, who was appointed state organization director, had 
experience and skill in building county organizations. When Anglin start- 
ed working for Jones in August 1986, Jones and Miller had already visited 
about half of the counties and developed contacts in about one-fourth of 
them. In addition to Anglin, who handled two districts, the Jones staff 
included four field representatives who would serve as the advance per- 
sons, coordinating activities when Jones was in the district. A separate 
office was also maintained in Jefferson County under Miller's supervision, 
and an experienced Fayette County politician handled that county. 
Faith Miller, who had handled public relations for various government 
agencies and political campaigns, worked on media primarily in the first 
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half of the campaign. As press agent, she had to stay in contact with 
reporters, for whom she prepared detailed press kits. She targeted report- 
ers and media in general in counties of opponents' strength, particularly in 
eastern Kentucky, where she had worked for a coal group. She also 
contacted experts to prepare various position papers on issues. 
Jones's broad strategy was to begin by building a strong organizational 
base and then to develop a media campaign later in the race. While the 
conventional political wisdom was that organization was only worth 5 
percent in a campaign, he believed the figure was closer to 20 percent; he 
also considered it a prerequisite to successful fund-raising. 
Steve Miller started traveling with Jones in January 1986. They aver- 
aged about three days a week of traveling during that first year. This 
included short trips in central Kentucky and two- or three-day trips to 
eastern or western Kentucky. The  travel priorities were based on Miller's 
theory as to where the election had to be won. Initially, they focused their 
travel on those counties that vote 3,000 or more in a Democratic primary 
for governor and tried to develop an organization or contact in each one of 
those counties. At first they focused primarily on western Kentucky, and 
then they turned to eastern Kentucky. These were areas that they thought 
would be responsive to Jones's message about the need to make sure that 
every Kentuckian gets his "fair share." 
In their first visit to a county, they were careful to make contact with 
the local officials. Although most local courthouse officials provide little 
campaign help to candidates, they talk a great deal with many others in the 
county about politics and candidates. It was important at the start that 
these officials perceived Brereton Jones as a viable candidate and that they 
believed he would finish the race and spend as much as he needed in order 
to win the nomination. Although Jones had to pay his respects to the 
courthouse group, he did not want to depend on them and largely found 
that he could not. 
For the first six months of travels, Jones concentrated on meeting 
individuals. They often asked local officials, business leaders, and other 
contacts for names of persons who were not necessarily established politi- 
cians but who might help the campaign. When they came through the 
counties the second time, they would contact these people, and only then 
did they try to find specific county chairmen. 
In making their local contacts, they drew on a variety of sources. Steve 
Miller had been active in the Junior Chamber of Commerce, had worked 
in Harvey Sloane's campaigns, and had made many contacts with sheriffs 
while working for the constitutional amendment on sheriffs' succession. 
Some of the volunteers came from the health care network with which 
Jones had been working; some came from Jones's contacts with the State 
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Agriculture Board; others resulted from Jones's contacts on the U.K. Board 
of Trustees and with U.K. alumni. 
Jones preferred to build an organization of amateurs, though some had 
worked in politics before. He wanted people who were not only enthusi- 
astic and hardworking but well respected in the community. This was 
important to the image he was trying to build. The  political amateurs were 
not scarred by previous political battles. But members of county Demo- 
cratic executive committees were often valuable because of their experi- 
ence and their demonstrated interest in politics. 
The  campaign used these activists for all of the traditional local 
activities: door-to-door organizing, contacts with local media, running 
phone banks, and putting up yard signs. The  campaign, for example, 
distributed about 30,000 yard signs around the state, in addition to 500 
large signs placed along highways. The  campaign worked hard to stay in 
touch with activists. They sent out regular newsletters. In mid-February 
they held about 150 "I Love Kentucky" Valentine's Day parties across the 
state, where those attending were shown a videotaped message from Jones 
along with all of his commercials that had been completed. 
One feature of the Jones campaign was a series of barbecues at the 
family farm in Woodford County, held once or twice a week during the fall 
of 1986, with perhaps thirty to forty supporters or potential supporters at 
each. More than two thousand attended a Fourth of July picnic at the Jones 
farm. 
Jones had ample funds with which to conduct his successful campaign. 
By the end of December 1986, Jones had raised about $350,000 from 
outside sources and loaned about $225,000 to his campaign, for a total of 
$575,000. The  final figures for the primary election, reported in July 1987, 
showed that Jones spent just over $2,200,000; almost three-quarters of 
this- $1,631,000-came from a personal loan. He had spent about 
$600,000 more than Patton, and his personal funds loaned to the campaign 
were twice as much as Patton's. 
The  Jones campaign did not schedule a single major fund-raising 
event. Jones raised a lot from his friends and fellow horse breeders early in 
the campaign. Later in the campaign the pace of fund-raising declined. At 
a time when the candidates for governor were raising an unprecedented 
amount of money, it was difficult for a relatively unknown candidate for 
lieutenant governor who was given little chance of winning to raise funds. 
After the primary campaign was over, Jones made some progress in raising 
money to pay off his debt, but he had trouble competing with Wilkinson, 
who was raising a huge amount of money to pay off all of his debt. A major 
source of funding in Kentucky is business and professional persons who 
want to do business with the state; and from their viewpoint, a contribu- 
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tion to a candidate for lieutenant governor, even one perceived as a 
possible winner, is not a wise investment. 
T h e  Jones campaign gave high priority to county organizations, pri- 
marily focusing on fifty-three counties where about 70 percent of the 
Democratic primaryvote is cast. But they had at least a minimum organiza- 
tion, with an active chairman and chairwoman, in more than 100 counties. 
Organization in Jefferson County was a particular problem, because of 
Armstrong's strength; and it was one of the responsibilities of Steve Miller, 
the campaign chairman. Miller's goal was for Jones to run second in the 
county and trail Armstrong by not more than thirty percentage points, and 
this was accomplished. T h e  campaign targeted two mailings in Jefferson 
County and had an extensive advertising campaign on television. 
T h e  other candidates had conceded eastern Kentucky to Patton; 
because Jones and Miller thought Armstrong was their leading opponent, 
they went into easten Kentucky counties trying to appeal to those local 
politicians who were not factional allies of the Patton supporters. Factional 
politics still prevails in a number of the eastern counties. Some political 
leaders in these counties requested election-day funding from the Jones 
headquarters, and they were flatly rejected. Providing election funds that 
might be used to buy votes could obviously damage the clean image Jones 
was trying to build. 
T h e  Media Campaigns 
Most voters learn about the candidates and issues in a statewide campaign, 
not by personal contact with candidates or campaign workers, but by the 
newspaper, radio, and television coverage of what the candidates say and 
by paid political advertising, primarily on television. 
Free Media Cover-age 
During the campaign the media reported occasionally on what candidates 
were saying in their speeches, particularly those delivered to organized 
groups (labor, business, education), and on what they said in an hour-long 
debate televised live on Kentucky Educational Television (KET) on May 
6, 1987. 
At the KET debate the five candidates were asked about the possibil- 
ity of calling a special session because, under Kentcky's constitution, the 
lieutenant governor becomes acting governor when the governor is out of 
the state. Both McDonald and Jones said that they would be willing, as 
acting governor, to call a special session of the General Assembly against 
the governor's wishes but that the circumstances would have to be un- 
usual. When asked what type of relationship they would have with the new 
governor- a relationship that sometimes in the past has been fraught with 
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discord-both said they would work as team players. But Jones and 
McDonald said they would pursue their own agendas if they disagreed 
with the governor. 
Jones was the only candidate who acknowledged that he sought the 
office of lieutenant governor as a springboard for governor. Jones said he 
"absolutely" wanted to be governor but that as lieuteant governor he could 
learn about the state bureaucracy, focus on important issues, and learn 
"which of the political leaders you can trust and which ones you can't." 
Jones's opponents-Armstrong, McDonald, Boswell, and Patton (who 
changed his stand later in the race)-sidestepped questions about their 
political aspirations. All said they had set their sights for now only on the 
office of lieutenant governor. T h e  lieutenant governor has few official 
duties other than presiding over the Senate and acting as governor when 
the governor is outside the state. But the office comes with an annual 
budget of $1.2 million and ample time and means for its occupant to gain 
statewide name recognition (12-4 May 6, 1987, pp. Al, A12.) 
While all of the candidates tried to make good use of the free media, 
Jones was particularly effective in doing so. Jones always answered every 
question and gave the impression of being painfully honest. Candor was a 
trademark of his campaign. An example is the fact that he readily acknowl- 
edged from the start that he was running for lieutenant governor so he 
could become governor. Jones made his amateur, frank image work for 
him. He gave carefully thought out answers to questions about his switch 
in party loyalty to the Democratic party. Against aides' advice, he allowed 
reporters to watch him film the carefully produced television commercials 
that propelled him past better-known rivals in his first race for public office 
in Kentucky. But Jones's candor often stopped at the gates of Airdrie Stud; 
he refused to let a television reporter photograph him at Airdrie late in the 
campaign, fearing that an image of wealth would turn off voters. Brereton 
Jones was endorsed by a total of ten daily newspapers and ten weeklies, 
compared to a total of three newspapers endorsing anyone else in the 
lieutenant governor's race. These endorsements were the result of exten- 
sive efforts by Jones and his staff to develop contacts with the press as well 
as specific attempts to generate endorsements. Faith Miller, in charge of 
media relations, contacted practically all newspapers in the state to ask if 
they would be making endorsements in the campaign. While many politi- 
cians believed that endorsements were not important in such a race, the 
Jones staff believed that they were. In fact, one of the Jones television 
commercials late in the campaign featured the press endorsements. 
Polling and Television Advertising 
T h e  conventional wisdom among politicians and reporters is that the 1987 
lieutenant governor's primary was decided by the media campaign and 
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particularly by the television ads of the major candidates; and there is no 
reason to doubt this thesis. T h e  television advertising campaign was 
fought out largely between the two millionaire candidates-Jones and 
Patton. Because of their limited budgets, Armstrong, McDonald, and 
Boswell ran a smaller number of ads that attracted less attention. 
Two of the candidates, Jones and Patton, had an array of professional 
campaign consultants, particularly media advisers and pollsters. Jones 
used Peter Hart, one of the most respected national pollsters, to carry out 
polls for him. At the end of 1986, Jones replaced his original media 
consultant because of disagreements over campaign strategy and replaced 
him with Frank Greer, who was recommended by Hart. Patton's consul- 
tant for most of the campaign was Lexingtonian William Wester. In early 
May Patton hired his own Washington consultant, Gary Nordlinger, to 
produce a supplemental media campaign. 
It is interesting to trace the successful utilization of polls by the Jones 
campaign. Jones spent a lot of money on polls conducted by national 
pollsters Peter Hart and Jeff Guerin. They did a benchmark poll in March 
1986, a benchmark poll in February 1987, and three polls after that; all had 
issues in them, but these got narrower as they got closer to the election. In 
the first benchmark poll, they were concerned with name recognition, 
issues, and attitudes toward Brereton Jones. The  polls showed that beinga 
West Virginian and a rich horse farm owner were not serious liabilities. T h e  
polls did show that the voters liked a nonpolitician, someone from the 
private sector. Also, the polls showed a strong pride in Kentucky; people 
liked living there and wanted to believe there was some hope for improve- 
ment. 
Jones discovered that his first polls did not include questions on all the 
issues that he considered important; the polls showed education and jobs1 
economic development were the leading issues, but there was no mention 
of agricultural concerns. Thus, in the second benchmark poll, Jones had 
the pollsters add "saving the family farm," and this issue ranked high even 
in Jefferson County, probably because of all the local, state, and national 
media coverage about the plight of farmers and the displacement of small 
farms. 
Jones's pollster carried out a series of polls late in the campaign to 
provide guidance about places where they needed to do media buys. For 
example, in northern Kentucky the Jones campaign was leading with 17 
percent, with Armstrong having 13 percent, and 45 percent being unde- 
cided. Therefore, they increased their television advertising in northern 
Kentucky to appeal to the undecideds. Louisville consistently had the 
lowest number of undecided votes, so it did not pay to expand the planned 
advertising coverage. The  campaign returned to western and eastern 
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Kentucky with more media buys because the polls showed that both areas 
had many undecided voters. 
Beginning in January 1987, when he arrived in Kentucky, Frank Greer 
maintained daily contact with the Jones campaign staff and had a hand in 
every aspect of the operation. He watched the Jones campaign and got a 
feel for the entire organization. studying its strengths and weaknesses. 
Greer sent an organizational person to Kentucky to help them set up their 
phone banks, and he hired a Washington company to do the direct mailing 
operation. However, Brereton Jones wrote most of the commercials him- 
self. 
When the polls showed how important the farm issue was, Jones 
insisted that the media consultant, Greer, produce commercials promoting 
various farm themes-"save the family farm," "send farm products abroad 
instead of other forms of aid," "use made in Kentucky products," and so 
on. It was clear to Jones (from polling and campaigning around the state) 
that people in eastern and western Kentucky felt left out-the Golden 
Triangle issue. And Jones's theme was designed to overcome this, to 
suggest working together-the team approach. 
Jones's use of paid media was superb. His television ads were judged 
by some observers to be the most professional and most skillfully executed 
of any in the 1987 campaign (including the gubernatorial). He obviously 
studied his polls and emphasized in television advertising what the unde- 
cided voters wanted to hear: "save the family farm," "promote made-in- 
Kentucky products," "get tough on crime," "provide vocational education 
and not rely on welfare," and so on. 
In April Jones aired mostly the same ads that he had used in March, 
which stressed his leadership on health care and education issues and 
pushed his plan for "Made in Kentucky" labels on the state's food prod- 
ucts. T h e  ad in which the three former governors-Chandler, Breathitt, 
and Wetherby-endorsed Jones was particularly effective. A vocational 
education spot was added, and new ads were recorded the week of April 
20. At the close of the race, the campaign added a spot that promoted the 
twenty newspaper endorsements received by Jones. 
Not only were Jones's ads well produced, but Jones was good at 
delivering his message: Jones would "bring people together to solve 
problems" in the same way that he did to help build a cancer center in 
Lexington and set up a system for free health care for poor people. T h e  
script of his "vocational education" ad is typical of the tone of his commer- 
cials: "Growing up on a small farm in Kentucky, I learned the value of hard 
work. As I've traveled to every county in Kentucky, I've seen the tremen- 
dous pride, the tremendous spirit of our people-people who want to 
work. As your lieutenant governor, I want to work to break the cycle of 
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poverty, to get people the vocational education and training they need to 
get off welfare and on their feet. Together we can make the right things 
happen; we can build a brighter future for all of Kentucky." 
Another of Jones's commercials developed his theme about promoting 
Kentucky agriculture: "When we walk in a store, most of us don't know 
where the food comes from. That's why we should proudly put the 
Kentucky label on all products. It makes sense to say made in America, 
and it makes twice as much sense to say made in Kentucky. And when you 
buy a pound of hamburger, you should know if it came from Argentina or if 
it's good Kentucky beef. With the Kentucky label, we can help our own 
farmers and provide jobs for our own people. Together we can make the 
right things happen for Kentucky." 
Paul Patton, who also wrote his own ads, started his television effort in 
February, with two name-recognition spots that ran mostly on Lexington 
stations and those serving western Kentucky. Patton's new round of nine 
spots in March and April was more issue oriented and ran on more stations, 
including those in Louisville for the first time. A biographical ad traced 
Patton's life from a straight-A report card in grade school to success in the 
coal business and politics. Two other spots focused on his work as judge 
executive of Pike County, the state's largest in area. One showed an illegal 
garbage dump cleaned up by Patton's solid-waste-control program. Patton 
said solid waste was a statewide problem but could be solved. "We did it 
here and we can do it for all of Kentucky" (C-J, April 20,1987, pp. B1, B14). 
Another ad said Patton increased the county's rural water supplies five fold, 
doubled meal programs for the elderly, increased recreation facilities 50 
percent, nearly doubled the miles of blacktopped roads, and more than 
doubled fire-protection facilities, while cutting administrative costs 47 
percent. 
Patton's television commercials struck many observers as traditional, 
old-fashioned, and dull. When Patton brought in a national media consul- 
tant with less than one month to go in the campaign, there was some 
change in the advertising style. In the last two weeks of the campaign 
Patton also ran a great many spots on radio. These simply told who Patton 
was and what he had done, that he had made a real difference as Pike 
County's judge executive. 
T h e  race for lieutenant governor, the most expensive in Kentucky 
history, escalated over the weekend of April 18 as the two millionaires 
resumed television advertising that continued until the May 26 election. 
While Jones and Patton were escalating the television campaign, late in 
April, Armstrong started advertising on television and radio in an effort to 
pick up a proportionate share of the approximately 40 percent of the vote 
that was still undecided. Armstrong's ads touted his record as attorney 
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general for crime victims, child safety, senior citizens, and consumers. 
McDonald did not run any paid television commercials until May 11. In the 
ads McDonald argued that "her experience in education made her the best 
candidate because education consumes half the state budget and is the 
avowed priority of all the gubernatorial candidates." In an apparent effort 
to deflect criticism of her political activities as superintendent, McDonald 
said on the ads: "Change is controversial. I had to shake up the system to 
shape up the system." Similarly, Boswell did not start until May 11 with 
paid television commercials. For Boswell, "the most poorly funded candi- 
date in the race, the medium, and the money, was the message. 'Boswell 
stops the buck,' one TV spot said as an animated deer-with dollar signs 
for antlers and eyes-comes to a screeching halt" (15-4 May 10, 1987, p. 
B5). 
Jones's highly effective television commercials were critical to the 
success of his campaign and thus to the outcome of the election. T h e  
media campaign in this race differed from that in the governor's race, 
however, in two important respects. There was no negative advertising by 
any of the candidates for lieutenant governor, and there was no interaction 
among their commercials. None of the candidates produced and aired new 
commercials to counter the arguments being made by their opponents' 
ads. One of the important consequences was that Jones's clean image was 
not damaged by any of his advertising or by that of his opponents. 
Polling the Volatile Voters 
The  1987 lieutenant gubernatorial primary was unusual because the pref- 
erence of voters changed dramatically in the closing weeks of the cam- 
paign. At least one-third of the voters remained undecided ten days before 
the primary. As the proportion of undecided voters dropped, David 
Armstrong failed to get many of them. And Brereton Jones's support rose 
from 9 percent in late April to about 23 percent in the last week of the 
campaign to 33 percent on primary election day. 
Public opinion polls played a more important role in this lieutenant 
gubernatorial election than in any previous one. For the first time, the 
Courie~Joumal carried out two Bluegrass state polls on the lieutenant 
governor's race, from mid-February to late April. More polls were carried 
out by the major candidates, and several of these polls were released to the 
media. T h e  release of media and candidate polls late in the campaign 
appears to have had a significant impact on the race. 
According to the results of the Bluegrass state poll, which was con- 
ducted from February 26 to March 9, Armstrong led his four rivals for the 
Democratic nomination for lieutenant governor. But the poll found that 
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Table 7. Polling Results in 1987 Lieutenant Gubernatorial Primary 
(in Percentages) 
Source Bluegrass Jones Jones Jones Primary 
Polls Poll Poll Poll Outcome 
----
Date of Feb. 26- Apr. May May May May 
polling Mar.9 17-28 4-5 17-18 20-21 26 
Candidates: 
Jones 3 9 12 20 23 33 
Armstrong 21 18 18 18 19 26 
Patton 9 14 13 13 20 23 
Boswell 10 8 7 5 6 10 
McDonald 10 1 1  8 6 8 7 
Other - - - - - 1 
Undecided 47 39 42 38 24 - 
Total 100 99 100 100 100 100 
Source: The Bluegrass polls were reported in the Courie~Jouma~ information on the 
Jones polls was provided by the candidate's staff. 
the race was still wide open-almost half the voters were undecided. T h e  
poll, taken after the February 25 filing deadline, showed that Armstrong 
was the choice of 21 percent of the 518 registered Democrats who said they 
were likely to vote in the May 26 primary election. McDonald and Boswell 
polled 10 percent, Patton 9 percent, and Jones trailed with only 3 percent, 
(table 7). 
T h e  Bluegrass state poll found that Armstrong held a commanding 
lead in Jefferson County, where he served as commonwealth's attorney. He 
also did well in the Bluegrass area around Lexington. But his margin over 
the other candidates was insignificant outside of the state's largest urban 
areas. Boswell, an Owensboro native, led in western Kentucky, and Patton 
led in eastern Kentucky. McDonald's support was spread about evenly 
throughout the state, and she did especially well among women. Much of 
Jones's limited support was in the Bluegrass region (C-4 March 22, 1987, 
pp. Al, A14). 
In a Bluegrass state poll conducted seven weeks later-April 17-28, 
Armstrong's lead had shrunk in the race for lieutenant governor (table 7). 
Entering the final three weeks of the campaign, 39 percent of the likely 
voters were still undecided, all five candidates were relatively close, and 
no one was out of contention. Armstrong was the choice of 18 percent of the 
528 likely Democratic voters polled. He led Patton by four percentage 
points, a difference that was not significant given the poll's margin of error 
of four percentage points. McDonald got 11 percent, Jones 9 percent, and 
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Boswell 8 percent. The  support for McDonald and Boswell had not 
changed significantly since the earlier Bluegrass state poll. In contrast, 
Patton picked up five points since the earlier poll and Jones six points-a 
surge that moved him from behind the pack into the thick of the race. 
This second Bluegrass state poll found that none of the candidates had 
been able to generate significant support from all regions of the state. 
Armstrong drew half of his support from Jefferson County, where he was 
the choice of 51 percent of the likely voters. Patton's eastern Kentucky 
base gave him about half of his support, and more than half of Boswell's 
strength was from western Kentucky. Jones's main strength was in the 
Lexington-Bluegrass and Louisville regions. About one-third of 
McDonald's support came from Jefferson and nearby counties. 
The  headline on the Courie~Joumal story reporting the poll read 
"Jones, Patton gaining on Armstrong in race for lieutenant governor- 
Jones, Patton gain momentum." By emphasizing the gains by Jones and 
Patton, rather than Armstrong's lead, the story on the poll provided an 
important boost to both the Jones and Patton campaigns (C-4 May 4,1987, 
pp. Al, A20). 
However, Armstrong's first television advertisements did not appear 
until the day after the polling was completed; until then, his advertising 
was limited to billboards in Jefferson County. T h e  smaller campaign 
budgets of Boswell and McDonald had kept them off television to that 
point. Boswell began his advertising the last week in April, airing thirty- 
second radio spots. 
The  Jones campaign carried out three tracking polls during May (table 
7). These show that a large proportion of the voters made up their minds 
very late; almost 40 percent were undecided in mid-May, and one-fourth 
were undecided a few days before the election. From late April to mid- 
May, while the proportion of undecided remained approximately un- 
changed, Jones's support grew at the the expense of Boswell and 
McDonald, while support for Armstrong and Patton remained level. In the 
last ten days or so, Jones and Patton each gained a disproportionate share of 
the undecided vote, but Jones's share was larger. 
Early in the campaign, when the polls showed Jones with only 3 or 4 or 
5 percent, his staff did all that they could to manipulate the responses to 
the polls in the media and among potential supporters, emphasizing that 
the number of undecideds in the race was about 50 percent. Late in the 
campaign, when the Jones staff had much more encouraging data from its 
own polls, as well as from data released to them by gubernatorial candi- 
dates, it became very important to release such survey findings to the 
media. Staff members hand-carried to the television stations and the press 
some of these poll results and tried to get interviews about the polls. Peter 
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Hart's reputation enhanced the prospects that the media would report 
these encouraging poll results. T h e  Jones campaign kept its supporters 
informed weekly with an insider's newsletter on how the campaign was 
progressing and constant reporting of the polls. 
Explaining the Outcome of the Primary 
Nearly every successful candidate for lieutenant governor in the last forty 
years had followed the same career path. They had built a strong base of 
political support in one part of the state (Wetherby, Wyatt, and Stovall in 
Jefferson County; Beauchamp, Waterfield, and Carroll in western Ken- 
tucky). They had been elected to statewide office one or more times 
(Stovall, Collins, Beshear) or else had played a prominent role in the 
legislature (Ford, Carroll). 
David Armstrong, David Boswell, and Alice McDonald were each 
trying to follow that route. Each had a definable regional base (and 
Armstrong was particularly strong in Jefferson County), and each held 
statewide office. In addition, each had an important specialized constitu- 
ency in the state: Armstrong appealed to lawyers, judges, and prosecutors; 
Boswell worked hard to mobilize farm support; and McDonald claimed 
the support of the education establishment. In the past these credentials 
would have been enough. 
Each of these traditional candidates had some weaknesses, of course. 
Neither Armstrong nor Boswell were dynamic campaigners or particularly 
effective speakers. McDonald was hurt by continuing charges that she had 
politicized the Department of Education. Boswell was not well known 
except in western Kentucky and among farm groups. Armstrong did not 
have either the staff or the statewide organization that one would expect a 
front-runner to have. 
But the fundamental reason why these candidates lost was that the 
other two candidates, Jones and Patton, who lacked some or all of the 
traditional attributes, raised the stakes in the lieutenant governor's race. In 
1983 the top spender spent $361,000, and $1,225,000 was spent on the 
lieutenant governor's race. In 1979 one candidate spent $624,000, the total 
was almost $1,400,000, but the winner (Martha Layne Collins) spent only 
$111,000. But the total cost of the 1987 campaign was over$5 million. Jones 
spent $2.2 million, and Patton spent almost $1.6 million; and they spent 
much of this money on television advertising. For the first time a lieuten- 
ant governor's race was fought out largely on television, and the victory 
went to the candidate with the personality, the media advisers, and the 
resources to win that battle. 
In addition to buying the necessary television time, a large bankroll 
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can make it possible to create and staff an adequate state headquarters, 
complete with field representatives, press agents, and newsletters. Both 
Patton and Jones understood the importance of organization and were able 
and willing to invest resources in it. They had the two strongest statewide 
organizations in the campaign, and this was a significant asset to each of 
them. 
Patton's organization was a traditional one. It was built on the local 
officeholders and county party leaders across the state whom Patton had 
come to know during his tenure as state party chairman; and this base of 
support was particularly strong in eastern Kentucky. One reason why 
Patton lost was that this organization support was much less solid than he 
had anticipated, because many of the local leaders outside eastern Ken- 
tucky gave only lip service to his campaign. 
T h e  Jones organization, created with much greater difficulty, relied on 
a wide variety of community leaders, some but not all of whom had been 
active in politics. It  proved to be more reliable because its members had a 
stronger personal commitment to Jones. It  typifies modern techniques of 
political organization and demonstrates that a newcomer to state politics 
who has good staff assistance can organize the state as well as or better than 
someone relying on traditional approaches. 
Jones was able to buy more time on television than his opponents and 
used that time most effectively. He  hired a top professional as his media 
adviser but was actively involved in planning the themes of the ads and 
even in writing them. He  is a superb campaigner, not only in person but on 
the screen; and this was the most important reason why his advertising 
campaign was successful. 
For months Jones campaigned around the state, meeting individuals 
and speaking to small groups; but there was no evidence in the polls that 
he was making an impact on the electorate. None of the other candidates, 
however, had attracted strong, solid support; and the proportion of unde- 
cided voters remained very high. When the commercials began to run on 
television, Jones began to climb in the polls; and when polls showed that 
Jones was gaining momentum, voters who perceived him favorably began 
to take him seriously as a candidate. While it is impossible to measure the 
importance of newspaper endorsements, this must also have strengthened 
his campaign in the closing days. 
In a campaign dominated by personalities rather than issues, Jones 
had a great personal advantage over his opponents. His campaign demon- 
strated once again that television can shape public attitudes and percep- 
tions rapidly during election races. It also demonstrated how late in the 
campaign voters may make choices in a second-level race and how rapidly 
they may change their minds in a campaign dominated by television. 
Democratic Primaries for Other Statewide Offices 
Every four years Democratic voters choose candidates for six other state- 
wide races, in addition to governor and lieutenant governor: secretary of 
state, attorney general, auditor, treasurer, superintendent of public in- 
struction, and commissioner of agriculture. (The clerk of the court of 
appeals was also elected through 1975.) All of these officials are barred by 
the constitution from serving a second consecutive term, and thus they 
often seek to stay in Frankfort by winning another statewide office. 
Of the twenty-six persons elected to one of these lesser statewide 
offices in four elections, 1971-83, eight ran in the succeeding election for 
lieutenant governor (three successfully), and two lost a race for governor. 
Nine others ran for a different lesser office, six successfully. From 1971 
through 1983, Frances Jones Mills and Drexell Davis, St ,  held statewide 
office, usually trading the offices of secretary of state and treasurer. In 
1987, however, Mills lost her race for treasurer, and Davis retired (though 
his son sought office). James B. Graham was elected superintendent of 
public instruction in 1975 and auditor in 1979, but he lost a second 
campaign for superintendent of public instruction in 1983 and for treasurer 
in 1987. 
Running for statewide office for the first time is a difficult undertak- 
ing. Most candidates have previously held local or legislative office, and 
some have worked in statewide campaigns for other candidate. Tradi- 
tionally, new candidates have started with a political base in their own 
county and have tried to put together a network of supporters among 
officeholders and political activists in as many of the 120 counties as 
possible. During the period when factionalism was stronger, some state- 
wide candidates were able to win a place on a slate headed by a guber- 
natorial candidate. 
Generally, these are low-visibility races, and name recognition is the 
key to success for most candidates. In the past most of these have also been 
low-cost races, precluding much reliance on expensive campaign man- 
agers and television advertising. In recent years, however, there has been 
an escalation in the amount of funds spent and the amount of television 
advertising bought in these campaigns. Table 20 in chapter 8 documents 
the growth in campaign spending for lesser offices from 1975 through 1987. 
It lists the amount spent by the winner and also by the highest spender. 
To shed some light on primary campaigns for a range of state offices, 
we present analyses of the 1987 campaigns for attorney general, auditor, 
and superintendent of public instruction. All were highly competitive, 
relatively expensive races, and all represented defeats for the candidate 
who was the front-runner early (and sometimes quite late) in the cam- 
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paign. What efforts did they make to build an organization across the state? 
How extensive were their financial resources? How extensively did they 
use media advertising? What issues did they raise? How can we explain the 
outcome of these races? 
The Candidates 
On May 26, 1987, state representative Fred Cowan, Jr., of Louisville won 
the Democratic attorney general primary with surprising ease, taking just 
over 50 percent of the vote and recording a margin of 45,808 votes over the 
front-runner, Jefferson County Commonwealth's Attorney Todd Hollen- 
bach. A third candidate, Raymond Kirk of Lexington, an attorney who 
described himself as volunteer counsel for the state Railroad Commission, 
garnered less than 40,000 votes (less than 10 percent of the total vote). 
Fred Cowan, Jr., an attorney, won his first electoral office by upsetting 
ten-term Republican state representative Bruce Blythe from Jefferson 
County's Thirty-second District. In the legislature he kept a relatively low 
profile but won a reputation as a liberal. Cowan began campaigning for 
attorney general in early 1986, and he seemed assured of an easy primary 
victory until Hollenbach entered the race. Todd Hollenbach had appeared 
to have a bright political future in 1969 when he was elected Jefferson 
County judge at only twenty-nine years of age. But, beginning in 1975, he 
lost four straight elections, including three statewide campaigns: a huge 
loss to the sitting governor, Julian Carroll, in the Democratic primary and 
successive losses for lieutenant governor in 1979 and 1983. In 1984, how- 
ever, Hollenbach was elected Jefferson County commonwealth's attorney. 
On May 26,1987, Robert Babbage of Lexington won the Democratic 
state auditor primary with 62 percent of the vote; he finished more than 
100,000 votes ahead of his competitor, Drexell Davis, J t ,  of Frankfort. 
The  two-man race for the Democratic nomination for auditor of public 
accounts pitted two political heirs in their first quest for statewide office. 
Bob Babbage, thirty-five, whose grandfather, Keen Johnson, was lieuten- 
ant governor from 1935 to 1939 and governor from 1939 to 1943, had been 
planning a statewide race for some office for years. Many who know him 
believe his ultimate political goal is to become governor. Babbage had 
been a financial consultant and had held several positions in public agen- 
cies. When he ran for auditor, he was in his sixth year as an at-large 
member of the Lexington Urban County Council. Drexell Davis, Jr. 
thirty-five, was a merit system employee in the state-local finance office of 
the Department of Local Government until he resigned in the fall of 1986 
to run for office. "Drex" Jr. was best known as the son of Drexell "Drex" 
Davis, Sc, sixty-five, who had been elected to statewide office for the 
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previous twenty years as secretary of state twice, state treasurer twice, and 
clerk of the state court of appeals once. 
On May 26, 1987, John Brock, superintendent of Rowan County 
schools, won the Democratic superintendent of public instruction pri- 
mary, taking just 26.9 percent of the vote and recording a margin of slightly 
more than 4,000 votes over state representative Roger Noe of Harlan (25.9 
percent). T h e  other contestants were former state superintendent Ray- 
mond Barber of Lexington (19.3 percent); Harry "Gippy" Graham of 
Frankfort, former administrator in the state Department of Education 
(11.2 percent); Louisville high school teacher Sherleen Sisney (10.9 per- 
cent); and Evelyn Travis, a retired Louisville schoolteacher who dropped 
out of the race and threw her support to Noe too late to have her name 
removed from the ballot (5.8 percent). 
John Brock of Morehead, forty-nine, a former teacher and principal, 
for the past eleven years had been superintendent of Rowan County 
schools, where he had made some impressive improvements in the school 
system. Roger Noe of Harlan, thirty-seven, has taught at Southeast Com- 
munity College since 1974 and was first elected to the legislature in 1977. 
He had been serving for several years as chairman of the House Education 
Committee and had played a key role in the education bills passed in 
recent sessions. 
Buil'dng an Organizational' Base 
Any candidate trying to build an organizational base for a statewide 
campaign must start with the assets he or she has and the contacts that have 
been developed during previous political efforts. T h e  nucleus of a candi- 
date's political base is normally the home county. T h e  race for attorney 
general was unusual because both Hollenbach and Cowan were political 
leaders in Jefferson County, though Hollenbach had been far better 
known for a longer period in the county. Bob Babbage had an advantage in 
the auditor's race because he held countywide office in Fayette, the second 
largest county. 
None of the candidates made any serious effort to build a political 
organization in all or even most of the counties. They lacked the time, 
resources, and contacts to accomplish this. Most of the candidates tried to 
set up organizations in the counties with the largest populations and, more 
specifically, the largest numbers of voters in Democratic primaries. In 
addition, they concentrated on counties in their part of the state, as well as 
on ones where they had political contacts. For more than a year Cowan 
made trips to various counties around the state trying to raise money and 
establish local organizations. Babbage was also aggressive in developing 
county-level organizations. Each of them succeeded in creating working 
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organizations in forty to fifty counties. T h e  candidates for school superin- 
tendent relied more on the educational organizations supporting them to 
establish the county bases. Hollenbach and Davis appear to have made the 
weakest organizational efforts, apparently relying on their presumed ad- 
vantage in name recognition. Within Jefferson County, both Hollenbach 
and Cowan utilized those members of the Democratic organization whose 
loyalty they could command. Statewide candidates from outside Eouis- 
ville seemed to find that Jefferson was an unusually difficult county to 
organize. 
Several of the candidates had enough resources to hire professional 
campaign staffs. Babbage, for example, hired two full-time workers, in 
addition to employing an advertising agency. Cowan also employed media 
consultants. Roger Noe had a full-time scheduler and an office manager 
and hired an experienced campaign consultant from New York. Brock did 
not hire any outside campaign staff. 
Group Endorsements 
Sometimes organized interests are central to a political campaign. Roger 
Noe got support from the Kentucky Education Association (KEA), and 
John Brock enlisted school superintendents on his side. Both Cowan and 
Hollenbach needed support from attorneys across the state. Both Cowan 
and Noe sought the support of fellow legislators, and they played a 
particularly important part in Noe's campaign. 
Roger Noe's campaign illustrates the advantages and risks of group 
endorsements. When Noe began to think seriously about running for 
superintendent of public instruction, his first step was to seek and obtain 
the endorsement of the 30,600-member Kentucky Education Association, 
without which he probably would not have entered the race. As chairman 
of the House Education Committee, Noe had worked closely with the 
KEA on many pieces of legislation. T h e  KEA endorsement was expected 
to bring him needed campaign money and the backing of teachers. 
Some observers believed the KEA endorsement was less of an asset 
than a liability for Noe. KEA was very helpful in financial assistance and in 
establishing contacts for Noe in various parts of the state. But KEA's 
organizational efforts were woefully inadequate, and it fell far short of its 
original plan to have a coordinator for Noe in each school building. Noe 
was disappointed in the campaign efforts by the teachers, who often 
seemed cautious, reluctant, or uninterested in active involvement in 
politics. T h e  superintendents appeared to be better organized and more 
united in their political activities on behalf of Brock, at least in the 1987 
campaign. 
Noe's opponents were critical of his relationship with KEA, saying that 
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Noe was partial to teacher interests and unable to unify education groups. 
Education reform groups tended to be a little suspicious of Noe because of 
the KEA link, though Noe was identified with reform. A Kentucky 
superintendents' group honored Noe a month before the KEA endorse- 
ment but then would not return Noe's calls during the campaign. 
Throughout the campaign Noe declined to say whether he favored man- 
datory collective bargaining for teachers, an issue KEA has pursued for 
years. "My position on professional negotiations is that it's been a terribly 
divisive, destructive issue for as long as I've been in the General Assembly, 
and I'm not making [it] an issue in my campaign," Noe said. 
Campaign Bchniqm 
The  nature and scope of the campaigns, particularly the use of television, 
was largely dictated by financial resources. In the race for attorney general, 
Fred Cowan spent just over $450,000, five times as much as Todd Hollen- 
bach. Bob Babbage outspent Drexel Davis by almost a 10 to 1 margin in the 
race for auditor; the figures were $294,000 to $32,000. Roger Noe outspent 
John Brock by more than 2 to 1, $181,000 to $86,000, in the race for 
superintendent of public instruction. Noe was the leading spender in that 
contest, and Brock was third. 
Polling can be a valuable asset to a candidate who uses it well, but it is 
also an expensive asset. Bob Babbage did not conduct any polls but made 
some use of the polls conducted by the Democratic party and by guber- 
natorial candidates that were made available to him. Fred Cowan had 
enough resources to conduct two polls, one in January 1987 and one in 
early May. Both polls showed that Cowan was running far behind Hollen- 
bach, though he had gained some ground in the second poll. The  poll also 
suggested that Hollenbach's support was soft and that he was not well 
known to viewers. They suggested that if voters had more information on 
Cowan he could win the race. 
The  polls used by Cowan were important because they had a major 
impact on his campaign strategy. T h e  polls convinced Cowan that Hollen- 
bach was vulnerable and could only be beaten by an aggressive campaign 
that would call attention to Hollenbach's vulnerabilities but that would risk 
being labeled as "negative." Hollenbach had been the subject of several 
grand jury investigations, had been criticized for some of his actions as 
commonwealth attorney, and had come under attack for business activities 
and a traffic accident. 
Several of the candidates made extensive use of mass media tech- 
niques. Babbage spent $80,000 on television, the focal point being a 
commercial in which viewers watched money being burned and heard the 
message, "We're running out of money to burn, Kentucky. Erase waste." 
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Cowan launched an aggressive campaign of television ads charging his 
opponent with misconduct in office and questioning his integrity. His 
opponent, Hollenbach, lacked the resources for a statewide television 
campaign. Neither Brock nor Noe made significant use of television 
commercials. 
Because television advertising is so expensive and because it is diffi- 
cult for those running for the lesser statewide offices to attract much public 
attention, the debates televised on KET assumed particular importance in 
the campaign. In the race for attorney general, the KET forum on May 5 
changed the whole dynamic of the campaign. Like a prosecuting attorney 
in a capital case, Cowan ticked off a list of charges, ranging from past grand 
jury investigations to claims of favoritism in return for campaign contribu- 
tions to an allegation that Hollenbach had left the scene of an accident he 
caused. "The issue is integrity," Cowan said, adding that the charges cast 
doubt on Hollenbach's fitness to serve. Hollenbach responded angrily, 
calling Cowan's tactics "wild and reckless charges," but he did not answer 
the charges directly. Following the debate, the press began to pay atten- 
tion to Cowan's charges and he reiterated his attacks in televised commer- 
cials. 
The  May 6 KET debate on the auditor's race gave Bob Babbage a 
vehicle to publicize his plans for streamlining state government and his 
criticism of the "musical chairs" practice that his opponent's father (Drexel 
Davis, S t )  had used for years in running for statewide office. Pressed by 
Babbage to detail the benefits of the "musical chairs" system, Davis listed 
several of his father's accomplishments and said, "He may have played 
musical chairs, but each time they stopped the music, he had a seat." 
As a minimum, statewide candidates who cannot afford more expen- 
sive media might be expected to mail out leaflets or letters to all the voters, 
but even this may be too costly for some candidates. The  computerized 
registration system, however, makes it possible to target those persons 
who have voted in the primary most consistently in the past and are 
therefore most likely to vote again. For candidates who can afford little or 
no television advertising, a targeted direct mail plan assumes particular 
importance. Roger Noe, for example, spent a substantial part of his 
budget, $71,000, on targeted direct mail. 
Candidates for statewide office travel from county to county making 
speeches, contacting groups, and enlisting support-usually concentrat- 
ing on the counties where they have tried to build local organizations. One 
purpose of those organizations, of course, is to arrange meetings and 
events for the candidate when he comes to the county. 
How does a candidate make good use of the day or half day that he or 
- 
she will spend in a medium-sized county? How can you gain some atten- 
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tion and have some impact when you are not well known and there is little 
interest in your campaign? Fred Cowan described the typical pattern that 
he would follow: "I went to the courthouse, perhaps spoke to the Kiwanis 
Club, perhaps a press conference, went to some radio stations, maybe met 
with a few key people." In many places the campaign would not spend a 
full day, and some time would be spent in fund-raising: a number of 
individual appointments to seek money. Most candidates find it useful to 
touch base with the local courthouse officials, hoping to gain some support 
or at least make their presence in the county known to local politicians. In 
Cowan's race for attorney general, he found that often the commonwealth 
and county attorneys were most helpful to him. 
In reality, of course, it is difficult for those running for most statewide 
offices to meet large numbers of voters or to draw a crowd for a speech. 
Candidates for these offices, in search of a crowd, often showed up at 
rallies being held by candidates for governor or lieutenant governor, to 
work the crowd as much as possible. In his campaign for auditor, Bob 
Babbage, for example, estimated that he went to five or six rallies of each 
candidate for the more important offices. 
The  trend toward more expensive races and greater use of television in 
campaigns may continue for the offices that are most visible and are 
perceived as stepping-stones to the governorship, such as lieutenant gov- 
ernor. The  costs of races for other offices may rise more gradually, simply 
because it is difficult to find financial contributors willing to invest in 
candidates for auditor or secretary of state. Because it is so costly to buy 
enough advertising to gain name recognition, those candidates who hold 
statewide office and thus already have some name recognition will con- 
tinue to have a major advantage over newcomers. 
PARTY ACTIVISTS 
IN RECENT years an extensive literature has developed on the attitudes, 
motivations, and activities of party activists-on differences between 
"amateurs" (see Carney, 1958; Wilson, 1962; Hirschfield, Swanson, and 
Blank, 1962) and "professionals" (see Kent, 1923; Salter, 1935; Forthal, 
1946) and on the reasons why convention delegates support certain presi- 
dential candidates (Abramowitz, McGlennon, and Rapoport, 1986a, 
1986b). But very little attention has been paid to activists who work in 
statewide primary campaigns. This is unfortunate, since volunteer activ- 
ists continue to play a crucial role in statewide primary elections, even in an 
era of professional campaign managers and media-oriented campaigns. 
Volunteer staffers are still key actors in the nominating and campaign 
decision-making processes. This chapter focuses on Kentucky Demo- 
cratic gubernatorial activists because they are the heart and core of the 
state's political nominating process. In contrast, in some other states it is 
the precinct workers who are the most vital actors. 
An examination of gubernatorial activists in Kentucky can provide 
valuable insight into the activities and motivations of statewide elite 
workers in general. These are the most active and vital political volunteers 
who contribute to the overall political process in innumerable ways- 
recruitment of candidates, management of campaigns, fund-raising, and 
SO on. 
This chapter addresses several important questions: Who are the 
Kentucky Democratic primary gubernatorial activists? How do they com- 
pare-demographically and politically-to those in other states? Are Ken- 
tucky activists fairly typical of elite political workers in general? 
There is a vast literature on the demographic and political charac- 
teristics of party activists-local precinct chairmen (e.g., Conway and 
Feigert, 1968), local ward leaders (e.g., Hofstetter, 1973), delegates to 
presidential nominating conventions (e.g., Roback, 1980), delegates to 
state party presidential nominating conventions (e.g., Abramowitz, 
McGlennon, and Rapoport, 1986a), state central party committee mem- 
bers (e.g., Be11,1985), congressional primary activists (e.g., Johnson and 
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Gibson, 1974), party leaders and activists (e.g., Costantini and King, 1984), 
campaign contributors (e.g., Hedges, 1984), and so on. 
Previous research has demonstrated that certain social and demo- 
graphic characteristics distinguish voters from nonvoters (e.g., Campbell, 
Converse, Miller, and Stokes, 1960; Verba and Nie, 1972; Wolfinger and 
Rosenstone, 1980). Likewise, the political activist is distinguishable from 
the nonactivist on the basis of similar characteristics (Patterson, 1963; 
Milbrath, 1965; Pomper, 1965; Wiggins and Turk, 1970; Verba and Nie, 
1972; Roback, 1974; Abramowitz et al., 1986a). Voluminous research on 
partisan leaders has indicated that party activists are an elite social and 
political group (see Crotty, 1967; Patterson and Boynton, 1969; Boynton, 
Hedlund, and Patterson, 1969; Marvick, 1968; Johnson and Gibson, 1974; 
Abramowitz et al., 1986a; Bell, 1985). Generally, party activists tend to 
have income, occupation, and education levels that are substantially high- 
er than the average for their states. 
It is important to examine the demographic and political charac- 
teristics of gubernatorial activists in order to gain insight into what leads 
them to make their individual political choices. We shall analyze two 
distinct types of personal characteristics-general personal background 
(e.g., education, age, religion, etc.) and political experiences or activities 
(e.g., years of active political involvement, etc.). Previous research sug- 
gests that party activists tend to be higher status individuals than the 
average Kentuckians, and we would expect that difference to be even 
greater because we are dealing with an elite group of political activists. 
We would like to compare the personal and political characteristics of 
Kentucky activists with those of persons active in state primaries in other 
states, to find out whether the Kentucky group is typical or has some 
unique characteristics. Unfortunately, no such data set is available. Con- 
sequently, for our comparison we will use Abramowitz et a1.k (1986a) 
sample of 17,628 delegates to twenty-two state party conventions in eleven 
states that in 1980 chose delegates to national nominatingconventions. We 
would expect each of the groups to include many of the most active 
workers in political campaigns, and in that sense each is an elite group of 
activists. But there may be some differences between the Kentucky group 
and the national sample that do not reflect differences between Kentucky 
activists and those in other states but rather differences between persons 
active in gubernatorial primaries and those who are elected to state con- 
ventions. 
We examine the political characteristics of the gubernatorial activists 
for several important theoretical reasons. The  motivations of long-term 
professional party activists may be different from those of short-term 
workers who are attracted or mobilized by a particuar campaign. If we 
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know to what extent these gubernatorial activists have a long-term politi- 
cal commitment, it will help us understand motivations for general politi- 
cal activity and activity in a particular campaign. A detailed political profile 
of these elite workers will provide valuable clues to the kinds of motiva- 
tions that might be important to them. Information about previous party 
activity, political positions held, types of electoral campaign participation, 
and years of active involvement in politics can enhance our understanding 
of the motives of these gubernatorial primary activists. 
We have survey data from individuals heavily involved in Democratic 
gubernatorial primaries in Kentucky for 1979,1983, and 1987. Each candi- 
date or a high-ranking staffer in his or her campaign provided a list of 
county, district, and state chairmen and treasurers, and these lists con- 
stituted the sampling frame of activists. Questionnaires were mailed to 
those active in the 1979 and 1983 primaries following the Novembw 1983 
general election. In all, 2,000 people were contacted, and responses were 
received from 734 (37 percent) of those surveyed, a return rate deemed 
acceptable in view of the length (16 pages) of the questionnaire. After the 
May 1987 primary, 1,500 questionnaires were mailed to those identified as 
active in the 1987 campaign, as well as those who had responded to the 
surveys sent out in 1983. Responses were received from 596 (316 non- 
panelists and 280 panelists-40 percent) of those surveyed. 
Comparison of Kentucky Primary Activists 
with Those  in Other States 
A comparison of the demographic and political characteristics of Kentucky 
elite gubernatorial workers with those of Democratic state presidential 
convention delegates in eleven other states may help us gain not only some 
clues about whether gubernatorial activists differ in some substantial ways 
from presidential activists (e.g., more "professionals" and fewer new- 
comers to politics in gubernatorial contests) but also some understanding 
about political activists in general. Abramowitz et  al.5 (1986a) large nation- 
al sample permits us to make comparisons with southern and border states 
(which would be most similar to Kentucky), as well as to make a national 
comparative analysis. The  Kentucky gubkrnatoria~ activists and the state 
presidential convention delegates are a fairly comparable group of work- 
ers-drawn from a similar echelon and from essentially the same layers of 
political workers. 
Table 8 presents a comparative demographic and political profile of 
the Kentucky Democratic gubernatorial activists with Democratic state 
presidential convention delegates in five southern and border states 
(Missouri, Texas, Virginia, South Carolina, and Oklahoma) and with those 
128 Political Parties d Primaries 
Table 8. Demographic and Political Characteristics of Activists in Kentucky 
and in Other States 
Characteristic 
Years lived in state 
Less than 5 years 
5 to 10 years 
10 to 20 years 
More than 20 years 
Income 
to $14,999 
$15,000 to $24,999 
$25,000 to $34,999 
$35,000 or more 
Education 
Grade school only 
Some high school 
Graduated high school 
Some college 
Graduated college 
Postcollege 
Occupation 
Lawyers 
Technical professionals 
Other professionals 
Teachers & counselors 
Students 
Elected & appointed 
public officials 
Insurance & real estate 
Other businessmen 
Private administrators 
Farmers 
White-collar workers 
Blue-collar workers 
Homemakers 
Retired 
Type of county residence 
Metropolitan 
Nonmetropolitan 
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Table 8 (cont.) 
Characteristic 
Sex 
Female 
Male 
Evangelical or "born again" 
Yes 
No 
Age 
18-29 
30-39 
40-49 
50-59 
60-69 
Over 69 
Race 
White 
Black 
Hispanic 
Oriental 
Indian 
Political activity of parents 
Not active 
Voted regularly 
Ran for office 
Worked campaigns 
Ran & voted regularly 
Worked campaigns & 
voted regularly 
Ran, worked, & 
voted regularly 
Political ideology 
Very liberal 
Somewhat liberal 
Middle of the road 
Somewhat conservative 
Very conservative 
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Table 8 (cont.) 
K (1979183 & 1987) SD (1980) ND (1980) 
Characteristic (%) (%) 
Party identification 
Strong Democrat 
Democrat, but not too strong 
Independent, closer to 
Democrats 
Completely independent 
Independent, closer 
to Republicans 
Republican, but not too strong 
Strong Republican 
Years active in politics 
Less than 5 years 
Between 5 & 10 years 
Between 10 & 20 years 
More than 20 years 
Frequency of involvement 
in political campaigns 
in last 5 years 
Active in all 
Active in most 
Active in few 
Active in none 
Kinds of campaigns active in 
(can check as many as apply) 
Local 
State legislative 
Congressional 
Gubernatorial 
Other statewide 
Presidential 
Political positions held now 
(can check as many as apply) 
Member local party committee 
Chairman local party committee 
Elected to state or legislative 
office 
Elected to local office 
Appointed to government office 
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Table 8 (cont.) 
K (1979183 & 1987) SD (1980) ND (1980) 
Characteristic (%) (%) (%) 
Kinds of groups active in 
(can check as many as apply) 
Labor unions 9.6 14.4 16.5 
Civil rights groups 4.2 24.2 19.0 
Educational or teachers groups 16.0 29.0 26.0 
Other professional groups 33.8 24.5 20.8 
Businesses 33.3 17.8 13.7 
Church-related organizations 31.8 30.9 26.8 
Women's rights groups 6.3 18.5 18.1 
Public interest groups 24.4 25.7 22.4 
Farm groups 17.6 10.2 12.0 
Conservation/ecology groups 6.5 12.3 14.4 
Antiabortion groups 3.9 3.6 5.5 
Other issue-oriented groups 8.3 17.8 17.1 
Note: Totals in all tables may not equal 100.0 percent because of rounding or 
multiple responses. 
K = Kentucky Democratic Gubernatorial Activists in 1979183 and 1987 
SD = Democratic SouthernlBorder State Presidential Activists from 5 states in 1980 
ND = Democratic National State Presidential Activists from 11 states in 1980 
in a national sample of eleven states (Arizona, North Dakota, Maine, 
Colorado, Utah, Iowa, and the earlier named southern/border states). T h e  
Kentucky data include those who worked in 1983 and/or 1979 (N = 682) 
and those elite workers in 1987 who were not part of our earlier sample (N 
= 316). 
Demographic ProJZe 
An examination of some demographic characteristics of the 998 guber- 
natorial activists reveals that most have lived in Kentucky for a long time: 
more than 88 percent for over twenty years, under 4 percent for less than 
five years. (Some of the data in these profiles are not included in table 8.) 
Almost two-thirds earn over $35,000 a year and less than 6 percent under 
$15,000. Almost one-third have postgraduate education; over half of these 
are in professions requiring a postbaccalaureate degree, including the 
predictable 10 percent attorneys. Nearly another one-fifth graduated from 
college, and one-fourth more attended college. Only about 6 percent did 
not complete high school. 
T h e  Kentucky activists have a higher level of income than the national 
sample, a contrast that is surprising, given the relatively low income levels 
of the population in Kentucky. This may be because a number of those 
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recruited to work actively in Kentucky gubernatorial campaigns are ex- 
pected to play some role in fund-raising. Kentucky activists have an 
education level nearly as high as the national and southern samples, 
although general education levels in Kentucky are well below average. 
Another difference is the tendency for the gubernatorial activists to be 
longer-time Kentucky residents, compared to state-residency patterns of 
activists in other states. 
About one-fourth of the Kentucky activists are lawyers, teachers, or 
other professionals. Almost one-fourth are business persons. And about 15 
percent are elected and appointed public officials. There are relatively few 
farmers and white-collar or blue-collar workers. There are only a few 
homemakers, though more than one-fourth of the sample are women. 
T h e  overwhelming majority of the activists are Protestants, including 
two-fifths who are evangelical (or "born again"), with only 13.3 percent 
Catholics, less than 2 percent Jews, and less than 5 percent who identify 
themselves as agnostic, atheist, or having no religious identification. T h e  
proportion of "born again" persons in the Kentucky sample is slightly 
higher than among southern activists and nearly twice as high as in the 
national sample. Clearly, this is a regional phenomenon. 
T h e  Kentucky sample is almost evenly divided among age groups: the 
thirties, the forties, the fifties, and those sixty and older. There are 
significantly fewer young people in the Kentucky sample-perhaps be- 
cause the Kentucky sample is an elite group of party activists. Almost 99 
percent of the Kentucky group are white, a much larger percentage than in 
the national and particularly the southern sample. 
Most of these gubernatorial elites in Kentucky were raised in politi- 
cally active families; one-fifth of their parents worked in campaigns and 
voted regularly, and more than two-ffths voted in most elections. 
Political Profile 
A study of the political characteristics of the Kentucky gubernatorial 
activists shows a wide range of political experiences, but the majority are 
seasoned politicos. Almost three-fourths report that they participated in all 
or most political campaigns in the last five years. Over one-third have been 
active in Kentucky politics over twenty years, and only 16 percent for less 
than five years. It  is obvious that these are people whose involvement in 
politics is substantial and consistent, year in and year out. This is signifi- 
cant because these individuals have been identified as the most active 
workers in the campaigns of particular candidates. In addition, more than 
one-third of the Kentucky activists have been actively participating in 
gubernatorial politics for more than twenty-five years. 
Kentucky activists have been slightly more active in recent political 
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campaigns than their national counterparts and have also been active in 
politics over a longer period of time. Clearly, the Kentucky activists are a 
more stable, long-term "professional" group than we find in the national 
sample. T h e  Kentucky political elites are closer to the southern Demo- 
cratic pattern but include more long-term workers. T h e  national presiden- 
tial delegate sample includes more newcomers to the political arena and is 
therefore made up of political workers who have been neither consistently 
as active nor as active over such a long period of time as the gubernatorial 
elite workers. 
Many of the Kentucky political elites hold party and other political 
positions. Over one-third are members of their local party committees, and 
almost half that number hold local party chairmanships. More than one- 
sixth hold public elective offices, mostly at the local level. T h e  1987 
gubernatorial activists were asked about prior electoral activity; 45 percent 
had run for public office at least once, 31 percent had been elected at some 
time in local elections, and 5 percent had won state legislative office. 
By comparison with their counterparts in other states, the Kentucky 
activists hold significantly fewer local party positions. One possible expla- 
nation is that party committee positions mean less at the local level in 
Kentucky because local politics is less competitive. There may also be a 
division of labor in Kentucky between those who hold high-level positions 
in primary campaigns and those who work in the local party. Persons active 
in party organizations in other states may be particularly likely to attend 
state conventions. 
In examining levels of participation in various kinds of political cam- 
paigns, we are interested in discovering whether most activists work in 
almost every level of politics, national, state, and local, year in and year 
out, or whether many of them specialize in only one level of elections 
perhaps because of a commitment to specific candidates. Ideally, both our 
Kentucky and our national samples would include both gubernatorial and 
presidential campaign activists. Instead, we must compare a sample of 
Kentucky gubernatorial primary activists and a national sample of dele- 
gates attendng state conventions to support presidential candidates. By 
definition, each sample is active in a different level of politics. 
There are some significant differences between the two groups. 
Those in the national sample of presidential activists were heavily in- 
volved in local politics, and 50 to 60 percent of them were active in each of 
the other levels of campaigns. T h e  southern presidential sample was 
consistently more active in each level of politics than the national sample, 
though the differences were not large. Since fewer than two-thirds of the 
national sample of presidential activists described themselves as being 
active in presidential campaigns, presumably about one-third of them 
were new to presidential politics, though some had worked at other levels. 
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An overwhelming proportion (almost 84 percent) of Kentuckians who 
are heavily involved in gubernatorial primaries have been active in local 
campaigns, and 50 to 60 percent have worked in most of the campaigns in 
other levels of elections, although the average falls below 50 percent for 
presidential races. A cross tabulation of the Kentucky data allows us to 
generalize about how many types of campaigns the gubernatorial activists 
participated in. About one-third of them were active in almost all kinds of 
campaigns at the national, state, and local levels. About 13 percent were 
active in presidential, gubernatorial, and local races at least. Some 15 
percent worked in all levels except the presidential. About one-fourth 
were regularly active only at the gubernatorial and local levels. And about 
15 percent participated only in gubernatorial politics or had not been 
consistently active at any level. 
Party Identijication 
Contemporary political scholars suggest that people living in southern and 
border states may possess dual party predispositions-Democratic for 
local and state elections and Republican for national elections. They have 
even found such differences, at least in the strength of party identification, 
among party activists (Hadley, 1985; Niemi, Wright, and Powell, 1987). 
Therefore, in our 1987 survey, we questioned the activists about both their 
national and their state party identifications. There are a larger proportion 
(78 percent) who identify strongly with the state Democratic party than 
those (61 percent) who identify strongly with the national Democratic 
party- 
We find that the strongest national and state party identifiers partici- 
pate more at the various levels of electoral contests. Also, party identifica- 
tion has a greater impact on activity in presidential races than on other 
types of political contests. Activists with strong to moderate state party 
identifications but weaker national party identifications are only half as 
likely to be involved in presidential campaigns. This difference is much 
smaller when we look at involvement in other levels of campaigns. 
In the 1983 survey, we used the same general party identification 
question that was asked the presidential delegates. Over 73 percent of the 
Kentucky activists consider themselves strong Democrats, and another 20 
percent identify as "Democrats, but not too strong." The  proportion of 
strong Democratic identifiers in Kentucky is slightly lower than the na- 
tional sample and (surprisingly) is eight percentage points lower than is 
found in the southern sample. 
Interest Group Involvement 
We want to know how involved political activists are in interest groups- 
for several reasons. They may be recruited into political activity because of 
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their commitment to groups that are politically oriented. Their concern 
about issues or commitment to an ideological position may be explained, 
at least in part, by their loyalties to a group. Similarly, the preference of an 
interest group may influence their choice of a candidate to support. To put 
the question more broadly, do political activists have divided group loy- 
alties, or are they primarily interested in Democratic party politics? 
Perhaps the most thoroughly documented aspect of the interplay 
between interest groups and activists is the phenomena of sponsored 
membership. In some states it is common for interest group leaders 
actively to recruit their members to be delegates to state and national 
nominating conventions. Sponsored membership may vary from state to 
state and from election to election. For example, Thomas Marshall (1981) 
reports that in Minnesota "the issue activists have demonstrated a con- 
tinuing interest in taking their issues to political parties. Feminists; pro- 
and anti-abortion advocates; educators; farmers; organized labor; racial, 
sexual preference, and ethnic minorities; and others have all organized 
into issue caucuses within one or both parties and have sought to elect 
their spokespersons to party posts and influence party policy-making" 
(p. 153). 
The  Minnesota Democratic-Farmer-Labor (DFL) and Independent 
Republican (IR) parties are the best examples of this model of party 
activists, and it is manifest in the loyalties of delegates to the parties' 
preprimary endorsing conventions for statewide office. This does not 
mean that all the delegates to such conventions are motivated by the 
concerns of interest groups. But an unusually large proportion of delegates 
to the Minnesota party conventions, including those with long records of 
party activity, have strong commitments to issues and organized interests. 
These political parties are coalitions of organized interests. 
Jewel1 (1984) asked delegates to both the 1982 D F L  and IR conven- 
tions if, in seeking election as a delegate, they were primarily interested in 
a candidate, a platform issue, or both. The  results are as follows: 
DFL delegates IR delegates 
Both 43% 23% 
Issue only 37 25 
Candidate only 11 14 
Neither 9 38 
In the Abramowitz e t  a1.k (1986a) study of delegates to eleven state 
party conventions in 1980, Francis and Benedict (1986) report that over 60 
percent of all delegates surveyed reported being active in groups outside 
the party (either single or multiple group memberships). After analysis of 
the motivations, issue positions, and ideology of these delegates, the 
authors concluded that "in spite of the activities of interest groups, the 
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political parties are still decidedly identifiable bodies possessing a high 
degree of loyalty and varying degrees of ideological unity" (p. 123). In 
addition, as part of this same study, Hauss and Maisel (1986) reported that 
the belief that the parties have been overtaken by extremists or "ideolo- 
gues" is but a myth. At the state convention level, they found that "both 
parties seem dominated by well-informed activists who are committed to 
traditional electoral strategies and mainstream electable candidates" (p. 
224). 
Past research suggests that Kentucky political actors consider them- 
selves political activists first and interest group members second (Jewel1 
and Cunningham, 1968), as contrasted with political elites in more ide- 
ologically and issue-oriented states such as Minnesota. Both the guber- 
natorial workers in Kentucky and the 1980 national sample of state 
presidential convention delegates were asked to identify the groups in 
which they had been politically active. In terms of interest group involve- 
ment among the different Democratic samples, we see that the Kentucky 
elite workers are less active than the national sample in the kinds of groups 
we usually associate with national Democratic politics: labor unions, civil 
rights groups, educational organizations, women's rights groups, and con- 
servationJecology groups. 
We conclude that Kentucky political activists are less likely than 
Democratic activists in other states to be active in those interest groups 
that are most politically oriented and identified with the Democratic party. 
(We do not think this is a result of the different composition of the two 
samples.) As a consequence, the Kentucky political workers are likely to 
be more independent of such influences. They come closer to having 
undivided loyalty to the Democratic party; and a smaller proportion of 
them are likely to judge candidates in terms of their agreement with 
positions taken by these interest groups. 
Political Ideology 
T h e  Kentucky elite volunteers are almost evenly balanced in their political 
ideology: 36.5 percent of them say they are liberal, 37.5 percent are 
conservative, and 26 percent cling to the middle of the road. Most liberals 
and conservatives use the adjective somewhat rather than very to describe 
their position. This balanced position makes the Kentucky activists con- 
siderably less liberal than either the southern or the national sample of 
presidential party activists. One reason for this difference, particularly in 
the South, may be that presidential politics attracts activists who are more 
in tune with the liberal position of the national Democratic party. The  fact 
that Kentucky activists are less likely to be active in interest groups 
oriented to the national Democratic party helps to explain their weaker 
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commitment to liberal positions. It is also worth recalling that 8 percent of 
the national sample and 17 percent of the southern sample are blacks who 
are more liberal in their preferences, and this contributes to the more 
liberal profile of these groups. 
ConcLusion 
T h e  Kentucky Democratic primary gubernatorial activists are the elites of 
party activists. Although they are longtime Kentucky residents, they are 
not typical Kentuckians in profession, education, or wealth. Their in- 
volvement in various types of political contests is intense, and year in and 
year out they apparently try to find candidates for whom they can cam- 
paign. They might be classified as "professional" long-term workers, in 
contrast to "amateurs" who are drawn into politics by a particular candi- 
date, goal, or issue. 
We have noted many similarities, socially and politically, between 
Kentucky gubernatorial supporters and the state presidential convention 
delegates in Abramowitz e t  al.'s (1986a) eleven-state study. Most of the 
differences between the two groups reflect the greater stability of activity, 
membership, and involvement of Kentucky gubernatorial activists com- 
pared to that found in presidential delegates in other states. Kentucky 
gubernatorial activists appear fairly typical of political activists in general, 
with a few noteworthy exceptions: their long-term stability of participa- 
tion, their lower level of involvement in interest groups, and their greater 
conservatism. 
Motivations of Political Activists in Gubernatorial Primaries 
In recent years, political scientists have focused considerable attention on 
the motives, goals, and purposes of political leaders and activists, but they 
have paid little or no attention to state primary activists. Our purpose in 
this section is to identify the reasons why such persons become actively 
involved in gubernatorial primaries. 
The  motivations of gubernatorial primary activists can be analyzed 
from the perspective of the incentive literature (Clark and Wilson, 1961; 
Wilson, 1973; Olson, 1965; Moe, 1980). Research on political leaders' and 
activists' motivations has often been guided by Clark and Wilson's distinc- 
tion among three types of incentives that organizations may offer partici- 
pants in return for their contributions: "material," "solidary," or "pur- 
posive." "Material" incentives are tangible rewards that have monetary 
value or can be translated into monetary terms. "Solidary" incentives are 
intangible rewards that result mainly from the act of associating and 
include socializing, group identification, member status, and fun seeking. 
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"Purposive" incentives are also intangible but pertain to the stated ends of 
association rather than to association per se; they involve suprapersonal 
ends-"the demand for the enactment of certain laws or the adoption of 
certain practices" (p. 135). 
Over the last two decades, numerous researchers have adopted or 
adapted Clark and Wilson's categories in analyses of political activists of 
various types-party leaders and activists (e.g., Costantini and King, 
1984), campaign contributors (e.g., Hedges, 1984), delegates to presiden- 
tial nominating conventions (e.g., Roback, 1980), local ward leaders (e. g., 
Hofstetter, 1973), and so on. T h e  dominant concern of these analyses has 
been to determine why people are active in politics, not why they become 
involved in particular candidates' campaigns. Whatever the focus of these 
studies, the Clark and Wilson typology is clearly the prevailing conceptual 
framework in the analysis of political motivations. There is, however, 
considerable divergence among these studies in operationalizations of the 
Clark-Wilson motivational categories. 
While the Clark-Wilson categories and adaptations and extensions 
thereof continue to hold sway in the literature, studies of local party 
organization have suggested other models. Kent (1923), Salter (1935), 
Gosnell (1937), and Forthal (1946) presented a "professional" model, in 
which the party organization was seen as attracting and disciplining work- 
ers through material incentives, making nonideological appeals and ori- 
enting itself toward obtaining votes. Carney (1958), Wilson (1962), and 
Hirschfield et al. (1962), on the other hand, presented an "amateur" 
model, in which the party activist is seen as more ideologically oriented, 
seeking reforms or improved services. A "candidate-oriented" model was 
summarized by Schlesinger (1965), who argued that the basic unit of party 
organization is focused on a collective effort to capture a single public 
office. Neither material nor ideological, the organization seeks control at 
some time, however far in the future. 
We will explore sources of activists' motivations for participating in 
gubernatorial primaries in terms of material incentives, solidary incen- 
tives, purposive incentives, and attraction to or linkage with a candidate. 
T h e  first three of these models have their theoretical foundations in the 
incentive theory literature, while the underpinnings of the fourth are in 
Schlesinger's (1965) "candidate-oriented" model of party organization. 
Predicton of Incentives 
If, as there is strong reason to assume, different persons have different 
motives for becoming active in political campaigns, then an important 
question arises: Is there any discernible patterning to the distribution of 
motivations? That is, are certain types of people more likely to be moti- 
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vated by certain kinds of incentives? There has been some attention to this 
question in the literature, but no body of theory is available to help us find 
answers. The  literature provides only scattered hints about the factors that 
might shape motivations. 
Are younger, better-educated persons, or those most active in certain 
groups, or ideologues likely to have stronger issue motivations? Are those 
who have been most active in politics or who have held more party 
positions less affected by issues? These possibilities relate to the distinc- 
tion between the more professional and experienced party leader who is 
driven by career or job goals or social or friendship factors and the younger, 
enthusiastic amateur who is motivated by issues. This distinction between 
professional and amateur is almost certainly overdrawn, but it nonetheless 
provides a good starting point. 
Reasons for Involvement in Gubernatorial Campaigns 
Respondents to our questionnaire were asked about their activities and 
motivations for participation in the 1979, 1983, andlor 1987 primaries. For 
each primary in which they indicated that they had actively supported a 
gubernatorial candidate, they were then asked to consider a set of items 
pertaining to their motivations for involvement. Consequently, many 
respondents gave reasons for their involvement in all three primaries, 
while others explained their involvement in either 1979 or 1983 or 1987. 
Reasons for becoming involved in the 1979, 1983, and/or 1987 primary 
campaigns were probed in a series of thirteen Likert-type items, similar to 
those used in several previous studies. 
Table 9 summarizes the respondents' stated motivations for active 
involvement in the 1979,1983, and 1987 gubernatorial primaries. The  most 
conspicuous features of these responses for all three primaries are the 
emphasis placed upon supporting particular candidates, the widespread 
endorsement of "good citizen" motivations, and the lack of emphasis on 
material incentives. Over 80 percent of the respondents said that "sup- 
porting a particular candidate I believe in" was a very important reason for 
their involvement. Similarly, more than three-quarters asserted that 
"fulfilling civic responsibilities," "influencing policies of government," 
and "working for issues" were very or somewhat important motivations. 
By contrast, more than 70 percent indicated that business and personal 
political gains were not very important factors in their involvement. 
These findings bear out conclusions reached in several prior studies. 
For example, both Kirkpatrick (1976), in her study of delegates to the 1972 
presidential nominating conventions, and Hedges (1984), in his study of 
campaign contributors, reported that those activists downplayed business 
reasons and other material incentives to roughly the same extent as did the 
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Table 9. Activists' Motivations for Involvement, 1979, 1983, 1987 
very Somewhat 
Motive Number important important 
To work with a 546 31.0 40.8 
certain group of 861 26.9 38.2 
people with whom I 549 20.2 33.7 
have political ties 
To develop social 536 20.5 31.7 
contacts with people 854 16.7 36.4 
with similar interests 549 13.1 33.2 
To enjoy the 
excitement of the 
campaign 
To work with friends 
and relatives who 
support a particular 
candidate 
To work for a 
candidate because of 
personal friendship 
with him or her 
To help my own 
political career 
To obtain a local or 
state government job 
To make business 
contacts 
To work for issues I 
feel strongly about 
To influence policies 
of government 
To fulfill my civic 
responsibilities 
To support a 
candidate who 
advocates the goals of 
an interest group of 
which I am a member 
Not very 
important 
15.0 
19.6 
25.5 
Not at all 
important 
13.2 
15.2 
20.6 
Total 
percent 
Party Activists 
Table 9 (cont.) 
very Somewhat Not very Not at all Total 
Motive Number important important important important percent 
To support a 563 82.4 14.9 2.3 0.4 100.0 
particular candidate I 866 87.5 10.5 1.6 0.5 100.1 
believe in 549 85.6 12.6 1.6 0.3 100.1 
Note: The first entry in each cell is for 1979, the second for 1983, and the third for 1987. 
Totals may not equal 100.0 percent because of rounding. 
Kentucky activists. Also, more than 75 percent of the contributors in 
Hedges's study and the Republican convention delegates in Roback's 
(1980) cited "good citizen" reasons as underlying their political involve- 
ment; that percentage is similar to the "good citizen" responses of the 
Kentucky gubernatorial activists. T h e  new element, distinctive to table 9 
and not emphasized in prior research, is of course the candidate motivation 
of the Kentucky volunteers. Attraction to a specific candidate was clearly 
the predominant motivator in the gubernatorial primary campaigns ana- 
lyzed here. This motivation may or may not be equally strong in other 
political settings, but at the very least typologies of activists' motivations 
should be expanded to take it into account. 
In comparing the results for 1979 with those for 1983 and for 1987, it is 
apparent that the percentages on individual items are similar for all motiva- 
tional items. T h e  1983 activists did stress "civic responsibilities" and 
"influencing policies of government" somewhat more, whereas the 1979 
activists rated more positively "working with a particular group," "obtain- 
ing a local or state job," and "interest group goals." In contrast, the 1987 
elite volunteers stressed "working for issues" somewhat more than either 
the 1979 or 1983 activists. But these differences were relatively minor and 
should not be permitted to obscure the overriding similarity of responses 
in the three primaries. 
In order to explore the structure of the activists' motivations, factor 
analysis was used to reduce the thirteen items to a smaller number of 
underlying dimensions. Table 10 presents the pattern matrices, using an 
oblique rotation. T h e  item on "support of a particular candidate I believe 
in" had to be excluded from the factor analyses since most activists 
strongly emphasized this reason, thus creating very little variation. 
T h e  remaining twelve items formed three dimensions, accounting for 
51.1 percent of the total variance in 1979, 48.8 percent in 1983, and 49.8 
percent in 1987. T h e  first dimension, on which the highest-loading items 
included "to work with a certain group with whom I have political ties," 
"to develop social contacts with people with similar interests," "to enjoy 
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Xble 10. Motivations for Involvement in 1979, 1983, 1987 Primaries: 
Oblique Rotated Factor MatricesX 
- -- 
Solidary Material Purposive 
Motive 1979 1983 1987 1979 1983 1987 1979 1983 1987 
To work with a 
certain group of 
people with 
whom I have 
political ties .724 SO7 .602 .046 .I98 .lo9 - .085 .096 .095 
To develop social 
contacts with 
people with 
similar interests .624 .370 .737 .I63 .249 .089 .088 248 .068 
To enjoy the 
excitement of the 
campaign .533 .326 .725 .053 .273 - .008 .048 .083 .042 
To work with 
friends and rela- 
tives who support 
a particular 
candidate 
To work for a 
candidate because 
of personal 
friendship with 
him or her .446 .427 .I98 -.070 .013 .I76 .017 -.036 -.I63 
To help my own 
political career - .009 - .035 - .031 .809 .724 .742 - .036 - .048 - .007 
the excitement of the campaign," and "to work with friends and relatives 
who support a particular candidate," quite clearly tapped solidary motiva- 
tions. Similarly, the high loadings of "to help my own political career," "to 
make business contacts," and "to obtain a local or state government job" 
indicate that the second factor tapped material motivations. Four other 
items ("to work for issues I feel strongly about," "to influence policies of 
government," "to fulfill my civic responsibilities," and "to support a 
candidate who advocates the goals of an interest group of which I am a 
member") formed a third dimension that fit very nicely with the concept of 
purposive incentives (although the loadings on the interest group item 
were lower than for most other items in 1979 and 1987). T h e  very same 
motivational items loaded on the same factors in each of the three primary 
campaigns. These dimensions are, of course, what would be anticipated 
on the basis of the Clark and Wilson typology of incentives, and the results 
Table 10 (cont.) 
Solidary Material Purposive 
Motive 1979 1983 1987 1979 1983 1987 1979 1983 1987 
To obtain a local 
or state 
governmentjob -.034 .030 ,044 .701 507 .531 -.080 .051 -.019 
To make business 
contacts .I14 .047 .035 .535 .653 .609 .I14 - .029 .047 
To work for issues 
I feel strongly 
about -.004 -.008 .018 -.I54 -.I65 -.060 .589 .648 .413 
To influence 
policies of 
government -116 -.I60 -.067 .I34 .I49 .245 .581 .464 .539 
To+ulfill my civic 
responsibilities .I12 .030 .I02 - .079 .027 - .074 .392 290 301 
To support a 
candidate who 
advocates the 
goals of an 
interest group of 
which I am a 
member .I18 .I14 .lo6 .I25 -.004 .I16 .275 .448 .I48 
Eigenvalue for 
unrotated solution 2.95 3.12 3.28 1.81 1.45 1.44 1.38 1.29 1.25 
Percent of total 
variance 24.50 26.00 27.40 15.00 12.10 12.00 11.50 10.80 10.40 
*Direct Oblimin Rotation using the SPSSX factor analysis procedure. The total variance 
explained in 1979 is 51.1 percent; for 1983, 48.8 percent; for 1987, 49.8 percent. 
presented in table 10 thus bear out earlier indications that the Clark- 
Wilson typology is empirically fruitful (see e.g., Hofstetter, 1973; Hedges, 
1984). 
On the basis of these factor analyses, sets of items were combined 
additively to form a summary score for each respondent on each dimension 
in a given year. Thus, a respondent's scores on the 1979 "to work with a 
certain group with whom I have political ties," "to develop social contacts 
with people with similar interests," "to enjoy the excitement of the 
campaign," and "to work with friends and relatives who support a par- 
ticular candidate" items were summed to create an index of solidary 
incentives for that year. The  same was done for 1983 and 1987; and parallel 
procedures were followed for the remaining dimensions. Since, as table 10 
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indicates, the "to work for a candidate because of personal friendship with 
him or her" item did not load highly on any of these factors (though in both 
1979 and 1983 it did load moderately on the "solidary" factor), it was used 
by itself as an indicator of the fourth type of motivation to which we 
referred above-attraction to or linkage with a candidate. 
In each year none of these motivational dimensions proved to be 
highly related to any other. Accordingly, we are dealing with motivations 
that are, by and large, independent of one another. On the other hand, 
scores on a given motivational dimension in 1979 were strongly correlated 
with scores on the same dimension in 1983 and 1987. Still, there was 
enough slippage among the 1979, 1983, and 1987 motivations that these 
activists were obviously not identically motivated in the three primary 
campaigns. This was especially true on the candidate-linkage dimension, 
which is not at all surprising in light of the candidate turnover from 1979 to 
1983 to 1987. 
Explaining Activists' Motivations 
In previous research (1984), drawing on our survey of 734 activists who 
played substantial volunteer roles in the 1979 and/or 1983 gubernatorial 
primary campaigns, Miller studied whether certain types of people are 
more likely to be motivated by certain kinds of incentives. T h e  dependent 
variables for the 1979 and 1983 incentive models include the three motiva- 
tional indices-solidary, material, and purposive-plus the candidate- 
linkage motivational item discussed above. The  independent variables 
include demographic characteristics (sex, age, education, place of resi- 
dence, income, years of residence in Kentucky, and occupation) and 
personal political variables (political positions held, frequency of political 
involvement, years of active involvement in Kentucky politics, and politi- 
cal philosophy). 
Let us briefly summarize the findings of multiple regression analyses. 
In the solidary model for 1979, age, residence, frequency of activity, and 
candidate preference are all related to solidary motivations, with younger, 
rural, and more intensely involved activists being more solidary oriented. 
Elite workers from nonmetropolitan counties have fewer available alter- 
natives for satisfying the need for association. It is a natural tendency 
among younger people to look for personal social connections via politics 
and civic organizations. The  significance of frequent involvement sub- 
stantiates earlier findings that a solidary reason is one that keeps people in 
politics and brings them back again and again even though it may not be 
the original reason for involvement (see Conway and Feigert, 1968). T h e  
1983 results for the solidary model are highly consistent with those for 
1979. Again, those who lived outside urban areas, who were younger, and 
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who were more intensely involved were significantly more solidary in 
motivational tendencies. 
For the material model for 1979, the significant findings are that the 
more materialistically motivated activists were younger, males, and those 
who held or had held more political andlor party positions. T h e  signifi- 
cance of young, male materialism fits societal norms: career advancement 
is anticipated. In 1983 younger activists were again more materialistic, as 
were lawyers, public officials, and businessmen. In Kentucky (as else- 
where), the practice of law has always been associated with the exercise of 
political influence. 
T h e  1979 findings for the purposive model reveal a very different set of 
influences. T h e  only significant findings are that those with more educa- 
tion tended to be more issue oriented and civic-minded, while lawyers 
were far less purposively oriented than any other occupational group. More 
educated people might be expected to be more issue oriented and civic 
minded, for education involves, to some extent, formulating thoughts 
about public concerns. As for lawyers, the findings concerning purposive 
motivations reinforce the image that was suggested by the findings for 
material motivations: lawyers tend to be oriented toward personal gain 
rather than the advancement of political causes. In 1983 lawyers were again 
significantly less purposive than every other occupational group. Those 
who had been intensely involved in political campaigns over the past five 
years were also significantly more purposive, as were those who had lived 
longer in Kentucky. 
In explaining the candidate-oriented motivation, we find that activists 
with higher incomes were significantly more motivated by personal friend- 
ship with a candidate. This makes considerable sense: wealthier people 
are more likely to move in elite circles, wherein they come to know 
prominent politicians. Moreover, wealthier people are more likely to be 
sought out by candidates for contributions of money and expertise. Work- 
ers (including farmers and blue- and white-collar workers) were signifi- 
cantly less candidate oriented than members of any other occupational 
group-hardly surprising in a state lacking a strong labor movement or a 
tradition of mass participation in party affairs. In Kentucky gubernatorial 
candidates are not drawn from the ranks of the lower classes, and the bonds 
of personal friendship tend to be restricted to the members of one's own 
social class. 
In both 1979 and 1983 we also found some evidence that different 
motivations were emphasized by supporters of particular candidates. T h e  
supporters of candidates who were more closely identified with the tradi- 
tional organization were more likely to stress solidary and materialistic 
motivations than those backing candidates who were "outsiders." Sup- 
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porters of some candidates were significantly more candidate oriented 
than others. There were few differences among the candidate groups in 
the emphasis put on purposive motivations. 
Overall, we found considerable comparability in findings for the 
motivation models in both primary campaigns. T h e  differences between 
the two campaigns are suggestive of changes in the political environment 
between the two periods and the type of candidates running in both 
primary contests. 
By identifying motivations for working in specific gubernatorial cam- 
paigns, we shed new light on why people become actively involved in 
politics. T h e  motivations of Kentucky gubernatorial primary activists are, 
as we have seen, reasonably similar to those uncovered in studies of other 
groups of political workers (see e.g., Kirkpatrick, 1976; Roback, 1980; 
Hedges, 1984). When we examined the motivational responses of these 
activists in detail, we saw that differences in motivation were largely 
reducible to three underlying dimensions-the same three motivations 
outlined by Clark and Wilson: solidary, material, and purposive. This is 
true despite the fact that Clark and Wilson sought to explain the nature of 
political organizations and we have been examining gubernatorial activists 
who are not in a formal organizational setting. 
We have gone on to examine the sources of variation in activists' 
motivations for participating in gubernatorial primaries. Since no well- 
articulated theory exists, this has primarily been an exploratory analysis. 
Activists' motivations for involvement are, in part at least, understandable 
in terms of their personal and political characteristics, experiences, and 
preferences. These activists differed from one another in terms of their 
motivations for involvement in some fairly predictable ways (lawyers, for 
example, being more motivated by material considerations). 
On the other hand, these variables have only very limited predictive 
power, for several reasons. The  activists are quite homogeneous in many 
characteristics, and many of them emphasized more than one of the broad 
categories of motivations-making distinctions between those holding 
these motivations less clear. There is also a methodological problem, 
because we were forced to correlate demographic and political charac- 
teristics existing in 1983 with motivations for involvement in both 1979 and 
1983 campaigns. Also, to some extent, differences in motivation are apt to 
be idiosyncratic-subject to a matrix of personal and situational factors far 
too complex to be fully understood by the participants themselves or 
reliably and validly measured via the tools of survey research. 
Perhaps the primary lesson to be learned from this analysis is that it is 
perilous to study motivations for high-level political activity apart from the 
context provided by the specific political campaign. Not only are some 
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activists drawn to political involvement by their attraction for or linkage 
with a particular candidate (a point too often ignored in prior studies of 
activists' motivations), but different candidates, to judge from our Ken- 
tucky data, tend to attract rather differently motivated campaign workers. 
At one level, political observers have long known this, the enduring image 
of the 1968 campaign for the Democratic presidential nomination serving 
as a superb case in point of differences in political motivations among 
active supporters of different primary candidates (e.g., the purposive 
supporters of Eugene McCarthy and George Wallace, as opposed to the 
solidary and material motivations of many Humphrey activists). But this 
insight has not sufficiently informed systematic research on activists' 
motivations. Our findings in Kentucky about the role of particular candi- 
dates in attracting activists with different motivations represent a step 
toward redressing this oversight. 
Future Political Activity 
Some studies of political party workers have focused on why activists 
remain involved in politics and what they would miss most if they gave up 
politics. Conway and Feigert (1968) showed that ideological or purposive 
rewards were the principal attraction for Democratic and Republican 
precinct chairmen, but when asked what they would miss most if they gave 
up their posts, they cited personal or social rewards most often. Eldersveld 
(1964), in a study of local Detroit political party members, and Grupp 
(1971), in a study of members of the John Birch Society, found, in at least 50 
percent of the relevant cases, that individuals who initiated their mem- 
bership for purposive reasons replaced those reasons with either material 
or solidary incentives. Bowman, Ippolito, and Donaldson (1969), in their 
study of the maintenance of activism among local party officials in two 
Massachusetts and three North Carolina communities, found that factors 
that apparently distinguished those who planned to continue from those 
who planned to quit were the relative importance attached to party loyalty 
and to the importance of the party office. 
In another study, Bell (1985) found that among California state central 
committee members, members of both parties were primarily motivated 
by purposive concerns, but ties to the community and the party followed 
right behind. Purposive motivations appeared to sustain these activists, 
and feelings of allegiance increased over time. When these political work- 
ers were asked what they would miss most if they were to end their 
political activity, over 43 percent of the activists mentioned that they 
would miss most what can generally be categorized as the "feeling of 
contributing to a cause or issue I believe in." Bell's findings suggest that 
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the future political party will be dominated by purposive activists. In 
contrast to Bell's findings, in their study of Democratic and Republican 
Pittsburgh committeepersons, Margolis and Owen (1985) found that the 
most important sustaining motivations for political involvement included 
"less obligation or commitment toward the party as an organization, more 
concern for personal interest, and less concern for party and community 
interest" (p. 320). 
When questioned whether they would be willing to remain active in 
politics, three-fifths of the Kentucky gubernatorial activists in 1983 and 
1987 said that they would definitely be willing to remain politically active, 
and another one-fourth stated that they would probably be willing. Less 
than 1 percent of the elite volunteers responded that they definitely would 
be unwilling to remain active in politics. 
In order to have a better understanding about why Kentucky activists 
are so willing to remain involved in electoral battles, we develop a model of 
willingness to remain active in politics. We posit that those who are long- 
term, frequently mobilized, and more strongly identified with the Demo- 
cratic party would be more likely to want to remain politically involved. 
Also, we suggest that activists who are more solidary oriented or material 
oriented would indicate a greater willingness to remain in politics. A 
solidary reason is one that keeps people in politics and brings them back 
again and again (Conway and Feigert, 1968). Those activists who are highly 
motivated by material concerns would want to keep reaping the monetary 
and other tangible patronage rewards of political involvement. Further- 
more, workers who identify strongly and positively with the primary and 
their specific campaign group (i.e., "good feelings" about the primary) and 
who do not experience a devastating primary loss should tend to desire 
future political involvement. 
T h e  sample for this mods1 includes the supporters of all the Demo- 
cratic gubernatorial candidates in 1983. T h e  dependent variable for the 
regression analysis involves the willingness to remain active in politics in 
the future; it is measured by a five-point Likert scale. T h e  independent 
variables include activists' broad motivations for involvement, attitudes 
about their political involvement, previous level of political activity, per- 
sonal political characteristics, and candidate preference indicators. 
T h e  regression results summarized in table 11 indicate that the inde- 
pendent variables explain almost one-third of the variation in 1983 guber- 
natorial primary workers' willingness to remain active in the future. 
Personal political variables, motivations for involvement, and attitudinal 
views about the 1983 primary are all related to future political involve- 
ment. Activists who are more long-term, intensely involved, and more 
strongly identified with the Democratic party appear to be more willing to 
remain active in politics. 
Table 11. Activists' Willingness to Remain Active in Politics in the Future 
Inde~endent variables B BETA 
Personal political variables 
Frequency of activity .198*** .199*** 
Years of activity .O1Ow . 140X* 
Party identification .252*** .255*** 
Motivations for 1983 primary involvement 
Solidary incentives - .024 - -090 
Material incentives .070*** .178*** 
Purposive incentives .O4OX* .116** 
Candidate-centered incentives - .021 - -029 
Attitudinal views about 1983 primary .047*** .244** * 
Participation in 1983 primary 
Hours worked - .0002 - .005 
Money contributed .0005 .061 
Candidate preference 
Sloane '83 - .008 - .005 
Stumbo '83 .032 .016 
(Collins '83 reference category) 
R2 = .323 
* X  = Significant at .O1 level; *** = significant at  .001 level 
B = unstandardized coefficients 
BETA = standardized coefficients 
As for the differences based on motivations for involvement, support- 
ers who expressed a greater willingness to remain actively involved in 
politics tended to be significantly more material oriented and purposive 
oriented in their incentives for primary participation. It is apparent that 
some supporters are more desirous of tangible political rewards as a result 
of their involvement, while others are more issue oriented and civic- 
minded and concerned with achieving "good government." One would 
expect the purposive motivations to be more transitory (as are candidate- 
oriented ~ncentives); it is surprising that political volunteers who enter a 
campaign for a particular cause or purpose indicate a greater willingness to 
remain active in politics. In contrast, we would anticipate that solidary 
incentives would be associated with future political involvement, but this 
expectation is not substantiated in the regression results (in fact, the 
opposite tendency is noted). 
As shown in table 11, attitudinal views about the 1983 primary are also 
related to activists' willingness to participate in future electoral contests. 
Workers who "cared most about what the campaign organization said or 
did," "were most interested in sticking with politics because of their 
primary involvement," "experienced good relationships with their pri- 
mary coworkers," and so on were significantly more willing to remain 
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Table 12. What Activists Would Miss Most about Political Involvement 
1979183 (N = 481) 1987 (N = 425) 
Responses No. % No. % 
Excitement of campaign 170 35.3 
Meeting peoplelsocial contacts 82 17.0 
Working with friends and relatives 88 18.3 
Working with group which 
shares political ties 122 25.4 
Civic service 37 7.7 
Influencing government policies 276 57.4 
Working for issues 90 18.7 
Personal ends 7 1.5 
Candidate-oriented factors 42 8.7 
Note: Activists could give two different answers. 
actively involved in politics. This bears out our expectation that activists 
who "identify" strongly and positively with the primary and their par- 
ticular campaign group and who do not experience a demoralizing primary 
loss would tend to desire future political participation. 
An examination of activists' responses in 1983 and 1987 to an additional 
question-"What would you miss most if you gave up political ac- 
tivities?"-provides further insight into elite volunteers' willingness to 
remain in politics (table 12). More than one-half in 1983 and one-third in 
1987 responded that they would miss "influencing government policies." 
This result substantiates Bell's (1985) earlier findings that purposive incen- 
tives were very important for state central committee members' sustained 
political involvement. More than one-third in 1983 and one-half in 1987 
also stressed that they would miss the "excitement of campaigns"; and 
another one-fourth in 1983 and less than 14 percent in 1987 mentioned 
"working with a group with whom they have political ties." More than two- 
fifths in 1987 stressed "meeting people and making social contacts"; in 
contrast, less than 17 percent of the 1983 sample stressed this reason. All of 
these types of solidary motivations for continuing political participation 
were also frequently mentioned in Conway and Feigert's (1968) study of 
local precinct chairmen. 
There is obviously no simple explanation for the willingness of many 
political activists to remain active in politics. They do not seem to get 
"burned out" often, despite the obvious frustrations associated with losing 
campaigns. T h e  more active a person has been for a longer period of time, 
the greater his or her willingness to remain active in politics. Those who 
emphasize material and purposive incentives seem more committed to 
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long-term activity, yet when asked what they would miss most, activists 
are most likely to mention solidary motivations as well as their influence on 
public policy. We should recognize that, in responding to a question about 
staying in politics, political workers may often be responding to short-term 
enthusiasms and frustrations, such as their attitude toward the most recent 
campaign; six months later their answer might be different. Our surest 
prediction is that the more involved and committed a person is to campaign 
politics, the longer he or she is likely to remain an active participant. 
CANDIDATE CHOICE 
AMONG GUBERNATORIAL 
PRIMARY ACTIVISTS 
VERY LITTLE is known about what brings state party activists into a 
particular candidate's primary campaign. Since volunteer staffers are still 
key actors in the nominating and campaign decision-making processes, a 
better understanding of what leads them into particular candidates' camps 
is long overdue. 
Activists might be drawn to a particular candidate for many different 
reasons. T h e  amateur model assumes that active campaign workers are 
recruited from outside the party system to campaign for certain causes or 
candidates (Carney, 1958; Wilson, 1962). This model may be appropriate 
in certain settings, but it can be rejected out of hand for Kentucky, where 
most primary workers have extensive political experience. The  factional 
model posits that most primary workers have an enduring loyalty to a 
certain party faction, which dictates their choice of a candidate. This 
model is obviously applicable in highly factionalized party systems, but as 
we saw earlier, the factional structure of the Kentucky Democratic party 
has become extremely fluid over the last two decades; consequently, the 
factional model does not seem applicable to the problem at hand. Under 
the professional model, which we test in this chapter, the members of a 
large and relatively stable pool of active party workers choose up sides in 
each intramural contest, selecting candidates on the basis of a combination 
of long-standing political predispositions and situation-specific influ- 
ences. 
Our research (as reported in chapter 3) has shown that in any guber- 
natorial primary a relatively small proportion of the most active political 
workers are amateurs, who are playing an active campaign role for the first 
time. Instead, a large proportion are long-term participants in the proc- 
ess-persons with extensive experience in gubernatorial politics who 
expect to remain active in politics and who enter each gubernatorial 
primary season with the expectation that they will play a role in one of the 
campaigns. 
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T h e  factional model differs from the professional model because it 
assumes that most political activists have long-term loyalties to one of the 
factions and start each gubernatorial primary season with a predisposition 
to support the candidates of that faction. As we have shown in chapter 4, 
however, the traditional factional system has disappeared from Kentucky 
politics, and therefore we would not expect to find party activists choosing 
sides in a gubernatorial race on the basis of factional loyalties. 
Factionalism as a Motivation for Support by Activists 
Most prior research on factionalism has studied external factional behavior 
over time, without examining the individual behavior of factional mem- 
bers. Contemporary knowledge about factionalism is fixed within the 
framework of Key's (1949) two themes: the disorganized and consequently 
personalistic politics of factions and the impact of economic and social 
influences on a dominant party's factional system. Scholars have typically 
followed Key's lead in studying only the forms of factions, and the causes 
and effects of those forms, differentiating unifactionalism, bifactionalism, 
and multifactionalism (see Black and Black, 1982a). 
Most studies of factions in southern and border states, patterned after 
Key's seminal work, measure factional support quantitatively by mapping 
the geographic areas of continued, durable support for particular factions. 
Aggregate statistical analyses of voting data are utilized rather than any 
broad-scale analysis of the role of party activists in factions. T h e  unit of 
analysis in such studies is the faction rather than the individual party 
activist, and the issue of continuity of support accordingly often does not 
arise. Thus,  we do not have any data from the earlier time period (begin- 
ning with the 1920s and 1930s) that would document the importance of 
factional loyalties, even though political activists must have played a major 
role in building the factions in the southern and border states. Sindler's 
study (1956) of Louisiana's factions is one of few research endeavors that 
pays attention to the role of activists; Sindler notes the importance of local 
workers in strong factional county organizations and their ties to the state 
factions. 
There are no studies of factional activists-especially no interview 
data-for any southern or border state. No one has asked political workers 
or voters anything about factional reasons for their support for candidates 
in the southern and border states. We assume that there were voter 
loyalties, but we have more reason to believe that political elites had 
longer-term loyalties to the traditional factions than the average voters. 
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The Erosion of Traditional Factionalism in Kentucly 
As we noted in chapter 4, there has been a long history of factional 
gubernatorial politics among Kentucky's Democrats, and the two domi- 
nant Kentucky factions were based primarily on personalities-"Happy" 
Chandler and Earle Clements. But there has not been a Democratic 
gubernatorial primary that clearly aligned one of the traditional factions 
against the other since 1967. 
Since the Kentucky factions were based primarily on personalities, 
they endured only as long as a few strong politicians dominated the 
Democratic party. The  motivations, for the most part, that underlay 
Kentucky's traditional factions were more personal loyalties than geo 
graphic, ideological, socioeconomic, or ethnic interests (see Sindler's analysis 
of Louisiana's factions, 1956). Consequently, the traditional factions began to 
fall apart about the time that Chandler and Clements each became relatively 
inactive in Kentucky politics. Also, splits occurred in the dominant Combs- 
Breathitt faction when Combs ran against Ford for governor in 1971. 
What was the role of political activists in these traditional Kentucky 
factions? What factors gave factions their continuity? It is commonly 
assumed that old-time local elite activists were the "glue" that held 
together the factions; these ardent supporters played a key role in the 
electoral activities of the factions (see Jewel1 and Cunningham, 1968). But 
Kentucky political activists were not studied, and were never systematical- 
ly surveyed, during the period when Democratic primaries were domi- 
nated by factionalism. Consequently, we have no data on the strength or 
persistence of activists' loyalty to specific factions. 
We do know that the local county factions had strong links to the state 
factions. These local organizations had lasting power because the local 
activists were motivated to continue to work for particular factions, es- 
pecially because of the rewards of the former patronage system. If the 
powerful local factions had not existed, often based around particular families, 
the statewide factions probably would not have had the same importance. 
Now the personalities who symbolized the traditional factions have 
left the scene, and a whole new generation of activists have become 
involved in Democratic politics. These younger activists have no reason 
for loyalty to the old factions. It remains to be seen whether new factions 
will develop that are capable of persisting from one election to the next. 
Political analysts would generally agree that the 1979, 1983, and 1987 
Kentucky gubernatorial primary election campaigns involved no durable 
factional divisions. 
Perceptions of Factionalism 
If traditional factional loyalties have disappeared from Kentucky politics, 
what has taken their place? Is there evidence of continuity of support in 
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the choices among candidates made by the activists who work in guber- 
natorial primaries? 
We assume that certain patterns of continuity should be found in 
recent Democratic primaries. We would expect that the active supporters 
of Collins and Sloane in their 1979 electoral races would be part of their 
1983 primary campaign organizations. Also, we would anticipate that the 
basic Atkins-Brown alliance would be an important part of Stumbo's 1983 
primary campaign group. Moreover, we would expect that the elite volun- 
teers for Brown in 1979 and for Beshear and Stumbo in 1983 would jump on 
these election bandwagons in 1987. 
Factionalism among activists requires not only continuity of support 
for particular candidates but also evidence that activists perceive factions 
to exist and have some sense of loyalty to them. If activists believe that 
factions still exist in Kentucky politics, we want to know how they define 
this term. 
We included questions about "factions" in our 1983 survey. Almost 70 
percent of the activists felt that their coworkers in the 1983 primary 
campaign made up a political group or "faction" (cohesive, durable group). 
And more than 62 percent felt that the supporters of one or more of the 
other candidates made up factions in 1983. The  corresponding figures for 
1979 were somewhat lower. Almost 58 percent felt that their coworkers 
made up a faction, and more than 53 percent felt that the supporters of one 
or more of the other candidates made up factions in 1979. 
In terms of perceptions of different candidates' activists in 1983, more 
than 79 percent of Stumbo supporters perceived that they belonged to a 
faction; this is compared to 71 percent of Collins activists and 67 percent of 
Sloane activists. In 1979 more McBrayer supporters (66 percent) believed 
that their coworkers made up a faction than the supporters of the other 
candidates (65 percent of Sloane's, 63 percent of Brown's, 60 percent of 
Hubbard's, and less than 56 percent of both Atkins's and Stovall's support- 
ers). 
Although many activists define political groups as factions, some of 
them use this term very loosely and not the way political scientists would 
define factions; others describe factions in terms of specific political 
leaders or courthouse groups. Respondents were asked to define the main 
special or defining characteristic of their primary campaign group and of 
the opponents' in 1979 and/or 1983. Most frequently, activists simply 
named candidates or characterized groups in terms of meaningless bland 
terms, i.e., "sincere, determined, hardworking group." We found that 
activists were more likely to place a factional label on the "other group" 
rather than on their own. T h e  only significant references to labor factions 
occur in 1983 when the other faction is described that way. The  term 
administration faction (or antiadministration faction) comes up most fre- 
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quently in 1979 as a description of the other faction (i.e., almost 25 
percent). We note that these political workers are just as likely to refer to 
local factions as they are to state administration factions. 
Activists' Choice of Gubernatorial Candidates 
If political activists play an important role in gubernatorial campaigns, we 
want to determine how they make their choices among the gubernatorial 
candidates. What criteria are important in selecting a candidate? Are there 
important differences between the types of political activists who support 
one candidate or another? In order to win the support of activists, must 
candidates make commitments to particular interest groups or on par- 
ticular issues? Are the political activists attracted primarily to candidates 
with particular ideological positions? Or do activists select a candidate to 
support largely on the basis of personal friendship and previous contacts? 
To answer these questions, we will look at a number of variables that 
might be expected to distinguish one group of supporters from another or 
to affect the choices made by activists. We will carry out a multivariate 
analysis to weigh the relative importance of the variables that appear to be 
important. We may find that some of these individual variables are impor- 
tant in explaining the support for one candidate in one election even 
though they do not subsequently turn out to have broader importance in 
explaining the choices made by activists. 
Vam'ables Affecting Activists' Choice of a Candidae 
In studies of vote choice in general elections, party identification is often 
treated as a "standing commitment" on the voter's part; it may provide a 
framework within which voting decisions are made. By the same token, we 
might anticipate considerable continuity of candidate choice from one 
primary to the next, as supporters of Candidate X in one primary join the 
organization of Candidate X in the next primary or (in the absence of 
Candidate X) perhaps support Candidate Y, whom they perceive as allied 
or associated with Candidate X. We might aso expect to find that some 
candidates closely identified with the political establishment draw their 
support largely from political professionals, while political newcomers re- 
cruit their workers largely from amateurs. 
Another factor that might shape candidate choice concerns broad 
motivations forpolirical activity. As discussed earlier in chapter 3, Clark- 
Wilson's motivation typology (solidary, material, and purposive incentives) 
has informed analyses of various types of political activists, including party 
leaders and volunteers, campaign contributors, convention delegates, and 
local ward leaders. These studies, however, have been concerned with 
determining why people become politically active in the first place, not 
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why they become involved in a particular candidate's campaign. But such 
motivations still underlie the choice of a particular candidate. For exam- 
ple, an "establishment" candidate would presumably attract a greater 
share of volunteers whose motivation was solidary than would a candidate 
from outside the party mainstream, more of whose supporters might be 
purposively motivated; similarly, an odds-on favorite should attract more 
workers who are materially motivated than a candidate whose chances 
appear dim. 
There is no theoretical reason for expecting differences in the demo- 
graphic characteristics of activists supporting particular characteristcs. But 
we will explore some of the more obvious personal differences among 
political activists supporting different candidates. 
In some states primary election campaigns are focused heavily on 
conflicts between interest groups and debates over programmatic issues. 
Political activists might be recruited to candidate campaigns because of 
their commitment to particular interests and issues. In American politics 
there has been an increasing entry into political campaigns of individuals 
who are strongly committed to a particular interest-women's issues, 
labor, education, business, pro or antiabortion, civil rights, and so on. In 
the past interest groups have played a relatively small role in Kentucky 
primaries. Is there any evidence from recent Kentucky primaries that 
significant numbers of activists are becoming committed to a candidate out 
of loyalty to groups that advocate particular interests? 
Prior researchers have argued that candidate choice in conventions and 
primaries often involves a trade-off between a candidate's ideological or 
issue position and his or her electability (Abramowitz, McGlennon, and 
Rapoport, 1986; Jeweli, 1984; Stone and Abramowitz, 1986b). However, in 
Kentucky Democratic politics, this trade-off is usually not critical because 
any nominated Democratic gubernatorial candidate should be electable. 
This should make it possible for Democratic activists to select candidates 
based on programmatic rather than purely strategic considerations, just as 
analyses of mass voting behavior indicate that the perceived ideological 
similarity between voter and candidate underlies electoral choice. How- 
ever, it should also be noted that Kentucky Democratic politics has 
consistently been more personalistic than ideological, concerned "more 
with style than substance" (Peirce and Hagstrom, 1983: 384). In such a 
climate, candidates' programmatic appeals tend to be muted. That  being 
the case, activists-candidate similarity on the issues seems likely to play a 
less decisive role in Kentucky than it would in most other states. 
Continuity of Support 
T h e  factional alignments of the past were largely irrelevant to the elections 
of 1979, 1983, and 1987. In 1979 long-standing rivals Chander and Combs 
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joined forces behind the same losing gubernatorial candidate (Terry 
McBrayer). In 1983 Chandler supported a candidate (Martha Layne Col- 
lins) with apparent roots in the other faction, while Combs supported a 
candidate (Harvey Sloane) with no apparent factional roots at all. 
In 1979 a self-proclaimed outsider, John Y. Brown, Jr. entered the 
primary at the last minute and upset Gov. Julian Carroll's attempt to pass 
the governorship on to his designated successor, Terry McBrayer. In 1983 
Governor Brown also failed in his attempt to anoint another factional 
outsider, Human Resources Secretary Grady Stumbo. In 1987, although 
there was no overt action by Governor Collins on behalf of any candidate, it 
was well known that her top political lieutenants and her state party 
chairman were working hard for Lt. Gov, Steve Beshear. The  surprise 
victor, Wallace Wilkinson, was a political newcomer with strong roots in 
the 1979 and 1983 Sloane campaigns; but Louisville mayor Harvey Sloane 
threw his support to Beshear. "Happy" Chandler supported the outsider 
Wilkinson, and Combs supported Stumbo, his eastern Kentucky favorite 
son. Former governor Carroll was unable to attract his former factional 
allies. 
Is there any substitute for traditional ftictionalism in Kentucky? Is 
there any sign of continuity of supporters from one candidate to another? 
In order to discover whether there was much continuity of support for a 
specific clustering of candidates, we asked explicit questions about sup- 
port for particular candidates in the 1979, 1983, and 1987 primaries. 
Table 13 provides a cross tabulation of candidates supported by activ- 
ists in 1979 and 1983. We note that 52 percent of McBrayer supporters 
worked for Collins, in contrast to 34 percent for Sloane and 10 percent for 
Stumbo. We would expect McBrayer activists to favor a more seasoned 
politician like Collins. As anticipated, more than 77 percent of Sloane's 
1979 supporters reported their active involvement in his 1983 second 
gubernatorial race. Despite Brown's support for Stumbo in 1983, only one- 
fourth of Brown supporters and only a few Atkins supporters worked for 
Stumbo in that year. 
As another measure of continuity of support, more than 56 percent of 
the elite workers who supported Collins in 1983 stated that they worked 
actively in her 1979 lieutenant governor's electoral contest. Of those who 
worked for Sloane in both primaries, 54 percent made up their minds to 
work again for him in 1983 very early in the campaign. As for Atkins 
supporters, less than 28 percent of those who worked for Atkins in 1979 
supported him actively in his 1983 lieutenant governor's primary cam- 
paign. 
Table 14 provides a cross tabulation of 1979183 candidates' supporters 
by those of 1987. (The sample consists of members of our earlier study.) As 
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Table 13. Continuity of Activists' Support, 1979 and 1983 
1983 Candidates 
Collins Sloane Stumbo None 
- 
1979 Candidates 
Atkins 2 1 5 5 6 
56.8 13.5 13.5 16.2 
6.9 2.1 4.2 8.7 
Brown 53 36 31 5 
42.4 28.8 24.8 4.0 
17.4 15.1 26.1 7.2 
Hubbard 14 7 7 2 
46.7 23.3 23.3 6.6 
4.6 2.9 5.9 2.9 
McBrayer 131 85 26 10 
52.0 33.7 10.3 4.0 
43.0 35.6 21.8 14.5 
Sloane 13 76 6 3 
13.3 77.6 6.1 3.0 
4.3 31.8 5.0 4.3 
Stovall 27 17 22 2 
39.7 25.0 32.4 3.0 
8.9 7.1 18.5 2.9 
None 46 13 22 41 
37.7 10.7 18.0 33.6 
15.1 5.4 18.5 59.4 
Note: The first entry in each cell is the number of activists; the second entry is the 
percentage of the 1979 candidate's supporters who worked for the 1983 candidates; and 
the third entry is the percentage of the 1983 candidate's supporters who worked for the 
1979 candidates. 
582 activists worked in both primary campaigns; 28 activists worked in 1979 only; 81 
activists worked in 1983 only. 
we would anticipate, a large percentage (42 percent) of Collins "professio- 
nal" volunteers worked for the insider, Beshear; but 26 percent of them 
supported the outsider, Wilkinson. Along with Sloane's personal endorse- 
ment, Beshear also received assistance from more than 39 percent of 
Sloane's supporters. But Wilkinson, Sloane's 1983 state campaign fund- 
raiser, did attract more than 27 percent of Sloane's former workers. Stum- 
bo, whose 1987 campaign never ignited widespread public support, had 
the active support of almost one-half of his 1983 elite volunteers. Brown, 
the front-runner until the last week of the campaign, had the support of 
more than 28 percent of Stumbo's 1983 activists and more than one-fifth of 
Collins's workers. 
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Table 14. Continuity of Activists' Support, 1983 and 1987 
(1979183 Panel Members) 
1987 Candidates 
Beshear Brown Carroll Stumbo Wilkinson 
(N=76) (N=45) (N=14) (N=31) (N=49) 
1983 Candidates 
Collins 38 20 5 4 24 
41.8 22.0 5.5 4.4 26.4 
50.0 44.4 35.7 12.9 49.0 
Sloane 31 12 9 5 22 
39.2 15.2 11.4 6.3 27.8 
40.8 26.7 64.3 16.1 44.9 
Stumbo 7 13 - 22 3 
15.6 28.9 - 48.9 6.7 
9.2 28.9 - 71.0 6.1 
Note: The first entry in each cell is the number of activists; the second entry is the 
percentage of the 1979183 candidate's supporters who worked for the 1987 candidates; 
and the third entry is the percentage of the 1987 candidate's supporters who worked for 
the 1979183 candidates. 
215 panel members worked in the 1983 and 1987 gubernatorial primaries; 11 panel 
members worked in the 1979 and 1987 gubernatorial primaries; 22 panel members 
worked only in another 1987 statewide primary; 24 panel members did not participate 
at all in a 1987 primary. 
Table 15 is based on data from the new participants in our 1987 study. It 
shows that Beshear supporters had come primarily from the Collins and 
Sloane campaigns, as did the majority of Wilkinson and Brown activists. 
Stumbo, of course, drew almost 58 percent of his workers from his earlier 
gubernatorial campaign group. Carroll's base of support came from mem- 
bers of Collins's organization. More than one-third of these 1987 elite 
workers had not participated actively in the 1983 primary. 
In terms of continuity of support, 64 percent of the elite workers who 
supported Beshear in 1987 (panel members and new participants) stated 
that they worked actively in his 1983 lieutenant governor's electofal con- 
test. Of those who worked for Stumbo in both primaries, 91.8 percent 
made up their minds to work again for him in 1987 very early in the 
campaign. 
We have not found that there are some well-defined, clear-cut fac- 
tional alignments extending over successive primaries in the period from 
1979 to 1987. We do not see the Brown-Atkins workers moving en masse to 
Stumbo, who obviously had to develop his own base of support. We even 
see some slippage in support for Sloane from 1979 to 1983 and for Stumbo 
from 1983 to 1987. The  continuity of support we find is neither strong nor 
consistent, and it certainly does not indicate the presence of any underly- 
ing factional system. 
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Table 15. Continuity of Activists' Support, 1983 and 1987 
(New Participants in 1987 Study) 
1987 Candidates 
Beshear Brown Carroll Stumbo Wilkinson 
(N = 48) (N = 58) (N = 33) (N = 45) (N = 132) 
1983 Candidates 
Collins 18 23 14 3 53 
37.5 39.7 42.4 6.7 40.2 
Sloane 13 8 7 5 26 
27.1 13.8 21.2 1 1 . 1  19.7 
Stumbo 3 5 - 26 4 
6.3 8.6 - 57.8 3.0 
Did not partici- 14 22 12 11  49 
pate in 1983 29.2 37.9 36.3 24.4 37.1 
Note: The first entry in each cell is the number of activists; the second entry is the 
percentage of the 1987 candidate's supporters who worked for the 1983 candidates. 
We would expect to find even less continuity of support among rank- 
and-file voters. A study (Goldstein, 1988) of Jefferson County voters in the 
1987 Democratic gubernatorial primary suggests that there is also rela- 
tively little continuity in their voting patterns between 1983 and 1987. 
These data, collected in exit polls, are less reliable than the data from 
political activists because voters would presumably be less likely to re- 
member how they had voted in a primary four years earlier. (The  voters' 
stated preferences in 1987 accurately reflect the actual vote in Jefferson 
County that year, but their recollections of their 1983 vote seriously 
overstate the vote for Collins and understate that for Stumbo and Sloane.) 
In 1987 John Y. Brown was able to get nearly half of the vote from those 
who said they had voted for Collins and over 40 percent of the Sloane vote, 
even though in 1987 Sloane was endorsing Beshear. Beshear won only one- 
sixth of the former Sloane supporters. Grady Stumbo was able to gain votes 
from only about one-seventh of those who said they had voted for him in 
1983. Wilkinson drew a larger share of former Stumbo supporters than did 
Brown, even though there had been a clear link between Brown and 
Stumbo in 1983. In short, there is no evidence that Jefferson County voters 
were paying any attention to the linkages and endorsements among politi- 
cians. 
Amateun and PmfessionaIs 
We have described Kentucky political activists as professionals because 
most of those we surveyed have been consistently involved in guber- 
natorial primaries and have worked frequently in campaigns at other 
levels. I t  is true, of course, that each primary election brings new workers 
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into the campaign process. Moreover, candidacies differ a lot in their 
ability to attract different types of activists. Those candidates who are 
running for political office for the first time, such as Brown in 1979, 
Stumbo in 1983, and Wilkinson in 1987, might be expected to rely more 
heavily on workers having little or no campaign experience. To test that 
possibility, in table 16 we compare the political experience of workers for 
the various candidates in the three gubernatorial primaries. 
Based on the levels of political activity, there were fairly sharp distinc- 
tions among the supporters of the various candidates. Sloane (1979), 
Brown (1979), and Stumbo (1983 and 1987) attracted workers who had been 
active in politics for shorter periods of time. In fact, one-fourth of Stumbo's 
1983 supporters had been active for less than five years, the highest 
proportion of any candidate in the three primaries. In 1987 Stumbo's 
supporters were more experienced but were still more amateur than those 
supporting any other candidates. At the other extreme almost half of 
workers for McBrayer and Hubbard in 1979 and for all of the candidates 
except Stumbo in 1987 had been active for over twenty years (data not in 
table). Although the new candidates generally had fewer veteran workers 
than did others, it is important to recognize that all candidates relied 
heavily on experienced political activists. A majority of the elite workers 
for each candidate had been active for at least ten years, and this propor- 
tion was over two-thirds for Wilkinson in 1987. 
About four-fifths of McBrayer and Stovall workers in 1979 and more 
than three-fourths of Collins's and Sloane's in 1983 and Beshear's activists 
in 1987 had been active in all or most political campaigns. In contrast, 
almost 30 percent of Sloane workers in 1979, one-third of Stumbo's in 1983, 
and more than one-third of Brown's and Stumbo's supporters and more 
than 30 percent of Wilkinson's in 1987 had been active in few political 
contests during the last five years. 
At least one-third of the supporters of most candidates held local party 
office, but there were some marked differences among the different 
candidates' camps. For the 1979 candidates, the proportions were almost 
one-half for McBrayer and Stovall workers, and both of these groups 
included a number of local officeholders. Among the 1983 candidate 
camps, Collins had the highest proportion of supporters holding party 
office or local elective office, while only one-fourth of Stumbo's workers 
held local party office. In the 1987 primary, Stumbo was again the only 
candidate to have much less than one-third of his workers holding party 
office. Beshear had the most local party committee members, and he and 
Carroll had the largest proportions of local officeholders. 
These 1979,1983, and 1987 candidates (except for Stumbo) drew most 
of their support from people with a long record in politics. However, 
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Table 16. Political Activity of Activists by 1979, 1983, and 1987 
Candidate Groups (in Percentages) 
Atkins Brown Hubbard McBrayer Sloane Stovall 
1979 (N = 37) (N = 125) (N = 30) (N = 252) (N = 98) (N = 67) 
- -- 
Active 10 years or more 64.8 61.6 70.0 80.5 58.2 76.1 
Active in all or most 
political campaigns 
(last 5 years) 75.0 76.0 82.7 86.5 70.9 80.6 
Political positions 
held now 
Member local party 
committee 32.4 38.4 36.7 48.8 28.6 44.8 
Elected to local 
office 8.1 10.4 13.3 24.2 6.1 17.9 
1983 Collins Sloane Stumbo 
(N = 305) (N = 239) (N = 120) 
Active 10 years or more 67.6 70.3 55.9 
Active in all or most 
political campaigns 
(last 5 years) 78.9 79.8 64.7 
Political positions 
held now 
Member local party 
committee 41.3 36.4 25.0 
Elected to local 
office 23.2 15.9 10.0 
1987 Beshear Brown Carroll Stumbo Wilkinson 
(N = 129) (N = 108) (N =47) (N = 77) (N = 188) 
Active 10 years or more 79.8 85.2 80.8 61.1 69.1 
Active in all or most 
political campaigns 
(last 5 years) 78.3 64.8 70.3 61.1 66.5 
Political positions 
held now 
Member local party 
committee 45.0 30.6 34.0 22.1 33.5 
Elected to local 
office 24.8 10.2 23.4 3.9 15.4 
maiden statewide candidacies do  attract new elites, and Brown in 1979, 
Stumbo in 1983, and Wilkinson in 1987 did rely on both amateurs and 
professionals in their campaigns. Generally, these data bear out our asser- 
tion that most elite political activists are long-term political professionals 
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with a continuing record of involvement in statewide politics, rather than 
amateurs who drop into and out of Democratic campaigns as a con- 
sequence of new stimuli. 
Recruitment 
There is a dearth of studies in the literature about the recrtlitment of 
activists at all levels of the political process. To what degree are guber- 
natorial activists self-starters? Who are the recruiters-candidates, 
friends, business associates, incumbent political leaders, or others? Which 
and how many activists are recruited through interest groups-that is, 
come into politics through their membership in labor unions, teacher 
associations, business organizations, or other groups? 
In our 1987 survey, we asked the activists (concerning the 1987 and 
1983 primaries): "Did some person and/or group contact you to work? If 
not, please describe what kind of initiative you took." In the 1987 primary, 
most of the activists were recruited to work in a particular campaign: 161 
panel members and 232 new participants. More than one-half of these 
panel members and one-third of the new participants were recruited by 
the candidates themselves; another 10 percent of panelists and 20 percent 
of new participants were recruited by statewide campaign managers. 
Moreover, activists' friends and relatives contacted 12 percent of the panel 
members and 17 percent of the new participants to become involved in 
particular campaigns. Also, early committed campaign workers recruited 
11 percent of panelists and 14 percent of new participants; whereas 9 
percent of panel members and 10 percent of new participants were con- 
tacted by county-level politicians. Few activists in both samples said they 
were recruited by either state leaders, candidates' friends and relatives, or 
interest group friends. A much smaller number of activists were "self- 
startersv-56 panel members and 65 new participants; of these, three- 
fourths of each sample contacted particular campaigns and volunteered 
their services. More than one-tenth personally contacted either the candi- 
dates or groups with whom they had political ties. T h e  responses con- 
cerning recruitment in 1983 were comparable. 
An examination of a few of the responses to the open-ended recruit- 
ment question reveals the dominant presence of the candidates and state- 
wide campaign leaders in the recruitment process. A Beshear supporter 
remarked, "I was asked by Steve Beshear to participate." According to a 
Wilkinson activist, "Wallace Wilkinson and Dr. Poore recruited me." 
Another Wilkinson supporter noted, "J.R. Miller asked if I would help 
him in Hancock County." One Carroll worker explained that he was asked 
by "the candidate, Julian Carroll, a personal friend"; whereas another 
Carroll worker said, "Rep. Hank Hancock asked me to serve as county 
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chairman." In contrast, one Beshear activist explained that he was re- 
cruited "through both individuals in my county and the Kentucky Educa- 
tion Association. " 
We are looking for some evidence that recruitment occurs through 
factional leaders or through organized interest groups. In fact, we find that 
the recruitment process is more individual than institutional. T h e  candi- 
date or a top aide does the recruiting; or else it is done by friends and 
relatives of the activists. But we must keep in mind that we are dealing 
with people who have worked often before; they are ready to be asked. 
Motivation for PoliticaL Activity 
T h e  various 1979 and 1983 candidates tended to draw rather differently 
motivated campaign supporters. In 1979 McBrayer supporters were more 
solidary oriented than the supporters of all the other candidates. We earlier 
noted that McBrayer was a "faction" candidate, while Brown, Atkins, and 
Sloane were all "antipolitics" candidates. In 1983 the workers of Grady 
Stumbo were significantly less solidary oriented than those supporters of 
Martha Layne Collins and Harvey Sloane. In 1979 Stovall's supporters 
were significantly less materialistic than those of McBrayer. There were no 
significant differences in material motivations among supporters of the 
other candidates. In 1983 workers of Stumbo were significantly less mate- 
rially oriented than were those of Collins and Sloane, the leading candi- 
dates to the very last moment. 
In 1979 Stovall activists were significantly more purposive than those 
of most other candidates, but there was no significant difference between 
Stovall's workers and Brown's. But in 1983, in regard to purposive incen- 
tives, there were no significant differences among the candidates' support- 
ers. In 1979 Brown supporters were significantly less candidate oriented 
than workers of the other candidates. In 1983 Collins supporters were 
significantly more candidate oriented than supporters of Sloane or Stum- 
bo. 
There were also differences in 1987 among the motivations expressed 
by the various candidates' supporters. Beshear, Brown, and Carroll sup- 
porters were significantly more solidary oriented than the others; these 
men had held the highest statewide offices and tended to draw volunteers 
with close long-term ties to the Democratic party establishment. To many 
of their rural volunteers, politics was a major part of their social life. 
Beshear and Brown workers were more materially oriented, presumably 
because their candidates were front-runners, and they were expecting to 
reap the spoils of victory. Stumbo and Wilkinson activists were signifi- 
cantly more purposive oriented than the other candidate groups. Stumbo's 
populist working class message attracted many workers who wanted to 
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elect a candidate who shared their issue concerns. T h e  lottery "no tax 
increase" stand of Wilkinson tended to draw 'some workers into the 
entrepreneur's campaign. 
In an open-ended question, each respondent was asked to give the 
most important reason for his or her involvement in the 1979,1983, and/or 
1987 primaries. More than one-third of the workers in both the 1983 and 
1987 gubernatorial ampaigns cited their candidate's personal qualities- 
e.g., honesty, experience, and integrity-as the primary reason for their 
involvement. In 1979, however, this response was less common (17 per- 
cent) than personal friendship with their candidates (27 percent). Another 
reason cited most often was "working for issuesw-one-fifth of the 1987 
volunteers, 17 percent in 1983, and 11 percent in 1979. Material incentives 
were emphasized by fewer than 1 percent of the respondents. 
It is interesting to look at some of the activists' explanations for their 
involvement in primary campaigns. Some supporters noted their candi- 
date's commendable personal qualities. A Collins volunteer remarked, 
"Having known Martha Layne Collins since 1970, and having followed her 
achievements through the years, I felt that Martha Layne Collins was the 
best qualified candidate for Governor." Another Collins worker com- 
mented, "I liked her as a friend. Had really gotten to know her and liked 
her integrity, honesty, and relationships with people." A Carroll activist 
responded, "Strong belief that we needed an experienced, handsome 
governor and believe Julian Carroll was the most knowledgeable Ken- 
tuckian with regard to state government." A Wilkinson volunteer added, 
"I thought Wilkinson was the best candidate and we needed someone 
qualified after the Collins fiasco." 
Other supporters noted their personal friendships with their candidate 
and key Kentuckian politicos as their primary motive for involvement. A 
McBrayer worker said, "I was a close friend of Gov. Julian Carroll and 
Terry McBrayer; they recruited me to be chairman of my county." Another 
McBrayer activist explained, "Terry McBrayer was a local attorney and 
neighbor. I knew his parents and family. I wanted a governor to help with 
roads and bridges in this area." A Stovall activist commented, "Telma 
Stovall is a good friend. I've worked many years with her in Kentucky 
politics-and in her successful lieutenant governor race." A Wilkinson 
worker explained, "Wallace is my neighbor and friend. He asked me to be 
part of his winning campaign." 
Some activists cited "working for issues" as their most important 
reason for involvement. A Stovall volunteer stated, "I wanted a liberal 
candidate for the working people of Kentucky and Stovall's labor record 
proved her beliefs." A Brown supporter commented on the "availability of 
a man with new ideas and business experience. I thought we had a 
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winner." A Sloane activist in 1983 remarked, "Sloane attracted me from his 
1979 campaign and from issues he stood on through his mayoral races; I 
would have supported Sloane in 1979 had I known him." Another Sloane 
worker noted, "I have an interest in having some influence in Frankfort 
regarding educational issues and other favorite 'causes."' A Wilkinson 
worker stated, "I want to elect a person who identifies with small business 
and ordinary working people. Ready for a change in state government." To 
establish a state lottery was stressed by several Wilkinson workers as their 
chief motivation for involvement; one supporter explained, "Kentucky 
needs a lottery and Wilkinson is the man to get it done." 
Only a few respondents mentioned material incentives for involve- 
ment. A Brown activist in 1979 remarked, "Because John Y. Brown, Sr., 
had done me a favor in the early 1950s." A Carroll supporter commented, 
"For the benefit of family and friends." Another Carroll worker said, 
"Julian Carroll has always been good to my county-plenty of jobs and 
roads. " 
Some workers wanted, as their main incentive, to defeat certain 
opponents. According to a Brown worker in 1979, "We had to defeat 
McBrayer and Carroll to get rid of corruption in state government." A 
Wilkinson supporter acknowledged, "Someone to beat John Y. Brown as 
he was one of the worst. Wilkinson is a go getter and has new ideas." A 
Stumbo worker in 1983 maintained, "We needed a candidate who could 
fully understand the economic base of Eastern Kentucky. Also I have 
become somewhat tired of the controlling Democratic factions of Ken- 
tucky and I saw in Stumbo an alternative to Collins and the courthouse 
group." 
Demographics 
There were fairly sharp differences among the candidates' supporters in a 
few of the demographic characteristics previously described in chapter 3. 
Among the 197911983 activists, both Hubbard and Stumbo received sig- 
nificant support from "born again" activists. McBrayer, Stovall, and Col- 
lins activists were stronger Democrats than the other candidates' 
volunteers; we would expect these seasoned candidates to attract long- 
term, strongly partisan professional workers. Both Brown and Collins 
supporters were wealthier than the other candidate groups, whereas 
Stovall and Stumbo activists-many with strong labor union ties-had the 
least financial resources. In terms of education, Sloane workers ranked the 
highest, Stovall the lowest. T h e  different candidate groups attracted 
people from various occupations; McBrayer and Collins had more lawyers 
and elected or appointed public officials, Sloane had more teachers, and 
Brown, Atkins, Hubbard, and Collins had more business types. Both 
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Sloane and Stumbo attracted younger volunteers, whereas McBrayer, 
Hubbard, Stovall, and Collins attracted older workers; both Sloane and 
Stumbo had more young political newcomers-amateurs-in their cam- 
paign organizations. 
Among the 1987 activists, both Beshear and Brown supporters were 
wealthier than the other candidate groups; more than one-half of Beshear's 
and Brown's elite volunteers earned over $50,000 a year, and another one- 
fifth earned over $35,000. In contrast, as anticipated, only one-half of 
Stumbo's group earned more than $35,000 a year (one-half of these making 
over $50,000). In terms of education, Beshear supporters ranked the 
highest, Carroll's the lowest; almost one-half of Beshear's workers had 
postcollege graduate education. Beshear had more lawyers and teachers, 
whereas Wilkinson, Brown, and Carroll had more business persons. Be- 
shear has had strong teacher support in all his statewide races, and we 
would expect the millionaire entrepreneurs, Wilkinson and Brown, to 
attract more businessmen. Surprisingly, "born again" Christians were not 
attracted to any one candidate, although Julian Carroll was trying to attract 
this group. About two-fifths of those in each campaign organization identi- 
fied themselves as such. In terms of partisan identification, Beshear and 
Stumbo supporters were stronger national Democrats than were support- 
ers of other candidates; Beshear, Carroll, and Wilkinson workers were 
stronger state Democrats than were workers for other candidates. 
The Impact of Interest Group Invo/vement in Choice of Candidates 
As noted in chapter 3, social and issue groups (i.e., noneconomically based 
groups such as women's rights, antiabortion, and civil rights groups) are not 
usually salient in Kentucky party politics, particularly in the gubernatorial 
nominating process. Do activists become committed to candidates be- 
cause of their loyalty to interest groups supporting those candidates? Do 
interest group leaders in Kentucky actively recruit their members to 
become part of particular candidates' campaigns? Unfortunately, this type 
of data is not available; but we do know, based on our 1987 survey findings, 
that very few activists were directly recruited into the different candidates' 
organizations by their interest group friends. 
We find much variation in interest group involvement among the 1979, 
1983, and 1987 activists. For example, 25 percent of Stovall's supporters in 
1979 and 35 percent of Stumbo's in 1983 mentioned labor union involve- 
ment. This helps to explain why labor issues were important to both 
Stovall's and Stumbo's activists. In both 1979 and 1983 Sloane activists were 
more likely than others to cite involvement in educational groups; and 
Sloane's supporters gave greater emphasis to education issues. Even 
though education was a major issue in both 1979 and 1983 and though 
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teachers were active in the two primaries, their support was widely divided 
among the candidates in both elections. Business interest group involve- 
ment was more important to Atkins (31 percent), Hubbard (31 percent), 
and Brown (29 percent) activists in 1979 and to Collins supporters (30 
percent) in 1983; this finding helps to explain the fairly conservative 
orientation of these candidates' supporters on tax issues. It is surprising 
that Collins had relatively few supporters belonging to women's groups. 
The  1987 qustionnaire asked activists to list not only the groups in 
which they were involved but also those in which they were very active. In 
1987, as in 1983, Stumbo activists were more involved than other candi- 
dates' supporters in labor union activities, even though Beshear won the 
AFL-CIO statewide endorsement. We note that most of Stumbo's labor 
union members were very active interest group participants. Almost one- 
fourth of Beshear activists had educational group ties; the teachers were 
instrumental in his lieutenant gubernatorial victory in 1983. Brown's sup- 
porters led the other candidate groups in their ties to business organiza- 
tions and other professional groups. At least one-third of every campaign 
group was involved in church-related organizations. Almost one-fourth of 
Brown's, Carroll's, and Wilkinson's elite volunteers participated in farm 
groups, although few were very actively involved. Very few 1987 candi- 
dates' activists were engaged in civil rights, women's rights, conservation1 
environmental, or antiabortion groups-the traditional national Demo- 
cratic social and issue groups. 
Importance of Issues in Activists' Choice of Candidates 
Critics of the national presidential nominating system often argue that 
candidates must make strong commitments on issues or expensive prom- 
ises in order to satisfy political activists whose support they must have; and 
these commitments and promises undermine the nominee's chances of 
winning the general election. Walter Mondale's experience is often cited 
as an example. Mondale's 1984 presidential campaign was handicapped by 
the many commitments he had made to a variety of liberal groups in 
winning the nomination. 
In making a choice about a candidate to support, do Kentucky political 
activists give much weight to the positions taken by candidates on issues? 
Must a Kentucky gubernatorial candidate take positions on specific issues 
in order to win the support of activists; if so, can this requirement be a 
handicap in winning the general election? At the outset, there are several 
reasons for doubting that this situation arises very frequently in Kentucky. 
On the one hand, we know that most activists do not have strong commit- 
ments to interest groups, and we doubt that many of them have strong 
ideological convictions. On the other hand, most Democratic nominees do 
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not risk electoral defeat in November. Conventional wisdom suggests that 
issues are not as important in Kentucky politics as they are in some other 
states. One reason for doubting that issues affect activists' choices is that 
activists frequently make a commitment to work for a candidate very early 
in the campaign before the central issues in a campaign begin to emerge. 
On the other hand, gubernatorial candidates who have experience in state 
government may have previously taken positions on issues or made com- 
mitments to interests that are well known to political activists. At the start 
of the 1987 campaign, for example, Beshear was well known as a supporter 
of education, Stumbo had a record of support for populist positions, and 
Brown was preparing to run on the record of his previous administration. 
It is also very possible that during the primary campaign some candi- 
dates may be constrained in defining their issue position on issues because 
of the types of supporters in their camps. For example, in 1987 Beshear 
could not afford to alienate the teachers, and Wilkinson could not afford to 
deviate from the image of being a tax cutter that he had developed from 
the start. 
Before jumping to conclusions about the importance of issues, we 
need to examine more carefully what political activists say about issues and 
about their perception of the candidates' issue positions. Our data are 
drawn from several questions in the surveys of activists: (1) When respond- 
ents were asked (in a closed-ended question) what were the reasons for 
working in the campaign, one answer they could choose was "to work for 
issues I feel strongly about." (2) They were also asked an open-ended 
question: "Was there any particular issue (or issues) which caused you to 
become actively involved?" (3) Respondents were asked their opinion on 
several issues that played some importance in the primary election. (4) 
Respondents were also asked their perception of each of the candidates' 
positions on these same issues. 
Consequently, we can determine whether activists assert that issues 
play a part in their choices, and we can also tell whether activists have clear 
perceptions about candidate positions and whether they are more likely to 
support candidates whom they perceive as agreeing with them. 
In 1979 and 1983 more than 85 percent of the supporters of all the 
candidates mentioned (in a closed-ended question) working for issues 
they felt strongly about as an important reason for involvement in the 
primaries. In contrast, in response to the open-ended question about 
particular issues that led them to become involved, there was great varia- 
tion among the supporters of particular candidates. In 1979 the proportion 
mentioning a specific issue ranged from 30 percent of the Brown support- 
ers to only 11 percent of McBrayer's activists. In 1983 58 percent of 
Stumbo's supporters but only about one-third of the Collins and Sloane 
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activists mentioned a specific issue. Some, but not all, of these variations 
among the major candidates are consistent with conventional wisdom 
about these candidates. For example, we think of McBrayer as being less 
issue oriented and more of an administration candidate; and Stumbo was 
perceived as waging an issue-oriented campaign. But it is surprising to find 
only a small proportion of Sloane supporters in both 1979 and 1983 citing 
issues because Sloane was regarded as a more ideological, nonorganization 
type of candidate. 
There are only a few issues that were cited frequently by supporters of 
particular candidates. In 1979 education was mentioned often by the 
supporters of McBrayer and Sloane, labor and social issues were stressed 
by the Stovall activists, and honesty and the reform of government were 
emphasized by supporters of Atkins and Brown, as well as the few Hub- 
bard supporters who cited issues. In 1983 the most salient issues cited as 
reasons for involvement were education (particularly by the Collins and 
Sloane groups) and labor and right-to-work issues (mainly by Stumbo 
activists). In each case, these issues reflect the positions emphasized by 
the candidates, and in several cases they are compatible with the interest 
group loyalties of political activists. 
Whether or not activists assert that their support for a candidate was 
motivated by one or more issues, it is interesting to determine whether 
various candidates drew support from activists having distinctly different 
positions on issues that were important during the campaign. 
In fact, we find some important variations among the candidate groups 
in response to closed-ended questions about activists' opinions on major 
issues. Significantly more Sloane supporters (in both 1979 and 1983) 
strongly advocated tax support for education than the supporters of any 
other candidate. Hubbard supporters were more concerned than all other 
candidate groups in 1979 and 1983 about the importance of coal production 
to Kentucky (versus modifying environmental regulations). In 1979 Sloane 
activists were most likely to oppose cutting back services, as an alternative 
to raising taxes; in 1983, however, the differences among the three candi- 
date groups on this issue were small. Significantly more Atkins and Sloane 
supporters than other 1979 candidate groups disagreed with the proposi- 
tion that the political process would work better if there were more 
patronage available. Generally speaking, there were greater differences on 
issues among the supporters of various candidates in 1979 than in 1983. 
In 1987 the respondents were asked their opinions on a series of issues 
as well as their perceptions of the different candidates' stands on the same 
issues. These were all ones that had been pertinent during the campaign: 
cutting back services as an alternative to raising taxes, increasing funds to 
get quality education, priority emphasis on teaching morality, more profes- 
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sionalism and less patronage in government, basing increased teacher pay 
on merit and not on longevity, and paying more attention to the working 
people. 
Despite the importance of these issues and the amount of campaign 
debate devoted to some of them, there was far from complete consensus 
among activists in their perception of the views of each candidate. On 
those issues where the position of a candidate was generally recognized by 
a substantial proportion of activists, an even larger proportion of that 
candidate's supporters were likely to recognize it. On some issues the 
supporters of a candidate were the only ones to have a clear perception of 
his position. On those issues where the position of a candidate was not 
clear, other candidates' supporters were usually unsure of his position, 
whereas the candidate's own workers were likely to attribute their views to 
their candidate. We can illustrate these conclusions with a number of 
examples. 
On the issue of cutting back services as an alternative to raising taxes, 
the positions of Wilkinson and Brown were well recognized; more than 
one-half of all the activists perceived both candidates as agreeing with the 
necessity of paring down services in order to avoid any tax increases. 
Wilkinson and Brown workers shared this view about their candidates' 
stands to an even greater extent. In contrast, there were wide splits, even 
among their own workers, in the perception of Beshear's and Stumbo's 
positions on this issue. There is some sign of activists' opinions guiding 
their perception in the case of both Beshear's and Stumbo's supporters. 
On the issue of increasing funding to get quality education, a recogni- 
tion of Beshear's position stands out among all respondents, and his 
activists were even stronger (84 percent) in their perception of Beshear's 
support for education funding. The  positions of the other candidates were 
less well known. Wilkinson was perceived by almost one-third of the 
activists to be against raising education funding, and this perception was 
particularly held by those of his supporters who shared that opinion. 
The  argument that priority emphasis be given to teaching morality was 
recognized as Carroll's position by 73 percent of all respondents and by 91 
percent of his supporters. Wilkinson and Stumbo supporters were much 
more likely than others to believe these two candidates were strong 
advocates of teaching morality, and this was particularly true of supporters 
of that position. 
Brown was recognized as an advocate of more professionalism and less 
patronage in government by 68 percent of all activists and by 90 percent of 
his workers. Nearly all Stumbo workers and most Wilkinson workers also 
perceived their candidates as strongly for professionalism in government, 
and the Wilkinson activists' opinion was strongly related to their own 
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opinions. T h e  perception of Beshear was split on this issue, even for his 
own supporters, whose perception was correlated with their own opinions. 
On the question of basing increased teacher pay on merit and not on 
longevity, none of the candidates had well-recognized positions, probably 
because they avoided the issue during the campaign. 
Most respondents recognized that the populist issue of paying more 
attention to the working people had been emphasized by Stumbo, a 
perception shared by almost all of his supporters. T h e  activists' perception 
of Brown's stand was split, even in the case of his supporters, where it was 
related to their own opinions. Carroll and Wilkinson volunteers were both 
more likely than others to perceive their candidate as supporting a populist 
position. 
In all three elections there were distinct differences among the candi- 
dates' support groups on some of the issues. This suggests that the issue 
position of candidates has some effect on the choices made by political 
activists. On the other hand, it is likely that some activists choose a 
candidate for reasons unrelated to issues and subsequently either adopt 
their candidate's position on an issue or attribute to the candidate their own 
position. T h e  data from the 1987 race help to clarify this relationship 
because they also include the activists' perceptions of positions taken by 
the candidates. When a candidate is prominently identified with an issue, 
this will be recognized by most activists, but the candidate's supporters are 
particularly likely to perceive this issue position and also to agree with it. 
When there is more general uncertainty about a candidate's stand on an 
issue, his or her supporters are more likely to attribute to the candidate 
their own issue preferences. 
The Impact of IdeoLogy in Activists' Choice of Candidates 
Kentucky gubernatorial candidates are rarely described in the media as 
either liberals or conservatives, and primary voting alignments are not 
usually defined in clear ideological terms. In 1983 and 1987 the guber- 
natorial activists rarely mentioned the terms liberal and consemative in any 
of their open-ended explanations of the reasons for active involvement for 
particular candidates. 
Although this evidence suggests that these activists do not think of 
candidates explicitly in liberal/conservative terms, some indirect measures 
suggest that ideological perceptions are important. First, we would consid- 
er that ideology has an influence if there is some consensus among the 
candidates' supporters about the ideological position of the candidates and 
some fairly clear distinctions are perceived among them. A second criteri- 
on would be whether activists generally prefer the candidate whom they 
perceive as being closest to their own ideological position. We would posit 
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1979 
A11 S1 St M OA B H 
Activists ----------------1------1----- 1---1-----1----------1---------- 
2 3 4 
McBrayer S1 St M OA B H 
supportws ----------------1------1-----1---1-------1---------1--------- 
2 3 4 
Sloane S1 0 St A M  B H 
Supporters -------------------1----1---1-----1-1---1------------------- 1 
2 3 4 
Atkins S 1 St M B A  0 H 
Supporters -l------------l-----------l----l-l--------------l-l---------- 
2 3 4 
Stoval 1 St 091 M A  B H 
Supporterr --------------1---------1-1------1--1---1----------------- 1 -- 
2 3 4 
Hubbard S 1 St AB M 0 H 
Supporters -----------1------------1------1----1-----1-------1---------- 
2 3 4 
Brown S 1 StM A B 0 H 
supporters ----------------1--------11----1----1-1--------1------------- 
2 3 4 
............................................................................ 
(scale of 1 to 5 from most liberal to most conservative) 
M = McBrayer; S1 = Sloane; St = Stovall; A = Atkins; H = Hubbard; B = Brown; 
0 = Activists 
Figure 1. Placements of Candidates and Activists on Liberalism/Conservatism 
Scale in 1979 
that ideology has a strong influence on choice where we find a strong 
positive relationship. 
Figures 1 to 3 show a fairly substantial range in the ideological posi- 
tions of the candidates from most liberal to most conservative (on a scale of 
1 to 5) as perceived by all the activists (mean of the entire sample). When 
we break down the sample by individual candidate's supporters, for the 
most part this observation still holds true. There is some tendency for 
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1983 
-
A1 1 S1 St 0 C 
Activists ----------------------1---1---------1-------1---------------- 
2 3 4 
Collins S1 St 0 C 
Supporters --------------1---------1-------------1-----1---------------- 
2 3 4 
Sloane StSl 0 C 
supporters -------------------------ll-------l----------l--------------- 
2 3 4 
Stumbo S1 St0 C 
supporters --------------------------l-------ll-----l------------------- 
2 3 4 
............................................................................ 
(scale of 1 to 5 from most liberal to most conservative) 
C = Collins; S1 = Sloane; St = Stumbo; 0 = Activists 
Figure 2. Placements of Candidates and Activists on LiberalismIConservatism 
Scale in 1983 
supporters of other candidates to perceive an opposing candidate in more 
extreme terms. For example, in 1979 Hubbard is perceived as more 
conservative by Sloane activists than by his own supporters; and Sloane is 
perceived as more liberal by Atkins and Hubbard supporters than by his 
own. In general, activists supporting candidates at one end of the spec- 
trum tend to perceive candidates at the other end of the spectrum as being 
more extreme in their ideological views. 
In 1983, however, there are not very large differences among the 
supporters in their own ideological positions, and there are only modest 
differences in the activists' perceptions of the opposition candidates com- 
pared to 1979. There is surprising little difference as to how Collins is 
perceived by each of the candidates' activists. 
In 1987, as shown in figure 3, Beshear is perceived as somewhat liberal 
to middle-of-the-road by both his own supporters and the activists as a 
whole, whereas he is viewed as considerably more liberal by some support- 
ers of the more conservative candidates (i.e., Brown, Carroll, and Wilkin- 
son). In contrast, Brown is perceived as middle-of-the-road to somewhat 
conservative by his own activists and as middle-of-the-road to somewhat 
conservative by supporters of Beshear and Stumbo. 
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1987 
-
All Bs St 08 WC 
Activists ----------------1---------1----------1--11------------------- 
2 3 4 
Beshear Bs St 0 B W C 
supporters -------------------1---1--1---------1---1------1------------- 
2 3 4 
Brown Bs St WC BO 
Supporters -------------1------------1---------11----1------------------ 
2 3 4 
Carroll Bs St B O C W  
supporters ---------l--------------------l------l--l-ll----------------- 
2 3 4 
Stumbo Bs St0 WC B 
Supporters ------------------------1---11---------11-1------------------ 
2 3 4 
Wilkinson Bs St B C W O  
supporters ---------------l-------------l-----l---l---ll---------------- 
2 3 4 
............................................................................ 
(scale of 1 to 5 from most liberal to most conservative) 
Bs = Beshear; C = Carroll; St = Stumbo; W = Wilkinson; B = Brown; 
0 = Activists 
Figure 3. Placements of Candidates and Activists on LiberalismlConservatism 
Scale in 1987 
The "born again" Carroll is perceived as middle-of-the-road to some- 
what conservative by both his own elite volunteers and all the activists. 
The  more liberal candidate Beshear's supporters view Carroll as the most 
conservative of all the candidates. The  populist Stumbo is perceived as 
somewhat liberal to middle-of-the-road by his workers, all the activists, 
and the elite volunteers in each of the other candidates' groups. In 
contrast, Wilkinson, the eventual victor, is perceived as middle-of-the- 
road to somewhat conservative by his supporters and also by the workers in 
each of the other gubernatorial campaign groups. 
As noted in figures 1 to 3, there is usually a very close relationship 
between one's own ideological position and one's perception of one's 
candidate's position (i.e., there is a fairly small distance between where a 
supporter stands and the perceived stance of his or her candidate). In some 
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cases in 1979 and 1987, the candidate's perceived ideological position is not 
the closest to that of the candidate's activists. For example, in 1979 
McBrayer supporters were closer to Atkins than to their own candidate, 
and the Atkins supporters were closer to Hubbard than to anyone else. 
The overall position of the activists was closest to the overall perception of 
Atkins. Also, in 1987 Beshear workers were closer to Stumbo than to their 
own candidate. In contrast, in 1983 all of the candidates' supporters were 
closest to their chosen candidate in political ideology. One probable reason 
for this finding is the smaller number of candidates in the 1983 primary 
contest. With six candidates in the 1979 race and five candidates in the 
1987 race, it is not surprising that the supporters were not always closest to 
their chosen candidate. 
There is generally only a small gap between the mean ideological 
preference of activists supporting a particular candidate and their percep- 
tion of his or her ideological preference. This may mean that activists 
choose to support candidates whose ideological preferences they agree 
with. It could also mean that activists attribute to their candidate their own 
ideological leanings. This is similar to the dilemma we encountered in 
assessing the influence of perceived issue positions on choice. The  data do 
not permit us to measure the impact of issue positions with any precision. 
Where most activists, including a candidate's supporters, agree on their 
perception of his or her ideological posture and where candidates are 
perceived to have quite different postures, it would seem that ideology 
plays a part in the choice of a candidate to support. This is the pattern that 
we find in figures 1 to 3 for most candidates. 
An entirely different possibility, suggested by cognitive dissonance 
theory (Heider, 1958), is that activists may choose a candidate on the basis 
of factors other than ideological proximity but, having selected their 
candidate, then come to perceive the candidate as sharing their own 
political views. Augmenting this tendency toward "assimilation" of the 
favored candidate may be a "contrast" effect, embodying the tendency to 
exaggerate the differences between oneself and candidates one opposes 
(see, e.g., Granberg and Brent, 1974; Sherrod, 1971-72). 
E lectability and Viability 
Prior researchers have argued that candidate choice in conventions and 
primaries often involves a trade-off between a candidate's ideological 
position and his or her electability (Abramowitz, McGlennon, and 
Rapoport, 1986; Jewell, 1984; Stone and Abramowitz, 1986b). However, in 
Kentucky Democratic politics, this trade-off is usually not very critical, 
since any nominated Democratic gubernatorial candidate is usually electa- 
ble. Unlike the party professionals in a strong two-party state, Kentucky 
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activists are not heavily concerned with the strongest candidate in the 
general election, because the Republicans are usually weak. For example, 
more than 90 percent of the activists in our 1979183 sample felt that their 
primary candidate would very likely win the general election. 
In order to gain information about the viability of Democratic candi- 
dates, we asked the 1987 activists to assess their candidate's chances of 
winning the primary election: "When you first became active in the 
campaign, how did you assess your candidate's chances of winning the 
primary?" Half of the elite volunteers were optimistic; more than 35 
percent thought that their candidate was very likely to win, and another 15 
percent felt that their candidate would probably win. In contrast, less than 
one-fourth of the respondents believed that their candidate would proba- 
bly or very likely lose the election. The  more pessimistic activists were 
usually those supporting Wilkinson, Stumbo, and Carroll-the candidates 
generally perceived early in the campaign as least likely to win. 
Activists have obvious reasons for wanting to support a winner, and 
this was clearly a major reason for the support given to Beshear and 
particularly to Brown in 1987. On the other hand, those activists who 
started out being pessimistic about the chances of their candidates in the 
primary (particularly the Wilkinson, Stumbo, and Carroll supporters) 
clearly did not choose a candidate on the basis of perceived viability. 
But changing perceptions of viability caused some activists to shift 
candidate support late in the campaign. According to polls and political 
experts, in 1987 there was a last-minute shuffling of voters and activists 
from certain candidates to the surprise winner, Wilkinson. T h e  collapse of 
Beshear's campaign, Carroll's failure to generate support, and the polls 
showing that Wilkinson was gaining all contributed to changes in activists' 
support. In the last few days of the campaign, there is evidence that a 
number of activists, particularly Beshear supporters and some Carroll 
workers in western Kentucky joined the Wilkinson ranks. 
Summary of Factors Distinguishing Candidate Groups 
In order to have a clearer understanding of the different factors that 
distinguish the various candidate organizations in 1979,1983, and 1987, we 
have summarized the most significant distinctions in table 17. This in- 
cludes the following factors: continuity of support, professional/amateur 
status, motivations, demographics, interest groups, issues, and ideology. 
Maltivariate Analysis of Activist.' Choice 
In earlier research (1985), based on the survey of 1979 andlor 1983 political 
activists, Miller used multivariate analysis to measure the variables that 
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Table 17. Summary of Factors Distinguishing Candidates' Groups 
Continuity Amat/Prof Motives Demogr Groups Issues Ideology 
1979 
Atkins Prof 
Brown Amat/Prof Less Cand 
Hubbard Prof 
McBrayer Prof More Sol 
More Mat 
Sloane AmatProf 
Stovall Prof Less Mat 
More Purp 
Business Business Honesty Mid 
Business Business Honesty Mid 
Hi Inc 
Born ag Business Coal Cons 
Business Honesty 
Lawyers Educ Mid 
Pub off 
Hi educ Teachers Educ Lib 
Young 
Lo educ Labor Labor Lib 
Lo inc 
Older 
1983 
Collins McBrayer Prof More Cand Hi inc Business Educ Mid 
Business 
Sloane Sloane Prof Hi educ Teachers Educ Lib 
McBrayer 
Stumbo Brown Amat/Prof Less Sol Born ag Labor Labor Lib 
Less Mat Young 
Lo inc 
1987 
Beshear Collins Prof More Sol Hi inc Teachers Educ Lib 
More Mat Hi educ Profess 
More Cand 
Brown Collins Prof More Sol Business Business No tax Mid 
More Mat Profess Antipatronage 
Carroll Collins Prof More Sol Low educ Farm Morality Mid 
More Mat Business 
Older 
Stumbo Stumbo Amat/Prof More Purp Young Labor Populist Lib 
WilkinsonCollins Amaerof More Purp Business Farm No tax Mid 
Lottery 
Factors: Continuity of Support, Amateur/Professional Status, Motivations (Solidary, Mate- 
rial, Purposive, Candidate-Oriented), Demographics, Interest Groups, Issues, and Ideology 
bring activists into a particular candidate's primary campaign. (Detailed 
information concerning the dependent and independent variables is pro- 
vided in the Appendix.) Table 18 summarizes the results of a discriminant 
analysis of these data for the 1983 primary campaign. Two discriminant 
functions were derived, both of which are statistically significant and make 
major contributions to discriminatory power. T h e  first function, with a 
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Table 18. Discriminating among Supporters of Collins, Sloane, and Stumbo 
Standardized Discriminant 
Function Coefficients 
Predictor Function I Function I1 
- - 
Motivations for involvement 
Solidary .221"* - .050 
Material -060 .I70 
Purposive - .048 -.lo9 
Candidate-oriented - .063"* - .224** 
Ideological closeness to candidates 
Closeness to Collins .067"** - .618*** 
Closeness to Sloane .619*"* .416*** 
Closeness to Stumbo - .555*"" . 098** * 
Interest group membership 
Labor union - .534*** .297*** 
EducationalITeachers group .037 .003 
Business organization .071 - .I22 
First worked actively in 1983 -. 161" .I11 
Candidate supported in 1979 primary 
Atkins .012 .018 
Brown - .001 . 260X 
Hu bbard .131" .I50 
McBrayer .310XX .I83 
Sloane .469*** .506** * 
Stovall - .040 .209 
Group centroids 
Collins Supporters - .030 - .746 
Sloane Supporters .722 .567 
Stumbo Supporters - 1.344 .636 
Eigenvalues .537 .443 
Canonical correlations .591 .554 
Percent correctly classified 69.7 
Goodman and Kruskal's tau .521 
*Significant at .05 level; ""significant at .O1 level; """significant at .001 level 
The significance test was based on the serial deletion procedure described by Sigelman 
(1984). 
canonical correlation only slightly greater than that of the second, explains 
54.8 percent of the common variance. T h e  model's discriminatory power is 
fairly impressive, as indicated by Goodman and Kruskal's tau coefficient of 
.521, which means that by knowing where the respondents stood on the 
independent variables we reduce by 52.1 percent the number of errors we 
would otherwise make in classifying each one as a Collins, Sloane, or 
Stumbo supporter. 
Candidate Choice among Gubernatorial Activists 181 
According to the group centroids, the first function distinguishes 
Sloane supporters on the one extreme from Stumbo supporters on the 
other, with Collins supporters falling in between but closer to the Stumbo 
supporters. The  second function separates the Collins supporters from the 
Stumbo and Sloane supporters, who are closely clustered. The  central 
issue, however, is neither overall predictive power nor the alignment of the 
three groups of volunteers on the two functions but the impact of each 
predictor in the model, as indicated by the standardized discriminant 
function coefficients. 
Motivations for involvement. Two broad motivational dimensions distin- 
guish between Sloane and Stumbo supporters. Probably because Stumbo 
was a new candidate with only a regional rather than an established 
statewide base, activists motivated by solidary considerations were more 
likely to gravitate to the Sloane campaign. Stumbo's volunteers were more 
likely to have been drawn to the candidate himself than were Sloane's 
workers. But the coefficient for the same motivation on the second factor 
indicates that Collins supporters were significantly more candidate ori- 
ented than either Stumbo or Sloane supporters; Collins, a longtime cam- 
paigner, had developed close personal ties throughout her political career 
with many "professional" activists. 
Ideologicalproximity. The  ideological closeness between activists and the 
three candidates had a sizable impact on their choice of a candidate. On 
both functions all three ideological proximity measures registered signifi- 
cant effects, and the direction of these effects was quite predictable: those 
whose liberal/conse~ative self-descriptions were close to their descrip- 
tions of a particular candidate were likely to sign on with that candidate's 
campaign. 
In order to examine this effect more closely, let us return to figure 2, 
which reveals that across all three groups of activists there was a fairly wide 
range in perceptions of the candidates' political orientations, with Sloane 
and Stumbo perceived as more liberal than Collins. The  same pattern 
shows up in the perceptions held by each group of activists. Interestingly, 
though, the three groups were themselves quite similar in terms of their 
self-perceptions, for all tended to describe themselves as falling very near 
the midpoint of the ideological continuum. Moreover, figure 2 shows 
graphic evidence of the point made statistically in table 18: on average the 
supporters of a given candidate saw themselves as having more in common 
with that candidate than with either of the other contenders. The  clearest 
case in point is that of the Stumbo supporters; whereas both the Collins 
and the Sloane workers tended to see Stumbo as being fairly far removed 
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from the Kentucky political mainstream, the Stumbo volunteers, whose 
ideological self-images were virtually identical to those of their counter- 
parts in the other two camps, viewed their candidate as no less moderate 
than they themselves were. 
Interestgroup membership. Of the three large interest group constituencies, 
only one-labor unions-was linked to candidate support in 1983, and 
Stumbo was the primary recipient of this support. Collins, seen as the 
most conservative of the three contenders, enjoyed little support within 
the labor movement, while the UAW, UMW, and AFL-CIO all threw their 
support to Stumbo after watching Sloane waffle on the right-to-work issue. 
Activity inpriorprimaries. Stumbo, a newcomer to statewide politics, drew 
significantly greater support from activists who had not previously been 
involved in a Democratic gubernatorial primary than did Sloane, a repeat 
candidate. First-time gubernatorial primary activists were less likely to be 
involved in the Collins campaign. 
Continuity of support. T h e  activists who had worked for Sloane in his 
unsuccessful 1979 campaign tended to line up behind him again in 1983; 
indeed, more than 77 percent of those who claimed to have worked for 
Sloane in 1979 joined the 1983 Sloane campaign as well. Sloane also drew 
significantly more heavily than Stumbo did from the 1979 supporters of 
Terry McBrayer. Brown's followers were more likely to gravitate to either 
the Stumbo or the Sloane camp than to the Collins campaign, as evidenced 
by the significant coefficient for 1979 Brown support on the second 
function. 
Analysis. A multivariate analysis such as this enables us to weigh the 
relative importance of a number of variables that may explain activists' 
choice of a candidate to support. One disadvantage is that this may cause 
us to overlook the importance of a single variable, such as one issue 
emphasized by one candidate in one election. Moreover, discriminant 
analysis is an awkward technique for discriminating among supporters of 
five or six candidates. This is why we have used it only in the 1983 primary 
election. 
Among the variables most helpful in predicting which candidate polit- 
ical activists would support in 1983 were their support for a particular 
candidate in 1979, their involvement in a labor union, their basic motiva- 
tion for supporting a candidate, and-above all-their ideological close- 
ness to the perceived position of a candidate. 
T h e  fact that Kentucky Democratic activists tend to be longtimers 
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rather than in-and-outers, coupled with the factional tradition of Kentucky 
politics, also suggests that activists' involvement might be characterized by 
considerable continuity of support from one campaign to the next. Some 
such linkages are visible in our data, but all in all the continuity factor is not 
nearly as strong as might have been expected. Nor do group memberships, 
other than union membership, appear to have played a very important role 
in drawing activists into particular campaigns. 
It is noteworthy that ideological proximity has so much importance in 
a discriminant analysis. We have already pointed out, however, that there 
may be other explanations for the ideological congruence between activ- 
ists and the candidates for whom they work. In Kentucky Democratic 
activists tend to work year in and year out with political friends and 
neighbors, and a shared set of political orientations may underlie these 
continuing networks. This suggests more of a collective than an individual 
logic of candidate choice, a possibility premised on group attraction to a 
given candidate. Moreover, some activists may attribute to candidates 
their own ideological positions. Unfortunately, our data do not permit us to 
determine which of these interpretations best accounts for the unexpec- 
tedly strong showing of ideological proximity as a factor underlying candi- 
date choice among Kentucky Democratic activists. 
ConcZusions 
Kentucky gubernatorial activists are the heart and core of the state's 
political nominating process. They are the most active and vital political 
volunteers; they provide much of the essential manpower and funding that 
are required to carry out campaigns for nominations. Similarly, they pro- 
vide much of the effort and funding in the general election campaigns. 
These elite workers appear to make choices on the basis of material 
incentives and personal contacts in contrast to ideological, issue-oriented 
concerns. They tend to be long-term professionals without close ties to 
interest groups; they pledge their first loyalties to the party and not to 
significant interest groups. However, we find that their choice of candi- 
dates often coincides fairly closely with ideological closeness and certain 
issues, an apparent anomaly that we discussed above. 
In the contemporary political environment, there are some campaigns 
where political activists play a much smaller role. In these campaigns paid 
professionals perform the key organizational tasks; professional campaign 
structures take the place of volunteer activists' organizations. A profession- 
ally staffed campaign group, utilizing sophisticated mass media tech- 
niques, might be a very successful electoral vehicle in a nominating system 
that relies largely on primary elections and makes no use of organizational 
endorsements. T h e  1979 gubernatorial campaign of John Y. Brown, J t ,  
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was an example of a candidate with considerable financial resources 
winning by having a professionally staffed media-oriented campaign. 
Wallace Wilkinson in 1987, however, combined a more traditional organi- 
zation of activists with an expensive and skillful media campaign. 
Perspectives of the Primary Campaign 
Reasons for Winning or Losing 
Activists were asked to give the most important reasons for the win or loss 
of their candidates in the 1979, 1983, andlor 1987 primaries. Generally, 
elite volunteers for victorious candidates stressed reasons such as the 
commendable personal qualities of the candidate (65 percent), popular 
issues (51 percent), good organization (38 percent), favorable finances (35 
percent), and good media (25 percent). More than 90 percent in 1979, 84 
percent in 1983, and 43 percent in 1987 praised their candidate for possess- 
ing admirable qualities-e.g., honesty and integrity (John Y Brown, Jc, 
1979; Martha Layne Collins, 1983; and Wallace Wilkinson 1987), experi- 
ence (Collins), and "nonpolitical status" (Brown and Wilkinson). Almost 
90 percent of the Wilkinson supporters cited popular issues for the victory 
of their candidate-especially the no-taxllottery stand; in contrast, only 30 
percent of Brown's and one-third of Collins's workers stressed popular 
issues. On the other hand, more than 53 percent of Collins's supporters 
emphasized good organization, compared to 18 percent of Brown's and 22 
percent of Wilkinson's activists. Although the 1987 gubernatorial campaign 
was, by far, the most expensive in Kentucky's history, with the winning 
candidate spending almost $4.3 million, only 34 percent of Wilkinson's 
supporters emphasized financial resources as a major reason for his victory. 
A Brown activist in 1979 commented, "John Y. Brown has charisma. 
He looks good on television. And Phyllis is such an asset." Another Brown 
worker stated, "He's a millionaire who is going to run Kentucky like a 
business. He has promised to get rid of the political corruption in Frank- 
fort." A Collins worker in 1983 remarked, "I think it was her 'eyeball to 
eyeball' contact with the voters and her remarkable memory in calling 
them by name after meeting only one time." One Collins activist at- 
tributed the victory to good organization and enough money: "Martha 
Layne Collins had the best grass roots organization and ample funds to get 
her message across." 
One volunteer perceived that Wilkinson won because of the "lottery 
-money-and the skills to communicate to people across Kentucky that 
he was sincere and not counterfeit." Another Wilkinson worker suggested 
the victory was due to "well executed campaign strategy, issues, organiza- 
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tion. Poor campaign strategies of opponents-especially mud-slinging." 
One Wilkinson worker's explanation included the candidate's outsider 
status: "The lottery issue, coupled with commitment not to raise taxes, 
ample funds to get the message across-good organization-new face not 
tainted by public's low opinion of Frankfort." 
Among the supporters of losing candidates in 1979,1983, and/or 1987, 
the most frequently given reasons for the loss were inadequate financial 
resources (47 percent), negative advertisinglbad media (43 percent), un- 
popular issues (23 percent), and weak organization (1 percent). McBrayer 
supporters in 1979 stressed his association with the unpopular Governor 
Carroll and the harmful effects of negative advertising, whereas Sloane 
activists in 1983 stressed Governor Brown's last-minute endorsement of 
Stumbo as a major reason for their candidate's loss. Also, Beshear's and 
Brown's activists in 1987 cited the devasating effects of negative advertis- 
ing; in contrast, Stumbo's and Carroll's supporters emphasized very inade- 
quate financial resources. 
A McBrayer activist in 1979 remarked, "Brown came in at the last 
minute and bought the election. And his mud-slinging ads against the 
Carroll administration were very effective." According to one Stovall 
worker, "Thelma didn't have enough money and the media portrayed her 
as a loser." A Stumbo supporter in 1983 commented, "I believe the reason 
Stumbo lost was due to the fact that he was an unknown candidate and his 
funds were insufficient in comparison to the publicity Collins and Sloane 
have had over a period of years." One Sloane volunteer in 1983 suggested, 
"John Y. Brown's support for Grady Stumbo in the last few days took votes 
away from Sloane and caused him to lose." Another Sloane activist in 1983 
stated, "Sloane's loss was in direct relation to his inability to get a bloc vote 
from organized labor, a group he had done so well with in previous 
elections. Stumbo won over some 35,000 labor votes that would have voted 
for Sloane." 
One Beshear supporter in 1987 commented, "Beshear followed poor 
advice, created a perception of a negative campaign, would not endorse 
the lottery issue, could not explain where new revenue would be found 
other than growth." Another Beshear volunteer maintained, "Beshear was 
forced to take on Brown to set Brown's record straight; but the negative 
campaign had a backlash and Beshear opened up the way for Wilkinson 
who had avoided any close scrutiny since he was not seen as having a 
chance of winning." According to a Carroll supporter, her candidate lost 
because of his political past: "The scandal the last time he was governor 
and the deal with Hunt." One Carroll worker remarked, "The media 
repeatedly defamed Mr. Carroll, never gave him any praise-all bad and 
this made people wonder if and why he was in the race-so he could not 
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raise moneys or hopes." Brown's laziness was noted by one of his volun- 
teers: "John Y didn't work very hard. He went to a ball game and played golf 
the last days of the campaign. He gave away the election to Wilkinson." 
Divisive Pm'rnaries and Party Activists in 19 79 and 1983 
It has often been asserted that direct primaries undermine political parties 
by producing, exacerbating, or at the very least publicizing rifts among 
their supporters. V.O. Key (1964) believed that "the adoption of the direct 
primary opened the road for disruptive forces that gradually fractionalized 
the party organization. [Tlhe primary system . . . facilitated the con- 
struction of factions and cliques attached to ambitions of individual lead- 
ers" (p. 342). Those who voluntarily commit their time, energy, money, 
and other resources to a candidate who loses the party primary may be 
reluctant to transfer their loyalties to the winner (Hacker, 1965). Even if 
the issue positions of the winning and losing candidates are virtually 
identical, the experience of losing can sour an activist on further involve- 
ment, as can the fact that the winning candidate was the agent of this 
defeat. 
Over the years considerable research has accumulated concerning the 
effects of divisive primaries on general election outcomes (see Born, 1981; 
Kenney and Rice, 1984; Piereson and Smith, 1975; Stone, 1984,1986), but 
relatively little is known about how activists respond to defeat in pri- 
maries. Are they more likely to pitch in and work for the primary worker in 
the general election campaign or to withdraw, at least temporarily, from the 
political fray? Just as importantly, what factors shape these responses? A 
rare glimpse at these issues was provided by Johnson and Gibson's (1974) 
study of volunteers in the 1970 primary and general election campaigns in 
an Iowa congressional district. Among those whose candidate did not 
survive the primary, three-quarters anticipated becoming less active in the 
general election campaign, nearly half indicated an unwillingness to vote 
for the primary winner, and one-fifth actually intended to work for the 
other party in some capacity. But this short-term drop-off in partisan 
activity seemed unlikely to inflict lasting harm on the party, since most of 
the activists-losers as well as winners-voiced an intention to participate 
in future campaigns and to seek higher positions within the party (Johnson 
and Gibson, 1974: 76-77). 
Since the Johnson-Gibson study was limited to a single district during 
a single year, it seems appropriate to reexamine the response of primary 
activists to the defeat of their candidate. We use data from our survey of 
Kentucky gubernatorial workers in the 1979 and 1983 primary campaigns 
to clarify the impact of divisive primaries on party activists. 
A closely contested primary is not necessarily divisive. Rather, di- 
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visiveness occurs only when the campaign is characterized by bitterness 
and ill feelings among the participants-by animosity so palpable as 
potentially to alienate individuals and groups essential to the party's 
success in the general election (Westlye, 1985: 5). 
Were the 1979 and 1983 primaries truly divisive? Before Brown's entry 
the 1979 primary was a free-for-all, with the party split along several lines. 
Then Brown, in an eleventh-hour, media-based campaign, launched a 
hard-hitting attack against old-style politics in general and the Carroll 
administration in particular, focusing on corruption as the prime issue in 
the campaign. Although McBrayer was not named in the ongoing grand 
jury investigation of the Carroll administration, Brown and others (es- 
pecially Atkins) capitalized on McBrayer's links with Carroll to tar him with 
the same brush, and the campaign in its latter stages became uncommonly 
personalistic and acrimonious. Brown's maverick operating style and pub- 
lic disdain for the party organization also antagonized many party regulars. 
The  Sloane camp, for its part, was embittered by what it perceived as 
Atkins's sellout to Brown, especially since a Sloane-Atkins linkage had 
earlier been considered. In the end, all the defeated candidates did back 
Brown's candidacy in the general election, but the primary battle left long- 
term scars. 
The  sheer nastiness of the 1979 primary was not repeated in 1983, but 
even then ill feelings continued to prevail among the various camps. 
Sloane was portrayed as a "wimp," a characterization that naturally rankled 
him and his backers, while Stumbo, who enjoyed support from the labor 
movement, was pictured by some as a wild-eyed radical. Doubts were also 
raised about Collins's fitness for the job, with overt references to her 
background as a beauty queen and home economics teacher and to her 
close ties to the "courthouse crowd." There were also veiled suggestions 
that Kentucky was not ready for a female chief executive. Stumbo's labor 
supporters worked energetically to defeat Sloane. Sloane, the acknowl- 
edged front-runner early on, was very upset with his defeat in this very 
close primary (Collins won with just 35 percent of the vote). Sloane 
demanded a recount, conceded to Collins only two weeks after the pri- 
mary, and withheld even his grudging endorsement for several more 
weeks. 
By any standard, then, the 1979 primary would have to be considered 
highly divisive. The  1983 primary was a less vitriolic and divisive affair. But 
since the close three-way race generated sharp antagonisms among the 
three camps, we believe that it, too, can fairly be included in the category 
of divisive primaries. It should be remembered that in neither of these 
primaries did any of the losing candidates support the Republican candi- 
date in the general election, as Chandler had done in some previous 
primaries that he had lost. 
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How did those who campaigned for losing candidates in the 1979 and 
1983 primaries react? It seems likely that responses to a primary loss are 
shaped by the activist's political experience and commitments. Those who 
have been involved in politics on a more or less continuous basis and who 
strongly identify with the party should be less prone to walk away from a 
general election campaign after their candidate loses in the primary; those 
whose involvement has been more intermittent or who are less firmly 
bonded to the party should be more likely to sit out the general election 
campaign. Johnson and Gibson (1974) noted in this regard that "bolters" 
were more likely than "nonbolters" to be political amateurs; 80 percent of 
the bolters had less than five years of political experience, and nearly 50 
percent had no campaign experience. Similarly, only 25 percent of the 
bolters, but 50 percent of the nonbolters, were strong party identifiers (pp. 
73-76). 
It also seems possible that activists' reactions to a primary loss are 
shaped by the motivations that led them to become involved in the 
primary campaign in the first place. In particular, those motivated by a 
material incentive (e.g., financial rewards or career enhancement) are 
primarily interested in the "spoils" of victory, in contrast to those whose 
motivation is more social (solidary) or ideological (purposive) (Clark and 
Wilson, 1961). Where the materialistic orientation prevails, the activist 
should be eager to become involved in the general election campaign, for 
to withdraw after a loss in the primary would be to cut oneself off from the 
spoils. On the other hand, some of those who enlist in a campaign are 
motivated mainly by their friendship with or admiration for a candidate, 
and this type of motivation seems less likely to transfer over to a second 
candidate. 
It is also plausible that activists who invested most heavily in a primary 
campaign and who derived the greatest satisfaction from their participa- 
tion in the primary would be most willing to become involved in another 
candidate's bid for election. We might also anticipate that the willingness 
to work in the general election would depend on which loser the activists 
had worked for. Some candidates seem to attract more "professional," 
long-term activists than others, and these professionals tend to work year 
in and year out in both primary and general election battles. In the 
Kentucky context, we would expect, for example, that McBrayer's rela- 
tively professional supporters would have been more likely to line up 
behind Brown than would Sloane's relatively amateur supporters. 
Analysis here focuses on the subset of respondents who worked for a 
losing candidate and who answered every question upon which the analy- 
sis is based (N = 284 for 1979 and 262 for 1983). There are obvious 
difficulties in using recall data of any kind (see Weir, 1975), but political 
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activists might be expected to remember their participation in a campaign 
much more accurately than the average citizen recalls his or her relatively 
casual political involvement. On the other hand, the time dimension of 
this study presents a potential complication. Respondents were asked in 
1983 to describe their involvement in the 1983 primary and, where applica- 
ble, in the 1979 primary as well. If their memories had faded over four 
years, they may have based their 1979 responses on their 1983 experiences. 
The  dependent variable in the analysis is a yeslno response to the 
question, "In 1979 [1983], did you work for the Democratic gubernatorial 
nominee in the general election?" The  independent variables, based on 
the propositions outlined above, fall into five categories: personal political 
characteristics, motivations for invo!vement in the primary campaign, 
level of involvement in the primary campaign, positive affect toward the 
primary campaign, and primary candidate preference. 
Fourpersonalpoliticalcba~acteristics were included in the analysis: a 1 to 
5 Likert scale summarizing a respondent's degree of involvement in 
Kentucky campaigns during the last five years; the number of years the 
respondent had been actively involved in Kentucky politics; a 1 to 5 
liberalism-conservatism scale; and the respondent's party identification 
(measured on the traditional 1 to 7 scale). Motivations for involvement in the 
primary were measured in a series of thirteen 1 to 4 Likert-type items 
drawn from prior empirical work o the Clark-Wilson (1961) typology of 
motivations (see chapter 3 for a detailed explanation). One item ("support 
of a particular candidate I believe in") was set aside because so many of the 
respondents highlighted it. Factor analyses of the remaining twelve items 
uncovered three dimensions in both 1979 and 1983-solidary, material, 
and purposive. Based on these results, each set of items was combined 
additively to form a summary score for each respondent on each dimension 
in a given year. T h e  "personal friendship with a candidate" item was used 
by itself as an indicator of a candidate-centered motivation for participa- 
tion in the primary. 
Two separate indicators of level of involvement in theprimary campaign 
were employed for each year: the number of hours per week and the 
amount of money the respondent contributed to the campaign. Posihe 
affect toward the primary campaign was probed in a series of seven 1 to 5 
Likert-type items ("experienced good relationships with the co-workers"; 
"felt primary deserved my support even if I were unable to participate"; 
"campaign involvement made me more interested in sticking with pol- 
itics"; "felt I belonged to a cohesive group"; "cared about what the 
campaign organization said or did"; "participation increased due to per- 
sonality of candidate"; and "importance of the primary campaign's pur- 
pose"). Since factor analyses uncovered a single underlying dimension for 
each year, the seven items were combined into a single additive index of 
positive feelings about the primary campaign. Finally, dummy (0, 1) 
variables were coded to designate each activist's candidatp.gference in the 
campaign(s) in which he or she worked. 
Of the 284 activists who had worked for one of the losers in the 1979 
Democratic gubernatorial primary, 214 (75.4 percent) subsequently joined 
the campaign of the Democratic nominee, John Y. Brown, Jr. This percen- 
tage declined somewhat in 1983, when (probably as a reflection of ani- 
mosities that developed during the extremely competitive primary) only 
67.6 percent of the Sloane and Stumbo supporters decided to work in the 
Collins campaign. Did the 30 percent or so of the Kentucky activists who 
did not join in the general election campaign after their favorite lost in the 
primary differ in any systematic way from the approximately 70 percent 
who did campaign for the winner of the primary? Table 19 summarizes a 
pair of discriminant analyses bearing on this question; the two analyses are 
identical, except that the variables in each were matched to the election at 
hand. 
As the summary statistics at the bottom of table 19 indicate, the 
performance of these models was fairly impressive. T h e  best gauges of 
predictive power are Goodman and Kruskal's tau coefficients of .405 and 
.434 for 1979 and 1983, respectively; this means that the errors in classifica- 
tion based on the discriminating variables were more than 40 percent 
below what would have been expected had classification been attempted 
based solely on the marginal distribution of the grouping variable. 
T h e  standardized discriminant function coefficients identify the inde- 
pendent variables that do most to distinguish those who remained active in 
the general election campaign from those who did not. In both 1979 and 
1983, two personal political characteristics stood out above all the other 
predictors in the model. Those who had been involved in political cam- 
paigns relatively rarely or only intermittently over the previous five years 
were significantly more likely to drop out afte'r a primary loss than those 
who had been involved in Kentucky politics on a more sustained basis. 
Similarly, the party identification scale (which largely distinguished be- 
tween strong and less strong Democrats, with some independents and a 
handful of Republican identifiers) also separated the stayers from the 
dropouts among supporters of losing primary candidates; those who were 
more closely identified with the Democratic party were more likely to 
work for the party's nominee after their preferred candidate had lost in the 
primary. 
T h e  effect of political ideology was significant in 1983 but fell short of 
significance in 1979. In 1979 Brown ran as a reformer, attacking corruption 
in state government and old-style patronage politics. He did not adopt any 
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Table 19. Discriminant Analysis Summary, 1979 and 1983 Activists' 
Response to Primary Defeat 
Standardized Discriminant 
Function Coefficients 
Predictor 1979 1983 
Personal political characteristics 
Frequency of campaign activity .581X** .443* 
Years of campaign activity 236 -.lo0 
Party identification .504* * * ,464+** 
Political ideology - .206 .450X* 
Motivations for primary involvement 
Solidary incentives - .239 .029 
Material incentives - .034 .401X 
Purposive incentives - .057 253 
Candidate-centered incentives .029 -.I69 
Level of involvement in the primary 
Hours worked - .089 - .038 
Money contributed -.I63 .254 
Satisfaction with the primary campaign .028 .271 
Candidate Preference 
Atkins 1979 .401X 
Hubbard 1979 .204 
McBrayer 1979 .403* 
Stovall 1979 .234 
Sloane 1979 (reference category) - 
Stumbo 1983 .I15 
Sloane 1983 (reference category) - 
Group centroids 
Nonworkers for the Democratic nominee - .899 - .641 
Workers for the Democratic nominee .294 .308 
Eigenvalues .266 .I99 
Canonical correlations .458 .407 
Percent correctly classified 78.200 76.300 
Goodman and Kruskal's tau .415 .456 
*p ( .05 **p ( .Ol ***p ( .001 
identifiable issue positions, except for his refrain that he would "run state 
government like a business." On the other hand, in 1983 Collins was 
clearly the most conservative of the three primary candidates, both in her 
orientation toward reform and the issue positions with which she and her 
opponents were identified. Thus, the more liberal among the supporters 
of Sloane and Stumbo were significantly more likely to sit out the 1983 
general election campaign than were their more conservative counterparts. 
Among the motivations for involvement in the primary campaign, only 
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the material motivation significantly affected the losing primary activists' 
likelihood of remaining active in the general election campaign, and that 
only occurred in 1983. Those who participated in a primary campaign for 
what they hoped to get out of it in a material (largely career-advancement) 
sense were less hesitant to transfer their loyalties to the primary winner's 
campaign than those who were less moved by material considerations. In 
1979, however, Brown's oft-expressed scorn for old-style patronage politics 
led to a perception that few tangible rewards, especially jobs, would result 
from working for him in the general election. By contrast, Collins, an old- 
line politico and ally of courthouse "professional" activists, was probably 
seen as more likely to reward her supporters with jobs, personal service 
contracts, and other forms of patronage. 
In 1979 Atkins and McBrayer backers were significantly more likely 
than Sloane supporters to sign on with the Brown general election cam- 
paign. These differences come as no great surprise, considering Atkins's 
withdrawal from the primary and subsequent endorsement of Brown, 
McBrayer's heavy reliance on long-term "professional" politicos who 
would be predisposed to back the party's choice no matter who it may have 
been, and the predominantly "amateur" character of Sloane's primary 
workers. By contrast, in 1983 there was no significant difference between 
Sloane and Stumbo supporters in the decision to work for Collins's elec- 
tion; in both cases the percentage who worked for Collins in the fall 
campaign fell below the percentage of losing primary activists who had 
rallied behind Brown in 1979. 
We have seen that the decision of activists who backed a losing 
candidate in the primary to work for the party's standard-bearer in the 
general election is reasonably predictable. The  more active a primary 
worker has been in recent elections and the stronger his or her sense of 
identification with the party, the greater the likelihood that he or she will 
work to elect the winner of the primary. It is also true that backers of some 
primary candidates are more likely to sit out the general election than are 
supporters of other primary candidates. 
Two points stand out about the willingness or reluctance of Kentucky 
Democratic party activists to back a party nominee against whom they 
have campaigned in the primary election. First, the sheer frequency with 
which Kentucky Democratic activists transfer their loyalties from a candi- 
date who lost in the primary to the party's gubernatorial nominee appears 
to be considerably higher than was the case in the Iowa congressional 
district analyzed by Johnson and Gibson (1974). Second, the factors that 
best predict this tendency relate to the activists' involvement in the party. 
Together, these two points convey a strong sense that Democratic activists 
in Kentucky view primaries as intramural contests for which they must 
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choose up sides. When one's side loses the intramural contest, there is 
relatively little hesitancy-especially on the part of those who identify 
most strongly with and participate most extensively in the party-to enlist 
in the extramural battle against the Republicans. 
We consider it highly probable that this willingness to campaign for 
the election of a candidate one originally opposed reflects the decline of 
traditional factionalism, the fluidity of political alignments, and the non- 
ideological nature of politics in Kentucky. This interpretation suggests a 
proposition that can serve as a guidepost for future comparative state 
analyses: that the willingness of losing primary activists to campaign for 
the primary winner is greatest in party systems where there are neither 
deep factional nor ideological divisions. 
FUNDING POLITICAL 
CAMPAIGNS 
IN ORDER to run a competitive, statewide campaign in Kentucky, a 
candidate must employ a wide variety of techniques for communicating 
with at least half a million voters. T h e  candidate must travel back and forth 
across the state, along with members of the staff, for many months. 
Campaign literature must be printed and mailed to hundreds of thousands 
of voters; yard signs and bumper stickers must be purchased and dis- 
tributed. Many of the jobs that used to be performed by volunteers are 
now carried out by paid workers, such as those who run the phone banks. A 
serious candidate for major statewide office must hire political consultants, 
media experts, and pollsters; and the good ones are expensive. Statewide 
polls done by professionals are also expensive; cut-rate polls are virtually 
useless. Most expensive of all is the cost of creating and buying time for 
television and (to a lesser extent) radio advertising. 
T h e  costs of carrying out a competitive campaign are high and are 
continuously growing. In our analysis of gubernatorial primaries, we have 
seen that the success of a candidate increasingly depends on the quality 
and quantity of his or her television advertising. T h e  costs of campaigns 
are escalating in large part because the importance and cost of television 
have been growing. They have also escalated because, in recent cam- 
paigns for major office, there have been more candidates who were able 
either to raise large sums of money or to loan large sums to their campaigns. 
T h e  High Cost of Campaigns 
Campaign costs for statewide and state legislative races have escalated 
dramatically over the last two decades. In 1967 the thirteen candidates for 
governor spent a total of just under $2 million in the primary and general 
election campaigns. In 1987 one candidate for governor spent more than 
twice that amount in the primary alone. Between 1975 and 1987 the cost of 
living has slightly more than doubled, but the cost of campaigning has 
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Table 20. Spending by Statewide Candidates in Democratic 
Primaries, 1975-87 
Total costs 
for office 
Cost of 
winner 
Highest 
cost Office 
Governor 
1975 
1979 
1983 
1987 
Constant $ 
1975 
1987 
Lieutenant Governor 
1975 
1979 
1983 
1987 
Constant $ 
1975 
1987 
Attorney General 
1975 
1979 
1983 
1987 
Constant $ 
1975 
1987 
Auditor 
1975 
1979 
1983 
1987 
Constant $ 
1975 
1987 
Superintendent 
of Public Instruction 
1975 
1979 
1983 
1987 
Constant $ 
1975 
1987 
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Table 20 (cont.) 
Total costs Cost of Highest 
Office for office winner cost 
- - 
Commissioner of 
Agriculture 
1975 80,021 31,516 31,822 
1979 80,198 14,805 24,557 
1983 204,052 84,512 84,512 
1987 232,500 207,184 207,184 
Constant $ 
1975 80,02 1 31,516 31,822 
1987 110,033 98,052 98,052 
Secretary of State 
1975 49,818 46,080 46,080 
1979 73,015 65,998 65,998 
1983 84,468 20,586 56,582 
1987 203,701 58,001 58,001 
Constant $ 
1975 49,818 46,080 46,080 
1987 96,404 27,450 27,450 
Treasurer 
1975 45,723 37,461 37,461 
1979 31,320 31,320 31,320 
1983 193,387 106,396 106,396 
1987 299,591 70,643 90,440 
Constant $ 
1975 45,723 37,461 37,461 
1987 141,785 33,433 42,802 
Totals for 
all offices 
1975 3,048,527 - - 
1979 7,849,165 - - 
1983 8,936,3 13 - - 
1987 19,408,141 - - 
Constant $ 
1975 3,048,527 - - 
1987 9,158,112 
Source: Compiled from the records of the Kentucky Registry of Election Finance for 
each of the years. 
risen far more than that (table 20). Just about everyone seems to deplore 
the spiraling cost of campaigning and the increasing amount of time 
required for fund-raising. "It's obvious that campaign costs are getting 
totally out of hand," said Steve Beshear, who raised and spent $2.9 million 
in finishing third in the 1987 Democratic primary. "We're reaching the 
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point where only the very wealthy will be able to run." Unless candidates 
have a personal fortune, they have little choice but to accept large dona- 
tions from special interests. Such donations sometimes come with strings 
attached-commitments on appointments, contracts, and jobs. 
Statewide Elections 
Because Democratic primaries are usually more competitive than general 
elections, they are usually more expensive. Table 20 provides some per- 
spective on the rising expenses of Democratic primaries and what it costs 
to win. The  governor's race, of course, has been by far the most expensive. 
From 1975 to 1987 the costs of winning the gubernatorial nomination 
increased by almost four times, and total expenses increased by eight 
times. In terms of constant dollars, the cost of winning doubled, and total 
costs increased by three and one-half times. 
In 1979 campaign finance in Kentucky was changed dramatically and 
perhaps permanently. The  impetus was the candidacy of John Y. Brown for 
governor. Realizing that much of the public was disillusioned with the 
corrupt electoral process, Brown ran as the candidate without political 
support, who could not be bought; he set out to spend his own money for 
his election bid. Since there are no limits to the use of personal funds, 
Brown lent his campaign $1.25 million of his own money, hiring a campaign 
staff across the state to substitute for a patronage-driven volunteer organi- 
zation. Brown's four major opponents attempted to spend equal amounts, 
and in the end over $5.8 million was spent in that primary-almost five 
times more than any previous Kentucky race. 
In the 1983 gubernatorial campaign, personal spending was a smaller 
factor, but overall expenditures continued to rise. With only three major 
candidates seeking the Democratic nomination, over $6.4 million was 
spent. Brown's election had made media more central to the Kentucky 
campaign process. In order to meet media's insatiable needs, more money 
was spent. Candidates became more dependent on individual contribu- 
tions, enhancing the risk of more promises for political favors. 
The  1987 primary marked a new phase in the campaign finance 
process. Candidates running for statewide office in the 1987 primary spent 
more than $19.6 million, making the election by far the most expensive in 
Kentucky's history. However, the total cost would be more than $20 
million if the tally included expenditures for the political services of 
independent committees or the in-kind contributions of individuals. In 
the governor's race, the Democratic and Republican candidates spent 
$12.5 million, led by Wilkinson, who spent more than $4.2 million in 
winning the Democratic nomination. Wilkinson spent an estimated $2.09 
for every registered voter or about $18.09 for every vote he actually 
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received. In losing efforts, Brown spent $18.38; Beshear, $21.84; Carroll, 
$23.73; and Stumbo, $8.86 per vote received. For both the general elec- 
tion and primary campaigns, the cost of the governor's race topped $15 
million. Wilkinson's bid for governor carried a record $6.8 million price tag 
(H-L, June 27, 1987, p. A10). 
While the rising costs of the gubernatorial election have attracted the 
most attention, financing has also begun to have a major impact on the 
outcome of the primary for lieutenant governor. In most election cam- 
paigns, if there are large disparities in spending, the winner is the candi- 
date who spends the most. But exceptions can occur if the low spender is 
much better known than the high spender. In 1975 Thelma Stovall, a 
veteran state officeholder, spent only $50,000 in her successful campaign 
for lieutenant governor; one of her opponents, a county judge, spent over 
$600,000. In 1979 Martha Layne Collins, who had been elected once to 
statewide office, was narrowly nominated lieutenant governor despite 
being outspent by another candidate by half a million dollars. But in 1987 
Brereton Jones, a political newcomer with a budget of over $2 million, 
defeated several candidates who had more electoral experience but small- 
er budgets. T h e  total spending in the lieutenant governor's primary was 
over $5 million, not far behind the total costs of gubernatorial primaries in 
1979 and 1983. 
There have also been rapid increases in the costs of races for the other 
state offices, some of which used to be quite inexpensive. It cost ten times 
as much to be nominated attorney general in 1987 as it did in 1975. In 1979 
the winning candidate for auditor spent less than $17,000; in 1987 the 
winner spent nearly $300,000 and outspent his opponent almost 10 to 1. 
T h e  cost of winning the job of commissioner of agriculture rose from under 
$15,000 in 1979 to over $200,000 in 1987. 
The  contrast between the costs of Democratic and Republican pri- 
maries is startling. T h e  total costs of Republican gubernatorial primaries 
was $250,000 or less in three of the four elections from 1975 through 1987, 
although in 1979 the price tag rose to over half a million dollars. Generally, 
these races have not been closely competitive; and even when the race was 
closer (as in 1987), the candidates have been unable to raise large funds. 
T h e  costs of Republican primaries for all other statewide offices in the four 
election years were negligible, largely because the Republicans have rarely 
had any significant competition. 
In the general election campaigns for governor, there have been wide 
variations in the level of Republican spending, and the Democratic party 
has generally raised as much money as was necessary to stay ahead. In 1975 
Julian Carroll, who enjoyed the advantage of incumbency, spent less than 
$300,000. Both Louie Nunn in 1979 and Jim Bunning in 1983 spent more 
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Table 21. Total Spending in Statewide General Election Races, 1975-87 
1975 1979 1983 1987 
Governor 
Dem. 286,395 1,863,250 1,394,584 2,610,075 
Rep. 233,292 1,225,148 1,364,700 255,788 
Lieutenant Governor 
Dem. 15,452 99,359 79,760 913,947 
Rep. 15,488 87,469 54,452 6,299 
Attorney General 
Dem. 14,493 14,687 57,492 224,003 
Rep. 2,641 18,730 12,337 52,389 
Auditor 
Dem. 9,509 7,845 916 66,491 
Rep. 7,324 2,296 2,878 1,341 
Superintendent of 
Public Instruction 
Dern. 6,210 29,672 153,375 145,574 
Rep. 1,631 7,749 9,473 1,850 
Commissioner of 
Agriculture 
Dem. 15,358 30,352 35,100 89,614 
Rep. 1,835 5,594 3,847 1,490 
Secretary of State 
Dem. 9,605 26,965 14,983 31,072 
Rep. 29,443 12,131 8,643 29,759 
Treasurer 
Dem. 14,684 10,426 38,662 21,068 
Rep. 3,424 3,396 12,133 5,797 
Totals 666,784 3,445,069 3,243,335 4,456,557 
Dem. 371,706 2,082,556 1,774,872 4,101,844 
Rep. 295,078 1,362,513 1,468,463 354,713 
Source: Compiled from the records of the Kentucky Registry of Election Finance for 
each of the years. 
than $1 million in their general election bid, and the Democratic candi- 
dates spent comparable or higher amounts (table 21). 
In 1987 the Republican nominee, John Harper, was not perceived by 
most Republicans as a competitive candidate. He was able to raise and 
spend only a quarter of a million dollars, less than any Republican candi- 
date for governor in at least twenty years. Harper's fund-raising effort faced 
unusual handicaps because he decided to run only after Larry Forgy's 
surprise withdrawal from the race in January 1987. Forgy had raised more 
than $750,000 and was expected to be a formidable challenger. The  last 
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time a Republican won a gubernatorial election-when Nunn ran in 
1967-he raised more than four times what Harper raised before adjusting 
for inflation. Democrat Wallace Wilkinson, engaging in financial overkill, 
spent $2.6 million, more than ten times as much as Harper. If primary and 
general election spending are combined, Wilkinson outspent Harper 
about 25 to 1. 
The  cost of running for the state legislature has also escalated dramatically. 
T h e  costs of primary and general election campaigns quadrupled from 
$722,000 in 1975 to more than $2.8 million in 1986, while the cost of living 
was approximately doubling (table 22). In addition to summarizing the 
total spending in legislative races for each year, the table shows the average 
cost of winning primaries and general elections in which there were 
contests and the highest amount spent by any winner in these races. 
The  most obvious finding in the table is that it costs much more to be 
elected to the Senate than to the House. There are about 100,000 people 
in the average Senate district and 38,000 in a House district, a ratio of 2.6 to 
1. It has generally cost from two to four times as much to run successfully in 
a Senate primary and about twice as much to run in a Senate general 
election, though the small number of Senate races in any one category 
makes precise comparisons impossible. 
The  most striking finding is the rapidly increasing costs of winning an 
election. Between 1975 and 1986 the average cost of winning a contested 
primary has increased by four to five times; the cost of winning contested 
general elections has increased about seven times. Another way of measur- 
ing change is to compare the proportion of expensive races. 
Many of the most expensive winning House races are found in the two 
largest counties; in 1979 and 1981, thirteen of twenty-two House races 
costing over $10,000 (for primary and general elections combined) were in 
Jefferson or Fayette counties. In 1984 the most expensive successful 
House campaign, costing almost $74,000, was in Fayette County (the 
losing Democrat in the primary and the losing Republican in the general 
election spent another $70,000). In 1983 the most expensive Senate 
campaign was in a district largely in Pike County; the winner spent over 
$84,000 in the Democratic primary (beating a candidate who spent almost 
$77,000) and another $5,400 in the general election. 
In the 1988 primary at least eight candidates spent more than $40,000 
each, with Sen. Michael Moloney of Lexington setting a record by raising 
$99,465 and spending $87,836 to finance his successful reelection bid 
against his half sister, Mary Moloney Mangione, who raised and spent 
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Table 22. Spending by Candidates in Legislative Races, 1975-86 
Average cost of 
winning in 
Total costs contested races Winner's highest cost 
House of Representatives 
Democratic Primaries 
1975 $245,618 $2,375 $13,401 
1981 415,744 4,588 15,837 
1986 893,057 11,366 67,245 
Constant $ 437,773 5,571 32,963 
Republican Primaries 
1975 37,105 1,130 1,825 
1981 182,247 2,644 17,651 
1986 205,948 4,622 15,870 
Constant $ 100,955 2,266 7,779 
General Elections 
1975 161,629 1,738 8,446 
1981 480,05 1 6,644 28,454 
1986 692,663 11,665 40,858 
Constant $ 339,541 5,718 20,028 
Senate 
Democratic Primaries 
1975 $190,558 $7,661 $26,683 
1981 375,339 17,091 31,474 
1986 617,725 35,609 68,903 
Constant $ 302,806 17,455 33,776 
Republican Primaries 
1975 $24,926 4,354 $7,406 
1981 24,605 8,627 8,627 
1986 151,307 23,964 26,842 
Constant $ 74,170 11,747 13,158 
General Elections 
1975 54,420 3,701 7,630 
1981 217,797 12,196 26,234 
1986 349,753 28,391 65,651 
Constant $ 171,448 13,917 32,182 
Source: Compiled from the records of the Kentucky Registry of Election Finance for 
each of the years. 
Constant dollars are 1986 spending controlling for inflation since 1975. 
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$43,749. The  amount raised by Moloney easily eclipsed the previous 
record of $81,315 by Sen. Helen Garrett in 1986 (C-4 July 8, 1988, p. Bl). 
Polifical Implications of Hi$ Costs 
It has become expensive to run a competitive race for the Kentucky Senate 
and sometimes for the House. Unless they are wealthy, candidates who 
must raise $15,000 to $20,000 or more must devote considerable effort to 
fund-raising and in most cases must have the support of local party leaders 
or other organized groups. T h e  cost of mounting an effective challenge to 
an incumbent state senator is a serious obstacle to any challenger. When no 
incumbent is running, the higher level of competition is likely to increase 
campaign costs. 
At the state level the high cost of fund-raising has even more serious 
implications. Experienced, capable individuals who ought to be taken 
seriously as candidates for statewide office either decide not to run or to 
drop out of the race because they are not personally wealthy and are unable 
to raise large sums or are unwilling to make the commitments that are part 
of large-scale money raising. 
Joe Prather, a former president pro tem of the state senate who 
dropped out of the Democratic gubernatorial primary early in 1987, said he 
became frustrated with trying to raise large amounts of money. Prather said 
that money was not the main reason he quit the race-"it was the only 
reason." He said he decided not to use his position as the apparent favorite 
of the Collins administration to raise money from people who hold state 
contracts. Offering jobs as cabinet secretaries or positions on university 
boards of regents and trustees will bring "about whatever you want to 
name," Prather said. But, he added, brokering such important positions 
hurts the universities and the state. Most of the money going into political 
campaigns is from people or interest groups who want something, Prather 
said. "I don't care how sensitive a governor is to the issue," he said. "You 
are going to end up more obligated than you want to be" (C-4 October 14, 
1987, p. Al). 
Harvey Sloane and Grady Stumbo are examples of major candidates 
who accumulated large debts during their first gubernatorial campaigns, 
debts that became an embarrassment and an obstacle when they renewed 
their quest for the gubernatorial nomination four years later. 
Wealthy candidates who can pay their own way have a significant 
advantage over those of average means. Had Wilkinson been employed in 
a job that paid $38,000 a year, he would not have won the nomination in 
1987. Longtime politicians dropped long-held plans to run for governor- 
simply because of the tremendous difficulty of competing with the more 
wealthy candidates. Julian Carroll lent his campaign $250,000, while 
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Grady Stumbo lent his campaign $150,000; but that is insignificant com- 
pared to the more than $2.33 million loaned by Wilkinson to his campaign. 
The  1988 Kentucky General Assembly passed new legislation that is 
supposed to make it impossible to pay back loans by candidates. H.B. 453, 
which became effective January 1,1989, prohibits candidates from recoup- 
ing debts after the primary and general elections. Wilkinson recouped 
more than $2.33 million, including $144,000 in interest on loans he made 
to his campaign, after winning the primary. Lieutenant Governor Jones 
lent his campaign $1.6 million and then tried to recover much of that 
amount. According to H.B. 453, gubernatorial candidates may not lend 
more than $50,000 in money, service, or other thing of value to their 
committee in any one election and be compensated for it. Other statewide 
elected officers are limited to $25,000, and remaining candidates are 
limited to $10,000. S.B. 47 prohibits candidates from soliciting or accept- 
ing contributions for primary or general election expenses after the dates of 
the respective elections. The  campaign-debt measure also prevents any- 
one from raising money on a candidate's behalf. 
This legislation is expected to reduce campaign costs because candi- 
dates will be reluctant to spend their own money or borrow what they 
cannot recover. This law may also encourage people to get involved in 
campaigns from the start, since they would not be able to buy into the 
camp of a winning candidate after an election, and it might eliminate the 
perception that people who do buy in receive special treatment for doing 
so. Had such a law been in effect during the 1987 primary season, Wilkin- 
son would have been prohibited from mounting the intense fund-raising 
drive that recouped his $2.3 million investment in the few months after he 
won the primary. 
Role of Interest Groups in Elections 
One of the most important trends in campaign financing in recent years 
has been the growth of political action groups (PACs) created by interest 
groups to channel funds to the candidates they favor. Some attention in the 
literature has been focused on interest groups' financing of legislative and 
statewide campaigns (see Jacobson, 1980; Patterson, 1982; Malbin, 1984; 
Alexander, 1984; Sabato, 1984; Giles and Pritchard, 1985; Jones and Borris, 
1985; Schlozman and Tierney, 1986; Schneider, 1986; and Sorauf, 1988). 
We are most interested in the level of PAC contributions in Democratic 
primaries and general election campaigns for governor, other statewide 
races, and for the legislature. Which interest groups make significant 
contributions to political campaigns, and what proportion of campaign 
funding comes from PACs? 
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Since 1968 the Kentucky Registry of Election Finance has been the 
repository of campaign reports for all state and local offices. Campaign 
treasurers must submit reports on all contributions of individuals and 
groups of more than $100. Before 1968 the unrealistic legal limitation on 
contributions and the minimal requirements for reporting prevented the 
collection of comprehensive and accurate campaign finance data. In July 
1986 the maximum contribution an individual can make to a candidate in 
one state or local election was increased from $3,000 to $4,000. Before 1988 
there was no cap on PAC contributions in Kentucky. Individuals, who 
could give no more than $4,000 to a candidate in any one election, could 
give unlimited amounts to PACs, which in turn could give as much as they 
wanted to a candidate. The  legislation passed in 1988 limits both the 
amount that an individual may contribute to a PAC and that a PAC may 
accept from an individual to $2,000 in any one election; it also limits both 
the amount that a PAC may contribute to a candidate and that a candidate 
or a committee may accept from a PAC to $4,000 in any one election. 
Interest groups make contributions to candidates for one or both of 
two reasons. The  first is to attempt to make those candidates who are 
elected indebted to them, more accessible to their lobbyists, and more 
willing to act in accordance with their wishes on policy issues. The  second 
reason is to assist in the reelection of incumbents or the election of new 
candidates who appear to be already sympathetic to the viewpoints of the 
interest group. 
For candidates at least willing to lend a sympathetic ear to a special 
interest group's concerns, PACs constitute a tempting source of money. In 
part because it is easier to raise money from PACs than from individuals 
and because of the absence of legal limits on PAC funding before 1988, 
Kentucky politicians have been increasingly relying on PACs to help fund 
the growing cost of campaigns. 
How much power do special interests have in Kentucky? According to 
R.G. Dunlop and Richard Whitt, reporting in the Courie~-Joumal(0ctober 
11, 1987, p. Al), "the rights of individuals are frequently subordinated to 
those of special interests who view Frankfort and the county courthouses 
as their personal fiefdoms and who make contributions to political candi- 
dates and parties in return for favors. In an era of skyrocketing campaign 
costs . . . poorly financed citizens' groups have little chance against big 
corporations, their lobbyists and political action committees." In addition, 
state representative Joe Clarke said, "The excessive amount of money in 
campaigns, and where it's coming from, is perverting the system. It's 
coming from special interests, not from people saying, 'This person would 
make a good governor or representative.' The  ordinary guy doesn't get a 
chance to participate except as part of a special interest, and the public 
Funding Political Campaigns 205 
interest is rarely served." Because some interest groups have more re- 
sources than others to contribute to political campaigns, the growing 
dependence of candidates on funding from PACs may obviously affect the 
way decisions are reached and choices are made among competing inter- 
ests in Frankfort. 
The  concern about the influence of PACs in Kentucky reflects the fact 
that their influence in state and local elections has increased significantly 
in the last decade (Hays, 1987-88). During the period from 1977 to 1987, 
the number of PACs registered in Kentucky leaped from 93 to 331. The  
amount of money they gave to political candidates doubled, and the PAC 
percentage of total donations also rose sharply. PAC outlays to candidates 
in the state increased from $1.35 million in 1977 to an estimated $2.3 
million in 1987. During that ten-year period, PACs contributed a total of 
$17.8 million to candidates in Kentucky (see Graves, 1987). But, as we 
shall see, the increases in PAC contributions have been much more 
dramatic in legislative races than in gubernatorial races. 
In this section we discuss PAC contributions to several levels of 
campaigns: gubernatorial and other major statewide races (1979,1983, and 
1987) and legislative races (in selected years from 1975 through 1986). 
Several broad questions concerning PAC contributions need to be ad- 
dressed: What kinds of PACs contribute the most funding to gubernatorial 
races? Do PACs follow the strategy of concentrating their funds on one 
candidate or hedge their bets by spreading contributions among several 
candidates? What choices do PACs make in putting money into the 
primary andlor general election? Do PACs follow the general strategy of 
supporting the favored winner, or do they try to change the outcome of a 
race? Are there certain groups that put their funding primarily in legislative 
races? Have some groups substantially increased their funding to legis- 
lative races since the shift of balance of power from the governor to 
legislators? 
Gabmatoria/ Elections 
Table 23 shows, by type of interest group, how much the PACs spent in the 
1983 and 1987 gubernatorial races (data on the 1979 race is also provided in 
this discussion). We have identified seventeen types of interests and 
aggregated the money given by PACs within each group. Most of the 
categories in the table are self-explanatory; the special issues include such 
things as right to life and gun regulation. The  business and industry 
category excludes groups named in other categories, such as coal and 
insurance. Although these categories are not exhaustive, they were chosen 
because of their recognized political and economic power in Kentucky and 
the frequency and total sums of their giving. 
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Table 23. Contributions by Categories of Interest Groups to Gubernatorial 
Candidates in Primary and General Elections, 1983 and 1987 
1983 1983 1987 1987 
Primary General Election Primary General Election Categories of 
groups Dem. Dem. Rep. Dem. Dem. Rep. 
Education 70,864 2,250 1,190 53,000 - 35,000 
Labor 221,366 78,360 1,621 78,000 44,000 - 
Public employees 6,000 350 - 6,500 5,000 - 
Professionals 7,000 12,700 6,000 90,000 8,000 - 
Health & medical 500 1,750 - 13,000 19,000 1,000 
Insurance - 1,000 500 25,500 32,000 1,500 
Real estate 5,200 7,000 - 13,000 2,000 - 
Construction 1,000 1,000 4,000 12,000 21,000 - 
Banking and finance 6,900 21,000 10,500 131,050 13,500 2,500 
Business and 
industry 17,775 16,390 4,100 19,000 41,700 - 
Horse industry 1,000 3,000 - 16,300 5,000 - 
Transportation 7,500 500 - 16,750 10,000 - 
Utilities 1,400 - - 9,500 7,500 - 
Oil and gas 3,000 - 500 16,000 6,000 - 
Coal 1,000 500 - 1,000 - - 
Liquor 4,000 2,000 2,000 6,500 - - 
Special issues 3,200 - - 2,300 - - 
Total group 
contributions 357,705 147,800 30,411 509,400 214,700 40,000 
Total receipts 
guber. races 4,408,910 1,770,551 1,221,617 12,324,038 2,610,075 255,788 
% of guber. 
receipts from 
groups 8.1% 8.4% 2.5% 4.1% 8.2% 15.6% 
Source: Compiled from the records of the Kentucky Registry of Election Finance for each 
of the years. 
We do not include in our.calculations the large group of PACs that are 
designated "political" by the Kentucky Registry; these PACs do not 
represent specialized interest groups. In some cases, they are the personal 
campaign financial vehicles of elected officials to channel funds into the 
campaigns of targeted candidates-e.g., Sheriff Jim Greene PAC and the 
Harvey Sloane Committee. In some cases, they represent a cluster of 
individuals of varied occupations who pool their moneys to enhance the 
electability of certain candidates-e.g., Kentuckians for Progressive Gov- 
ernment PAC (primarily for Wilkinson). And in other cases, they are the 
political arm of certain state, regional, or county party organizations- 
e.g., Good Ole Boys of the Grand Old Party. 
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T h e  size of PAC contributions to gubernatorial candidates grew from 
1979 to 1987, but in all three elections PAC contributions constituted a 
relatively small proportion of total funding for gubernatorial candidates in 
both primaries and general elections. PAC contributions to Democratic 
gubernatorial primary campaigns increased from $86,000 in 1979 to 
$516,000 in 1987; but as a percentage of all funding, PAC contributions 
increased only from 2 to 4.2 percent (but hit a high of 8.1 percent in 1983). 
Only two organized interests-labor and education-consistently 
made major contributions through PACs to the gubernatorial races. These 
interests have a tradition of organized campaign efforts in Kentucky 
Democratic primaries and general elections. Most of the other organized 
interests made very little use of PACs for these races. In fact, the increase 
between 1979 and 1983 in PAC spending for primaries was due largely to 
greater spending by education and labor PACs. The  percentage of PAC 
spending was lower in 1987 than in 1983 partly because labor contributed 
less but largely because of a huge increase in individual contributions, 
resulting partly from Wallace Wilkinson's efforts after the May 26 primary 
to raise money to pay off his loans. 
In general election campaigns, PACs contributed about 4 percent of 
costs in 1979,6 percent in 1983, and 9 percent in 1987. In each case funding 
for Democrats outweighed that for Republicans by a margin of about 4 to 1 
or 5 to 1. The  proportion of Republican funding that came from PACs was 
unusually high (15.6 percent) in 1987, not because of a large increase in 
PAC funding, but because funding from individuals dropped by almost $1 
million between 1983 and 1987. 
In the 1987 Democratic primary, most of the PAC money went to the 
three leaders. Beshear, who was perceived as the early favorite, received 
$196,000; Brown, the later favorite, got $130,000; Wilkinson, the eventual 
winner, got $152,000. Carroll and Stumbo, the two other major Demo- 
cratic gubernatorial contenders, received minimal PAC moneys. 
Nearly one-third of Beshear's PAC support came from the banks and 
securities firms; Beshear, in his roles as lieutenant governor and attorney 
general, had wooed these interests as political friends. More than one- 
fourth of his PAC support came from the Kentucky Education Association 
and its local affiliates, and he also received substantial funding from labor 
unions. Both education and labor groups had contributed significant 
moneys to his earlier campaigns since he had worked hard as a state 
representative and public official promoting their issues. In 1987 local, 
state, and international labor groups were courted heavily by both the 
Beshear and Stumbo forces, and Beshear eventually received the lion's 
share of labor funding, perhaps because he was perceived as more likely to 
win (Stumbo, a staunch advocate of labor, had received substantial funds 
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in his 1983 unsuccessful quest for governor). Although Beshear received 
more funding from PACs than did other candidates, it constituted less than 
7 percent of the money he raised. 
Brown's PAC support was spread among law firms, banks, utilities, 
and other businesses, with the largest contributions made by banking and 
finance PACs ($31,600). Brown was also the recipient of $24,000 from the 
Kentucky Life Insurance Company PAC. Various transportation PACs 
were also supportive of Brown's candidacy ($10,250). It is not surprising 
that the millionaire Brown, with his well-known ties to Kentucky and 
national corporate interests, received considerable business and banking 
PAC money. As governor (1979-83), he had striven to "run Kentucky like a 
business." 
The  political newcomer Wilkinson's PAC support was spread arnong 
many of the categories of specialized interests, with a majority of the PAC 
contributions coming after the May 26 primary upset. Major PAC contrib- 
utors included professionals (lawyers, engineers, accountants, and archi- 
tects), $53,250; banking and finance institutions, $35,700; labor unions, 
$20,800; and business and industry groups, $14,000. Wilkinson did not 
receive for his primary campaign committee any PAC support from teach- 
ers, public employees, utilities, transportation groups, and special issue 
groups. 
In the 1987 gubernatorial general election, Wilkinson garnered more 
PAC support than he had received in the primary: $216,200. Those 
interests that had supported other candidates in the primary had a par- 
ticularly strong incentive to contribute to Wilkinson's fall campaign. Labor 
groups contributed more than one-fifth of Wilkinson's total PAC receipts, 
followed closely by business and industry PACs. Having backed a loser, 
Brown, in the primary, the insurance industry gave its significant financial 
assistance to Wilkinson in the general election contest. T h e  health indus- 
try PACs also jumped on board Wilkinson's victory train. 
Although Republican candidates received token PAC contributions in 
the primary, the political arm of the Kentucky Education Association gave 
Republican Harper $35,000 in the general election; it was the largest 
single contribution he received in his campaign for governor. Harper, the 
first Republican to be endorse by the KEA, had almost no success in 
raising moneys from other PACs. 
As reported earlier, table 23 does not reflect the contributions of 
political PACs. In the 1987 gubernatorial primary and general election 
campaigns, these political PACs did make some significant contributions 
to targeted candidates. For example, Lieutenant Governor Beshear re- 
ceived $15,000 from a PAC operated in the name of Jefferson County 
sheriff Jim Greene and an additional $4,000 from the Friends of Mayor 
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Abramson PAC. After snaring the nomination on May 26, Wilkinson's 
primary campaign committee also received a $9,000 contribution from the 
Abramson PAC. Wilkinson was also given $21,000 for his primary commit- 
tee by a political PAC, Citizens for Better Government-especially estab- 
lished to channel moneys for Wilkinson's campaign expenditures. In the 
1987 gubernatorial general election, political PACs contributed more than 
$25,000 to Wilkinson's landslide victory. County judge executive Harvey 
Sloane's committee contributed almost $9,000, and Sheriff Greene's PAC 
gave $4,000. Kentuckians for Progressive Governmenr: helped swell Wil- 
kinson's campaign chest with an additional $10,000. 
In the 1983 Democratic gubernatorial primary, the leading PAC con- 
tributors in the 1983 Democratic gubernatorial primary were labor, educa- 
tion, business and industry, professionals, transportation, and banking and 
finance. Labor unions, whose money was funneled through national, 
state, and local PACs, overwhelmingly supported Grady S t ~ m b o  
($210,710) with 95 percent of their contributions; the bulkof the funds was 
contributed by national organizations. T h e  Kentucky Education Associa- 
tion, through its statewide and county PACs, clearly favored Harvey 
Sloane, giving him more than $63,000, which was 89 percent of what 
education PACs invested in the race. Martha Layne Collins, who won the 
primary, was the major recipient of money coming from business and 
industry PACs. 
In the 1983 general election, more than half of the PAC contributions 
to Democrat Martha Layne Collins came from labor unions. Banking, 
business, and professional groups were the only other organizations con- 
tributillg more than $10,000 in the election, in each case more heavily to 
the Democratic candidate. Surprisingly, education PACs made only token 
contributions in the gubernatorial race. 
We conclude that, despite the dominant role of the gubernatorial race 
in Kentucky politics and the governor's powerful role in public policy 
making, most interest groups-other than the labor and education 
PACs-have contributed little or nothing to gubernatorial races. Candi- 
dates for governor must raise most of their funds from individuals. 
Other Statewide Races 
With a few important exceptions, PACs have not made major contribu- 
tions to the campaigns of candidates running for other statewide races. By 
far, the largest contributions were made by the education and labor PACs. 
In recent years the most expensive statewide races below the guber- 
natorial level have been Democratic primaries for lieutenant governor. In 
1987, when spending for this race broke all records, PACs contributed less 
than 2 percent of the more than $5 million total. Education and labor PACs 
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were not viable contributors in this race. Although they leaned toward 
Armstrong and Jones, education groups neither endorsed nor gave PAC 
money to any candidate. (They had supported Armstrong generously in 
his 1983 successful attorney general bid.) Also, since several of the candi- 
dates eagerly vied for labor's support, the labor PACs were reluctant to put 
their valuable financial and manpower resources behind any one candi- 
date. Armstrong was the sole recipient of any labor moneys-a minimal 
$7,000 total from a few groups. T h e  front-runner, Armstrong, did receive 
the lion's share (96 percent) of PAC moneys, almost $75,000; this repre- 
sented 12.7 percent of his total receipts. Armstrong's major PAC support 
was spread among law firms, housing industry contractors, banking and 
securities institutions, and labor unions. His largest contributions-more 
than $30,000 -were from lawyers' PACs; as attorney general, he had 
worked closely with attorneys from around the state. 
In the 1983 Democratic lieutenant gubernatorial primary, PACs con- 
tributed 10.6 percent of the nearly $728,000 total, and in 1979 PACs gave 
only 4.1 percent of the nearly $1.4 million spent by four candidates. By far, 
the largest contributors in both races were the education PACs, which gave 
$41,155 in 1983 and $23,500 in 1979 to candidates for lieutenant governor in 
the primary. There were other significant contributions by labor PACs 
(almost $15,000 in 1983 and over $9,000 in 1979). 
T h e  costs of general election contests for lieutenant governor have 
been more modest, although in 1987 a record $913,947 was spent by the 
Democratic victor (a lot of this money was earmarked to help recoup 
Jones's personal campaign debts). Although Jones had only reaped $2,000 
in PAC moneys in his primary battle, he received more than $63,000 from 
PACs for his general election contest. Specialized interests wanted to 
support the winning ticket. Jones's major PAC support was spread among 
banking and finance institutions ($10,800), law firms ($10,025), teachers 
($10,000), and businesses and industries ($8,000). T h e  Republican nomi- 
nee, Webster, received no PAC moneys. 
In the 1987 primary election, the most important examples of PAC 
contributions to statewide candidates below the lieutenant gubernatorial 
level were the funds contributed to the Democratic candidates for superin- 
tendent of public instruction, attorney general, auditor, and secretary of 
state. In his unsuccessful bid for the top education spot, state represen- 
tative Roger Noe, chairman of the House Education Committee, received 
the financial backing of the supposedly powerful teacher groups-$57,000 
from the state and local KEPACs. State representative Fred Cowan re- 
ceived important PAC contributions (almost $20,000) in his successful 
quest for the attorney general's office; the teachers gave him $7,500, along 
with $3,000 from banking and finance institutions and $2,000 from law 
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firms. Lexington councilman Bob Babbage, in his auditor's race victory, 
reaped more than $7,500 in small contributions from various specialized 
interests. In the secretary of state contest, Bremer Ehrler received more 
than $14,000 in PAC funds; his largest contributions, $12,000, came from 
public employee groups. In contrast to their primary involvement, special 
interest groups doled out minimal contributions in the 1987 general elec- 
tion to statewide candidates, other than the top two offices. Before 1987 
the most important examples of PAC contributions to statewide candi- 
dates below the lieutenant gubernatorial level had been the funds contrib- 
uted to the candidates for superintendent of public instruction, par- 
ticularly in Democratic primaries. In the 1983 Democratic primary, educa- 
tion PACs contributed $40,000, which was 39 percent of the total spent in 
that race. 
Legislative Races 
T h e  cost of legislative campaigns for all the House seats and half the 
Senate seats quadrupled between 1975 and 1986, with total campaign 
receipts increasing from $722,000 to $2,847,000. During the same period 
the amount of funds received from PACs grew more dramatically, from 
about $40,000 to nearly $900,000, with the proportion of money contrib- 
uted by PACs increasing from 5.6 to 31.5 percent. In 1986 PACs contrib- 
uted 30.6 percent of the total receipts of legislative primaries and 32.5 
percent of the total receipts of legislative general elections. T h e  rapid 
increase in the rate of PAC contributions to legislative campaigns reflects 
the growing power of the legislature vis-a-vis the governor, a trend that a 
number of the interest groups have clearly recognized. 
T h e  leading PAC contributors to House and Senate electoral cam- 
paigns have been education, health and medical, labor, horse industry, 
banking and finance, business and industry, and real estate interests. T h e  
education lobby, through its statewide and county PACs, has clearly 
concentrated most on legislative races. Health and medical PACs contrib- 
ute more heavily to legislative races than to statewide races. As the costs of 
health care rise and the available funds fail to keep pace, health and 
medical PACs have a greater stake in legislative decisions and more reason 
to invest in legislative races. Labor has also substantially increased its 
funding of legislative races, with most of its funds going to Democratic 
candidates in targeted House and Senate races. 
The  horse industry has also discovered the legislature. In the past 
most of the contributions were made by individuals rather than PACs and 
were given to gubernatorial candidates. The  Kentucky Horsemen's Be- 
nevolent Protective Association (including trainers and small owners) took 
the lead in forming a PAC and contributing to legislative races. Subse- 
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quently, the Kentucky Thoroughbred Association (primarily breeders and 
large owners) has followed its lead. 
During the 1988 session of the General Assembly, PACs donated 
nearly $50,000 to the campaign funds of several legislators. Although many 
legislators said privately that the practice is unseemly, most said there is no 
easy way to restrict such contributions before and during a session. "Polit- 
ical contributions are a fact of life for those of us who are not wealthy," 
stated House majority leader Greg Stumbo, D-Prestonsburg. "I think if 
you look most of those PAC donations are less than $300 or $400. In this 
day of high-cost politics, you're not going to find many people who would 
be swayed by $300 or $400." Two legislators, Rep. Bill McBee, D- 
Burlington, and Rep. J.R. Gray, D-Benton, held a joint fund-raiser the 
night before the session began (C-.J April 19, 1988, p. Al). 
Most Kentucky PACs usually support incumbent legislators and sel- 
dom support challengers. There are very good reasons for such tactics. 
Incumbents in Kentucky are seldom defeated. T h e  domination of most 
districts by one party has always made it difficult to defeat incumbents in 
general elections. As incumbent legislators have gained greater visibility 
and seniority, they have also become less vulnerable to defeat in primary 
elections. 
Comparing Group Contributions to Legisiative and 
Gubernatorial Candidates 
The  rate of PAC contributions to legislative campaigns has been growing 
more rapidly than PAC contributions to gubernatorial campaigns. In 1979 
PAC contributions to gubernatorial races exceeded those to legislative 
races by about $100,000. In 1986187 the gross amount of contributions from 
PACs had been reversed; PACs gave about $120,000 more to legislative 
than to gubernatorial races. In proportional terms the contrast is even 
greater, partly because the costs of gubernatorial races have been rising so 
rapidly and partly because of the persistence of self-financed campaigns. 
In 1986 31 percent of all legislative campaign funding came from PACs. If 
PACs had provided 31 percent of the funding for the 1987 gubernatorial 
race, they would have contributed about $4.7 million instead of about 
$770,000. 
It is difficult to calculate the exact percentage of PAC contributions to 
gubernatorial campaigns because winning gubernatorial candidates have 
been able to recover the sizable sums that they have loaned their cam- 
paigns. For example, in 1979 John Y. Brown at first paid personally for huge 
amounts of campaign expenditures; PAC contributions were artificially 
low because a large percent of the total funds came from Brown himself. 
During the course of his administration, Brown recouped all of his elec- 
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toral investments from grateful supporters, though only a small proportion 
of this came from PACs. In contrast, it did not take any time at all for 
Wilkinson to recover the funds he loaned his 1987 primary campaign. He 
did it immediately, chiefly from individual contributors who wanted to do 
business with the state or receive jobs, appointments to commissions, or 
other benefits. In other words, he got paid back before the official books 
were closed on the primary election, partly from PACs, but largely from 
individual contributions of $4,000 each. Why have PACs in recent years 
given such a high priority to legislative races, compared to gubernatorial 
races? The  obvious answer is that the legislature has been gaining a much 
stronger role in policy making, and the governor's domination of legislative 
decision making has faded. Interest groups recognize that, in order to pass 
or defeat legislation, it is at least as important to win supporters in the 
legislature as to win the support of the governor. There is another explana- 
tion that may not be so obvious. A large proportion of the increasing 
funding for gubernatorial races comes from individuals who want some 
tangible benefit from state government: a job, an appointment to a board, 
a chance for their firm to do business with the state. It is the governor's 
office, and not the legislature, that controls those benefits. 
Abuses and Reforms of PACs 
During the last decade PACs were not perceived to be a problem by many 
politicians in Frankfort, where two modest proposals to impose some 
restraints on PACs fell flat. In 1983 and again in 1984, the Registry 
recommended to a legislative subcommittee that PAC donations to politi- 
cal candidates be subject to the same limitations as those governing 
individuals. Both times, the recommendation got nowhere. But the high 
level of spending during the 1987 Democratic primary and the attention 
given to the problems of PAC contributions by the Courie~Journal (in a 
series written by R.G. Dunlop and Richard Whitt and published in mid- 
October 1987) brought the issues of PAC spending onto the high-priority 
agenda of the 1988 General Assembly. 
Two examples from the Wilkinson campaign illustrate the problem 
caused by the absence of limitations on PAC contributions and spending. 
Four days before the 1987 May primary, four Lexington residents gave a 
total of $21,000 to a PAC called Citizens Committed to Better Govern- 
ment. One of the group gave $8,000; another gave $6,000. The  PAC 
turned around and passed the money on to the campaign of Wilkinson, 
who won the Democratic gubernatorial nomination. Only after the Courier 
Journal (July 18, 1987, pp. B1, B9) brought the matter to the attention of 
the Registry of Election Finance was the PAC asked to retrieve some of the 
money from Wilkinson and return it to the original contributors. T h e  
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Registry made its request-which it had no power to enforce-on the 
grounds that the PAC had been used in an attempt to disguise contribu- 
tions in excess of the $4,000 limit for individual donations. 
Another Wilkinson PAC, Kentuckians for Progressive Government, 
raised $120,000 from a handful of individuals and paid for more than 
$100,000 of Wilkinson's campaign expenses. One contributor-beer dis- 
tributor Ronald J. Plattner of Fort Mitchell-gave the PAC $35,000, and 
four others gave a total of $50,000. All the contributions were apparently 
legal under existing state law, since there were no limits on how much 
individuals could give to a PAC (C-4 October 16, 1987, pp. Al, A8). T h e  
Registry did investigate Kentuckians for Progressive Government to see 
whether it supported more than one candidate or was merely a campaign 
fund for Wilkinson. The  Registry concluded, much to the consternation of 
PAC watchdog opponents, that the PAC's activities were legal. Although 
Wilkinson's campaign did not report these expenditures, the director of 
the Registry explained that Wilkinson would not be penalized because 
PACs "are pretty loosely controlled." 
It remains to be seen how future Kentucky statewide and legislative 
elections are affected by the 1988 legislation on PACs, which limits the 
amount that a PAC may contribute to $4,000 per candidate per election 
and limits contributions to a PAC to $2,000 per individual in any one 
election. There is also a provision that names of PACS must now "reason- 
ably identify" the group's sponsorship and purpose, a requirement intend- 
ed to allow the public to know what PACs such as Kentuckians for 
Progressive Government stand for. 
T h e  Role of Individual Contributors in Political Campaigns 
We have noted earlier that, despite the dominant role of the gubernatorial 
race in Kentucky politics and the governor's powerful role in public policy 
making, most interest groups-other than the labor and education 
PACs-have contributed little or nothing to gubernatorial races. Candi- 
dates for governor must raise most of their funds from individuals; some of 
these contributors are actively involved in interest groups, but their contri- 
butions seem designed more to advance their own concerns than the goals 
of the organized groups. 
In the case of many organized interests, the contributions of individu- 
als dwarfed those made by PACs. Because campaign finance reports list 
the occupations of contributors, it is possible to calculate individual contri- 
butions of specific occupational groups, and such data for 1983 have been 
summarized for several groups by O'Keefe (1986). In the 1983 Democratic 
gubernatorial primary, for example, coal operators contributed $111,803; 
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Table 24. Comparison of Contributions to Beshear, Brown, and Wilkinson 
in 1987 Gubernatorial Primary 
Beshear Brown 
Total amount raised $2,905,699 
Total contributors 5,928 
Number of giving $4,000 legal 
maximum 106 
Number giving $300 or less 3,694 
Total contributions $300 or less $373,515 
Number giving over $300 2,234 
Total contributions over $300 $2,280,197 
Donations from PACs of 17 
interest group categories $196,100 
From architectslengineers & 
family members $248,300 
From lawyers & family members $265,621 
From coal operators & family 
members $41,500 
From state employees & family 
members $36,577 
Wilkinson 
$4,271,632 
4,484 
Source: Courier-Journal, May 10, 1987, pp. Al, A13. 
Candidate Reports at Kentucky Registry of Election Finance 
Note: Some of the figures may be incomplete because the candidates' official 
election finance reports for contributions do not list specific or correct occupations for 
each donor. 
The total amount raised for each candidate does include in-kind contributions and 
other receipts. 
The totals for PAC contributions do not include moneys from "political PACsW- 
e.g., $15,600 to Beshear's campaign from the Sheriff Jim Greene PAC. 
These accounts have not been audited; therefore, sometimes the figures are under- 
stated or overstated because of the method of reporting. 
farmers gave $63,540; insurance agents gave $42,421; and bankers gave 
$39,490-in each case a much larger figure than was contributed by the 
corresponding PACs. In the 1983 general election, data on individual 
contributions in several interest areas show much larger contributions than 
those made by PACs. For example, individuals in the construction busi- 
ness gave $162,000; coal operators gave $87,000; and bankers gave 
$73,000. There were also significant contributions by persons in the horse 
business, insurance agents, and farmers (O'Keefe, 1986). In nearly all 
cases, a large proportion of the funds went to the Democrats. 
In the 1987 gubernatorial primary, millionaire businessman John Y. 
Brown, Jt , was heavily financed by Kentucky's corporate community and 
wealthy large contributors. More than 250 people donated the $4,000 legal 
maximum to Brown's campaign (table 24) and thus contributed 30 percent 
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of the money raised by Brown. Steve Beshear had both broad individual 
support and financing from a variety of special interests. Beshear received 
just slightly more than 100 contributions of $4,000 apiece. 
Beshear, who liked to contrast himself to Brown by stressing his broad 
appeal and his ties to the average voter, received contributions from far 
more people than Brown, and many more people gave him $300 or less 
(3,694 to 738)-lending considerable credence to the lieutenant gover- 
nor's claim of greater grass-roots support. However, Beshear's small givers 
donated a total of only $373,515, which constituted only about 13 percent 
of the total he raised. That means the remaining 2,234 givers to Beshear 
donated more than $2.2 million, 75 percent of his total receipts, an amount 
nine percentage points lower than Brown's (C-J: May 10,1987, pp. Al, A13). 
Beshear appeared to be the candidate preferred by representatives of 
special interest groups that often do business with state government. 
Those groups have traditionally given generously to candidates in the 
hope of later being able to win contracts or jobs, get favorable treatment on 
regulatory matters, or simply have a receptive ear in Frankfort. Architects, 
engineers, lawyers, and their relatives gave Beshear nearly 18 percent of 
the total he raised. Donations from those sources constituted about 11 
percent of Brown's total and 14 percent of Wilkinson's. 
Coal operators have traditionally given generously to the state's politi- 
cians. But donors who could be identified as coal operators and members 
of their families gave surprisingly little to the gubernatorial candidates 
(about $107,500 to Brown, $41,500 to Beshear, and $157,684 to Wilkinson). 
Industry representatives say the main reason for the relatively low level of 
donations is the depressed market that has left few operators' profits 
unscathed (C-J: May 10, 1987, pp. Al, A13). 
Since state employees (and their families) viewed Beshear as the early 
front-runner, he received the majority of their financial support compared 
to Brown: $36,577 to $4,500. After his primary victory, Wilkinson took in 
the bulk of receipts from this bloc of givers: almost $50,000. 
Once Wilkinson won the primary, there was an outpouring of money 
from contributors-engineers, architects, "businessmen," lawyers, con- 
tractors, bankers, coal operators, and so on-who wanted access to the 
next governor. Wilkinson's campaign committees raised about $2.4 million 
during the summer-enough to repay the $2.3 million loans he had made 
to his main primary election committee. Therefore, as depicted in table 
25, the winner reaped $4,271,632 in total amount raised for the primary 
campaign, the major bulk after the May 26 election. By designating earlier 
committees as primary committees and creating a new committee to 
finance the general election, the Wilkinson campaign was able to max- 
imize contributions from big givers. Soon after the primary some people, 
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Table 25. Individual Contributions by Occupational Group to 
Wilkinson Primary Campaign 
Number giving 
Occupational group Total contributors $4,000 Total $ raised 
Accountants 74 7 $99,201 
Agriculture 48 4 $64,400 
Architects 28 5 $41,190 
Attorneys 219 15 $274,610 
Banking & finance 92 10 $125,450 
Business 1,268 148 $1,847,740 
Coal operators 97 17 $157,684 
Contractors 152 23 $259,550 
Consultants 23 4 $36,990 
Doctors 48 2 $48,362 
Education 19 - $18,050 
Elected officials 25 2 $19,540 
Engineers 167 35 $295,466 
Health industry 18 1 $23,900 
Horse racing & breeding 22 2 $26,500 
Insurance 70 2 $85,000 
Real estate 56 2 $55,837 
Retired 30 1 $25,538 
State employees 34 2 $48,550 
Others 5 1 12 $88,376 
-
Totals 2,541 294 $3,641,934 
Source: Compiled from the records of the Kentucky Registry of Election Finance. 
Note: Some of the figures may be incomplete because the candidate's official 
election finance reports do not list specific or correct occupations for each donor. 
Contributions include family members. 
many of whom had earlier made maximum $4,000 contributions to Brown 
or Beshear, gave the maximum $4,000 individual contribution to the 
Wilkinson primary committee and then gave another $4,000 later to the 
general election committee. 
After the primary several of Wilkinson's biggest donors were from out 
of state. Almost 10 percent of Wilkinson's money came from people who 
were not able to vote for him in the general election, a total of over 
$500,000 in donations from people in twenty other states and the District 
of Columbia. T h e  contributors included engineers, contractors, de- 
velopers, bond-finance specialists, and coal company executives. Two of 
Wilkinson's out-of-state contributors, Robert C. Kanuth, Jr., of Wash- 
ington, D.C., and William E. Roberts of Columbus, Ohio, had put 
$450,000 into Collins Investments Inc., a company founded by Dr. Bill 
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Collins shortly after his wife, Martha Layne Collins, was elected governor 
in 1983. Both men are executives with Cranston Securities, which became 
senior underwriter or comanager of the sale of more than $1 billion in state 
bonds, earning $1.35 million in commissions (C-4 October 24,1987, p. A6). 
Table 25 provides a detailed breakdown of individual contributions 
($300 or more) by occupational groups (and their family members) to 
Wilkinson's primary campaign. For each category information is given for 
(a) the number of contributors; (b) the number contributing the $4,000 
legal maximum; and (c) the amount raised. Two-thirds of the money 
($2,394,850) was raised after the May 26 election. Wilkinson received 
$4,000 maximum donations from almost 300 individuals representing 
diverse occupational groups. Almost 50 percent of the 2,541 givers fall into 
the catchall "businessperson" category; this constituted 43 percent of the 
total primary receipts. Raymond Wallace, the executive director of the 
state Registry of Election Finance, said that overly broad descriptions of 
occupations have been a "sore spot" with the Registry, but (as of then) the 
agency "hasn't taken any exception to it." S.B. 268, passed by the 1988 
legislature, requires that occupations of contributors must be specific; 
general terms such as businessman are prohibited. 
John Harper, the Republican gubernatorial nominee in 1987, had great 
difficulty raising money for the simple reason that he was not perceived as 
a possible winner. Contributors to a gubernatorial race who hope to get 
some kind of return on their investment have no reason to contribute to a 
losing cause. Harper's largest donors were four individuals who gave in 
both the primary and general election: Harold Hardy, a Shepherdsville 
businessman; GOP chairman Robert Gable; and John Tarrant and A. 
Robert Doll, both Louisville lawyers. Because Harper, too, formed sepa- 
rate committees for the primary and the general election, the four were 
able to surpass the usual limit of $4,000 in contributions per individual per 
candidate. At least one of Harper's biggest contributors, Doll, also gave to 
Wilkinson after his primary victory. Much of Harper's large financial 
support appeared to be from executives and professionals (C-J, October 14, 
1987, p. Al). 
When individuals contribute to a gubernatorial candidate, they may be 
hoping to gain either collective or individual benefits. Instead of giving to 
a PAC, for example, business or professional persons may contribute 
directly to a gubernatorial candidate in an effort to get favorable considera- 
tion for a particular interest. 
Because he wanted the racing industry to have the ear of the man 
likely to be the next governor, in July 1987 Churchill Downs president 
Thomas Meeker sent out a fund-raising letter, on Churchill Downs let- 
terhead, to help raise the $2.3 million that Democratic nominee Wilkinson 
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lent his own campaign. Meeker wrote, "We at Churchill Downs are in 
active support of Mr. Wilkinson, since we firmly believe he will provide 
the thoroughbred industry with his personal support and assistance before 
the General Assembly. . . . Please join me and others who make their 
living in the thoroughbred industry in supporting Wallace Wilkinson, our 
next governor." Meeker sent the letter to about ten people who have 
businesses allied with thoroughbred racing and who have an interest in 
protecting the industry. Meeker received several checks that he passed on 
to the Wilkinson campaign (C-.J July 15, 1987, pp. B1, B3). 
It is not always possible to determine the motives of contributors by 
knowing about their business interests. Does a prominent coal mine 
operator donate to the gubernatorial campaign in the hope that strip 
mining regulations will generally be relaxed or in the hope that permits for 
his own mining operations will be expedited In cases like this, it is 
obvious that both motives may be involved. 
But when large contributions are made by the persons in those busi- 
nesses and professions that most often do business with the state, it is 
reasonable to assume that their primary goals are individual rather than 
collective. In reality, those who raise funds for gubernatorial candidates 
concentrate their attention on the business and professional groups that 
are most likely to seek state contracts. 
One common use of gubernatorial patronage power is the granting of 
personal service contracts. State personal service contracts are big busi- 
ness; during the 1985-86 fiscal year alone they were worth approximately 
$74 million. Engineers and architects received over $100 million worth of 
these contracts from 1980 to 1987, more than 25 percent of all personal 
service contracts (awarded for such projects as road and bridge design, 
building construction, and reclamation of abandoned strip mines) and far 
more than any other profession. "State contracts for professional services, 
including those provided by engineers and the architects who often work 
closely with them, are not awarded through a competitive bidding process. 
Rather they are granted under subjective 'professional selection' guide- 
lines that sometimes result in decisions influenced by politics" (C-J, 
October, 15, 1987, pp. Al, A10). 
Personal service contracts are not awarded to the lowest bidder; fees 
are negotiated once a firm or an individual is selected for the job. To get a 
contract, a firm must send information about itself to the state, which 
accepts the application without requiring documentation. State officials 
review the firms and compile three top choices. The  list is given to the 
secretary of finance or the secretary of transportation to make the final 
decision. Every step of the way, state officials concede, a call from the 
governor's office or from Democratic party headquarters can make a big 
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difference. And as Floyd Poore has admitted, when suggesting a firm to 
award a contract, "you pick one favorable to you. I don't think there is any 
question about that (C-4 October 15, 1987, p. A10). 
"There is no evidence that unqualified firms are regularly awarded 
state personal service contracts. Indeed, even the system's harshest critics 
concede that firms doing business with the state generally are at least 
competent. But some firms that get contracts also happen to be the most 
generous contributors to successful candidates for governor and the Dem- 
ocratic Party. Conversely, some who do not give don't get" (C-4 October 
15, 1987, pp. Al, A10). 
The  act of giving as a prerequisite for getting is particularly prevalent 
in the case of architects, engineers, and others who do business with the 
state under personal service contracts. Although state officials say these 
nonbid contracts are bestowed on merit, evidence abounds that the proc- 
ess is in fact highly politicized. A survey by the Courie~-Joumal(0ctober 15, 
1987, pp. Al, A10) of roughly seventy architects and engineers in 1987 
showed that more than two-thirds of those who would voice an opinion- 
31 of 45-believe political favoritism influences contract awards. While 
the National Society of Professional Engineers prohibits political contribu- 
tions where there is even an appearance of a quid pro quo, Kentucky's 
legislation merely prohibits making a political contribution for "specific 
work." As a result, there are many cases like engineer Wesley Witt, who 
gave an unsolicited $3,000 to Beshear and later a solicited $2,000 to 
Wilkinson, explaining it was "in keeping with the political aspect of 
business in politics." Among those firms who have never received con- 
tracts, many blame the failure on their lack of political connections. 
Engineer William Cassidy, whose firm has applied for twenty state jobs in 
the past ten years but has never received one, claimed, "If you are going to 
do work in Kentucky, you are going to donate." 
An examination of state contracts gives credence to these opinions. It 
is no coincidence that almost 60 percent of the more than two hundred 
members of the Democratic party's Century Club are architects and 
engineers. Five engineering firms that received more than $50 million 
worth of personal service contracts under the Collins administration do- 
nated a total of at least $85,000 to Collins' 1983 campaign or to the 
Democratic party in the ensuing years. All five regularly purchase at least 
one Century Club membership (15-4 October 11,1987, p. A14; October 15, 
1987, p. A10). 
Even in the face of budget cuts totaling $250 million, the amounts 
spent on personal service contracts rose dramatically under the Collins 
administration, allowing her to "take care" of people who made substantial 
donations. While Brown-who depended less on campaign contributions 
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in his race-spent $33.8 million on average each year of his term, Collins 
spent $47.4 million a year. Payments to attorneys rose from $1.9 million a 
year to $2.2 million, while state attorneys could have handled much of the 
load at costs far less to the state ((7-4 October 14, 1987, p. All). 
Promising state jobs and appointments in exchange for political contri- 
butions has always been a common occurrence in Kentucky politics. When 
a new governor is elected, his or her first few months in office are devoted 
to making appointments to task forces and committees, filling state jobs, 
and awarding personal service contracts. Although the growth of the merit 
system has reduced the proportion of state patronage jobs, the governor 
makes a large number of appointments to boards and commissions. Most 
of these are party-time positions and may pay very little beyond expenses, 
but they often carry great prestige. An obvious example is an appointment 
to the Board of Trustees of the University of Kentucky and the boards for 
the other state universities. 
It is expected that the new governor will allot his or her patronage to 
friends and to those who helped win the election. It is a traditional practice 
for a gubernatorial candidate to promise a prospective supporter a position 
or a contract in exchange for a campaign contribution. For example, shortly 
after Gov. Martha Layne Collins took office in December 1983, then 
Transportation Secretary Floyd Poore, one of the top fund-raisers in her 
campaign, submitted a lengthy list of supporters who were in line to get 
state positions. Poore's memorandum to the staff in the governor's office, 
dated February 16,1984, stated, "Following is a list of commitments to the 
following boards, councils or commissions for March, April, May and June, 
1984. . . ." The  final page of the memo listed twenty-five of the thirty- 
one names under the heading, "COMMITMENTS THAT MUST BE 
MADE." According to state records, Collins honored only twelve of the 
commitments-nine from the so-called must list. Among those appointed 
included Jerry Stricker, a Collins fund-raiser, who was named to the 
University of Kentucky Board of Trustees, and Jack Moreland, a large 
contractor, who was named to the advisory council on vocational educa- 
tion. Warren Shovert was promised by Poore that he would be named to 
the Northern Kentucky University Board of Regents in exchange for a 
$2,500 contribution, but he never received it. Four years later Poore 
promised Shovert the same appointment for a $6,000 contribution (from 
Shovert and his wife) to the Wilkinson campaign (C-4 October 14, 1987, 
pp. Al, A10). 
In a move that could reduce the number of the governor's political 
appointments, a state court ruled in June 1987 that the state's Department 
of Personnel must redefine its rules regarding state workers paid with 
federal money. If this ruling stands past appeal, 300 of 515 jobs would be 
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brought under the state's merit system, limiting the number of political 
appointments. This decision has the potential of limiting some of the 
political abuses that are so apparent, but the governor's patronage powers 
remain great. 
Implications of the  Campaign Financing System in Kentucky 
What difference does it make how much it costs to win elections and how 
the money is raised? There are implications for both the government and 
politics of Kentucky. Despite the growth of legislative power, the governor 
remains the single most powerful decision maker in Frankfort. Thus, it 
seems ironic that the majority of money raised in gubernatorial campaigns 
comes from persons who want personal benefits from the state rather than 
from those who are trying to influence state policy making. 
If contracts are granted only to those firms that have made campaign 
contributions, there is the risk that the state will pay more for poorer goods 
and services than it would in a patronage-free system. If campaign contri- 
butions are a prerequisite to service on important boards and commissions, 
obviously the state will lose the services of talented individuals who are 
unwilling to pay this price. As the demands on state government increase 
and the problems it must solve grow more difficult, the real costs of the 
gubernatorial campaign financing system to the commonwealth continue 
to escalate. 
It is more difficult to evaluate the governmental implications of legis- 
lative campaign financing. Because most races are relatively uncom- 
petitive and inexpensive, most legislative candidates do not have to 
depend on PACs for a large amount of financial aid. But, if the trend 
toward more expensive races and higher PAC financing continues, there is 
a greater likelihood that some legislative decisions will be influenced by 
the relative financial strength of the various interest groups. 
In the political realm, as long as most legislative campaigns are rela- 
tively uncompetitive and inexpensive, it seems unlikely that candidates 
are often discouraged from running because campaign funds are unavaila- 
ble. T h e  fact that incumbents can raise money more easily is only one of 
many advantages that they usually have over challengers. Those chal- 
lengers, in either primaries or general elections, who are perceived to have 
a serious chance of winning are usually able to raise enough money to be 
competitive. Campaign financing at the state legislative level has not yet 
become the all-consuming force that it is in congressional politics. 
The  political impact of campaign financing on gubernatorial elections 
is far more dramatic and discouraging. The  skyrocketing cost of political 
campaigns has placed serious constraints on potential gubernatorial candi- 
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dates. There are only two possible routes a candidate can follow in order to 
be competitive. The  first is to be wealthy and willing to give or loan 
millions of dollars to the campaign. T h e  second route is to gain enough 
political strength to be perceived as a plausible winner and then to make 
whatever commitments are necessary to raise millions of dollars. Candi- 
dates like John Y. Brown and Wallace Wilkinson have combined these two 
approaches. They have started out by loaning large sums to their cam- 
paigns and then have recovered all or most of these funds by following the 
second route to success. This technique for making and repaying loans will 
not work if the legislation passed in 1988 is successful. 
The  campaign financing system, as it has operated in recent years with 
escalating costs and greater emphasis on television advertising, gives an 
obviously huge advantage to the wealthy candidate who is willing to invest 
in a political future. I t  places certain other types of candidates under an 
equally large disadvantage. One is the political newcomer or underdog 
who might be a highly successful campaigner if he or she had enough funds 
for a television campaign. If Brereton Jones or Wallace Wilkinson had not 
been wealthy, how could they have gained the visibility needed to capture 
public attention? If Grady Stumbo had been as well financed as his 
opponents in 1983 or 1987, might he have won the nomination? If John 
Harper had been taken seriously by Republcan fund-raisers, could he have 
won as many votes as Nunn in 1979 or Bunning in 1983? 
Another type of person who is seriously handicapped is the non- 
wealthy candidate who refuses to solicit funds from those who would do 
business with the state or to make promses to those who want jobs and 
board appointments. Larry Forgy asserted that one reason he abandoned 
the Republican campaign for governor in 1987 was his unwillingness to 
make the promises and commitments sought by many potential contrib- 
utors. "If you're willing to sell positions, you can raise a lot of money," 
according to former state senator Joe Prather, who made an abortive run for 
the Democratic nomination for governor in 1987. Although state law 
prohibits a candidate from paying money for political support, it appar- 
ently permits promises of jobs, contracts, and board appointments in 
exchange for financial support. "The big attraction of giving," according to 
Sen. Ed O'Daniel, D-Springfield, "is what everyone gets when the cookie 
jar is opened" (C-J; October 14, 1987, p. Al). 
The  fact that most contributors to gubernatorial campaigns want 
something in return is nothing new; it is a familiar reality in Kentucky 
politics. But some things have changed: the escalating costs of guber- 
natorial politics and the growing number of wealthy political amateurs. 
Because the ground rules have changed and fund-raising has assumed 
greater importance, serious candidates for governor are under greater 
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pressure to pay any price and make any necessary commitments in order to 
be competitive. If one were inventing an electoral system designed to 
produce the best possible governor, it seems unlikely that it would resem- 
ble the present system. 
REPUBLICAN 
ORGANIZATION 
AND FRAGMENTATION 
IN MANY respects, Kentucky is a competitive two-party state. T h e  
Republican party has won seven of nine presidential elections starting in 
1956. It held both U.S. Senate seats from 1957 to 1972 and regained one in 
the 1984 election. In the U.S. House the Republicans have consistently 
held the mountain Republican seat; since the mid-1960s they have consis- 
tently held at least one seat in the suburbs of Louisville and northern Ken- 
tucky; and since 1978 they have held a Bluegrass seat centered in Lexing- 
ton. T h e  Republican majority exceeded 60 percent in Sen. John Sherman 
Cooper's race in 1966 and in the 1972 and 1984 presidential elections. 
But in state elections the Republican party has failed to capitalize on 
its success in national races. Kentucky has elected only one Republican 
governor since the 1943 race: Louie Nunn in 1967. In recent years the 
Republican party has consistently won between 20 and 30 percent of the 
state legislative seats-approximately the same number it held during the 
1940s and 1950s and considerably less than it held during the administra- 
tion of Louie Nunn (1967-71). Despite some success in metropolitan and 
urban counties and cities, the Republican party has not made significant 
inroads into local offices in Democratic counties. Almost inevitably, an 
analysis of the Kentucky Republican party must focus on the question: 
"What has gone wrong?" 
T h e  administration of Louie Nunn appears to have been the golden 
age of the modern Republican party. After defeating Jefferson County 
judge Marlow Cook in a bitter primary, Louie Nunn was elected with a 
margin of 51.6 percent and with the support of dissident Democrats led by 
"Happy" Chandler. Nunn, having run for governor previously and having 
managed statewide campaigns, understood electoral politics and believed 
strongly in building the party organization. Governor Nunn also under- 
stood the importance of patronage; it was handled in the governor's office 
and was used to build the party organization at the state and local levels. 
During Nunn's administration there was a close working relationship 
between his office and the state party headquarters. Nunn selected John 
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Kerr to serve as state party chairman, and he remained in office throughout 
the administration. The  state party had an executive director with several 
assistants and an annual budget of about $100,000. The  governor encour- 
aged the party to run registration drives. He helped the party to raise funds 
and consistently attended the dinners and other events held for that 
purpose. 
Nunn also worked to unify the Republican party. In the 1968 Senate 
race, after backing another candidate in the primary, he supported his 
former opponent, Marlow Cook, in the general election. Nunn raised 
money for Cook and threw the full weight of his administration behind 
him, and Cook was elected. T h e  state party chairman also served as 
campaign chairman in 1968 in an effort to coordinate activities on behalf of 
the entire congressional and presidential ticket. In addition, Nunn worked 
vigorously to help the party carry the state for Richard Nixon. With the 
governor's support, extensive efforts were made to recruit strong legis- 
lative candidates, though they failed to prevent some slippage in the 
unusually high proportion of Republicans in the legislature. 
After polling leaders of his administration and the Republican party, 
Nunn decided that Tom Emberton would be the strongest candidate for 
governor. Emberton's campaign was well financed, but he did not prove to 
be a strong campaigner and lost the election to Wendell Ford, polling 44.3 
percent of the vote. T h e  golden age was over, and the decline of the state 
Republican party had begun. 
One person who was very active in the state Republican party during 
the 1970s, after Nunn's administration, described that period as the 
"wilderness years" for the Republican party. Republicans were damaged 
by the repercussions from the Watergate scandal, but in Kentucky they 
were damaged even more by the political successes of Governors Wendell 
Ford and Julian Carroll. Both men were able to unite the Democratic party 
after their primary victories, and both gave attention to maintaining the 
effectiveness of the state and local Democratic parties. T h e  Republican 
party lost governmental control of Louisville and Jefferson County in 1969, 
although in 1977 Republicans recaptured the Jefferson County judge 
executive's position with Mitch McConnell's victory. 
In 1975 the Republican gubernatorial candidate, Robert Gable, got 
only 37.2 percent of the vote, running against incumbent Julian Carroll. In 
1979 Louie Nunn won only 40.6 percent of the vote in his comeback effort 
against John Y. Brown. In 1983 the Republican party leadership had great 
difficulty finding an experienced, well-known Republican who was will- 
ing to run for governor. One after another of the leading officeholders and 
other prominent Republicans considered and then declined the offer. 
Finally, Jim Bunning, a state senator from northern Kentucky (and former 
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major league pitcher), agreed to run. But he entered the race too late and 
with too little financial support, and he lost to Martha Layne Collins with 
44.2 percent of the vote, just shy of the Republican percentage in 1971. 
It appeared that in 1987 the Republicans would finally have a strong, 
well-financed candidate who would get an early lead in the campaign and 
have wide support within and outside the party. But that candidate, Larry 
Forgy, withdrew from the race early in January 1987, too late to find a 
replacement who could be a serious contender. John Harper, a relatively 
obscure state representative, emerged from the primary with 41 percent of 
the vote. But he was not taken seriously by Republican leaders, had great 
difficulty raising money, and polled only 36 percent against Wallace 
Wilkinson, the lowest proportion of votes cast for a Republican candidate 
for governor since 1868. 
T h e  State Republican Party Organization 
T h e  responsibility for developing organizational strength, supporting local 
parties, raising funds, recruiting and assisting candidates, and registering 
and mobilizing voters rests with the state party organization. When a party 
does not control the governorship, the resources for carrying out these 
duties and rewarding party workers are limited. T h e  longer a party has 
been in the minority, the more difficult-and the more important-it 
becomes to run an effective party organization. The  question is what has 
the state Republican organization done, and what can it do, to rebuild the 
Republican party? 
During the 1970s a number of persons served as state party chairman, 
but none of them stayed in office long enough to have any major impact on 
the party organization. Some continuity was provided, however, by Larry 
Van Hoose, who was executive director of the state Republican party from 
1972 to 1979. The  party organization made some effort to recruit more and 
better statewide, legislative, and local candidates; while the party lead- 
ership claimed some success, there continued to be serious shortages of 
viable Republican candidates, particularly at the legislative and local 
levels. The  fact that elections are held annually in Kentucky may be an 
obstacle to a minority party in trying to recruit candidates; because a new 
election is always just around the corner, there is never enough time for 
long-range planning and the development of candidates. 
During the period when Van Hoose was executive director, some 
efforts were made to modernize the state party headquarters. The  annual 
budget was raised to about $200,000 during this period, with as many as six 
staff members. The  headquarters acquired a computer for word processing 
and mailing lists. While some efforts were made to strengthen local 
Republican organizations, there was little indication of any success. In the 
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heavily Republican Fifth District, the local parties did not believe that a 
high level of organization was necessary, while in the much larger number 
of heavily Democratic counties, the Republican party was often virtually 
nonexistent. Someone familiar with local politics has estimated that dur- 
ing this period the Republican organization existed only on paper in 95 
percent of the counties. 
During the 1980s the Republican state chairmen included Liz 
Thomas, who had been on the staff of Congressman Gene Snyder; Gordon 
Wade, another northern Kentucky leader; and Robert Gable, a Lexington 
businessman (and former gubernatorial candidate), who took office in 
November 1986. 
On paper the Republicans have a large and elaborate party structure. 
The  state convention meets in even numbered years, its members chosen 
at county mass meetings. T h e  Republican state central committee 
(RSCC) is a huge body, including, among others, the chairman and vice- 
chairman of each county committee, all Republican legislators, state and 
congressional officeholders, the heads of various party organizations, and 
twenty at-large members chosen by the convention. T h e  RSCC holds one 
regular meeting a year and selects the chairman and other offices. But most 
of the work of the RSCC is carried out by its executive committee, which is 
scheduled to meet almost every month and which consists of the twenty 
elected members plus nineteen ex officio members. 
Activities of the Repablican State Pady 
The  Republican state party has an annual budget of about half a million 
dollars. T h e  party headquarters is located in a house in Frankfort, not far 
from the capitol. It  has a staff of four: the executive director, a political 
director, a finance director, and an administrative assistant. The  headquar- 
ters has a computer, used primarily for maintaining various mailing lists. It  
publishes a newsletter, maintains contacts with local organizations as well 
as with the national party, runs fund-raising campaigns, and carries out the 
other kinds of activities that would be expected for a state party headquar- 
ters. The  state Republican party organization carries out the fund-raising 
efforts necessary to finance its $500,000 a year budget, though about 
$65,000 of the budget comes from the state government under the tax- 
payer check-off plan. Though the state party provides a number of serv- 
ices that may be helpful to candidates, it provides only very limited and 
occasional funding to help candidates running for public office. For the 
most part state, legislative, and local candidates must raise their own 
money. 
One of the fundamental problems facing the state Republican party 
has been the weakness of local organizations in a large proportion of the 
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rural counties outside the Fifth District. The small proportion of regis- 
tered Republicans, the shortage of viable local candidates, and the ab- 
sence of local party activists undermine the best efforts at party building. 
In July 1987 the state party instituted what it called the Four-Star Program, 
designed to provide incentives to the county party organizations to be- 
come more active. The  plan was to evaluate the success of local parties in 
twenty-two areas of activity, ranging from voter registration to filling all the 
precinct positions and organizing women's and young Republican organi- 
zations. In the area of registration, for example, points would be awarded 
for increases in Republican registration over a year. Counties achieving the 
highest scores would be recognized annually and would be given a modest 
financial award. 
The  obvious purpose of the program is to encourage counties to 
improve their organizations and to increase their level of political activity. 
One by-product is to give the state organization a more accurate picture of 
the level of organization and activity in the various local parties. When the 
program was inaugurated in the summer of 1987, only 60 percent of the 
county parties filled out the surveys sent out by state headquarters to 
measure the initial level of activity. In the first year only one-third of the 
local organizations qualified for any points under the program; most of 
them were in larger and middle-sized counties, and they included only a 
dozen of the twenty-nine counties that have a majority of voters registered 
Republican. Obviously, much work remains to be done in building viable 
local organizations throughout the state. 
One of the most serious weaknesses of the Republican party in Ken- 
tucky is its failure to run candidates for a large number of legislative seats, 
including some in districts where a strong candidate should have a reason- 
able chance of winning. In the four elections from 1979 through 1986, the 
Republicans contested an average of only 53 of 100 House seats and 11 of 19 
Senate seats. In 1988 the number of seats contested by Republicans fell to 
41 in the House and 9 in the Senate. 
From time to time the Republican state party has made some effort to 
recruit a larger number of legislative candidates. In 1967, the year of Louie 
Nunn's election, the Republicans contested 78 House and 16 Senate seats. 
During the Nunn administration the state party organization made serious 
efforts to recruit and support legislative candidates, particularly in districts 
where the party had some realistic chance of winning. It sought out 
persons to run, raised funds for both incumbents and challengers, and ran 
training programs for legislative candidates. In the two elections held 
during the Nunn administration, 1969 and 1971, the Republicans had 70 
and 68 House candidates and 11 and 16 Senate candidates. 
In the years that followed, the state party organization continued to 
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make efforts to recruit and finance candidates, but the results were 
disappointing. T h e  proportion of House seats that were contested 
dropped to little more than half, and from 1973 through 1981 there were 36 
House districts that had a Republican candidate only once or not at all in 
five elections. 
Following the 1986 election the state party organization developed a 
targeting plan in order to identify the legislative districts where the party 
had the best chance of winning. The  party collected precinct-level data on 
recent elections from the county courthouses and contracted with the 
national Republican party to aggregate these data and prepare an index for 
each legislative district. T h e  index was based on Reagan's presidential 
victory in 1984 (weighted double) and two Senate races, McConnell's 
winning effort in 1984 and Jackson Andrew's losing effort in 1986. T h e  
resulting index, called the "optimum Republican voting strength," meas- 
ured the proportion of votes in each legislative district that might be cast 
for a Republican candidate who was running a serious campaign. (The 
choice of these three elections produces a statewide index of 49 percent.) 
T h e  index, like any targeting system, enables the party leadership to 
determine where the party should make the greatest effort to recruit 
candidates and where it should concentrate its resources, including funds 
raised or services provided to a candidate. In districts where the index is 50 
percent or more (or perhaps even 45 percent), the data can be used to 
encourage potential candidates to run. T h e  index based on the 1984 and 
1986 statewide elections was 50 percent or better in 50 House districts, 
suggesting that Republican candidates should have a realistic chance in at 
least half of the districts. But in reality only 41 Republicans, 27 of them 
incumbents, ran for House seats in 1988. The  targeting system may have 
helped the party to distribute resources, but it failed to encourage candi- 
dates to run in a number of seats that, in theory, were winnable. Of course, 
some of these uncontested seats may have been held by entrenched 
Democrats who were perceived to be unbeatable. 
One of the most valuable resources in political campaigns is com- 
puterized lists of individuals who have made previous donations to politi- 
cal candidates. T h e  state Republican headquarters has such lists of 
contributors, but there is contradictory evidence about its willingness to 
share such lists with Republican candidates. In 1987 the Harper organiza- 
tion believed that the contributor lists it received from the state party were 
incomplete and did not include some of the best prospects. T h e  Harper 
organization was also concerned that, while it was struggling to raise funds 
for its campaign, the state Republican organization was carrying on its own 
competing fund-raising operation. The  state party headquarters appar- 
ently does not have a policy of making statewide lists of contributors 
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available to every state Republican candidate or making local lists available 
on request to those running for legislative or local office. When the party 
targets state legislative districts as important, it sometimes contacts proven 
contributors and asks them to contribute to these campaigns. 
Criticisms and Limitations of the State Party 
Republicans around the state differ in their judgments about the priorities 
and the accomplishments of the state party organization. Those who 
criticize the RSCC also differ in their prescriptions for the party. Some 
critics charge that a small group maintains control over the state central 
committee, a charge that is difficult to evaluate from the outside and one 
that is probably inevitable in a party that has often suffered from fac- 
tionalism. T h e  rules now provide that the executive committee will 
nominate a slate of officers-chairman, vice-chairman, secretary, and 
national committeeman and committeewoman-and that the central com- 
mittee must vote for or against the entire slate. This rule is criticized as a 
device used by the leadership to stay in office. 
T h e  argument is often made that the party organization, at both the 
state and local levels, does not try hard enough to attract new members. 
T h e  issue came to a head in 1988 when supporters of Pat Robertson tried to 
win seats on various state and local party committees. Under present party 
rules a person who wants to shift party membership cannot participate in 
Republican party affairs until he or she has shifted registration (and state 
law prohibits shifting between the general election and the primary). In 
1988 some efforts were made, unsuccessfully, to permit newcomers to 
participate in party affairs before they were able to shift their party 
registration. 
Some critics argue that the Republican party should devote more 
attention to developing potential state and local candidates. They distin- 
guish between recruiting, which is done-often in desperation-at the 
last moment, and development, which is a long-term process. This may be 
a more appropriate task for local organizations, which are in a better 
position to identify new talent. Some have suggested that the state party 
should run long-term training programs (on the model of Leadership 
Kentucky) for Republican activists identified by local parties as being 
particularly promising. 
T h e  state party organization can provide a few services that should 
benefit any Republican running for office. For example, from time to time 
the state party organizes voter registration drives or, less frequently, cam- 
paigns to convert Democrats to Republican registration. In reality, how- 
ever, the success of such efforts depends almost entirely on the vigor of 
local organizations. 
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The  management of political campaigns has become a complex and 
sophisticated business, and serious candidates for major office must rely 
on experts in polling, television and radio advertising, mass mailing, and 
computer technology. By offering such services to candidates, state party 
organizations in some states have been able to strengthen the party's 
competitive position and at the same time enhance the effectiveness and 
influence of the state organization. 
The  Kentucky state Republican party could carry out public opinion 
polls and make the results widely available. It could provide analyses of 
county and precinct returns to state, congressional, legislative, and local 
candidates; and it has very recently provided such data on a limited basis to 
legislative candidates. The state party could use its computer resources to 
provide candidates with various kinds of lists, such as registered voters, 
active Republican workers, and financial contributors, and it has appar- 
ently done so on a selective basis. 
The  state Republican party could provide more extensive services to a 
larger number of candidates, but to do so would cost money; and the state 
party seems to have difficulty raising enough funds to maintain its existing 
level of operations and services. The  approximately $65,000 it receives 
from the state government, under the taxpayer check-off plan, is less than 
15 percent of its annual budget. 
If the state party organization were to engage in a much more ag- 
gressive fund-raising operation, it would be competing for funds directly 
with individual candidates and particularly with the senatorial and con- 
gressional officeholders, who have been very successful in building large 
campaign chests. Because its resources are limited, the state party is 
selective in providing even minimal help to Republican candidates. The  
purpose of targeting legislative races is not only to recruit more candidates 
but to distribute limited resources wisely. The  state party has provided 
little assistance to those Republican challengers for congressional seats 
whose campaigns appeared hopeless. 
Local Republican Party Organizations 
Though a comprehensive analysis of local Republican organizations is 
beyond the scope of this book, the organizations in Jefferson County 
(Louisville) and Fayette County (Lexington) deserve particular attention. 
These are counties with large numbers of voters who frequently vote for 
Republican candidates, though a majority of them are registered as Demo- 
crats. These are counties that Repulican candidates for statewide office 
must win if they are to be seriously competitive. Consequently the organi- 
zational effectiveness of these county parties is of great importance to the 
state Republican party. 
LouisviZZe 
T h e  modern Jefferson County Republican party organization developed 
in the late 1950s when a new generation of leaders, headed by William 
Cowger and Marlow Cook, gained control of the organization. T h e  old 
guard had been dominated by businessmen and fund-raisers rather than 
active party workers. T h e  new leadership reorganized the executive com- 
mittee to include the chairmen of the city wards and county districts. (It 
was not until 1974 that the organization was organized along legislative 
district lines.) Steps were taken to encourage broader participation in the 
party. 
Once the organizational groundwork had been laid, the party won 
control of both the Louisville and Jefferson County governments in 1961. 
After easily winning primary contests, William Cowger was elected mayor 
of Louisville, and Marlow Cook became county judge. T h e  organization 
quickly capitalized on its position of power. I t  hired a full-time organiza- 
tional chairman, and by the late 1960s there were nine salaried empl~yees  
working at headquarters on a year-round basis. As long as the Republicans 
controlled both the city and county, they had approximately two thousand 
patronage jobs to dispense, and the patronage workers were assessed 2 
percent of their salaries to support the party. From this and other sources, 
the party raised enough funds to support this operation and to provide 
assistance to candidates. Persistent voter registration drives substantially 
narrowed the gap between Democratic and Republican registration totals 
in the county. T h e  availability of patronage jobs provided one strong 
incentive for registering as a Republican. 
T h e  party leadership continued the established practice of endorsing 
candidates for legislative and local office. T h e  executive committee ap- 
pointed a candidate selection committee, which solicited recommenda- 
tions from ward and precinct leaders and investigated potential 
candidates. T h e  candidates endorsed by the executive committee for local 
and legislative office were frequently unopposed and were rarely defeated 
in primaries. T h e  party then provided strong support for these candidates 
in the general election. 
In 1965 Marlow Cook was reelected county judge; Mayor Cowger 
(who could not serve a second term) was succeeded by Republican Ken- 
neth Schmid. T h e  next year Cowger was elected to Congress from the 
Third District, and Republican Gene Snyder was elected from the Fourth 
District. During the 1960s the Republicans usually won majorities, occa- 
sionally large majorities, in the legislature. They were aided by the 1963 
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reapportionment that provided more seats primarily in suburban areas. 
T h e  Republican success in Jefferson County did not breed harmony, 
however. There was a split between the relatively liberal Cowger-Cook 
faction and the deeply conservative Gene Snyder. Snyder, who had been 
elected in 1962 and defeated in the 1964 landslide, had to defeat a 
candidate from the Cowger-Cook faction in the 1966 primary before 
winning the election, and this was a source of continuing bitterness. T h e  
first step in Louie Nunn's gubernatorial election in 1967 was a bitter 
primary battle with Marlow Cook, which inevitably damaged relations 
between the county and state Republican organizations. 
In 1969 Republican control of Jefferson County and Louisville came to 
an end. Cook was elected to the Senate in 1968; his appointed successor as 
county judge died in an automobile accident, and his replacement lost the 
1969 election to a Democrat. T h e  Louisville Republicans lost control of 
the board of aldermen in 1967 and the mayor's office in 1969. And in 1970 
Representative Cowger was narrowly defeated by Democrat Ron Mazzoli. 
T h e  1970s was a period of factional turmoil on the executive commit- 
tee. Because it lacked officeholders and patronage, the organization had 
fewer resources and a smaller staff, and it lacked the ability to maintain as 
strong a precinct organization as in the past. In the early 1970s the party 
organization abandoned the practice of endorsing candidates for nomina- 
tion to local and legislative office. 
In 1977 the Jefferson County Republican drought ended when Mitch 
McConnell was elected county judge. McConnell was a former aide to 
Marlow Cook who had been active in Jefferson County Republican party 
affairs for several years. He was reelected in 1981, completing seven years 
in the post before his election to the Senate in 1984. 
T h e  seven years of Republican control in Jefferson County did not 
restore the party to the position of strength it had enjoyed in the 1960s. 
This was in part because Mitch McConnell did not devote much attention 
to party-building activities, and he gave little priority to recruiting local 
and legislative candidates. He  was willing to lend his name and appearance 
to fund-raising events for the party. But many Republicans believed that 
McConnellYs fund-raising efforts were focused primarily on his own cam- 
paign for reelection and subsequently on his campaign for the U.S. 
Senate. McConnell's priorities have frequently been criticized by other 
Republican leaders in the county. But McConnell, like some other Repub- 
lican officeholders in the state, believes that successful candidates must be 
self-reliant, raising their own funds and mobilizing their own supporters. 
Another reason why the Jefferson County Republican party benefited 
less from McConnell's tenure as county judge was that the party failed to 
win control of the mayor's office in Louisville, as it had in the 1960s. There 
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may also have been less patronage available at the county level than had 
been the case a decade earlier. T h e  disappearance of party organizational 
endorsements in primaries may also have weakened the party. 
During the 1980s the Jefferson County Republican party has not been 
as well organized as it was in the 1960s or as the Democratic party has been 
in recent years. T h e  lack of patronage has made it more difficult to provide 
incentives for workers at the precinct and district levels. Candidates for 
local and legislative office find that some precincts are well organized and 
in others they must recruit their own workers. 
T h e  county party organization faces several handicaps in raising 
funds. It cannot rely on patronage workers for funds. Some of the business 
and professional persons who might be expected to support the Republi- 
can party have preferred to make campaign contributions to the Demo- 
crats who hold office in the city and county, notably Mayor Abramson and 
county judge executive Sloane. T h e  decline in financial resources has 
inevitably led to reductions in the party headquarters operation; in the late 
1980s it has had only three paid staff members. 
In recent years the county party organization has become more active 
in recruiting local and legislative candidates. In 1986 and 1988, for exam- 
ple, it tried very hard to find someone to run in every legislative district. It 
succeeded in finding a candidate, though not necessarily a viable one, in 
nearly every district in 1986; but in 1988 there were a number of gaps in the 
slate. T h e  county organization is selective in the amount of assistance it 
provides to local and legislative candidates. Those who demonstrate the 
ability to raise funds and recruit volunteer help, and thus prove that they 
have some potential for winning, are most likely to receive some tangible 
assistance from the organization. The  party has recently provided candi- 
dates with voter registration lists and organized seminars in campaigning 
run by Washington consultants. Another resource made available to some 
candidates is a phone bank at party headquarters. T h e  party has not, 
however, provided them with lists of financial contributors. 
T h e  factional divisions that once plagued the Jefferson County Re- 
publican party appear to be a thing of the past perhaps because, for the 
party out of power, there is less to fight over. On several occasions during 
the 1970s, there had been competing slates for party office, but during the 
1980s the pattern has been for a single slate of candidates to be elected to 
the county committee without opposition. 
Lexington 
T h e  Republican party in Fayette County was one of the first to capitalize 
on the popularity of national Republican candidates in the late 1950s and 
the 1960s. It developed a relatively active grass-roots organization, and in 
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1965 it won temporary control of the county judgeship. In the mid-1960s 
the increase in representation for Fayette County enabled the party to start 
winning legislative seats, particularly in the higher-income suburban dis- 
tricts. 
Some of those active in the Fayette Republican party believe that 
since that time there has been a decline in the level of organizational 
effort. Some attribute it to the growing importance of television, which 
makes she candidates more independent and reduces the importance of 
old-fashioned organizational work. The party has had success in running 
telephone banks and working the polls on election day. Less than two- 
thirds of the precinct offices have been filled in the late 1980s. In recent 
years, however, the party has had some success in raising money and has 
been able to maintain an office for party headquarters. By 1988 the local 
party had a budget of about $15,000 a year. 
From time to time the Fayette County party has tried to recruit more 
candidates for local and legislative office. In 1981, for example, it ran a 
number of candidates for courthouse offices but without success. From 
1971 through 1988, in elections for each of the two Senate seats entirely in 
Fayette County, the Republicans consistently held one seat and contested 
the other only two of five times. In the nine elections for the five House 
seats entirely in the county, the Republicans always won the seventy- 
eighth; contested the seventh-ninth seven times, winning it once; con- 
tested the seventy-sixth six times, winning it once; and contested the 
seventy-seventh only five times and the seventy-fifth only four times. 
Only in 1971 did it contest all the seats, while in 1979 it contested only the 
seat it won. 
The  strongest component of the Fayette Republican organization is 
that led by Rep. Larry Hopkins, who first sought legislative office in 1971. 
State senator John Trevey and state representative Pat Freibert have 
worked closely with Hopkins, and each holds a legislative position for- 
merly held by Hopkins. Though none of the three often face a serious 
challenge, they have a network of supporters who can be mobilized when 
necessary. Persons close to the Hopkins organization argue that it gives 
strength and vitality to the entire county organization. Critics argue that 
the Hopkins group works principally for its own candidates and does not 
contribute enough to the county organization. 
There has been some fluidity in leadership of the party; during the 
1980s four different persons chaired the local organization. The  entry of 
Robertson supporters into the Fayette County organization (discussed 
later) raised the possibility of more instability of leadership as well as 
factional rivalries within the party. 
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Fragmentation in the  Republican Party 
Political Fiefdooms 
The  minority party in any state faces the necessity of winning votes from 
independents and majority party voters in order to win elections. T h e  
Republican party in Kentucky faces the reality that only 29 percent of 
voters are registered as Republicans. Republican candidates for statewide 
or congressional office (outside the Fifth District) face the same problem. 
They must win both Democratic and Republican votes, and in some 
congressional districts they must win more Democratic than Republican 
votes in order to put together a majority coalition. 
A Republican candidate who seeks statewide or congressional office in 
Kentucky is, for the most part, on his own. T h e  state party organization 
can provide very little assistance. T h e  candidate must raise his own 
campaign funds, recruit his own political workers, build his own political 
organization, and develop issues that will appeal to both Republican and 
Democratic voters. It  is true of course that, in raising funds and recruiting 
volunteers, the candidate will draw largely from a pool of Republican 
contributors and workers. But to be successful, the candidate must de- 
velop and maintain his own organization, including persons who have not 
been active in the Republican party and often including Democrats as 
well. 
Once a Republican candidate has been elected to office, the strategy 
for winning reelection remains the same. The  incumbent builds as large a 
bank account as possible for the next campaign. He  tries to maintain and 
strengthen his political organization. He publicizes his service to the 
people of the district or state. He tries to develop a record that will be 
acceptable to a majority of constituents. He  tries to broaden the base of his 
political support among Democrats as well as Republicans. And when he 
runs for reelection, the radio and television commercials and the billboards 
do not emphasize his affiliation with the Republican party. 
In addition to Sen. Mitch McConnell, elected in 1984, there are three 
Republican members of the U.S. House. When Larry Hopkins was 
elected in 1978, he became the first Republican in modern times to 
represent the Sixth District, which encompasses Lexington and the sur- 
rounding Bluegrass area. Jim Bunning was elected to the Fourth District 
seat in 1986, replacing the retiring Republican congressman Gene Snyder, 
who had represented the district since 1966. T h e  Fourth District includes 
the suburbs of Louisville, the suburban area south of Cincinnati, and the 
rural counties along the Ohio River between these two areas. T h e  only 
truly Republican district is the Fifth, in the hill country of southeastern 
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Kentucky. Since 1980 it has been represented by Harold Rogers. 
The  Republican members of Congress have developed their own 
power bases that are independent of the Kentucky Republican party. 
These congressmen believe that they were originally elected because of 
their own efforts, and they are convinced that they must maintain this 
independence if they are to be reelected. If they are perceived as partisan 
Republicans by Democratic and independent voters, their reelection is 
jeopardized. If they work actively for, or campaign with, Republican 
candidates for other offices, their bipartisan image may be damaged. If 
they share their organizational resources, such as lists of financial contrib- 
utors, with other candidates, their own electoral prospects may be weak- 
ened. 
The  best example of an independent Republican congressman is 
Larry Hopkins. In 1978, when the incumbent Democratic congressman in 
the Sixth District was upset in a primary, Republican leaders persuaded 
the Republican candidate, who was perceived as too weak, to withdraw 
and selected state senator Larry Hopkins in her place. He won his first race 
by a 51 to 46 percent margin. In subsequent elections the Democratic 
candidates have become weaker, and Hopkins's margin has grown-to 71 
percent in 1984 and 74 percent in both 1986 and 1988. 
The  voter registration in the Sixth District is 77 percent Democratic 
and 20 percent Republican. When Hopkins won 71 percent of the vote in 
1984, he must have gained nearly two-thirds of his votes from registered 
Democrats (assuming he won nearly all the Republican votes and taking 
into account a slightly higher turnout among Republicans). Hopkins's 
ability to win the votes of most Democratic voters is not unique, of course. 
In the 1984 election Ronald Reagan carried the Sixth District by 62 percent 
and probably got at least 60 percent of his votes from Democrats. 
The  Democratic party rarely wins a contested statewide election by a 
margin as large as its 7 to 3 advantage in registration, and Democratic 
candidates for Congress and the legislature who have more than token 
opposition rarely win a share of the vote equivalent to the Democratic 
share of registration in their district. In other words, a substantial propor- 
tion of registered Democrats regularly vote Republican, and an even larger 
percentage are potential Republican voters in any election. Nevertheless, 
Republican candidates like Larry Hopkins are always very conscious of the 
disadvantage that they face in terms of voter registration, and thus they are 
conscious of the need to build and maintain a bipartisan voting coalition. 
Larry Hopkins has developed that coalition by his untiring attention to 
his constituents. He does everything that the textbooks say a congressman 
should do to win reelection. Hopkins pays careful attention to the needs of 
his district, and his staff handles casework diligently. Hopkins visits the 
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district every weekend and makes excellent use of his time. Hopkins 
makes sure that constituents know about his activities and his accessibility. 
If he spends a Saturday afternoon at a shopping mall to meet constituents 
and listen to their concerns, postcards are sent out in advance, and a story 
appears in the press the next day, reporting on his appearance. He sends 
out newsletters regularly to constituents in general and to specialized 
groups. He appears frequently on television commenting on legislation 
and public issues. 
Hopkins has a conservative voting record in Congress and a record of 
strong support for a Republican president. But he has demonstrated 
enough independence in his voting record to satisfy many moderate and 
conservative Democrats. He is skillful in becoming identified with issues 
that will appeal to a bipartisan constituency. As a member of the subcom- 
mittee of the Armed Services Committee that visited Lebanon to investi- 
gate the tragic bombing of the Marine barracks, he was the only 
Republican to join in the majority report attacking the military leadership 
for negligence. He has vigorously supported residents of Richmond, in the 
Sixth District, in their fight against the army's plan to build an incinerator 
on a nearby base to dispose of nerve gas stores, a plan that they believe is 
fraught with danger. 
Hopkins's game plan and his hard work have paid off Potential Demo- 
cratic candidates who might be tough adversaries have declined to run, and 
in recent years Hopkins has faced only little-known candidates who had 
few resources and little support fro the Democratic party. Consequently, 
he has not had to run a vigorous or expensive campaign. In recent years 
Hopkins has not found it necessary to establish a formal campaign head- 
quarters or to mobilize an army of volunteers. In part because of this, 
Hopkins has not had to run for office as a partisan Republican. Instead, he 
runs as an incumbent congressman. He is the most successful Republican 
vote getter in the history of the Sixth District, but he accomplishes this by 
using a strategy that makes it easy for Democrats and independents to vote 
for him. 
Without a doubt, Hopkins's bipartisan strategy is perfectly designed to 
win reelection comfortably in a district that is Democratic in registration 
and bipartisan in its voting patterns. The  question is whether this strategy 
damages the efforts of Republicans to build a stronger state party in 
Kentucky. If Hopkins were more openly a Republican and used his 
position as an incumbent to engage in party-building activities, would it 
make a significant difference-or would it simply increase the risk that the 
Sixth District seat would be lost to the Democratic party? 
Those Republicans who speak disparagingly of the congressional 
"fiefdoms" may criticize all of the Republican incumbents, but Larry 
Hopkins is more often a target because he has been in office longer and 
because it is he who has perfected the bipartisan strategy. Some of these 
critics speak in general terms, focusing on Hopkins's bipartisan style and 
asserting that he is "not a strong party person." Some criticisms are more 
specific. 
There are charges that Hopkins has built his own organization in 
Fayette County and uses it for his own campaigns but has been unwilling 
to use his resources and workers to build a stronger Republican organiza- 
tion in Fayette County. Those who work closely with Hopkins, on the 
other hand, assert that it is the Hopkins campaign group that has energized 
the Fayette County organization and has provided a large proportion of the 
volunteers who have worked in other local campaigns. They claim that, 
because Hopkins is so strong and rarely has serious challenges, his sup- 
porters are free to devote more time to other campaigns in Fayette County 
and the other counties in the Sixth District. 
Critics argue that Hopkins has raised a campaign chest larger than he 
needs and continues to raise funds, even during gubernatorial campaigns, 
but is unwilling to participate in fund-raising efforts for other Republicans. 
Hopkins has taken the position that candidates must raise their own funds; 
he will not donate to other candidates funds that have been contributed to 
his own campaign. He does not usually speak at fund-raisers for other 
candidates nor provide other tangible assistance to candidates. Moreover, 
Hopkins does not share his lists of contributors with other Republican 
candidates, probably in part because he raises some of his funds from 
Democrats, who would be less likely to contribute if Hopkins provided 
their names to other Republican candidates. Supporters of Hopkins argue 
that other candidates do not need lists of contributors because the names 
of any contributors over $300 are a matter of public record at the Registry of 
Election Finance. 
Supporters and critics of Hopkins do not disagree about the reality of 
his campaign style. Larry Hopkins raises his own funds and campaigns 
independently of other Republican candidates. He  appeals to Democrats, 
independents, and Republicans, and he does not emphasize his Republi- 
can affiliation. He  campaigns on his record as a congressman and par- 
ticularly his long record of service to the district and its constituents. 
Supporters and critics disagree about whether this independent strategy 
harms the Republican party. Hopkins and his supporters argue that the 
greatest contribution he can make to the Republican party is to keep on 
winning reelection by the largest margin possible. He  argues that the 
presence of a strong Republican on the ticket, one who is able to win votes 
from Democrats as well as Republicans, is a major asset to other Republi- 
cans running for state or local office in the Sixth District. 
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The  issue of campaign fund-raising is one of the major sources of 
dissension among congressional officeholders and candidates. As the cost 
of campaigning has increased, money raisir.g has become a year-round 
preoccupation of most senators and representatives. Even those who have 
rarely had strong opposition, like Larry Hopkins, believe it is necessary to 
keep building a larger campaign war chest because the next election may 
produce a stronger challenger. Mitch McConnell's election to the Senate in 
1984 was barely over when he started raising money for the 1990 race, and 
by mid-1988 he had raised $1.2 million and had $1 million in the bank. 
Friction arises among Republican leaders over the timing, the bound- 
aries, and the style of fund-raising efforts. Candidates for Congress never 
stop raising funds, and this arouses resentment from gubernatorial candi- 
dates trying to raise funds in a noncongressional election year. John Harper 
was also upset that during his gubernatorial campaign the state Republican 
party was raising funds for its own treasury and using his name in the 
campaign. Congressional candidates may object if a statewide, or another 
congressional, candidate comes into their district to raise funds. Mitch 
McConnell agreed to travel with John Harper in 1987 and introduc;: him to 
audiences but held his own fund-raising events at the same time. When 
McConnell campaigned on Nunn's behalf in the 1979 gubernatorial race, 
he used the occasion to distribute sign-up sheets to those in the audience 
and to use these lists for his own fund-raising efforts. 
Other Sources of Dissension 
Through the years there have been a number of other factors that have 
caused dissension in the party. The  wide diversity among areas of Republi- 
can strength within the state is one source of disagreement. In the Appala- 
chian Fifth District lie most of the counties of traditional Republican 
control. The  Republican leaders and activists in these counties may be 
more interested in winning and holding county office than they are in the 
statewide fortunes of the Republican party. As we have noted, the Repub- 
lican party in some of these counties is divided into factions sometimes 
based on farrrily loyalties. The  main concern of a Republican congressman 
from the Fifth District is to maintain this political base and to avoid 
challenges in the primary. 
The  second major base of Republican strength is in the major metro- 
politan centers of Louisville, Lexington, and northern Kentucky. All three 
are areas where congressional and local races are potentially competitive 
though not always closely contested. The  Republican bases of metrc- 
politan power are greatest in the congressional seats and in local govern- 
ment of Jefferson County and sometimes Louisville. The  social and 
economic interests and the issue priorities of Republican constituents in 
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metropolitan areas are quite different from those in the Republican Appa- 
lachian areas. 
Bitterly contested primaries within Republican ranks are not a cause of 
discord, because they are so rare. The  last primary for major office that 
might be described as bitterly divisive was the 1967 gubernatorial primary 
in which Louie Nunn defeated Marlow Cook. Ironically, it also produced 
the last candidate able to win a gubernatorial election. 
In the years since his administration, Louie Nunn has from time to 
time been a controversial figure within the party. Despite Nunn's support 
for Cook in his successful race for the Senate in 1968, relations between 
these two figures remained uneasy as long as Cook was active in politics. 
Surprisingly, when Nunn ran for governor again in 1979, he had only minor 
opposition in the primary. Nunn is an outspoken man, in public and in 
private; and for many years his brother Lee, a skillful campaign manager, 
was also a source of controversy. Some other Republican leaders who have 
appeared on the scene more recently seem to resent Nunn's continuing 
efforts to wield some influence behind the scenes. There has been friction 
between Louie Nunn and both of the recent Republican congressmen 
from the Fourth District: Gene Snyder and Jim Bunning. 
From time to time the state's active Republicans have been divided in 
their loyalties to presidential candidates. That was the case, for example, 
in 1976 when Pres. Gerald Ford narrowly and somewhat surprisingly 
defeated Ronald Reagan in the presidential primary. In 1988 there were 
some sharp conflicts between the supporters of George Bush and Robert 
Dole. There has been little evidence, however, that these differences 
have caused any lasting splits in the Republican party. 
In 1988, however, the supporters of Pat Robertson added a new 
dimension to Republican factionalism. In the primary election Robertson 
got only 11 percent of the votes (less than 14,000 votes in a light turnout), 
but his campaign enlisted a number of workers, many of whom were new 
to Republican politics. Some had been Republican voters, though not 
politically active; some had been Democrats, who changed party registra- 
tion; and some had not even been registered. Once the campaign was over, 
the Robertson supporters in some parts of the state turned their attention 
to trying to win a place in the Republican party. They were led by Philip 
Thompson, who had served briefly in 1985 and 1986 as executive director 
of the state Republican party. 
In the spring of 1988 (after the primary), the Robertson supporters 
attended Republican county meetings in a small number of counties and 
tried to win seats on the county committees, with mixed success. Their 
most dramatic success occurred in Fayette County, where a large number 
of Robertson loyalists attended the county convention. (One party regular, 
looking at the newcomers, asked, "Who are these people?") Voting as a 
bloc, they elected a slate of candidates to the county executive committee 
that included a number of new Robertson supporters and a number of 
veteran conservatives who were acceptable to them (NationaIJoumal, June 
26, 1988, p. 824). 
Among the other counties where Robertson supporters won control of 
local committees were Madison and Franklin; they also made some in- 
roads in Jefferson County meetings. In some of the county and district 
meetings, Robertson supporters or delegates were challenged by veteran 
Republicans who questioned whether they had shifted their registration to 
the Republican party early enough to meet the deadline. Some of the 
fights over credentials had to be settled at the state level. 
By the time the state convention was held in April, compromises had 
been worked out between the party leadership and the Robertson forces. 
Six Robertson supporters, including Thompson, were among the twenty 
at-large members elected to the forty-member state central committee. 
The  attitude of established Republican leaders and veteran activists to the 
newcomers loyal to Robertson is varied and sometimes ambivalent. On the 
one hand, Republicans understand that the party needs to expand its 
ranks, and it needs the enthusiasm and commitment that characterize 
many of the newcomers. On the question of issues, the difference be- 
tween the two groups is one of priorities, not principles. Some Republi- 
cans doubt whether these converts will maintain their commitment to the 
party when and if Robertson fades from the political scene and whether 
they will demonstrate equal enthusiasm in working for other Republican 
candidates. 
Some of the Republicans who have controlled local party organizations 
are less than enthusiastic about sharing their power with any new group of 
political activists. Some critics believe that the conflicts over the Robert- 
son group are symbolic of a broader problem in the Republican party. 
Those who hold state or county Republican office, it is claimed, are too 
often content to keep the status quo and to take advantage of whatever 
patronage or benefits come from Republican control of the White House, 
rather than sharing power and trying to enlarge the Republican base of 
support. 
T h e  problems faced by the Republican party organization are not 
unique to Kentucky. They are typical of the problems that have been faced 
by the minority Republican party in most southern states. It is not unusual 
for those Republicans who win election to state or local office to give 
higher priority to their own reelection than to state party-building efforts. 
In Texas, for example, the Republican party has developed relatively 
slowly, given its potential electoral base, and former senator John Tower 
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and Gov. William Clements have both been criticized for their lack of 
support for the party organization. 
It is easy to blame state party chairmen and members of the state 
Republican committee for failing to recruit more aggressively and to 
provide more tangible assistance to the party's candidates. But the state 
party needs substantial financial resources to provide significant amounts 
of support; and the minority party has very little leverage in raising funds 
and runs the risk of competing directly with its officeholders if it makes 
vigorous efforts to raise funds. If there is any prescription for Republican 
success, it would be to elect a governor who is deeply committed to party- 
building activities, a point we will return to in the next chapter. 
10 
NOMINATING AND 
ELECTING 
REPUBLICANS 
Republican Registration and Primary Elections 
In order to vote in Republican primaries, a voter must be registered as a 
Republican; and during the gubernatorial primaries from 1979 through 
1987, the percentage of registration that was Republican remained steady 
at 28 percent (down from 30 percent in 1975). 
Registered Republican voters are distributed unevenly across the 
state, even more so than are the Democrats (chapter 3). In 1987 the largest 
proportion of Republican registrants (37 percent) was found in 29 counties 
where they constituted a majority of those registered; 29 percent were in 
the four major metropolitan counties, where they constituted 29 percent of 
registered voters; and 24 percent were in 29 other counties where Republi- 
cans were between 21 and 50 percent of the total (table 26). In the 
remaining 58 counties, including most of western Kentucky and scattered 
counties in the rest of the state, Republicans had less than 20 percent of 
the registration total and comprised only 10 percent of the statewide 
Republican registration total. 
In the 1987 gubernatorial primary, the distribution of Republican votes 
approximated the distribution of registered Republicans, except that a 
larger proportion of the primary turnout (44 percent) came from the 
counties with a majority Republican registration. In other words, voters 
who were registered as Republicans were more likely to participate in the 
gubernatorial primary if they lived in heavily Republican counties. Among 
the major metropolitan counties, the level of voting in Republican pri- 
maries was considerably higher in Fayette than in the other three. 
A voter might be expected to register as a Republican in order to 
participate in primary elections at the state level, or the county level, or 
both. In reality, highly competitive Republican primaries at the state level 
are rare, and the winners of those primaries are usually defeated in the 
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Table 26. Republican Patterns of Registration and Turnout 
in 1987 Gubernatorial Primary 
Rep. prim. Rep. prim. Total Rep. Total Rep. Rep. gen. 
vote as vote as % 
Counties regis. prim. vote elect. vote % of Rep. of Rep. gen. 
. - 
(N) (000s) (%) (000s) (%) (000s) (%) regis. elect. vote 
Jefferson 
28% Rep. 
regis. 
Fayette 29% 
Rep. regis. 
Campbell & 
Kenton 30% 
Rep. regis. 
Major metro 
29% Rep. 
regis. 
Rep. regis. 
under 10% 
(34) 
Rep. regis. 
10-20% (24) 
Rep. regis. 
21-50% (29) 
Rep. regis. 
over 50% 
(29) 
Source: Calculated from data compiled by the State Board of Elections. 
general election. While Republican candidates for the U.S. Senate or 
House are more likely to win, there is seldom serious primary competition 
if the incumbent is running. The  voters who have the strongest incentive 
to register as Republicans are those living in counties where local govern- 
ment is under Republican control. Not only are there likely to be competi- 
tive primaries, but the winners frequently win the November election. 
The  importance of local Republican primaries can be illustrated by 
looking at the figures for turnout in the 1985 Republican primaries, when 
only local races were contested (table 27). Two-thirds of all the votes cast 
were in the counties where the Republicans held a registration majority, in 
most of which it is likely that Republicans held some or all of the local 
offices. In these 29 counties almost 64 percent of the registered Republi- 
cans voted. By contrast, only 11 percent of the primary vote came from the 
four major metropolitan counties, which contained 28 percent of the 
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Table 27. Republican Patterns of Registration and Primary Turnout 
in Local Races, 1985 
Counties 
Rep. prim. Total Rep. Total Rep. vote as 
regis. prim. vote % of R ~ D .  
(N) (000s) ( %  (000s) (%) regis. 
Jefferson 28% Rep. regis. 108 18.1 13 6.3 12.3 
Fayette 29% Rep. regis. 30 5.0 6 2.8 19.4 
Campbell & Kenton 
30% Rep. regis. 31 5.2 4 1.9 13.2 
Major metro 
29% Rep. regis. 169 28.3 23 11.0 13.7 
Rep. regis. under 10% (33) 14 2.4 1 0.7 10.1 
Rep. regis. 10-20% (25) 48 8.1 3 1.4 6.2 
Rep. regis. 21-50% (29) 143 24.0 43 20.1 29.7 
Rep. regis. over 50% (29) 222 37.3 141 66.8 63.5 
Source: Calculated from data compiled by the State Board of Elections. 
registered voters; in these counties 14 percent of the registered Republi- 
cans voted. 
Registered Republicans are much more likely to vote in local primary 
elections than they are in statewide contests. In each of three years with 
only local (or legislative) elections on the ballot (1977, 1981, and 1985), at 
least 200,000 registered Republicans participated in primary elections. 
T h e  highest Republican primary turnout in a gubernatorial election year 
during the 1979-87 period was in 1979 when 142,000 voters cast a vote, 
132,000 of them in the gubernatorial contest. Even the presidential pri- 
mary in 1988 attracted only 122,000 Republican voters. In years with only 
senatorial or congressional races on the ballot during this period, there was 
no Republican turnout higher than 70,000 (table 28). 
T h e  relatively low proportions of Republicans voting in primaries for 
statewide office have several implications. T h e  most obvious point is that a 
small proportion of voters are able to determine who the party's nominees 
will be. In 1987 only 90,000 participated in the primary selecting John 
Harper to run for governor, though he eventually won three times that 
many votes in the general election. In 1984 only 50,000 participated in the 
senatorial nomination, though Mitch McConnell, the winning candidate, 
eventually received 645,000 votes in the fall election. 
There are two major reasons for this large disparity between voting in 
the Republican primary and in the general e!ection. A relatively small 
proportion of Republicans participate in primaries, and a substantial 
number of registered Democrats usually support the Republican candi- 
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Table 28. Republican Statewide Primaries for Major Offices, 1978-88 
Vote as % 
Total of Rep. Winning 
Year Office vote regis. percentage Winning candidate 
1978 Sen. 30,114 6.1 47.2 Louis Guenther 
1979 Gov. 132,125 27.9 80.2 Louie Nunn 
1980 Pres. 94,795 19.4 82.4 Ronald Reagan 
1980 Sen. 61,280 12.4 42.0 Mary Louise Foust 
1983 Gov. 97,836 19.0 74.4 Jim Bunning 
1984 Sen. 49,817 9.5 79.2 Mitch McConnell 
1986 Sen. 41,592 7.5 39.0 Jackson Andrews 
1987 Gov. 90,370 16.4 41.4 John Harper 
1988 Pres. 121,644 22.0 59.6 George Bush 
date in the general election. In 1984, for example, less than 10 percent of 
registered Republicans voted in the senatorial primary, but 69 percent of 
them went to the polls in the November election (though probably not all 
voting in the Senate race). In that general election race, McConnell 
received 246,000 more votes than the total registered Republicans who 
went to the polls. 
The disparity between turnout in the primary and general elections 
also gives greater influence on the outcome of the primary to the areas of 
highest turnout. In the 1987 election, for example, the 29 counties with a 
majority of registered Republicans cast 44 percent of the vote in the 
gubernatorial primary but only 16 percent of the Republican vote in the 
general election. The  four major metropolitan counties cast 37 percent of 
the Republican general election vote but only about one-fourth of the 
primary vote for governor. 
In theory, the disparities in registration and turnout in Republican 
primaries should give an advantage to a candidate who runs well in the 
counties that have heavy turnout in the primaries. These counties might 
choose a candidate who had less political strength in the counties that had a 
larger vote in the general election. For example, primary voters in the 
strong Republican counties of the Fifth District might be able to select a 
candidate who was unable to appeal to potential Republican voters in the 
metropolitan counties and thus unable to be elected. In reality, this 
problem seldom arises, largely because so few statewide Republican 
primaries are seriously contested. 
The  most important close Republican primary in modern times was 
the 1967 gubernatorial race in which Louie Nunn defeated Marlow Cook 
by only 5,000 votes (two percentage points). Marlow Cook, county judge 
of Jefferson County, carried that county with 76 percent of the two- 
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candidate vote (there was a minor third candidate); Louie Nunn won 62 
percent in the rest of the state. Both Jefferson County and the most heavily 
Republican registered counties had larger proportions of the primary vote 
than of the general election vote. Nunn's weakness in Jefferson County 
did not prevent him from winning the general election. 
In the 1987 primary we have noted that the turnout was low. Harper got 
half the vote in the four largest metropolitan counties and only 35 percent 
of the vote in the heavily Republican counties that had a dispropor- 
tionately high turnout. While this disparity contributed to Harper's small 
margin, it did not prevent his being nominated. 
In 1967 a total of 179,000 Republicans, about one-third of those 
registered, voted in the gubernatorial primary. Louie Nunn defeated 
Marlow Cook, 50.4 to 48.3 percent, and went on to win the election. At 
that time it was the third largest number for a Republican gubernatorial 
primary in history (the higher turnouts being in 1927 and 1939). Over the 
next five elections, the highest turnout in a gubernatorial primary was 
132,000 (27.5 percent of party registration), and the average was 101,000 
(20 percent of registration). 
T h e  major reason for this low turnout was a lack of close competition in 
the primary; in some races there was probably also a perception that none 
of the candidates stood a chance of winning in November. In 1971 Louie 
Nunn's handpicked candidate, Tom Emberton, had no difficulty winning 
84 percent of the primary vote against three opponents. In 1975 Robert 
Gable won 54 percent of the vote against three opponents but was never 
perceived to have a good chance against incumbent Julian Carroll. In 1979 
Louie Nunn easily won the nomination with 80 percent of the vote against 
three minor opponents. In 1983, despite his late entry into the race, Jim 
Bunning won three-fourths of the vote, which was ten times the vote of his 
closest opponent. T h e  1987 race was considerably closer; John Harper won 
41 percent, compared to 25 percent for the second-place finisher. But none 
of the candidates were well known or generated enough interest to pro- 
duce a higher turnout. After twenty years the Republican primary had still 
not produced another close contest between strong candidates. 
Can the Republican Primary Be Revived? 
Encouraging More Competition 
T h e  absence of close competition among serious candidates in guber- 
natorial primaries hurts the Republican party in several ways. T h e  short- 
run effects are most obvious. During the primary campaign season, Demo- 
cratic candidates dominate the media and gain public attention and name 
- - 
recognition. Because the primary campaign generates little interest, turn- 
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out in the primaries is low and is likely to be unrepresentative of Republi- 
can registered voters. Republican voters who have paid little attention to 
the campaign and have failed to vote in the primary have not developed 
any sense of commitment to a Republican candidate. Whoever wins the 
primary becomes the nominee without having been forced to test the 
effectiveness of his campaign skills and of his issues before large numbers 
of voters. 
There are also some long-run implications. Because there is seldom 
serious competition in statewide Republican primaries, voters who identi- 
fy with the Republican party have little incentive to register as Republi- 
cans and to get in the habit of primary voting-unless they live in one of 
the counties where local politics is dominated by the Republican party. 
Voters who have no strong commitment to either party, but are dissatisfied 
with the administration in office, tend to look for a candidate they can 
support in the Democratic primary rather than looking for a good Republi- 
can candidate. 
There are, of course, some advantages to the Republican party in 
avoiding primary battles. The  most obvious advantage is that the party 
avoids bitter primary fights that can divide the party and make it difficult 
to unite behind the victor and win the general election. The  morning after 
Louie Nunn's bruising primary victory over Marlow Cook, the press 
analysis suggested that it would be very difficult for Nunn to reunify the 
party in time to win the November election; but he succeeded, thanks in 
part to a factional split in the Democratic party. Despite this example, it is 
highly possible that a divisive Republican primary could be damaging 
enough to undermine the prospects of a nominee who might otherwise be 
competitive. 
A second and perhaps more serious problem is a financial one. Repub- 
lican candidates for statewide office have had difficulty raising enough 
funds to compete effectively in the general elections (a problem we discuss 
in more detail below). These problems would be compounded by a 
competitive primary because the candidates would have to raise funds 
from the same types of persons, and often the same individuals, who 
would contribute to a general election campaign. Assume that it would 
cost a candidate $2 million to run a vigorous, closely contested race for the 
Republican nomination and $3 million to run such a race in the November 
election. If there were one strong candidate, uncontested in the primary, 
Republican fund-raisers would have to raise $3 million; if there were two 
strong Republican candidates, they would have to raise $4 million for the 
primary, making a total of $7 million. And if most of the available Republi- 
can sources were exhausted in the primary election, it might not be 
possible to raise enough money to beat the Democrats in the fall. 
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Most Republican leaders agree in theory that, despite the costs and 
risks, the Republican party would benefit from having competitive pri- 
maries for major office when there is no incumbent Republican running 
and when the party has some realistic prospect of winning the general 
election. They do not see any advantage in encouraging several weak 
candidates to run or in finding a primary challenger if one strong candidate 
is in the race. 
In practice it is much more difficult to persuade two strong candidates 
to enter a race. In both 1983 and 1987, the party had difficulty recruiting 
one reasonably strong candidate. Bunning agreed to run in 1983 only after 
an extensive search had produced no other viable candidate; it is difficult 
to believe he would have agreed to battle for the nomination against a 
strong challenger. In 1987 Larry Forgy's somewhat reluctant campaign was 
based on the assumption that he would have no challenger in the primary; 
and when he dropped out, the party could not even produce one strong 
candidate as a replacement. 
Expanding the Prima7y Electorate 
All Republican leaders seem to agree on the necessity of increasing the 
number of Republicans who participate and who are eligible to participate 
in the primary. Obviously, the best way to get registered Republicans to 
participate and to encourage Republican registration is to have more 
competitive primaries. If Kentucky continues to hold presidential pri- 
maries, leaders hope that more voters will be persuaded to shift registra- 
tion in order to vote in those contests. Some Republican leaders are also 
exploring a variety of ways to make more voters eligible to vote in Republi- 
can primaries. These would require a change in state law and/or party 
rules. Three changes have been suggested, moving from the simplest to 
the most drastic: (1) shortening the lead time required for changing party 
registration, (2) permitting independents to vote in Republican primaries, 
and (3) adopting open primaries. 
State law provides that an individual who wants to change party 
registration in order to vote in a primary must make the change before the 
preceding general election. This means that a registered Democrat who 
wanted to vote in the May 1987 Republican primary had to change by early 
October 1986. Similarly, Democrats who wanted to support Pat Robertson 
in the March 1988 primary had to shift registration by October 1987. Voters 
are most likely to be attracted to the Republican primary by a candidate 
whom they particularly want to support; but by the time such a candidate 
files for office, it is too late for Democrats to change party registration. 
In 1988 supporters of Pat Robertson who wanted to change party 
registration challenged the Kentucky law in federal court. The  judge 
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rejected their challenge, citing a U.S. Supreme Court decision upholding 
a New York law that set such a deadline. Republican legislators have tried 
in vain to get the Democratic majority in the legislature to reduce the lead 
time required for changing registration. 
In 1966 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled (Tashjian v. Republican Party of 
Connecticut) that the Connecticut Republican party had the right to permit 
registered independents to vote in its primary despite a state law requiring 
that primary voters be registered with the party. Early in 1987 the Republi- 
can leaders in Kentucky debated the desirability of capitalizing on this 
decision and inviting independents into their party. But the executive 
committee of the state party was split down the middle on the question, 
and the proposal was dropped. Only 3 percent of registered :Toters are 
independents, but this is approximately 10 percent of Republican registra- 
tion. If many of these decided to vote in a Republican primary, it might 
have a modest effect on the outcome. A decision by the Republican party 
to open the primary to independents might have a greater symbolic value, 
demonstrating that the Republican party is open to new voters. Indepen- 
dents who voted in the Republican primary might be more likely to vote 
for the party's candidates in November. 
There appear to be several reasons why the Republican executive 
committee did not adopt a policy of permitting independents to partici- 
pate in the primary. T h e  number of voters registered as independents is 
too small to have any dramatic effect on the party's primary. Some Republi- 
cans in the Fifth District were apparently concerned that Republicans in 
their counties might shift their registration to independent, retaining the 
right to vote in the primary. Rural Republicans might also have recognized 
that their influence in the primary might be eroded by an influx of 
independents. Over 70 percent of the independent registrants are found in 
eight counties that are in or near metropolitan areas; in these counties the 
independents constitute 6 percent of total registration. 
Most Republican leaders agree that the party would benefit much 
more from the adoption of an open primary law that would permit all 
registered voters to participate in either party's primary, Mitch McConnell, 
for example, has said that closed primaries are "the single biggst inhibiting 
factor to the growth of the Republican party in Kentucky." If primaries 
were open, in those years when the Republicans had more competitive 
primaries, voters who often support Republican candidates would be more 
likely to vote in the Republican primary. Such voters would presumably be 
more likely to support Republicans in November than if they had voted in 
the Democratic primary. Perhaps more important, in a competitive pri- 
mary the choice would be made by a larger electorate, and the winner 
would be a candidate who should be better able to appeal to a broader 
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range of voters in the general election. The  same reasons that make 
Republicans enthusiastic about an open primary, of course, make Demo- 
cratic legislators unwilling to adopt it. 
While the argument that an open primary would help the Republican 
party is plausible, there are equally plausible arguments on the other side. 
Whether the primary is open or closed, the Republican primary will only 
attract substantial numbers of voters if and when it becomes competitive. 
In an open primary system, voters could cross over to the Republican 
primary when it offered interesting choices but could just as easily return 
to the Democratic primary in years when there were no significant Repub- 
lican contests. If the Republican party consistently had important con- 
tests, a significant number of voters would probably shift registration in a 
closed system. Among the eleven southern states, only two, Florida and 
North Carolina, have closed primaries; but the Republican parties in those 
states have made as much progress in recent years as those in other 
southern states. In the period from 1965 to 1982, Florida and North 
Carolina ranked second and third among the southern states in the propor- 
tion of voters in gubernatorial primaries voting in the Republican primary 
(Jewell, 1984: 215). 
The 1987 Republican Gubernatorial Primary 
On May 26,1987, John Harper won the Republican gubernatorial primary 
with 41 percent of the vote; he finished seventeen percentage points and 
15,036 votes ahead of his nearest competitor, Joe E. Johnson 111. State 
representative Harper defeated three opponents in a race that drew little 
enthusiasm among the state's Republicans. His opponents were Johnson, a 
former Fayette County judge; tractor-pull promoter Leonard "Buck" 
Beasley; and perennial candidate Thurman Jerome Hamlin. 
Why were there so few Republican votes cast? Why was there so little 
interest and so much apathy in the race? Why did Larry Forgy, the party's 
all-but-anointed nominee, drop out of the race in early January 1987? Just 
six months before the primary, Forgy was expected to have an excellent 
chance of wresting the governor's office from the longtime domination of 
the Democrats. In an effort to answer these and other questions, we will 
examine the 1987 campaign in some detail: the candidates, their campaign 
strategies and resources, the development of issues, and the use of televi- 
sion. 
T h e  1987 campaign deserves attention because it is one of the most 
unusual in recent years-finally a Republican candidate had a chance of 
beating the Democrats, yet he dropped out of the primary electoral battle. 
But it also deserves attention because in many ways it is typical, in its last 
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five months, of recent Republican gubernatorial primaries-low turnout, 
minimal campaign funds expended, and very limited use of television and 
radio advertising. T h e  last five months of the Republican gubernatorial 
primary were in stark contrast to those of the Democratic counterpart 
(discussed in detail in chapter 4). T h e  three top GOP gubernatorial 
hopefuls spent less than 1 percent of the $12 million spent by the five major 
Democratic hopefuls. Unlike the costly, exciting Democratic primary, the 
Republican campaign did not begin in earnest until May 1987. 
The Candidae Who Withdrm from the Race 
Larry Forgy, aged forty-seven, was a Republican loyalist who began work- 
ing in politics at age sixteen in his native Logan County, where he grew up  
in a family of "blue-belly Republicans." Forgy received a B.A. and law 
degree from the University of Kentucky. H e  became a partner in a 
Louisville law firm and also developed coal business interests. H e  moved 
to Lexington in the late 1970s, partly to broaden his exposure to more 
Kentuckians. 
For years Forgy "carried the presumption that some day he would run 
for governor and quite possibly be elected. . . . Some of Kentucky's most 
powerful political figures were his patrons. H e  was, as one Republican 
observed, almost the surrogate son of such influential Kentuckians as 
former U.S. Senator John Sherman Cooper and former Governors Louie 
B. Nunn and Bert Combs." H e  served in Nunn's administration as state 
budget director and was a partner in Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs law firm. His 
political and legal affiliations placed him close to Kentucky's powerful coal 
and tobacco interests; and twice he had managed Ronald Reagan's presi- 
dential campaigns in Kentucky (C-J; January 18, 1987, p. Dl). 
Forgy was, in short, a real possibility to be governor, a phenomenon 
not known by Republicans in Kentucky for twenty years. He  had started 
early enough, had an appeal that "crossed party lines in urban and rural 
areas alike," and had a style agreeable to reporters and editorialists. H e  
seemed in a position to engage any of the Democratic candidates who were 
well known at the time. "Former Governor Julian Carroll would be easy 
pickings . . . because of his exposure to a federal grand jury investigation. 
Parts of Lieutenant Governor Steve Beshear's record as a legislator and 
attorney general might put him at risk if he were the Democratic nominee. 
A John Y. Brown victory would leave the party divided and allow Forgy to 
reap a harvest of dissident Democrats" (15-4 January 11,1987, pp. Al, A12). 
Forgy launched his campaign in the fall of 1985 and began spending 
most of his time raising money. H e  expected to raise far more than the $1.5 
million that Bunning did in 1983. No primary opposition surfaced for him, 
although in the early stages Sixth District congressman Larry Hopkins 
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refused to rule himself out of the gubernatorial race. By January 1987 Forgy 
had raised almost $750,000-from individuals (e.g., attorneys, coal indus- 
try executives, doctors, business executives, etc.) and PACs (e.g., bank- 
ing interests, law firms, tobacco groups, horse interests, etc.). Most of the 
contributions came from within the state-from both Democrats and 
Republicans. Moreover, it was generally acknowledged that Forgy would 
be able to count on large contributions from major Republican donors 
outside Kentucky because of his close relationship with the Reagan forces. 
In announcing his surprise decision to withdraw from the race in 
January, "Forgy said that after having spent more than 20 years in politics, 
working for other candidates and causes, he found it difficult to do for 
himself what he had done for others. H e  found himself unwilling to make 
personal sacrifices and compromises; fund-raising was especially dis- 
tasteful. H e  told some people that he had made the greatest mistake of his 
life by entering the campaign" (C-4 January 18, 1987, p. Dl). 
"Politicians in both parties were skeptical that Forgy, a veteran of 30 years in 
politics, pulled out solely because of his distaste for the campaign, especially the 
fund-raising side of it. Almost unanimously, they felt his decision was prompted by 
the precipitous decline in President Reagan's popularity in the wake of the Iran- 
Contra affair. . . . Forgy stuck to his contention that he found he did not have the 
stomach for the burdens of his first race and his role as his own major fund- 
raiser. . . . He also said he was troubled by the need to keep silent about what he 
said are Kentucky's critical budget and revenue problems: "How do you campaign 
across the state and be frank about that without committing political suicide?" [C- 
4 January 11, 1987, p. A141 
According to political writer Bob Johnson, "Given Forgy's knowledge 
of politics and government, it is inexplicable that he could play the role of 
governor-in-waiting for as long as he did and go all the way to the starting 
gate before scratching himself from the race" (C-J, January 18,1987, p. Dl). 
Almost one year after his startling withdrawal, Forgy acknowledged 
that he was on the brink of setting up a "laundering operation" to conceal 
large illicit cash contributions when he decided in January to drop out of 
the race instead. "I was confronted with a fundamental decision of 
whether I would continue to operate as I had been . . . or whether I was 
going to have operatives in the 'black-bag sense.' And I decided that 
simply wasn't for me." Forgy estimated that he rejected $200,000 or more 
in cash (H-L, October 17, 1987, pp. B1, B10). 
The Last-Minute Candidates 
When Forgy shocked the state with his decision not to run, Republican 
party leaders made brave statements about finding someone to fill the void 
in the seven weeks before the February 25 filing deadline. The  best 
Republican prospects had already assessed the odds and rejected the 
opportunity. With Forgy on the bench, the 1987 gubernatorial race looked 
like the start of another of Kentucky's political mismatches. Democrats 
had every reason to expect that the winner of the May gubernatorial 
primary would sweep past nominal Republican opposition in November. 
Four loyal Republicans came forth, for various reasons, to seek the state's 
highest office. 
John Harpec born in Chicago in 1931, spent most of his boyhood in 
Louisville, where his family owned a construction business. After two 
years at the University of Louisville and service in the air force, he 
returned to Louisville after his father's death to take charge of the family 
business, which was sold four years later. After establishing his own 
engineering and manufacturing firm in Chicago in 1956, Harper set up a 
second household in the mid-1960s in Bullitt County on what had been the 
farm of his wife's grandmother. In 1976 he sold his business and returned to 
his Kentucky farm. Harper, a practicing engineer, a licensed towboat 
operator, a part-time sod farmer, and an amateur historian, has traveled the 
world to supervise the installation of the equipment he designed as an 
engineer. 
In 1952 Harper became involved in Eisenhower's campaign by walking 
into a GOP office in Louisville and offering to help; he was named a 
precinct captain and began going door-to-door. People in Bullitt County, 
which is overwhelmingly Democratic, watched Harper revive and take 
charge of the local Republican party in the late 1970s. He lost his first bid 
for elected office in 1981, when he ran for Buliitt county judge executive. 
In 1984 he was elected state representative over an incumbent Democrat, 
becoming Bullitt County's first Republican legislator despite the 7 to 1 
Democratic registration advantage. As a legislator, Harper was responsive 
to local people but made few legislative waves (C-J, March 15, 1987, pp. 
Dl,  D4). 
Joe E. Johnson III attended first the University of Virginia and then the 
University of Kentucky, where he received his B.A. and law degrees; then 
he returned to Perry County to take over the family coal business. His 
feuds with roving union pickets were well publicized at the time. Johnson 
finally moved back to Lexington, and in 1963 he and two other young 
Republicans swept three of four Fayette County seats in the state House, 
where he served one term. Johnson headed Barry Goldwater's 1964 presi- 
dential campaign in Kentucky and a year later won the Fayette County 
judgeship. During his four-year term, he clashed with the University of 
Kentucky over its purchase of Maine Chance Farm, conducted a court of 
inquiry that led to the indictment of two local officials on bribery charges, 
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and tangled with the Lexington newspapers and the late financier Garvice 
D. Kinkaid, among others. Johnson was defeated for reelection in 1969 by 
Robert Stephens, now the chief justice of the state Supreme Court. Since 
then, he has been practicing law and tending to his coal and thoroughbred 
business interests. 
In January 1987, after Forgy's withdrawal, Johnson broke his self- 
imposed political exile to assure a Republican primary. "I wasn't even 
thinking about it," Johnson said in an interview, "until Forgy said he 
wouldn't run and I saw all those Republicans on television saying that 
there was no hope for the Republican Party because Forgy didn't run. I 
think we really need a primary to rejuvenate the party" (C-.I, March 22, 
1987, pp. Dl, D4). 
During the very low-key campaign, the fifty-seven-year-old Lex- 
ington native espoused a simple message: The  state's problems are tied to 
a chain of Democratic administrations that have spent the state into 
massive financial problems. Johnson ran a lackluster campaign; because of 
business financial woes, he had to devote his major energies to keeping the 
Kentucky Horse Center (a corporation in which he was the major stock- 
holder) solvent. Johnson, who placed second, reported $26,141 in spend- 
ing. His major contributors included friends in the coal and horse 
industries. His campaign emphasized direct mail. He  did not use televi- 
sion, and his only radio advertising was targeted spots on stations in 
London and Hazard. 
Leonard "Buck" Beasley, age forty-three, a native of Louisville, studied 
engineering and political science at the University of Louisville for about 
eighteen months, finally dropping out because work and service in the 
Kentucky National Guard took up too much time. Over the years he has 
been successful in several careers-from selling insurance to running the 
Kentucky Farm Machinery Show in Louisville. Residing in Washington 
County, he currently operates a convenience store and a small thor- 
oughbred horse farm that complements Pro Shows, Inc., which promotes 
tractor pulls across the nation. 
T h e  political newcomer did not jump into the 1987 race until Larry 
Forgy dropped out. Polls indicated, from the start, that Beasley's bid was a 
long shot. In a Cou~e~Joumalpoll  in March 1987, none of the Republican 
voters surveyed supported Beasley; Harper and Johnson each received 
support from 14 percent of those polled. But 71 percent of the voters were 
undecided, and it was this group that Beasley thought he could capture 
through personal appearances across the state and a few television com- 
mercials. T h e  affable tractor-pull promoter felt that his work on past 
campaigns, his diverse business experience, and his ability to understand 
all types of people would be enough to win the nomination. 
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Beasley believes the state should spend more money promoting its 
businesses, its farms, and its tourist attractions in other states. He pro- 
posed building an $80 million domed stadium to attract entertainment 
events to Kentucky to raise money; the stadium would be built with 
private dollars and leased to the state. Beasley, who finished third, just 
1,229 votes behind Johnson, spent $13,559; he received very few outside 
contributions. He lent his campaign $12,880, none of which was repaid. 
Since he is familiar with broadcast advertising, he made more use of the 
medium than his opponents, running some television spots and radio 
commercials (C-4 April 12, 1987, pp. B1, B7). 
Thtcman Jerome Hamlin, of London, Kentucky, has run for public 
office every year except one since 1951. The perennial candidate finished 
last, with less than 10,000 votes. The  former educator had a memorable 
slogan, urging voters to "vote for Hamlin before Hamlin dies." During his 
very limited campaign, he stressed that he supported raises for teachers 
but opposed raising taxes. 
The Haqer Campaign 
Like Joe Johnson, John Harper entered the race early in January 1987, and 
he also had no illusions. He did not really expect to become governor of 
Kentucky, nor did he have great hopes for the GOP after Forgy's with- 
drawal. He focused on the long-range goal of ending Democratic domina- 
tion of Kentucky politics: "You've got to do what you can-spread the 
gospel that there is an alternative." Harper said he did not enter the race 
"as a sacrificial lamb or with reluctance, but to get into it enthusiastically. 
There was no reluctance whatsoever." He said "his decision arose from a 
flash of inspiration, a sense of duty, and a belief in his own ability." His 
candidacy was viewed by Republicans with a certain amount of skepticism 
(H-L, March 8, 1987, pp. Al, A12). 
His campaign staff was skeletal, consisting of a paid consultant, his 
wife, who is an elementary schoolteacher and his "guiding light," and 
several volunteers. Harper drove himself wherever he went. And he went 
just about everywhere during the primary, to Lincoln Day dinners across 
the state, to shopping malls, and to school campuses. 
Harper campaigned much the same way he conducts himself as a state 
representative-he "gets to the point." At political forums he never 
wandered from his script, nor was the script typically political. Instead of 
generalities, he read from or stayed close to his prepared position papers. 
At informal gatherings Harper reflected his measured approach, often 
explaining that he feared that he might embarrass himself, his family, or 
his party. He kissed no babies and slapped no backs, literally or figur- 
atively; "yet Harper undertook the task of campaigning with a sense of 
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humor that offsets his serious demeanor." For people who read about 
politics, who talked about it every day, he provided an image to respect and 
enjoy. But the apathy of the voter was very real in the 1987 primary, and 
Harper was not very good at whipping up emotions among primary voters 
(H-L, March 8, 1987, p. A12). 
Harper tried, with limited success, to set up local organizations. He  
was successful in his organization-building efforts in about twenty to 
twenty-five counties, mostly urban and Fifth District counties. But there 
were some Fifth District counties that clearly were not going to support 
him-Perry, Clay, and a few others; he was told that these counties had 
already been bought and sold. Organizational efforts were also undertaken 
in certain areas of western Kentucky-Owensboro, Bowling Green, 
Glasgow; he did not try to build a strong base in Paducah. He  visited 
Somerset a dozen times and campaigned somewhat in northern Kentucky. 
Harper targeted the Louisville area since he had previously been a resi- 
dent of Jefferson County for a long time; Bullitt County is just on the edge 
of Jefferson County. Harper's candidacy was helped by the support of top 
Republican officials in Jefferson County. Although he tried to get some 
minority votes, he was never able to crack the west end vote in Jefferson 
County. And he claimed the support of most of the state's Republican 
representatives and senators. 
None of the GOP gubernatorial candidates wanted to spend much 
money in the primary because they were saving what little they had largely 
for the general election. Harper reported spending the most of the GOP 
final competitors-$33,265; he lent his campaign $13,000, then converted 
it to a donation to close out the books for his successful primary-election 
effort. His major expenses were for a direct mail campaign and limited 
television advertising. In the last two weeks when he was running in a dead 
heat with Johnson and Beasley, he began targeting mailings to Republican 
voters and used a few television advertisements. Free media attention was 
good in the Lexington area, but the Louisville media paid little or no 
attention to the Republican gubernatorial primary race, probably because 
of the assumption that the Republican candidate was doomed. 
Just nine days before the May primary, the three top Republican 
candidates were locked in tie for the lead, with the majority of voters 
undecided and little interest generated by the race. Although some Re- 
publican county officials saw Harper as the likely nominee, they all agreed 
that none of the candidates had a stranglehold on the nomination and that 
any one of them could emerge the winner. Harper and Johnson early on 
were considered the major candidates, but Beasley made surprising ad- 
vances, especially with the assistance of a statewide television campaign. 
All the GOP candidates' races began late and were hampered by a shortage 
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of money and interest. On May 26, 1987, John Harper emerged the 
Republican gubernatorial nominee after a very lackluster contest. 
The 1987 Gubernatorial General Election 
On November 3,1987, Democrat Wallace Wilkinson trounced Republican 
John Harper, winning the governorship by a record margin of 65 to 35 
percent. The  previous record was set by former governor Julian Carroll, 
who got 62.8 percent in 1975. About 40 percent of the state's 1.9 million 
registered voters-about 777,000 people-went to the polls, one of the 
lowest turnouts in decades. Voter turnout was lower than the 1,041,649 
votes cast in the 1983 governor's race and the 958,158 cast in 1979. In fact, it 
was the lowest percentage of the voting-age population cast for a governor's 
race in this century. Twice as many voters stayed at home as voted for 
Wilkinson. Although Wilkinson carried 115 of the state's 120 counties, 
compared with the 90 former governor Martha Layne Collins won in 1983, 
he lost in Fayette County, where he lives. Wilkinson blamed his poor 
showing there on "negative press." 
Wilkinson's support was strongest in rural areas, where he received 69 
percent of the vote, compared to 59 percent in urban areas across the state. 
Wilkinson did well in western Kentucky and in the traditionally Republi- 
can Fifth Congressional District, his boyhood home. His largest margin of 
victory was in the First Congressional District of far western Kentucky, 
where he polled about 76 percent of the vote. He carried the Fifth 
Congressional District with 62 percent. In counties with a heavily Demo- 
cratic registration, Wilkinson received about 81 percent of the vote. In 
counties with a heavy Republican registration, he received 59 percent. 
Wilkinson received a record percentage of the vote obviously because 
Harper did not draw the traditional Republican support (H-L, November 
4, 1987, pp. Al, A16). 
In the primary and general election, Wilkinson raised about $6 million 
and spent nearly all of it; in contrast, Harper raised and spent about 
$250,000. For every dollar Harper raised since the primary, Wilkinson had 
raised at least $40. Money alone was not the only difference: Wilkinson 
brought to the campaign enormous energy and an incredible work ethic. 
He was tireless in pressing his antiestablishment themes, particularly in 
the smaller, rural counties. During the primary and general election 
campaigns, he had visited every county seeking out voters, talking to and 
touching them. Wilkinson also developed other themes, notably promot- 
ing a state lottery, a proposal that gave credibility to his pledge to raise no 
taxes while spending the money required to bring economic development, 
jobs and wealth, to town after town across a frustrated state. As election 
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day approached, Wilkinson called on supporters to help him fight one 
more battle against the political establishment in Frankfort. His appeal in 
the Republican Fifth District, his home region, was particularly direct. In 
speeches there he told crowds that their time had come and that "a 5th 
District boy" was going to Frankfort to run the state (H-L, November 4, 
1987, pp. Al, All). 
Above all, Wilkinson had money; and money produced consultants, 
commercials, computers-and the staff to implement decisions and pene- 
trate the public consciousness from one end of the state to the other. There 
was also "the presumption of inevitable success that usually comes with 
winning the Democratic gubernatorial nomination in Kentucky." In con- 
trast, Harper had only his position papers, his own energies, and those of 
the hard-core Republican party. He did not have the funds to compete in 
any way with Wilkinson; and the Republican party did not deliver him an 
organization or any conduit to the voters. Nor did the GOP offer Harper 
any enthusiasm, hope, or concern. Throughout the general election, the 
polls never changed; from beginning to end, Wilkinson dominated the 
race (C-4 October 11, 1987, p. Dl). 
Harper tried to conduct a statewide campaign on the thinnest of 
shoestrings and without any experience in running a modern statewide 
campaign. Lacking Wilkinson's helicopters and campaign buses, Harper 
drove himself from stop to stop in a black Oldsmobile. Because he had no 
alternative, he tried to sell himself to voters at retail, reaching them in 
small groups. But the game is won by making the sale in wholesale lots. 
Harper's campaign management style involved getting the most done 
with the fewest people at the least cost. His shoestring budget dictated a 
much smaller staff than Wilkinson's. Most of his help and advice came 
from friends and interested Republicans in addition to those who joined 
after he won the primary. Like Wilkinson, the Republican nominee 
depended on his staff to organize his campaign, deal with the news media, 
and handle day-to-day tasks that the candidate cannot do while keeping a 
hectic travel schedule. Harper depended mainly on the help of four people 
who made up the core staff in his campaign: Bob Rowland, Jon Ackerson, 
Carolyn Davis, and Helen Kendall. 
After experimenting unsuccessfully with other consultants, the Re- 
publican nominee found among his primary campaign group a good, 
trusting "quasi campaign managern-Bob Rowland-who was employed 
in the minority leadership office of the legislature. Rowland was among 
the first to ask Harper to replace Forgy in the Republican gubernatorial 
primary, and he was involved with Harper's campaign from the beginning. 
Harper and Rowland, who had no statewide campaign experience, worked 
well together; Rowland was sensible, helpful, understood what was hap- 
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pening, and knew how to treat the press. Rowland spent four days a week 
helping to run the Louisville campaign office and three days on the road 
with Harper. T h e  candidate attributes any campaign successes to 
Rowland's efforts. Another key member of Harper's original support base 
was state representative Jon Ackerson from Louisville. Ackerson was a 
volunteer with several roles-general campaign adviser, Jefferson County 
chairman, chair of the statewide group of campaign advisers, and nego- 
tiator for the two televised debate formats. 
Another valuable Harper staffer was Carolyn Davis, the statewide cam- 
paign coordinator. Davis did not get involved in the Harper campaign until the 
primary election victory because of her position as executive director of the 
Jefferson County Republican party. Davis helped coordinate mass mailings, 
scheduling, volunteer activities, and office management in the state head- 
quarters in Louisville. A former chairperson of the Fayette County Republi- 
cans, Helen Kendall was in charge of Harper's central Kentucky headquarters. 
Kendall has been active in Republican party politics at the state level for years 
and in 1984 was the state executive director of the Reagan-Bush campaign (H- 
L, October 11, 1987, pp. El, E3, E8). 
After his primary win, Harper was told by the Republican state chair- 
man that the agenda of the state party was not necessarily the same as 
Harper's. The  message was that the state party had to be there perma- 
nently, while candidates come and go. Harper was informed that he 
needed the expert advice of Washington consultants, and several were 
produced. He was reluctantly given $6,000, voted on by the executive 
committee of the Republican Party of Kentucky (RPK). There would be 
two separate payments-$5,400 at first and another $600 once he pro- 
duced his contributors' list. A condition was placed on the money-it had 
to be used to engage a consultant selected by the RPK, at a rate of$1,000 a 
day. According to Harper the consultant afforded him no assistance and 
spent his time serving the needs of the state party headquarters. Con- 
sequently, after the first month, Harper terminated the arrangement with 
this consultant. 
Harper found that the Republican state party headquarters was often 
more of an obstacle to him than an asset. On the same day that he held a 
major press conference on his economic development plans, for example, 
Harper was upstaged by state party chair Gable who decided to launch a 
personal attack on Wilkinson. The  RPK gave Harper only a partial finan- 
cial contributors' list, which he did not think contained the best prospects. 
(In contrast, Forgy provided him with a complete list.) Harper was also 
upset because during his campaign the state party used his name to raise 
funds for its own needs. Unfortunately, Harper did not discover what was 
happening until his organization began to call these contributors and found 
that they thought they had already contributed to Harper's candidacy. 
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Of course, during the gubernatorial race, Representative Hopkins, 
Senator McConnell, Vice-President Bush, and other Republicans were 
raising money for their electoral pursuits. Congressman Bunning refused 
to assist in Harper's campaign because of Harper's stand against the lottery, 
which Bunning had endorsed in his 1983 campaign for governor. Former 
governor Nunn was the only major leader who worked hard for Harper; 
Nunn toured the Fifth District with Harper and was very insightful. 
Sen. Robert Dole campaigned for Harper a couple of times in Ken- 
tucky, and Harper subsequently supported Dole in his presidential cam- 
paign in the state, which was rather abortive. At the state GOP picnic in 
August 1987, with 400 Republicans in attendance, Harper received sup- 
port from several prominent Republicans, including Dole, Republican 
national chairman Frank Fahrenkopf, former U.S. senator John Sherman 
Cooper, and Louie Nunn. State party chair Robert Gable used the occa- 
sion to assail Democratic nominee Wilkinson's character and integrity. 
Harper was impressed by the effectiveness of many of the local party 
organizations during his general election contest. About two-thirds of the 
county groups were fairly active; Harper's group could contact them, and 
they would get things set up for Harper's campaign visit to their counties. 
Even in some counties that are heavily Democratic, the local Republican 
groups were responsive to Harper's candidacy. Local election headquarters 
were established, voter education and registration drives were conducted, 
in county after county. Harper especially commended the local party 
groups in the lower tier of counties near Tennessee for their strong 
campaign efforts on his behalf. 
Harper found that campaigning in the Fifth, Seventh, and even lower 
Second congressional districts was quite an experience; it was totally 
foreign to what he had been accustomed. In a number of the counties, 
local political leaders asked him, "How much walking-around money have 
you got?" When Harper told them that he did not do that, they told him 
that he could forget their counties. 
Harper's utilization of paid media was in direct contrast to that of 
Wilkinson's. T h e  Republican nominee was able to purchase much less 
television time, and he clearly did not have top professional assistance in 
preparation of his few political commercials. As in the primary, Wilkinson's 
expert consultants produced a plethora of sophisticated, well-targeted 
television and radio spots during the general election contest. Harper paid 
slightly more than $20,000 for television ads that were aired just before the 
election, whereas Wilkinson paid more than $100,000 for ads that were on 
the air by the end of September. Harper's low-budget campaign relied on 
polling and media assistance from the Republican National Committee. 
Although Harper received few endorsements and meager campaign 
funds, the political arm of the Kentucky Education Association (KEA), 
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which represents more than 30,000 teachers statewide, contributed 
$35,000 to his struggling campaign. Harper became the first Republican 
gubernatorial candidate in history to be endorsed by the KEA. David 
Allen, KEA's president and the chairman of KEPAC, said the size of the 
contribution reflected "a sincere commitment" to Harper's candidacy and 
"a definite desire to fully work toward the man's election." KEA was most 
unhappy with Democrat Wilkinson, who, unike Harper, said he felt no 
obligation to finance previous education programs. T h e  1985 education 
package largely favored teachers with higher salaries, bonuses for experi- 
enced teachers, smaller classes, and teacher aides. Wilkinson also angered 
KEPAC members by not meeting with them for an endorsement interview 
(C-4 September 27, 1987, p. Bl). 
Upon receiving the endorsement of the 190,000-member AFL-CIO, 
the state's largest labor organization, Wilkinson claimed that the labor 
group's support was "six times more important" than the KEA's. Harper, a 
longtime friend of labor in the General Assembly, had tried to capture the 
AFL-CIO endorsement for himself. T h e  Democrat nominee had earlier 
received the support of the state's United Mine Workers, United Auto 
Workers, and the Teamsters Union (H-L, October 4, 1987, p. Bl). 
The Debates 
It became obvious to Harper in the last few months that there was a tide 
rolling in Wilkinson's favor that could not be stopped. Harper considered 
the use of television debates to be valuable because debates would put 
both candidates on an equal footing. In August Harper recommended six 
debates throughout the state. In contrast, Wilkinson wanted two de- 
bates-one in eastern Kentucky and one in western Kentucky. Wilkinson 
was reluctant to hold debates because he wanted to attract as little atten- 
tion as possible; this would be the only vehicle by which Harper could get 
an equal arena to play on. It  was finally agreed that there would be two 
debates, one in Owensboro and one in Richmond. 
During the first sit-down debate held in Owensboro on October 4, the 
candidates sparred over the lottery and finances. Harper accused Wilkin- 
son of trying to dupe the public with his claims about a lottery as "the 
panacea to all ills" and the alternative to more taxes. He asserted that the 
lottery is a regressive tax because poor people spend proportionately more 
of their income on lottery tickets. Harper claimed that Wilkinson was 
overestimating the money a lottery would produce. In rebuttal, Wilkinson 
continued to maintain that the lottery was one way to pay for state 
services-that it would bring in $70 million. During the hour-long, often 
confrontational exchange, Harper tried to demonstrate his knowledge of 
state affairs and legislative activities. 
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Wilkinson emphasized the theme that he would not raise taxes, while 
saying that Harper would. The  Democratic nominee said state conformity 
to the new federal tax code, which Harper supports, would amount to a tax 
increase. Harper asserted that he had talked to legislative budget leaders 
and considered conformity one way to tackle the state's expected $450 
million budget shortfall. 
Wilkinson also disagreed with Harper concerning large incentive 
packages to lure new businesses to Kentucky, such as the one given to 
Toyota ($125 million incentive package). Wilkinson claimed that he fa- 
vored instead "county-by-county economic development. " Harper replied 
that the Collins administration ought to be commended for attracting 
Toyota Motor Corporation to Scott County because it meant 2,000 to 3,000 
jobs at the plant and as many as 10,000 others at satellite industries. 
During a question-and-answer period, the candidates attacked each 
other for conducting negative personal campaigns. Wilkinson said that in 
recent weeks Harper had called him "a Nazi," "a little weasel," and 
"sleazy." Harper denied using the first epithet, apologized for the second, 
and reiterated the "sleazy" description; he charged Wilkinson and his 
campaign with slandering his family (H-L, October 5, 1987, pp. Al, A15). 
On October 19 in Richmond, the second televised debate was held. 
Harper gained in a hard-won agreement that the second debate be a stand- 
up one (Harper is a much larger man than Wilkinson). When he found that 
one of the podiums had been placed closer to the cameras and was 
apparently intended for Wilkinson, Harper got to the auditorium first and 
claimed that podim so that the camera angles would increase, rather than 
decrease, the apparent differences in size. 
In the second debate the candidates repeated many of the points they 
had made in the first. Both candidates agreed on the necessity of reforms 
in election practices. They clashed over Wilkinson's release of income tax 
records. T h e  high point, or low point, of the debate occurred when Harper 
refused to retract his assertion that Wilkinson was a "wild card" who would 
"pluck the state clean like a chicken." 
The Development of Issues 
During the general election campaign, the Republican nominee released 
platforms dealing with education, transportation, tourism, and economic 
development; periodic press conferences gained his program some atten- 
tion in the free media. T h e  Harper and Wilkinson campaigns tackled the 
same themes but took different approaches to them. Most notable was 
Wilkinson's proposal for a constitutional amendment that would allow the 
establishment of a state lottery. Wilkinson presented the lottery as an 
alternative to taxes for raising $70 million a year for education and senior 
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citizens. Harper called it "Wallace in Wonderland economics," but he did 
not object to putting a lottery amendment on the November 1988 ballot. 
Harper favored applying the provisions of the new federal income tax code 
to state tax law; it would reduce or eliminate many state income tax 
deductions. In contrast, Wilkinson was adamantly opposed to adopting the 
federal code. 
Harper and Wilkinson differed sharply over financing and improving 
Kentucky's impoverished schools. Wilkinson angered education advocates 
and state legislators by declaring that he would not commit himself to 
preserving the education programs enacted in the 1985 and 1986 sessions of 
the General Assembly. In contrast, Harper promised to keep most of these 
programs. Harper refused to rule out a tax increase to help education; 
Wilkinson offered the lottery as an alternative to higher taxes. Wilkinson's 
innovative educational plan included spending $5 million each year on 
fifteen "benchmark schools" across the state where new methods could be 
implemented. Wilkinson also proposed a $70-million-a-year incentive 
fund to reward individual schools for improvement, rather than focusing 
on teacher evaluations and teacher merit pay. Harper described his educa- 
tion priorities as preventing dropouts, continuing reductions in class size, 
attracting and retaining good teachers, and providing free textbooks. Both 
Harper and Wilkinson agreed they would protect higher education from 
cuts when it came time to deal with the state's revenue shortfall (C-4 
October 19, 1987, pp. Al, A15). 
A Question of Money 
Have Republican gubernatorial candidates been losing elections because 
they cannot raise enough money? Or are they unable to raise enough 
money to be competitive because they are widely perceived as having little 
or no chance of winning elections? T h e  answer to both questions might 
appear to be yes, but in reality the answer is more complicated. In 1979 
Democrat John Y. Brown outspent Republican Louie Nunn by a 3 to 2 
margin and won almost 60 percent of the vote. In 1983 Martha Layne 
Collins outspent Jim Bunning by only about $30,000 and won about 55 
percent of the vote. In 1987 Wallace Wilkinson outspent John Harper by a 
margin of over 10 to 1 and won 65 percent of the vote. 
It can be argued that a Republican gubernatorial candidate actually 
needs to outspend a Democrat in order to overcome other factors, includ- 
ing the Democratic advantage in registration and the assistance often 
provided to Democratic candidates by the incumbent administration. A 
better argument is that a comparison of spending ought to take into 
account the primary election. Most of the money spent by candidates in 
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both primaries and general elections-whether it is on various forms of 
advertising, the cost of personal campaigning, or the expenses of staff and 
consultants-has the effect, directly or indirectly, of creating identifica- 
tion and an image for the candidates. To put it more simply, a candidate 
must spend money to become well known. 
When the primary campaign is over, the Democratic nominee is 
usually much better known than the Republican because he or she has 
spent much more money. T h e  Democrat is more successful in raising large 
amounts of money and must do so in order to win the primary. T h e  
Republican nominee has frequently faced only limited primary opposi- 
tion, has had fewer sources of campaign funds, and has often hoarded 
these funds for the fall campaign. If we combine primary and general 
election spending for the Democratic and Republican gubernatorial nomi- 
nees, we find that in both 1979 and 1983 the Democratic candidate 
outspent the Republican by roughly a 7 to 3 margin; and in 1987 Wilkinson 
outspent Harper by about 25 to 1. 
In both the 1979 and 1983 races, the Republican gubernatorial candi- 
dates were perceived as underdogs but not hopeless underdogs. Nunn was 
a former governor, while Brown's political strength was hard to predict. 
Bunning was taken seriously, despite his late start, because the Demo- 
cratic race had been very close and there were doubts about the electorate's 
willingness to vote for a woman. For these reasons the Republican candi- 
dates were able to raise enough funds to buy a substantial amount of 
advertising and appear competitive. If the Republican candidate in either 
of these races had been able to spend another half million dollars, the race 
might have been closer, although it seems likely that both Brown and 
Collins would have been able to match that increase if necessary. 
T h e  case of John Harper's campaign in 1987 is very different. Harper 
entered the race in January after Larry Forgy's unexpected withdrawal, 
and he had to defeat three other candidates to reach the November 
election. It is obvious that Republican fund-raisers and contributors did 
not believe that Harper had a serious chance of winning, and thus they did 
not raise and contribute enough money to enable Harper to run a competi- 
tive campaign. He had only a quarter of a million dollars to spend for his 
campaign, far less than would be necessary to run even a modest television 
advertising campaign. There is no way of telling whether the result would 
have been much closer if Harper had had a million dollars at his disposal. 
He  was relatively unknown, with a minimum of political experience, and 
without personal magnetism; thus, it was unlikely that he could have 
beaten Wilkinson or even come very close if the financial playing field had 
been level. But it is certain that Harper had no realistic chance in part 
because he lacked the funds needed to buy enough advertising to over- 
come his obscurity and to present himself to the voters of Kentucky. 
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How difficult is it for Republicans to raise the sums of money neces- 
sary for statewide campaigns? Republicans who have played leading roles 
in statewide races give contradictory answers. Some Republicans claim 
that their party faces an especially heavy burden in raising funds, par- 
ticularly for a governor's race, because they are in the minority. They argue 
that many business and professional people who can afford to make 
substantial contributions and who are sympathetic to the Republicans do 
not give because they fear retaliation from a Democratic administration in 
Frankfort. They would be unable to do business with the state, or their 
businesses would suffer from unusually strict regulation. 
Robert Gable, the Republican party chairman, has publicly asserted 
that the laws on public disclosure of the names of campaign contributors 
(giving over $300) damage the competitive political system. These laws 
"in effect, are steps toward totalitarianism in that they give a powerful 
chief executive a list of enemies, or at least his opponents. . . . If you fear 
that the present governor or the likely governor may be vindictive, you 
may fear to give money to his opponent" (H-L, March 8,1987). He  argues 
that a large number of potential donors work in businesses or professions 
that are affected by state government. He asserts, for example, that most 
lawyers work in law firms where at least one lawyer has a personal service 
contract or represents a client whose firm is doing business with or is 
regulated by the state. Coal operators may be hurt economically if it takes 
an unreasonably long time to get a permit from the state. 
Republican fund-raisers have found that some potential donors are 
willing to make large, anonymous (and thus illegal) contributions in cash 
but only small contributions in checks. If this is a widespread practice (and 
it is impossible to confirm), it would support the argument that many 
persons are intimiated by the possibility of retaliation from a Republican 
administration. 
When Larry Forgy suddenly dropped out of the 1987 race for governor, 
he gave as one of his reasons the difficulty he would face in trying to raise 
the $3 to $4 million necessary for a race, after having spent a year raising 
less than $1 million. Some observers thought that Forgy was discouraged 
by the demands of various kinds made on him by those whose contribu- 
tions he was soliciting. Gable has said that many persons wanted to know 
how they could contribute to the Forgy campaign without its being re- 
ported, despite the fact that Forgy was perceived as a plausible winner and 
Martha Layne Collins was not perceived as being a vindictive governor (H- 
L, June 14, 1987, p. 81). 
There are other experienced Republicans who deny that fund-raising 
is a fundamental obstacle to Republican success in a statewide race. One 
leader said, "There is plenty of money out there if you know how to raise 
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it." He  argued that large sums could be raised in relatively small amounts 
by using mass-mailing techniques. One Republican leader who is some- 
times mentioned as a possible gubernatorial candidate said that he would 
have no difficulty in raising $4 or $5 million if he got an early start. In his 
view, "A good Republican candidate who is perceived by potential donors 
as good can raise all the money that is needed for a race." He  also made the 
interesting argument that fund-raising by Republican congressmen does 
not really compete with gubernatorial fund-raising because potential con- 
tributors to the latter effort have different motivations. 
In our discussion of campaign financing (chapter 8), we demonstrated 
that a large proportion of funding for a gubernatorial race comes from 
business and professional persons who hope to benefit directly from 
contributing to the wnning candidate. Such persons have no particular 
interest in the ideology, the issue positions, or the party affiliation of the 
candidates; but they do not want to waste money on a loser. Obviously, 
there are loyal Republican donors who want to see a Republican elected 
governor, but much of the funding for a gubernatorial campaign must 
come from persons who are betting that they have chosen a winner. 
This line of argument leads us inescapably to the conclusion that 
Republican gubernatorial candidates will be able to raise adequate funds 
for a gubernatorial race only when and if they are widely perceived to be 
potential winners. It is equally obvious that one of the best ways a 
candidate can demonstrate that potential is to prove that he or she can raise 
funds. One of the great ironies of  arty ~ o r ~ ~ ' s  abortive campaign was that 
he was widely perceived as a potential winner, but he concluded that he 
was unable or unwilling to raise enough funds to be a credible candidate. 
Is There a Strategy for Republican Success? 
Most party leaders have a prescription for achieving Republican success in 
state elections. Their suggestions differ, and some seem to be incompati- 
ble. Some we would judge to be more promising and realistic than others. 
One veteran participant-observer in Republican politics, when asked 
"How do you turn things around?" replied simply, "Candidates turn things 
around." You need a candidate with enough "fire in the belly" to run, to 
recruit supporters, and to raise money. It is argued that this is the way the 
party has won congressional and senatorial elections, by finding a strong 
candidate who was willing to make the commitment to a vigorous cam- 
paign. 
What should be the role of the party in recruiting good candidates? A 
frequent answer to the question is that the party should be developing and 
encouraging promising candidates early in their careers. Someone sug- 
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gested that the Republican party should develop an inventory of potential 
candidates, for races at all levels in all of the counties, and then should 
provide more encouragement and assistance to them. T h e  Republican 
party in recent years has lacked the resources and often the determination 
to carry out such efforts. But a Republican party operating under a 
Republican governor should have not only more resources but more 
incentive. 
Some Republicans emphasize that an effective party organization 
should be able to recruit and develop strong candidates; others insist that 
the first step must be the emergence of a strong candidate, who can build 
his or her own campaign, raise enough money, get elected, and then help 
to build a strong party organization. This debate often has all the charac- 
teristics of a chicken-and-egg controversy. 
But the issue is a serious and a difficult one. A Republican candidate 
capable of being elected governor might come from one of two sources. A 
wealthy, charismatic businessman (a Republican John Y. Brown) might 
appear on the scene and be able to win election with little help from the 
party organization. The  alternative would be a candidate who had gained 
experience, visibility, and credibility as an officeholder at other levels (as 
Mitch McConnell and Larry Hopkins did). The better organized the state 
party is, the more help it can give to the second kind of candidate. 
Moreover, if the state party gave greater priority to the nurturing of good 
candidates at the lower levels, there would be a greater supply of potential 
gubernatorial candidates. Either approach is a plausible way to win the 
governorship, and neither one has been successful in recent years. 
There is evidence from other states that the key to rebuilding a 
minority party is often one or two strong, successful candidates. In the 
1950s Edmund Muskie revitalized the Democratic party in Maine, and 
Hubert Humphrey did the same in Minnesota. More recently, in southern 
states Jesse Helms boosted (but also divided) the North Carolina Republi- 
can party; William Brock, Howard Baker and Lamar Alexander breathed 
life into the Tennessee Republicans; and Strom Thurmond (by con- 
version) personified the new Republican party in South Carolina. 
The  strongest, most durable Republican officeholder in Kentucky in 
modern times was John Sherman Cooper, who was senator (with some 
interruptions) from 1947 to 1972. But Cooper was a highly independent 
senator and an unorthodox Republican, qualities that enabled him to win 
Democratic and independent voters. But Cooper was never governor, 
though he often toyed with the idea of running. 
To make the Republican party truly competitive in Kentucky, the 
party must win the governorship. The  impact of U.S. senators and repre- 
sentatives is primarily felt in Washington. A skillful governor who is 
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committed to party building has greater opportunities than any other 
elected official. He or she can use patronage to strengthen the organiza- 
tion, can raise large sums of money for campaigns, and can recruit both 
talented administrators and candidates for other offices. Moreover, that 
person has the opportunity to build a public record of accomplishment as 
governor that will make it easier to elect Republicans to high office in the 
future. 
To have the maximum impact, the Republicans must control the 
governorship for at least two successive terms. That  much time is needed 
to rebuild the party, to have a long-term impact on public policy, and to 
impress the voters with what Republicans can accomplish in the gover- 
norship. As long as the constitution bars gubernatorial succession, no 
Republican governor-no matter how charismatic and skillful-can hold 
that office for more than four years. Consequently, the party needs two 
strong gubernatorial candidates who can be elected in succession. Or else 
it needs one successful candidate who can use the governor's office to build 
a stronger party and also to develop a number of capable candidates who 
can run competitively for governor and for other offices. 
There are also those who believe that the Republican party needs to 
develop a stronger, more identifiable position on issues, a position that is 
distinctly different from that of the state Democratic party. Those advocat- 
ing this position usually mean that the Republican party should be more 
conservative, and they usually believe that a strongly conservative stance 
will appeal to Kentucky voters. That issue has not been directly tested in a 
recent gubernatorial race. 
Some of those who urge that the party take a stronger conservative 
stand want it to focus attention on moral issues, or family issues. This is 
obviously the position of the new activists in the party who supported Pat 
Robertson in the 1988 campaign. It  is a strategy designed to attract 
Democratic and independent voters in the Bible Belt, the geographic base 
of which is usually defined as the western part of the state. 
An alternative strategy would be to seek new supporters primarily in 
the larger urban centers of the state, such as Louisville, Lexington, and 
northern Kentucky. These are areas that have elected Republican con- 
gressmen and often voted Republican in statewide and presidential races. 
These voters are more independent and more diversified. Some may be 
attracted by emphasis on moral issues, and others give greater priority to a 
conservative position on economic issues; still others are moderate voters, 
less likely to be attracted by a conservative ideology than by such issues as 
improvements in education and reforms in Frankfort. 
A third approach might be called an inclusive strategy: not overlooking 
any voter, but trying to arouse the interest and deal with the concerns of 
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voters in all parts of the state. This is sometimes described as the Larry 
Hopkins model. By definition, such an approach must be flexible and 
personal rather than heavily ideological. It is the kind of strategy appropri- 
ate for a televised campaign built around an appealing candidate. 
Whose responsibility is it to develop a strategy with regard to issues? 
Some have argued that the state party chairman should speak out more 
forcefully and frequently on issues, but the chairman often lacks the 
visibility and credibility on issues to attract much attention. Republicans 
in the legislature have greater opportunities to develop a platform for the 
party and to speak out against the failures of Democratic administrations. 
T h e  Republican legislative party seldom plays that role with enough vigor 
or unity to gain public interest. Moreover, the legislature is out of session 
for long periods of time. There is a serious question about whether any 
single leader can speak authoritatively for the party on policy questions, 
without fear of contradiction by other Republicans. 
In the last analysis, of course, it is the gubernatorial candidate who 
defines the issues for the party, with little regard for the party's legislative 
record or the stands of previous standard-bearers. John Harper, for exam- 
ple, in opposing Wallace Wilkinson's lottery proposal, was directly contra- 
dicting the position that the last Republican gubernatorial candidate, Jim 
Bunning, had taken. It  is difficult for the party and its candidates to define 
issues clearly because the two parties do not stand for well-recognized 
differences on major issues. To the extent that political leaders disagree on 
important issues, the differences are more likely to be fought out in the 
Democratic primary than in the general election. 
PATTERNS OF 
VOTER TURNOUT 
The conventional wisdom is that the turnout of voters in Kentucky elec- 
tions is relatively low, and that impression is accurate. In the presidential 
elections from 1972 through 1988, Kentucky ranked between thirty-fourth 
and fortieth in voter turnout. In gubernatorial elections from 1960 through 
1986, Kentucky ranked thirty-second among the forty-two states electing 
governors in nonpresidential election years. On the other hand, in guber- 
natorial primaries from 1951 through 1982 (when both primaries were 
contested), Kentucky ranked nineteenth out of thirty-six nonsouthern 
states. 
It is important to understand why, and in what types of elections, 
voting turnout is low. Under what types of conditions do Kentuckians go to 
the polls? What would be required to raise the level of turnout in primary 
and general elections? 
Tables 29 and 30 on general and primary elections from 1978 through 
1988 provide a starting point for our analysis, showing turnout as a propor- 
tion of the registered vote and, for general elections, zs a proportion of the 
Table 29. Voting Turnout in Kentucky General Elections, 1978-88 
- - -  - -- 
Voting-age Number Number Voters as percentage of 
Year population registered voting Popu!ation Registered 
1978 2,528,000 1,666,104 557,608 22.1 33.5 
1979 2,562,000 1,728,631 958,158 37.4 55.4 
1980 2,596,000 1,821,417 1,291,929 49.8 70.9 
1981 2,624,000 1,875,231 1,036,014 39.5 55.2 
1982 2,652,000 1,825,954 740,504 27.9 40.5 
1983 2,675,000 1,852,353 1,041,649 38.9 56.2 
1984 2,697,000 2,017,756 1,379,735 51.2 68.3 
1985 2,711,000 '2,102,765 924,857 34.1 43.9 
1986 2,724,000 1,998,899 781,995 28.7 39.1 
1987 2,735,000 1,952,202 821,062 30.0 42.0 
1988 2,746,000 2,026,307 1,322,517 48.2 65.3 
Source: Calculated from data compiled by the State Board of Elections. 
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Table 30. Voting Turnout in Kentucky Primary Elections, 1978-88 
Democratic Primary Republican Primary 
Number Number Number Number 
Year registered voting Percentage registered voting Percentage 
1978 1,163,800 126,519 10.8 489,002 39,532 8.0 
1979 1,161,621 573,925 49.4 473,421 141,910 29.9 
1980 1,199,836 250,922 20.9 489,990 105,060 21.4 
1981 1,269,969 650,156 51.1 515,518 200,616 38.9 
1982 1,225,579 193,722 15.8 517,981 65,612 12.6 
1983 1,263,869 659,735 52.1 513,768 118,043 22.9 
1984 1,304,758 278,119 21.3 524,665 63,027 12.0 
1985 1,418,241 735,478 51.8 569,917 211,406 35.4 
1986 1,349,382 251,024 18.6 570,767 70,159 12.2 
1987 1,319,078 639,516 48.4 550,978 118,546 21.5 
1988 (P) 1,302,066 320,391 24.6 549,631 121,085 22.0 
Source: Calculated from data compiled by the State Board of Elections. 
Note: (P) = presidential primary. 
voting-age population. Voting as a percentage of the population is the best 
way of measuring turnout in general elections; but to measure separately 
turnout in Democratic and Republican primaries, it is necessary to meas- 
ure voting as a percentage of registration. 
T h e  proportion of persons who are registered tends to increase for 
those elections that are perceived as more important by the voters, such as 
presidential races. Between 1978 and 1988 for each type of election year 
(such as presidential and gubernatorial), there has been an increase of a 
few percentage points in the proportion of the voting-age population that 
is registered. 
Tables 29 and 30 report the total number of persons going to the polls 
each year, not simply the total voting for the highest statewide race. 
Turnout has been heaviest in the presidential races (about one-half of the 
voting-age population). Turnout was nearly 40 percent in the gubernatorial 
elections of 1979 and 1983 but dropped to 30 percent in 1987 when the race 
was perceived to be lopsided. It  is surprising to find that turnout was 
almost 40 percent in 1981 when only local and legislative races were on the 
ballot, though this figure dropped to 34 percent in 1985, perhaps because 
legislative races were moved to even-numbered years in 1984. Turnout has 
been lowest (less than 30 percent) in congressional election years, because 
most U.S. House and Senate and (since 1986) state legislative races are not 
very competitive. 
T h e  pattern is different in primary elections (table 30). In the Demo- 
cratic party turnout has been close to 50 percent of registration in years 
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with gubernatorial or local elections. It has been barely 20 percent in even- 
numbered years, either presidential or congressional, because there are 
very few seriously contested U.S. Senate or House primary races. Turnout 
was very low in the 1980 presidential primary because the race had been 
decided by late May; in 1984 Kentucky did not have a presidential 
primary; but in 1988 the turnout in the presidential primary rose to nearly 
one-fourth of registered Democrats. 
In the Republican primary turnout has been highest (from 35 to 39 
percent of registration) in local primaries, where there is frequently close 
competition. Gubernatorial primaries have been less competitive, and 
turnout has dropped from 30 percent in 1979 to less than 23 percent in 1983 
and 1987, perhaps in part because state legislative races are no longer held 
in odd-numbered years. Turnout in presidential and congressional elec- 
tion years has been very low (13 percent or less) except in the two years 
with presidential primaries (1980 and 1988). 
There is a clear explanation for the patterns of turnout in both general 
and primary elections. Voters are more likely to participate in elections 
that are competitive and that they perceive to be important. Presidential 
elections are obviously important, well publicized, and sometimes close in 
Kentucky. By contrast, congressional elections are usually one-sided, and 
the only close senatorial election held during this period-the McConnell- 
Huddleston race-occurred in 1984, a presidential year. 
Kentucky Democratic primaries are highly competitive in years with 
gubernatorial elections and also in years with local races-at least in the 
- 
counties with heavy Democratic registration; and turnout is relatively high 
in both election cycles. Republican primary competition is high in local 
elections in heavily Republican counties, but it is low in gubernatorial 
races; thus, Republican turnout is much higher in local primaries. Neither 
party has close congressional primaries very often, and so turnout is light. 
T h e  close relationship between turnout and competition in Kentucky 
is not a recent phenomenon, as we can demonstrate by adopting a histor- 
ical perspective. From 1896 through 1932 the percentage of eligible voters 
who voted in presidential elections was higher in Kentucky than in the 
nation as a whole. Since 1936 the proportion of voters in Kentucky has 
been lower than the national average in presidential elections (table 31). 
T h e  1896 election inaugurated a period of regionalism in American pol- 
itics, with southern states continuing to be dominated by the Democratic 
- 
party and most northern states dominated by Republicans. T h e  drop in 
state-level competition led to a decline in levels of national voting turnout 
that lasted until the 1928 and 1932 elections and the New Deal realign- 
ment. 
In Kentucky, on the other hand, the 1896 election marked the begin- 
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Table 31. Kentucky and U.S. Voters in Presidential Elections as Percentage of 
Persons Eligible to Vote, 1892-1988 
Kentucky 
Year Kentucky U.S. Lead or Lag 
ning of a period of intense two-party competition, in both national and 
state elections. A substantial number of conservative Democrats, upset by 
the "radical" policies of William Jennings Bryan, joined the Republican 
ranks, and many of them never returned. Although the Democrats carried 
Kentucky in most presidential elections from 1896 through 1928, the 
margin was always small and often less than a majority. Moreover, the 
Republican party won five of nine Kentucky gubernatorial elections from 
1895 through 1927 (including the disputed election of 1899). Because the 
two parties were competitive in Kentucky, the level of turnout remained 
remarkably high. T h e  New Deal realignment, which undermined region- 
alism and enhanced two-party competition at the national level, led to the 
reestablishment of Democratic dominance in Kentucky. As turnout levels 
rose nationwide, they fell in Kentucky, never to recover. 
Table 32. Voting Frequency of Registered Voters in General Elections and 
Primaries (in Percentages) 
Frequency All Elections Primary Elections General Elections 
of Vote All voters Dem. Rep. Dem. Rep. All 
0 0.0 15.4 27.8 3.4 2.1 3.0 
1 9.2 28.5 33.6 13.2 13.0 13.2 
2 10.5 27.3 19.3 16.2 16.3 16.3 
3 12.2 15.7 11.5 20.4 21.9 20.9 
4 13.6 8.9 5.5 22.3 22.3 22.3 
5 14.0 4.2 2.3 24.5 24.4 24.4 
6 13.1 
7 10.8 
8 8.0 
9 5.5 
10 3.0 
Source: Sigelman and Jewell, 1986. 
Individual Patterns of Voting 
We can gain more insights into voting turnout in Kentucky by looking at 
patterns of individual turnout from two sources. T h e  first is an examina- 
tion of individual records of voting and nonvoting maintained on computer 
by the State Board of Elections. We examined these records of voting in 
the five primaries and five general elections from 1978 through 1982. The  
second source of data is a telephone survey of a sample of registered voters 
in the state conducted in mid-1983. 
We were interested in finding out what proportion of voters went to 
the polls consistently over a five-year period and what proportion voted 
only occasionally or rarely. To make this estimate, we included in our 
calculations only those persons who were registered to vote over the five- 
year period in this study (Sigelman and Jewell, 1986). We used a 10 percent 
sample of registered voters (totaling over 100,000). 
These data on individual voting (table 32) show that a relatively small 
proportion of registered voters cast votes consistently over the five-year 
period. Just over one-fourth voted in at least seven of ten elections; at the 
other extreme one-fifth voted only once or twice. 
Five of the ten elections included in this survey are primary elections; 
and in some counties during some years, we know there is little or no 
competition in one or the other party primary. When there is no state or 
local contest in a party primary, no election is held in the county, and 
obviously a citizen of that county cannot gain a perfect voting record. In 
other counties the only contests may be very lopsided. We can gain a more 
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realistic picture of turnout by looking separately at individual voting in 
general and primary elections. 
We find that the proportion of persons voting in most general elections 
is much higher than those voting in most primaries; almost one-half of the 
registered voters voted in four or five of the general elections, but only 13 
percent of Democrats and 8 percent of Republicans voted in four or five 
primaries. There was greater Democratic participation in primaries but 
virtually no partisan differences in general elections. 
We know from aggregate data (table 30) that in most elections a higher 
proportion of registered Democrats than of Republicans votes in pri- 
maries; thus, it is not surprising to find that individual Democratic voters 
are more likely than Republicans to participate in primaries. It is notewor- 
thy that more than one-fourth of the Republicans and only 15 percent of 
the Democrats participated in no primaries. This results largely from the 
higher level of competition in statewide Democratic primaries. The reason 
the contrasts are not larger is that many of those who register as Republi- 
cans live in counties where local primaries are highly competitive. 
Critics of Kentucky politics frequently ask, "Why is voting turnout so 
low?" One answer, as we have seen, is the low level of competition often 
found in primaries and general elections. This problem is compounded by 
the frequency of elections, which results in elections being scattered 
thinly over the four-year cycle. 
What other factors affect voting turnout in the state? Is turnout low, for 
example, because education levels are low in Kentucky? Are certain voters 
more likely to stay home on election day: those who are poorly educated, 
those who have a lower income, or younger voters? Is turnout affected by 
voters' attitudes toward politics or parties? These are all variables that have 
proved to be important in other states (Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980; 
Crotty, 1977). Finally, is it possible that state election laws and procedures 
make registration and voting difficult (as indicated by Wolfinger and 
Rosenstone, 1980)? 
Data on individual patterns of voting and nonvoting in Kentucky come 
from two statewide surveys conducted in mid-1983. One was a survey of 
1,468 persons who were registered voters, stratified (based on the voter 
registration files) to include voters with various levels of voting participa- 
tion. The  second survey included 632 respondents who were not regis- 
tered to vote. This made it possible, by merging the two samples, to 
measure the characteristics and attitudes of individuals, ranging from 
those who were not even registered to those who voted most frequently. A 
probit analysis was used to measure the relative effect of a number of 
variables. 
In this survey the best predictor of whether, and how frequently, a 
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Kentuckian would vote was age. For example, if we compare typical 
Kentuckians (those who were average in all other respects), less than half 
of those twenty-six years old were registered and voted at least once in the 
five years, while only one-fifth of average citizens who were sixty years old 
failed to vote at all in five years. It may often be true that younger persons 
have other characteristics that make them less likely to vote; for example, 
they may be more mobile geographically and have less interest in politics. 
But we have found that age has a major effect on registering and voting 
even when all of these other variables are controlled (Sigelman, Roeder, 
Jewell, and Baer, 1985). 
Several other variables had a considerable effect on voting. Those 
voting more frequently were likely to be better educated, to have lived in 
the state and the county for a longer period, and to be married. Not 
surprisingly, the frequent voters were more likely to have a strong sense of 
civic duty and an interest in politics. There was also some tendency for 
males and persons who strongly identified with a party to vote more often. 
Assessing the  Obstacles to Registration and Voting 
Some research on voting and nonvoting in the fifty states has suggested 
that registration and voting are higher in those states where election laws 
and procedures make it easier for citizens to register as voters and to cast 
their votes. Kentuckians must register thirty days before a primary or 
general election, unlike a few states where election day registration is 
permitted. One way of determining whether legal rules contribute to the 
low turnout of voters in Kentucky is to ask why individuals do not register 
and often do not vote. 
Reasons for Not Registeerig 
In the 1983 survey nonregistered respondents were asked why they have 
never registered or why they failed to register after being dropped from the 
rolls or after moving to Kentucky. Two-thirds (68 percent) of the respond- 
ents said that they were not interested in politics; 11 percent said they were 
too busy or did not have enough time; 9 percent claimed not to have 
enough information about politics or expressed distrust of the political 
system or politicians; 4 percent seemed to think that they were unqualified 
to be registered; and 4 percent mentioned reasons of age, health, or the 
need to travel frequently. 
If these answers accurately reflect the attitudes of nonregistrants, it is 
difficult to believe that more flexible registration rules would produce 
much more registration. Almost 90 percent of the nonregistrants appear to 
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be uninterested, uninformed, distrustful, or simply too busy to bother 
with registering. 
Nonregistrants were also asked a series of specific questions about the 
requirements for registration and, where appropriate, were asked whether 
these requirements accounted for their failure to register. The  factors that 
were mentioned most frequently as reasons for not registering were the use 
of registration rolls to draw jury panels, the 6:00 P.M. closing time for 
voting, the requirement of party registration to vote in a primary, and 
uncertainty about whether one was entitled to take time off from work to vote. 
Although these were the most frequently mentioned reasons, none were 
mentioned by more than 10 percent of the nonregistrants, and none had been 
volunteered by more than a handful of nonregistrants in answering our earlier 
open-ended questions about their reasons for not registering. 
The  survey also found, however, that half of the nonregistrants had 
been registered at some time in the past, either in Kentucky or in some 
other state. When they were questioned about how they had lost their 
voting registration, about half said they had been purged from the rolls for 
nonvoting, while the other half said that they had moved. A substantial 
- 
proportion of those who had moved claimed to have voted fairly often 
when they were registered. 
Obviously, people who have much interest in political affairs and 
elections can renew their registration relatively easily after moving to 
another county or state. Those with a marginal interest in politics, how- 
ever, are likely to forget about the need for reregistering. Recent research 
on voting and nonvoting has shown that persons who have recently moved 
are significantly less likely to vote; and a major reason for this is the 
necessity of changing registration (Squire, Wolfinger, and Glass, 1987). 
This is apparently one of the less obvious reasons why younger persons 
vote less often. 
Proposals have been made in Congress to deal with this problem by 
requiring post offices to hand out reregistration forms to persons who fill 
out a change-of-address form. If the state of Kentucky were serious about 
encouraging those who move to reregister, it could use a variety of similar 
techniques, such as making registration forms available to those who 
renew driver's and automobile licenses. It is difficult to predict how much 
voting could be increased by making registration easier. But the non- 
registrants who have the greatest potential for voting are probably those 
who used to be registered before they moved; thus, a reform of registration 
procedures aimed at them would probably be productive. 
Reasons for Not Voting 
There are many reasons why people do not vote, including lack of interest 
in politics in general or in the candidates running in a particular election; 
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personal circumstances that make it inconvenient or impossible to vote; 
and lack of electoral competition, particularly in local elections or some 
primaries. Changes in the requirements for voting would presumably have 
little effect on those uninterested in politics or those who live in counties 
with little competition. They might have some effect on persons who have 
some interest in voting but find it difficult or inconvenient to get to the polls. 
In the 1983 survey all registered voters were asked how often they 
voted. Their answers differed markedly from the actual record because of 
the widespread tendency to exaggerate one's level of political activity. In 
fact, slightly over 40 percent claimed that they always voted-a figure at 
considerable variance from reality. All the rest (those who did not claim to 
always vote) were asked, "When you do not get a chance to vote, what is 
the main reason?" Although these explanations for nonvoting are not 
completely reliable, they may provide some clues to the variety of reasons 
for low turnout. 
T h e  wide variety of answers to this open-ended question included the 
following most common groups: 36 percent, by far the largest group, 
expressed a lack of interest in politics or in particular elections or candi- 
dates; 20 percent said they did not get a chance to vote because of their 
job; 14 percent said they were too busy, did not have time, or found it 
inconvenient to vote; 11 percent said they sometimes had been unable to 
vote because of poor health or age; and 8 percent claimed that travel 
prevented them from voting. 
It seems unlikely that those who are uninterested, distrustful, or 
poorly informed would vote if the process were made easier. Those who 
find it inconvenient to vote might vote more frequently if procedural 
changes were made. Those who say they are deterred from voting by work, 
travel, or poor health might be the most likely to take advantage of changes 
in voting procedures. 
One way of evaluating these reasons for not voting is to determine 
which ones are expressed most often by those persons who actually vote 
with some frequency or who show some interest in politics. It is obvious 
from table 33 that persons who say that health, age, or travel sometimes 
prevents them from voting are more frequent voters and are more inter- 
ested in politics than are people who cite other reasons for not voting. On 
the other hand, people who say they do not vote because of work conflicts 
are much more similar to those who cite lack of time or interest. 
Three-fifths of those who mentioned health as an excuse for not voting 
knew that persons who are disabled or ill can get an absentee ballot, 
though only 8 percent in this group had ever voted absentee. Among those 
mentioning travel as an excuse for not voting, 84 percent knew they could 
obtain an absentee ballot if they were going to be out of the county, but 
only 14 percent of them had used the absentee ballot. 
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Table 33. Reasons Given for Not Voting by Those Voting Frequently and 
Those Very Interested in Politics 
Proportion voting in Proportion very 
Excuse for at least half of interested in 
not voting elections politics 
Health or age 43 34 
Travel 29 30 
Lack of time 23 18 
Work 22 18 
Lack of interest 22 13 
Other excuses 10 10 
More than two-thirds (69 percent) of the registered voters knew they 
must be registered with a party to vote in its primary. Over half (53 percent) 
preferred to be able to vote in a party's primary without being registered 
with the party, while 35 percent favored party registration for primary 
voting. Less than 2 percent knew the deadline for changing party registra- 
tion. 
Based on these answers, there is some reason to believe that those 
persons who are interested in politics and vote more than occasionally 
would be likely to vote with greater regularity if it were easier for them to 
use the absentee ballot when they were ill or were traveling. 
An Assessment of Nonvoting 
Almost every characteristic of Kentucky politics contributes to depressing 
turnout in elections, The  average level of education in the state is low, and 
less well-educated persons are less likely to vote. There is so seldom 
competition in the Republican primary, except in local races in Republican 
counties, that registered Republicans often have little incentive to vote 
and sometimes literally have no contests in which to vote. In many rural 
counties a single party is so strong that there is often no serious two-party 
competition for local and legislative offices. Several congressmen are so 
well entrenched that they do not face serious challenges in either the 
primary or the general election. For many voters the only opportunity they 
have to make a choice between reasonably competitive candidates is in 
some statewide and presidential races. When there is little or no serious 
competition, it is not surprising that turnout is low. 
The  state has established a schedule of annual elections, which in- 
creases the burden on the voters and reduces the number of offices on the 
ballot at any one time-thus reducing the likelihood that some of the races 
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on the ballot would be competitive. There would be higher turnout in 
congressional elections in nonpresidential years, for example, if the gover- 
nor and other statewide offices were elected at the same time, as is the 
pattern in most states. There would also probably be higher turnout in 
primary elections if the state were to adopt an open primary law. This 
might or might not have the effect of making the Republican party more 
competitive and thus indirectly of increasing turnout. 
Until a few years ago, Kentucky law required that, in order to vote, a 
person must have lived in the state one year, in the county six months, and 
in the precinct for sixty days. A lifelong resident of the state who had voted 
in every election could have temporarily lost the right to vote by moving 
across town a few weeks before the election. T h e  law, which was on the 
books for many years, reflected a lack of understanding by political leaders 
that voting should be a fundamental right of Kentuckians. 
The  current election laws and procedures now make it possible for 
almost everyone who is determined to register and vote to do so, but they 
do not always make it convenient for less-motivated persons to register and 
vote. More persons would register and fewer would be dropped from the 
registration rolls if registration procedures were made easier, though the 
increase in registration would not be accompanied by a proportionate 
increase in voting turnout. More persons would presumably vote if the 
polling places closed an hour or two later than 6:00 P.M. There is evidence 
that voting would increase if it were made easier to vote by absentee ballot. 
A few states have gone so far as to permit anyone to vote absentee without 
having to provide the excuse of illness or travel. 
In some Kentucky counties political leaders have found the absentee 
ballot to be a useful vehicle in their efforts to buy or otherwise control 
votes. Legislators seeking to end election fraud have periodically tight- 
ened the restriction on the use of absentee ballots. When the Courie~ 
Journal in 1987 published a series of articles about vote buying, there was 
some serious discussion about abolishing the absentee ballot. Instead, the 
legislature in 1988 placed additional restrictions on the use of absentee 
ballots. T h e  absentee ballot is important partly because, in its absence, 
citizens who are well informed, interested in politics, and highly moti- 
vated will lose the right to vote. If the General Assembly is seriously 
interested in expanding voter turnout, it must devise some method of 
encouraging use of the absentee ballot by those who are legitimately 
entitled to use it. 
12 
PARTISANSHIP AND 
VOTING PATTERNS 
IN GENERAL ELECTIONS 
Partisan Trends in State Elections 
Kentuckians think of their state as fundamentally Democratic, but this has 
not always been true in the past, and it is not an accurate description of 
modern politics. From the mid-1890s until 1932, Kentucky had one of the 
most competitive two-party systems in the country. T h e  Democratic party 
had a 6 to 3 margin in presidential victories from 1896 to 1928, but its 
electoral margin was usually small and often less than a majority. T h e  
Republican party won five of nine gubernatorial elections from 1895 
through 1927, including the disputed election of 1899. T h e  legislature, 
however, with rare exceptions remained under Democratic control. De- 
spite the closeness of races at the state level, most counties voted consis- 
tently for one party or the other. 
Franklin Roosevelt9s election in 1932 launched two decades of Demo- 
cratic control of Kentucky politics. From 1932 through 1952 the Democrats 
won every race for the presidency in Kentucky, won every gubernatorial 
race except in 1943, and won every senatorial contest except for victories 
by John Sherman Cooper (in 1946 and 1952). On the other hand, the 
Democrats rarely won lopsided victories in these major races. Republican 
candidates won at least 40 percent of the vote in every race for president 
except 1932 and 1936, every race for governor, and every senatorial race 
except for 1936 and 1938. Democrats controlled all of the U.S. House seats 
except the traditional Republican southcentral seat and (after 1946) the 
seat in Louisville. T h e  legislature remained heavily Democratic. 
Since 1956 the pattern of elections in Kentucky has become more 
complicated. Republican candidates have been very competitive in na- 
tional elections and much less successful in state and local races. Republi- 
can presidential candidates have carried the state in every election except 
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Table 34. Partisan Percentages and Votes Cast in Statewide Elections, 1966-88 
Type of Percentage of Vote Votes Cast 
Year race Dem. Rep. Dem. Rep. Other 
1988 Pres. 43.9 55.5 580,368 734,281 
1987 Gov. 64.9 35.1 504,674 273,141 
1986 Sen. 74.4 25.6 503,775 173,330 
1984 Pres. 39.4 60.0 539,539 821,702 
1984 Sen. 49.5 49.9 639,721 644,990 
1983 Gov. 54.6 44.2 561,674 454,650 
1980 Pres. 47.6 49.1 616,417 635,275 31,127 
1980 Sen. 65.1 34.9 720,861 386,029 
1979 Gov. 59.4 40.6 558,088 381,278 
1978 Sen. 61.0 36.9 290,730 175,766 
1976 Pres. 52.8 45.6 615,717 531,852 
1975 Gov. 62.8 37.2 470,159 277,998 
1974 Sen. 53.5 44.1 399,406 328,982 
1972 Pres. 34.8 63.4 371,159 676,446 
1972 Sen. 50.9 47.6 528,550 494,337 
1971 Gov. 50.6 44.3 470,720 412,653 
1968 Pres. 37.7 43.8 397,541 462,411 193,098 
1968 Sen. 47.6 51.4 448,960 484,260 
1967 Gov. 48.0 51.2 425,674 454,123 
1966 Sen. 35.5 64.5 266.079 483.805 
-- 
Note: Only the most important other presidential candidates are listed: John Ander- 
son in 1980 and George Wallace in 1968. 
1964 and 1976. T h e  Republican party won all six senatorial races from 1956 
through 1968, but the Democrats won five of six from 1972 through 1986. 
T h e  Republican party has repeatedly won elections in three of the seven 
U.S. House races. In nine gubernatorial elections from 1955 through 1987, 
however, the Republican party won only once, in 1967. In the legislature 
the Republican minority during the 1980s was smaller than it had been in 
the late 1960s. 
In order to understand this new pattern of competition in Kentucky, 
we must obviously examine more closely how Kentuckians have been 
voting. A starting point is to review the vote cast for Democratic and 
Republican candidates, and the parties' percentage of the total vote, in 
presidential, senatorial, and gubernatorial elections from 1966 through 
1988 (table 34). 
By far the greatest Republican success has been in presidential elec- 
tions; the party won five of six elections from 1968 through 1988, and its 
candidates averaged almost 55 percent of the vote in the last five (exclud- 
286 Political Parties B Phmahes 
ing the three-party contest in 1968). Two candidates, Nixon in 1972 and 
Reagan in 1984, passed the 60 percent mark. In presidential politics it is 
now accurate to say that Kentucky is normally a Republican state. T h e  
Republican party in Kentucky, as in most border and southern states, is 
most successful when the Democratic opponent is a liberal from a northern 
state. 
T h e  Republican party has not achieved comparable success running 
against Democratic candidates from Kentucky in senatorial or guber- 
natorial elections. T h e  Democratic party averaged almost 55 percent of 
the vote in eight senatorial races (1966-86) and almost 57 percent of the 
vote in six gubernatorial elections (1967-87). 
T h e  most striking conclusion to be drawn from an examination of 
senatorial races is that differences in the quality of candidates lead to huge 
variations in Democratic and Republican votes. During this time period 
the Republicans won three senatorial races, but only once did they poll at 
least 52 percent of the vote-in 1966 when John Sherman Cooper won 
almost 65 percent of the vote in his final campaign. Before the period 
covered in table 34, Cooper ran six times for the Senate. From 1946 
through 1956 he ran five races, winning three and losing two, with margins 
from 46 to 53 percent (being forced to run frequently because he was 
elected three times for short terms). Finally, in 1960 he won by a comfort- 
able margin of 59 percent. Without Cooper on the ballot, the Republican 
party has been limited to narrow senatorial victories. T h e  other three 
Republicans elected to the Senate since 1946, Thruston Morton, Marlow 
Cook, and Mitch McConnell, all had margins of less than 53 percent. 
T h e  Democratic party, on the other hand, in recent years has bene- 
fited from strong senatorial candidates and from a shortage of Republican 
opponents with enough experience, political skill, and funding to make a 
serious challenge. In 1974 Democratic governor Wendell Ford defeated 
Republican senator Marlow Cook and won 54 percent of the vote. In the 
next two races, Ford faced increasingly weak candidates and won with 
margins of 65 and 74 percent. (The latter margin was the largest for any 
senatorial or gubernatorial candidate since 1868.) T h e  other successful 
Democratic candidate during this period, Walter Huddleston, narrowly 
defeated Louie Nunn in 1972, won 61 percent against a weak opponent six 
years later, and very narrowly lost to McConnell in 1984. 
During the 1966-86 period, the Democratic percentages in senatorial 
elections have ranged from 35 to 74 percent, and the Republican percen- 
tages have ranged from 26 to 65 percent. Clearly, there are large numbers 
of voters who have been voting "for the man, not the party" in senatorial 
races over a number of years. On occasion, presidential coattails have 
helped Republican senatorial candidates. This was almost surely the case 
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in 1984 when Reagan won with a 60 percent majority and Mitch McCon- 
nell had a margin of 0.4 percentage points. But Reagan's coattails were not 
strong enough to help Republican Mary Louise Foust in 1980, nor were 
Nixon's coattails enough in 1972 to elect Louie Nunn to the Senate. 
There is, of course, no exact way to measure split ticket voting from 
aggregate voting figures (in the absence of survey data on ticket splitting). 
I t  is particularly difficult to make estimates when the turnout is much 
lower in one race than in the other. Nevertheless, it is possible to make 
some estimates that suggest how much ticket splitting has gone on in years 
when presidential and senatorial races have coincided. In 1984 Senator 
Huddleston polled about 100,000 more votes than Walter Mondale, and 
McConnell polled about 177,000 fewer votes than President Reagan; at 
least 100,000 voters probably split their ticket for Huddleston, not quite 
enough to reelect him. In 1972, when Huddleston led the presidential 
ticket by 158,000 and Nunn trailed his ticket by 182,000, at least 160,000 
(nearly one-fourth of those voting for Nixon) probably split their ticket for 
Huddleston. In 1980 Wendell Ford must have benefited from 100,000 
ticket splitters, in addition to more than 170,000 voters for president, who 
cast no senatorial ballot, many of them probably ignoring the weak Repub- 
lican candidate. 
During the period since 1978, the State Board of Elections has com- 
piled data on the turnout of Democratic and Republican registrants at the 
polls. These data show that in most statewide elections the level of turnout 
was approximately the same for voters registered in each of the parties. 
T h e  greater Republican success in national elections and greater Demo- 
cratic success in state elections was not caused by variations in partisan 
turnout. One exception occurred in the 1987 governor's race, when Repub- 
lican turnout was six percentage points less than Democratic turnout. 
T h e  Republican party elected Louie Nunn as governor in 1967 with 
51.2 percent of the vote, but Democratic candidates won the next five 
gubernatorial elections with majorities ranging from 50.6 percent to 64.9 
percent. Nunn's election resulted in part from factional divisions in the 
Democratic party. But since that time the old factions have disappeared, 
and each of the five Democratic nominees from 1971 through 1987 had the 
support of the other Democratic candidates for the nominations. T h e  size 
of Democratic majorities has depended less on party unity than on the 
political skills and experience of the two parties' candidates. 
In 1971 the Republican nominee, Tom Emberton, had the backing of 
the Nunn administration but lost to Lt. Gov. Wendell Ford by more than 
six percentage points. After Ford's election to the Senate in 1974, Julian 
Carroll succeeded to the governorship and thus ran as an incumbent in his 
highly successful race (a margin of over twenty-five percentage points) 
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against Robert Gable. In 1979, after narrowly winning the primary with a 
late surge, John Y. Brown coasted to victory (almost twenty points) over 
former governor Nunn. In 1983 many observers believed that the Demo- 
cratic candidate, Martha Layne Collins, was beatable because her primary 
margin had been tiny and because Kentucky voters had never elected a 
woman governor or senator. But the Republicans had great difficulty 
finding a viable candidate, and state senator Jim Bunning, the eventual 
nominee, was handicapped by a late start and limited financing. Collins 
won by more than ten percentage points. In 1987 Republican prospects 
were severely damaged by Larry Forgy's late withdrawal from the race. 
T h e  nominee, state representative John Harper, had little visibility, poor 
campaign skills, little financing, and almost no support from party leaders. 
It  was no surprise when Wallace Wilkinson defeated John Harper by a 
margin of nearly 2 to 1. 
Regional Voting Patterns in State Elections 
There are traditional regional and county patterns of voting in Kentucky 
that date back at least to the turn of the century and often further back. In 
the last three decades, as we have seen, some of these patterns have been 
changing, at least in presidential and some other national elections. We 
will illustrate these patterns of both continuity and change with maps and 
with statistical summaries, emphasizing differences between national and 
state elections. We will also pay particular attention to voting trends in the 
larger, more urbanized counties, because of their greater numerical impor- 
tance and also because such counties are often more volatile and less 
bound by traditional voting patterns. 
T h e  simplest way to describe regional and county voting patterns is by 
using maps, though these obviously understate the importance of the 
large, urbanized counties. T h e  first map (figure 4) illustrates traditional 
voting patterns in the counties. It  covers all presidential, senatorial, and 
gubernatorial elections from 1920 through 1966. In those counties labeled 
as Democratic or Republican, the median of the average votes for the three 
types of elections was at least 55 percent for that party. All other counties 
are considered marginal. T h e  traditional Democratic counties include 
- 
most of those in western Kentucky, most of the Bluegrass, and much of the 
northern and northeastern counties. T h e  single largest concentration of 
Republican counties is in the southcentral area, roughly equivalent to the 
present Fifth Congressional District. There are, however, some Republi- 
can outposts in the west (particularly the cluster of Ohio, Grayson, Butler, 
and Edmonson) and in the northeast (Lewis, Carter, Johnson, and Mar- 
tin). Some of the marginal counties are along the borders between Repub- 
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lican and Democratic areas, and some are in the northeast and southeast. 
Of the eleven counties with the highest voting totals that we will be 
examining, five were traditionally in the marginal category (Jefferson, 
Fayette, Campbell, Boyd, and Pike) and six were Democratic (Mc- 
Cracken, Daviess, Hardin, Warren, Kenton, and Franklin). 
T h e  second map (figure 5) shows the counties that voted most consis- 
- - 
tently Democratic or Republican in statewide elections during the period 
from 1967 through 1988. A similar technique, based on the median of 
averages for the three types of elections, is used, with 55 percent being the 
criteria for Democratic or Republican counties (see Blanchard, 1982). 
While some counties have shifted from one time period to the next, the 
general geographical patterns of party strength are similar. T h e  Democrats 
remain strong in the west and much of the Bluegrass, northeast, and 
southeast; the only solid bloc of Republican strength is in the southcentral 
counties. Compared to the map covering the 1920-66 period, there are 
more consistently Democratic counties and fewer marginal counties. (The 
method of measuring voting consistency that is employed, however, does 
not fully reflect the recent growth of Republican votes in presidential 
elections.) 
County voting in gubernatorial elections continues to follow the tradi- 
tional patterns that we have seen. Most of the changes in voting patterns 
have occurred in national and particularly in presidential elections. T h e  
next map (figure 6) covers voting patterns in the 1979 and 1983 guber- 
natorial races, which are the closest ones since 1971. It shows the counties 
voting consistently Democratic or Republican in the two races, as well as 
seventeen counties that voted inconsistently. T h e  only large bloc of 
consistently Republican counties is in southcentral Kentucky. Almost all 
of the counties in this region that were inconsistent, including several 
further east, were carried by Nunn but not by Bunning. T h e  only other 
bloc of consistently Republican counties is Butler, Grayson, and Edmon- 
son in the westcentral area. Because he was a resident (and county judge) 
in Barren County, Nunn was also able to carry several counties close to that 
bloc, including his own. T h e  only significant group of counties carried by 
Bunning and not by Nunn were those along the Ohio River, most notably 
Campbell, Kenton, and Boone, which was Bunning's home base. It is 
noteworthy that all of the large urban counties except Campbell and 
Kenton voted Democratic, although the margins were small in 1983 in 
Jefferson and Fayette (and Fayette voted Republican in the 1987 race). 
T h e  county pattern of voting is quite different in presidential races. 
T h e  Republican party is much stronger, having averaged 55 percent in the 
last five presidential races, compared to 43 percent in the last six guber- 
natorial races. That  means that the Republican party has been able to carry 

Voting Patems in General Elections 293 
a much larger proportion of the counties in some presidential races than in 
most gubernatorial races. In examining the maps of county voting, we will 
concentrate on the last four presidential races, 1976 through 1988. T h e  
presidential map for 1976 (figure 7), the only one of these four won by the 
Democrats, is very similar to the map of recent gubernatorial races, with 
most of the Republican strength being concentrated in the southcentral 
counties and the small westcentral bloc. The  major difference is that the 
Republicans also carried the four largest urban counties: Jefferson, 
Fayette, Campbell, and Kenton. 
T h e  strongest Republican showing was in 1984. T h e  map (figure 8) 
shows that Walter Mondale, the Democratic candidate, was able to carry 
only a cluster of twelve eastern and southeastern counties and seven of the 
most heavily Democratic rural counties in the far west. All of the other 
counties that have normally consistently voted Democratic in most guber- 
natorial races voted Republican in the 1984 presidential race. Although 
Michael Dukakis won a larger minority of the vote in 1988 than Mondale 
had done in 1984, the pattern of county voting in 1988 was quite similar. By 
comparison with 1984, in 1988 the Democrats picked up six counties in the 
northeast, a cluster of five counties between Jefferson and Boone counties 
in the north, traditionally Democratic Marion County, and nine more 
counties in the far west. 
T h e  closest presidential race during this period was in 1980, when 
Reagan defeated Carter by a margin of one and one-half percentage 
points. T h e  map for that year (figure 9) therefore illustrates well the 
balance of counties in presidential elections. Generally speaking, those 
counties voting Democratic are more Democratic than the state as a whole, 
and the remainder are as much or more Republican than the whole state. 
That  map shows that, in addition to the traditional southcentral counties, 
the Republicans carried a larger bloc of westcentral counties, a few coun- 
ties in the northeast, and the urban counties of Jefferson, Fayette, Camp- 
bell, and Kenton. 
In recent years most Kentucky counties have cast a larger proportion of 
votes for Republican candidates in presidential races than in gubernatorial 
races. But the difference is particularly strong among certain categories of 
counties. We can see these differences if we rank order every county in an 
election from the largest to the smallest percentage for one party and then 
compare the vote in each county with the state average. For example, in 
the 1983 governor's race, when the statewide Democratic average was 55.3 
percent, the percent in Elliott, the strongest Democratic county, was 
almost 24 percent higher, while it was almost 29 percent less than the state 
average in Clii~ton, the least Democratic county. 
We can compare voting in two of the more closely contested races, for 
Figure 7. Partisan Voting of Counties in the 1976 Presidential Election 
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governor in 1983 and for president in 1980. Most of the counties that were 
above the state Democratic average in one race were also above it in the 
- 
other, but in some counties there were sharp differences. Woodford Coun- 
ty voted 71 percent Democratic for governor in 1983 (sixteen points above 
the state average) and just over 50 percent Democratic in 1980 (only one 
point above). Relative to the state average, Woodford was fifteen percen- 
tage points more Democratic in the governor's race than in the presidential 
race, the largest gap (in that direction) in the state. Nelson County, on the 
other hand, was thirteen percentage points more Democratic in the presi- 
dential race. 
Using this measure, we find forty-four counties that were at least three 
percentage points more Democratic in gubernatorial than in presidential 
races. About three-fourths of these counties are ones that remained loyal to 
the Democratic party in the state election but shifted further toward the 
Republican party than did the state as a whole in the presidential election. 
T h e  largest proportion of these counties is in western and westcentral 
Kentucky, but some are in the Bluegrass and northern area. The  other one- 
fourth are counties that voted Republican in the governor's race but more 
heavily Republican (compared to the whole state) in the presidential race. 
This latter group is concentrated almost entirely in the traditionally south- 
central region. 
There were sixteen counties that were at least three percentage points 
more Democratic in presidential races (or more precisely, lagged at least 
three points behind the statewide shift to the Republicans in such races). 
All of these were counties that voted Democratic in the governor's race. 
They were scattered around the state but included several Democratic 
counties in the southeast, several in the west (in and around Henderson), 
and several central counties like Marion and Nelson that have traditionally 
been loyal to national Democratic candidates in part because of their 
Catholic population. 
Clearly, most of the rural counties have maintained their traditional 
partisan loyalties in gubernatorial races and presumably in other races for 
state office. T h e  pattern of voting for state legislators in rural counties 
follows these same traditional patterns (Jewel1 and Miller, 1988: 22-25). 
These voting patterns have frequently been broken in recent presidential 
elections, in which traditionally Democratic counties have been voting 
Republican. This is particularly the case in the southwestern counties of 
the state, which have the reputation of being particularly conservative and 
where the liberal policies of national Democratic candidates have the least 
appeal. 
T h e  eleven counties with the highest number of voters deserve more 
- 
careful attention for two reasons. In recent years they have cast about 45 
Table 35. Voting in Urban Counties in Gubernatorial and Presidential 
Elections, 1976-88 
Average Democratic Average Democratic Percentage of Vote 
Percentage of Vote Compared to Statewide Average 
County Gubernatorial Presidential Gubernatorial Presidential Difference 
McCracken 
Franklin 
Pike 
Boyd 
Daviess 
Warren 
Jefferson 
Hardin 
Fayette 
Campbell 
Kenton 
percent of the total vote in the state. Moreover, in most of these counties, 
voting patterns are determined less by tradition than is the case in most 
rural counties. Compared to the other counties, most of these counties 
have demonstrated stronger Republican leanings in presidential than in 
gubernatorial races. 
Table 35 shows for each of these counties the average Democratic 
percentage of the two-party vote in three gubernatorial races (1979-87) and 
four presidential races (1976-88). All of the counties except Kenton have 
averaged more than 50 percent Democratic in gubernatorial races, but only 
four counties (McCracken, Franklin, Pike, and Boyd) have averaged more 
Democratic than Republican in presidential races. 
T h e  table also shows the average difference between the Democratic 
vote in each county and the statewide percentage. Most counties remain 
above the state Democratic average in gubernatorial races; the exceptions 
are Kenton, Campbell, Fayette, and Jefferson. But only five counties- 
McCracken, Pike, Franklin, Boyd, and (narrowly) Jefferson-are more 
Democratic in presidential races. 
Seven of the counties (all but Jefferson, Fayette, Campbell, and 
Kenton) have much in common. They are located in traditionally Demo- 
cratic parts of the state. They have continued to deliver comfortable 
Democratic margins in most gubernatorial races. But they differ in presi- 
dential races. Only Pike County has stayed nearly as strongly Democratic 
at both levels of elections. McCracken's strong Democratic commitment 
in state races has eroded but not quite disappeared in presidential con- 
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tests. T h e  other counties have moved to varying degrees toward Republi- 
can presidential support, particularly Warren and Hardin counties. 
Campbell, Kenton, and Fayette counties are the most Republican of 
the major urban counties. T h e  gubernatorial races are usually very com- 
petitive, but Republican presidential candidates can depend on substan- 
tial margins in all three counties. In fact, in the 1984 and 1988 elections, the 
Republican majority was at least two-thirds in Campbell and Kenton. 
These are high-income counties, with large areas that are suburban in 
character and that are obviously attracted to conservative candidates for 
national office. 
Jefferson County is the largest county, producing over one-fifth of the 
total state vote. The  average vote in both gubernatorial and presidential 
elections is close to the statewide vote, though the Jefferson County 
electorate is also volatile. T h e  city of Louisville, with significant labor 
union and black voting strength, is more Democratic; and the suburban 
areas of Jefferson County are more Republican. Jefferson County voters 
were less Democratic than the state average in the 1987 and 1983 guber- 
natorial elections when the Republican candidates may have been per- 
ceived as more urban in their orientations. They were more Democratic in 
1979 (when John Y. Brown ran against Louie Nunn). Jefferson County has 
tended to be slightly less Republican in presidential elections than the rest 
of the state. The  presidential race has been very close in Jefferson County 
in three of the last four elections, excluding only the 1984 Reagan land- 
slide. 
The  major urban counties are increasingly important battlegrounds in 
both state and national elections, not only because they are growing in 
population, but because they are becoming more competitive and more 
volatile. In most of these counties, the local parties have at least a mini- 
mum of organizational strength, and the campaigning is usually more 
vigorous than in many rural counties. 
Urban voters tend to cast their ballots more independently than rural 
voters, but this is not consistently true. In the seven presidential and 
gubernatorial elections from 1976 to 1988, there was a gap of twenty-five 
percentage points from the lowest to the highest Democratic vote in 
statewide totals. In seven of the urban counties, that gap was larger, 
ranging from thirty-two to thirty-eight percentage points. In Jefferson and 
Fayette, however, the gap was the same as the state average (twenty-five 
points), because of less enthusiasm for Wallace Wilkinson in 1987, the year 
when the state Democratic percentage was highest. In Boyd County the 
gap was only seventeen points; and in Pike County, which seems to vote 
Democratic whoever is running, the gap was only fifteen points. In other 
words, a substantial proportion of Kentucky voters has become indepen- 
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dent in most counties, but this trend is particularly evident in some of the 
urban counties. 
Patterns of Party Identification 
Since the development of modern survey research techniques in the 1950s, 
political scientists have used the concept of party identification as an 
important instrument for understanding political behavior and individual 
voting. They have found that a large proportion of persons identify them- 
selves as either Democrats or Republicans, this identification is relatively 
stable over a period of years, and party identification helps to predict how 
persons will vote. For years pollsters have been asking voters whether they 
consider themselves to be Democrats, Republicans, or independents; 
those who name a party have often been asked if they were "strong" or 
"weak" partisans, while independents have been asked if they "lean" 
toward either party. In recent years there has been some growth in the 
proportion of independents and some decline in the proportion of par- 
tisans who vote consistently for candidates of their party, but party identi- 
fication remains an important tool of political analysis (Shively, 1980). 
Stability of Pady Identijcation 
Obviously, we do not have survey data on party identification in Kentucky 
during the first half of this century. But throughout this period voting 
patterns were so stable, at both the county and the state levels, that we can 
assume a large proportion of voters were loyal to one party and usually 
voted for its candidates. The  fact that politics in most counties was 
dominated by a single party must have reinforced these partisan loyalties. 
Clearly, a majority of Kentuckians were Democrats, while the Republicans 
predominated in southcentral Kentucky and a few ~ t h e r  counties. 
Since the early 1950s, however, the Republican party has won most 
presidential elections in the state, has won a number of Senate races, and 
has gained control of three congressional seats. Obviously, a large number 
of Kentucky voters, frequently a majority, have been voting Republican in 
these races while many of them have been electing Democrats to the 
governorship, the legislature, and local offices in many counties. 
The  fact that so many Kentuckians have been splitting their ticket, in 
specific elections or at least over a period of several years, raises doubts 
about the stability and the impact of party identification in Kentucky. Are 
more voters becoming Republicans or independents? Do their party loy- 
alties have less effect on how they vote? Or is it possible that some voters 
identify with one party at the national level and another at the state level? 
Our best evidence about party identification of Kentuckians comes 
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from the semiannual statewide polls conducted by the Survey Research 
Center of the University of Kentucky (UKSRC) from 1979 through 1988. 
These surveys enable us to measure trends over time, as well as to measure 
the relationship between party identification and party registration, stan- 
dard demographic variables, and respondents' attitudes on issues. Because 
most questions have been asked more than once, we can pool the data and 
thus enlarge the sample. 
Voters were asked their party identification repeatedly from 1979 
through 1988 (with a break in 1984). To simplify the presentation and the 
comparison with other variables, we will concentrate on the three-way 
classification of identification (Democrats, Republicans, independents) 
but will break these down into more categories where it is useful to do so. 
(We will omit from the analysis the small number of those who failed to 
respond with an identification in one of the three categories.) 
Figure 10 shows the trend in party identification from 1979 through 
1988; in most years the question was asked in both the fall and the spring, 
and data from the two surveys have been averaged to reduce variations 
caused by sampling error. The  chart reveals a surprising pattern of consis- 
tency over the eight-year period. Partisan identification has ranged be- 
tween 51 and 54 percent for Democrats, between 22 and 28 percent for 
Republicans, and between 20 and 24 percent for independents. (For a 
more detailed analysis of these trends, see Jewel1 and Roeder, 1988.) 
There is no clear trend favoring either party but rather a cyclical 
pattern of small variations linked to the state and national elections. 
Republican identification was lowest in 1979, 1983, and 1987, years of 
gubernatorial primaries and elections. Republican identification was high- 
est in 1980 and 1988, during presidential years, as well as in the 1985-86 
period. (Data were lacking for the 1984 presidential election year.) Repub- 
lican gains have come largely at the expense of independents rather than of 
Democrats. 
A study of party realignment in southern states (Swansbrough and 
Brodsky, 1988) provides evidence of Republican gains in party identifica- 
tion that are greater in almost every southern state than we have found in 
Kentucky. (In a few states there has been a gain in independent, rather 
than Democratic, identification, a trend also missing in Kentucky.) For 
whatever reason, party identification in Kentucky has remained remarka- 
bly steady for a decade, except for variations tied to the electoral cycle. 
An examination of the seven-way breakdown of party identification 
(available for the 1980-86 period) also shows remarkable consistency over 
time. When the data for the years 1985-87 are pooled, they show the 
following breakdown: 24 percent strong Democratic; 28 percent weak 
Democratic; 7 percent independent, leaning Democratic; 9 percent inde- 
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No data  avai lable for  1984 
Figure 10. Trends in Party Identification in Kentucky, 1979-1988 
pendent; 6 percent independent, leaning Republican; 15 percent weak 
Republican; 11 percent strong Republican. These are almost identical to 
the figures for 1980, with slight losses for strong Democrats and slight gains 
for strong Republicans. The  conclusion from these data is unmistakable. 
Over nearly a decade, there has been no significant change in the party 
loyalties of Kentucky voters. About half remain Democrats, about one- 
fourth Republicans, and about one-fourth independents. 
Efect of Party Regstration on IdentiJication 
From 1979 through 1988 the proportion of voters registering as Democrats 
has ranged from 67.2 percent to 68.8 percent; the proportion of Republi- 
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Table 36. Comparison of Party Identification and Party Registration, 
1982, 1983, 1987 
Party Registration 
Party Percentage of Total Percentage Across Percentage Down 
identification Dem. Ind. Rep. Dem. Ind. Rep. Tot. Dem. Ind. Rep. 
Dem. 56 0 1 97 1 2 100 82 11 3 
Ind. 10 4 5 52 23 25 100 15 87 17 
Rep. 2 0 2  9 1 91 101 3 2 80 
Total 100 100 100 
Source: Jewel1 and Roeder, 1988. 
cans has ranged from 27.8 percent to 29.4 percent; and the proportion of 
independents and others has stayed close to 3.5 percent. Democratic 
registration inches up in years of gubernatorial races, while Republican 
registration is slightly higher in presidential years. T h e  proportion of 
voters registering as independents, while very small, is comparable to that 
in those other border and southern states that have closed primaries. 
Roughly two-thirds of the voters register as Democrats, and nearly 
one-third are Republicans; but half identify as Democrats, one-fourth as 
Republicans, and one-fourth as independents. What is the relationship 
between party identification and party registration in Kentucky? Do most 
of those who identify as partisans register that way? How do independent 
identifiers register? Does partisan identification cause party registration, 
or is it the reverse? 
Table 36 provides a cross tabulation of party identification and registra- 
tion, averaged for the years 1982,1983, and 1987. (Because some respond- 
ents are not registered, the totals are less than those for all identifiers, 
increasing the proportion of Democrats and decreasing the proportion of 
independents.) Almost all Democratic identifiers are registered as Demo- 
crats, and over 90 percent of Republican identifiers are registered as 
Republicans. Those who identify as independents are twice as likely to 
register Democratic than Republican, while one-fifth of them register as 
independent-virtually the only voters to do so. 
There are basically two reasons for a person to register as a Democrat 
or as a Republican. T h e  first is a sense of loyalty, and the second is a desire 
to vote in the Democratic or Republican primary. In Kentucky, as in most 
other southern and border states, the Democratic statewide primaries are 
often close and exciting, while the Republicans rarely have closely con- 
tested statewide primaries. We might expect to find Republican identi- 
fiers registering as Democrats in order to vote in state primaries, but our 
survey suggests that only about 9 percent of Republicans do so. 
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Locally, the party with a majority in a county frequently has close 
primaries, while the minority party seldom has contests and sometimes 
does not even run candidates. Consequently, registration patterns (par- 
ticularly in rural counties) are affected by the party balance at the county 
level. In 1987 (as noted in table 3 of chapter 3), there were thirty-four 
counties (out of 120) where the Democrats had at least 90 percent of the 
partisan registration, but in most of them the normal Democratic vote in 
statewide races was at least twenty percentage points less. It would appear 
that about 20 percent of the voters in these counties were registered 
Democratic but were usually voting Republican. There were also nine 
counties where 75 to 86 percent of the two-party registration was Republi- 
can though the normal Republican vote was approximately twenty points 
less than that. 
Given these registration patterns, we might expect to find that the 
relationship between party identification and registration is different in 
various types of counties. Table 37 shows this relationship for four types of 
counties: rural Republican, rural Democratic, rural strongly Democratic, 
and metropolitan (Jewel1 and Roeder, 1988). The  partisan categories for 
rural counties are based on voting in statewide races. (All Republican 
counties are combined to generate enough respondents. The  data only 
include two surveys in 1983.) 
An examination of the data shows that about 13 percent of Republicans 
in strongly Democratic and metropolitan counties register Democratic, 
but (particularly in strongly Democratic counties) the absolute numbers of 
these voters are very small. Much more important are the differences in 
registration by those who identify as independent. They are much more 
likely to register Republican in Republican counties and to register Demo- 
cratic in the other three categories of counties. In all four types of counties, 
it is largely the independents who account for the gap in partisan balance 
between registration and identification. Consequently, it is presumably 
the independents who largely account for the difference between voting 
patterns and registration. 
What do these data tell us about the meaning of party identification to 
voters in Kentucky? One possible explanation is that some voters do not 
think of themselves in terms of party identification until asked to do so by 
an interviewer. Some of them may confuse identification with registration 
and give the same answer for both; others, who recognize a contradiction 
between how they register and participate in primaries and how they vote 
in general elections, may decide on the spur of the moment to tell an 
interviewer that they are independents (Finkel and Scarrow, 1985). 
There are also substantive explanations for this phenomenon. More 
than half of those voters identifying as independents are registered as 
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Table 37. Cornparison of Party Identification and Party Registration in 
Various Types of Counties, 1983 
Party Number of Persons 
identification Dem. Ind. Rep. 
Rural Republican counties 
Dem. 51 1 5 
Znd. 5 6 12 
Rep. 0 0 72 
Total 
Party Registration 
Percentage Across Percentage Down 
Dem. Ind. Rep. Tot. Dem. Ind. Rep. 
Rural Democratic counties 
Dem. 178 2 5 96 1 3 100 85 18 6 
Ind. 26 8 15 53 16 31 100 12 73 17 
Rep. 5 1 67 7 1 92 100 3 9 77 
Total 100 100 100 
Rural strongly-Democratic counties 
Dem. 248 0 2 99 0 1 100 80 0 3 
Ind. 55 11 16 67 13 20 100 18 100 26 
Rep. 6 0 44 12 0 88 100 2 0 71 
Total 100 100 100 
Metropolitan counties 
Dem. 210 2 2 98 1 1 100 76 8 1 
Ind. 52 20 21 56 21 23 100 19 83 20 
Rep. 13 2 81 14 2 84 100 5 8 79 
Total 100 99 100 
Source: Jewel1 and Roeder, 1988. 
Democrats and presumably vote in the Democratic primary. But, as we 
will demonstrate later, many of them frequently vote Republican. In fact, 
among independent identifiers, those registered as Democrats are just as 
likely to vote Republican as are those who register independent. It appears 
that a number of voters think of themselves as independents because they 
are registered Democratic and vote in that primary but frequently vote 
Republican-at least in national elections. If such voters did not have to 
register with a party and were not limited to voting in one party's primary, 
many of them might think of themselves as Republicans. 
CharactePstics of Party IdentiJies 
National surveys have shown that Democratic identifiers are likely to have 
lower socioeconomic levels, including incomes and education; they are 
much more likely to be black and somewhat more likely to be female. 
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Table 38. Demographic Characteristics Related to Party Identification, 
1982-86 
Percentage Percentage Across 
Characteristics Down Dem. Ind. Rep. 
Education 
Less than high school 26 54 20 26 
High school 38 53 24 23 
College 35 47 25 28 
Age 
18-24 10 49 26 26 
25-40 38 48 27 25 
41-65 35 55 21 25 
Over 65 14 55 16 30 
Income 
Less than $10,000 23 56 2 1 24 
$10,000 to $20,000 29 51 24 25 
$20,000 to $30,000 25 50 25 26 
Over $30,000 23 51 21 27 
Gender 
Male 46 50 25 25 
Female 54 53 20 27 
Race 
White 94 51 23 27 
Black 6 69 20 11 
Total 100 52 23 26 
Source: Jewell and Roeder, 1988. 
Until recently younger voters were more Democratic, but there has been a 
trend of younger voters to be more independent or (most recently) Repub- 
lican. 
We find some of these differences among partisan differences in 
Kentucky, but the differences are quite small (Jewell and Roeder, 1988). 
Data from surveys in the 1982-86 period show that there is a slightly higher 
proportion of Democrats among the less well-educated, older, poorer, and 
female Kentuckians. There are a few more Republicans among the oldet 
and wealthier persons. And there are slightly more independents among 
those who are better educated and male and considerably more among 
younger persons (table 38). T h e  reason why most demographic differences 
are so small is that, particularly in rural areas, many voters develop a loyalty 
to the dominant party in the county, without regard to their socioeconomic 
status. A poor farmer in a traditionally Republican county is more likely to 
be Republican than a prosperous lawyer or business person in a traditional 
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Table 39. Comparison of Party Identification and Ideology, 1981-87 
(in Percentages) 
Ideology 
Party Liberal Middle-of-the-Road Conservative 
identi- Strong Weaker Leans Leans Weaker Strong 
fication liberal conser. Total 
Dem. 9.4 12.2 13.0 16.9 18.8 16.2 13.5 (2208) 
Ind. 6.9 10.5 9.2 21.8 19.3 19.8 12.5 (1035) 
Rev. 4.5 8.6 6.5 15.0 19.6 22.9 22.9 (1150) 
Democratic county. When we isolate rural from metropolitan areas, we 
find that in rural counties income levels are about the same among each 
group of partisans (although independents have more income in strongly 
Democratic counties). But in metropolitan counties Republicans have 
substantially higher income levels than Democrats or independents. 
Attitides of Party Identifien 
National surveys consistently show Democrats to be more liberal than 
Republicans, although the differences are smaller than those between 
political activists in the two parties. Surveys in Kentucky conducted by the 
UKSRC from 1981 through 1987 show that Democrats are somewhat more 
liberal, Republicans are more strongly conservative, and independents 
have a slight preference for the ideological center (table 39). Just about half 
of the Democrats and independents are middle-of-the road, while almost 
half of the Republicans are conservative. One reason why the ideological 
contrasts are not sharper is the traditional local base of much party identi- 
fication. More specifically, many Democratic respondents come from rural 
areas, particularly in western Kentucky, where conservative attitudes 
predominate. 
There are also moderate differences among the various partisan 
groups in their viewpoints on policy issues (table 40). Respondents were 
asked on three separate occasions (1981, 1983, and 1985) about whether 
more, less, or the same amount of money should be spent by state and local 
governments on programs for the poor, public schools, and environmental 
programs. Democrats were slightly more willing than Republicans to 
support spending for the poor and for public schools, while independents 
were more likely to support environmental programs. Surprisingly, there 
were almost no differences among the three groups in their judgment 
about whether state and local taxes were too high or about right. 
Independents were more likely, and Republicans least likely, to sup- 
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Table 40. Partisan Differences in Viewpoints on Policy Issues 
Percentages Down 
Policy question Dem. Ind. Rep. 
Spending priorities 
Aid to poor 
Spend more 55 50 45 
Spend same 34 32 35 
Spend less 11  18 20 
Funding for schools 
Spend more 67 67 58 
Spend same 30 29 38 
Spend less 3 4 4 
Environmental protection 
Spend more 38 43 31 
Spend same 50 45 53 
Spend less 12 12 16 
Statellocal taxes 
Too high 35 40 36 
About right 59 54 54 
Too low 2 2 5 
Equal rights amendment 
Favor 58 67 49 
Oppose 42 33 5 1 
Making abortion illegal 
Yes 60 45 56 
It depends 14 18 20 
No 26 37 24 
port passage of the Equal Rights Amendment (in 1981). A majority of both 
Democrats and Republicans believed that abortion should be made illegal, 
while independents were more evenly divided on the issue, possibly 
because more of them are located in metropolitan areas. There is also 
evidence (not shown in the table) that Democrats were less supportive of 
the death penalty for convicted murderers and more supportive of laws 
regulating handguns than the other two groups. 
On balance, we can conclude that the differences among partisans on 
policy issues are relatively small, compared to what we would expect to 
find in other states. This is probably because so many Kentuckians remain 
loyal to a party for traditional reasons and also because the state political 
parties have not consistently taken opposing stands on most of these 
issues. 
Party identification in Kentucky clearly affects the evaluation of politi- 
cal leaders. In the 1985 and 1986 spring surveys, for example, respondents 
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Table 41. National and State Party Identification: 1987 Kentucky Survey 
National Percentages of Total 
party ID Dem. Ind. Rep. Tot. 
Dem. 46 4 1 51 
Ind. 6 19 3 28 
Rep. 2 3 16 21 
Total 54 26 20 100 
State Party ID Percentages 
Percentages Across Down 
Dem. Ind. Rep. Tot. Dem. Ind. Rep. 
91 8 1 100 85 16 3 
21 70 9 100 11 73 13 
9 14 77 100 4 11 84 
100 100 100 
Consistent = 81.8% 
Inconsistent = 18.2% 
National party ID more Rep. = 10.8% 
National party ID more Dem. = 7.4% 
Total N = 705 
were asked to evaluate the job that Ronald Reagan was doing as president. 
On the average, for the two years, Reagan's performance was rated as good 
or excellent by 35 percent of Democrats, 59 percent of independents, and 
82 percent of Republicans. 
Partisanship has had a much smaller effect on the evaluations of the 
Kentucky governor. Averaging four gubernatorial evaluations from 1981 
through 1986 (two each of Democratic governors Brown and Collins), we 
find that excellent or good rankings were given by 50 percent of Demo- 
crats, 44 percent of independents, and 40 percent of Republicans. Brown, 
in particular, was evaluated almost as favorably by Republicans as by 
independents. 
Dual Pady Ident$cation 
Research conducted in other states, particularly in the South, has sug- 
gested that some voters have dual partisanship, identifying with one party 
in national politics and with another party in state or local politics (Hadley, 
1985; Niemi, Wright, and Powell, 1987). One plausible explanation for 
recent voting patterns in Kentucky would be that a substantial number of 
voters think of themselves as Republicans in national politics and as 
Democrats in state and local politics. 
T h e  best evidece on this question comes from the spring 1987 state- 
wide poll conducted by the UKSRC. After being asked the standard 
question on party identification, respondents were asked, "When it comes 
to national politics, do you consider yourself a Democrat, Republican, or 
independent?" and then "When it comes to state and local politics, do you 
consider yourself a Democrat, Republican, or independent?" 
T h e  results (table 41) show that 18 percent of the respondents an- 
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Table 42. National and State Party Identification: Fayette, Jessamine, and 
Woodford Counties in Kentucky, 1986 
Percentages Across 
National Percentages of Total State Party ID 
party ID Dem. Ind. Rep. Tot. Dem. Ind. Rep. Tot. 
Dem. 23 5 0 28 82 17 1 100 
Ind. 6 34 4 44 14 77 9 100 
Rep. 5 6 17 28 19 21 60 100 
Total 34 45 21 100 
Percentages 
Down 
Dem. Ind. Rep. 
66 11 2 
18 76 19 
15 13 79 
99 100 100 
Consistent = 73.6% 
Inconsistent = 26.4% 
National party ID more Rep. = 17.2% 
National party ID more Dem. = 9.2% 
Total N = 511 
swered inconsistently. Only 3 percent, however, identified with the Dem- 
ocratic party at one level and with the Republican party at the other; the 
rest identified with a party at one level and were independent at the other. 
Those who were inconsistent were slightly more likely (by an 11 to 8 
margin) to be more Republican at the national level. 
We might expect dual party identification to be stronger in the metro- 
politan areas, where the Republican party has been particularly successful 
in national and congressional races and less successful in state and local 
races. The  evidence is mixed. The  subsample of respondents in Jefferson 
County is large enough for separate analysis. Only 16 percent of them were 
inconsistent in their identification; and by a 2 to 1 margin, they were more 
Democratic at the national level. 
In a survey conducted in 1986 in Fayette County (Lexington) and two 
adjoining counties, Jessamine and Woodford, respondents were asked the 
same series of questions about levels of party identification. T h e  propor- 
tion answering inconsistently was much higher (26 percent), with almost 
two-thirds of these being more Republican in national politics (table 42). 
Although most of these were independent at one level, 5 percent were 
national Republicans and state Democrats. One other major difference is 
that 34 percent of the respondents in these three counties were indepen- 
dents (at both levels) compared to 23 percent in the statewide sample. 
It is commonly assumed that many Kentucky voters are registered 
with the Democratic party and vote in that party's primary but usually vote 
Republican, particularly in national elections. If this is so, we might expect 
that party registration would be more closely correlated with state than 
with national party identification. 
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A close examination of the data shows a more complex pattern, partly 
because there are so few who register as independents. Almost everyone 
consistently identifying as a Democrat registered Democratic, and 91 
percent of consistent Republicans registered Republican. Of the consis- 
tent independents, 54 percent registered Democratic, 25 percent inde- 
pendent, and 21 percent Republican. Almost everyone who identified 
with a party at one level and as an independent at the other level regstered 
with that party (rather than as an independent). Most of the few who were 
national Republicans and state Democrats registered as Democrats (and 
there was only one person who was a national Democrat and a state 
Republican). 
These surveys suggest that dual identification results when voters' 
political beliefs conflict with their state or local identification. In the 
survey of the Lexington area, state Democrats who identified with the 
Republican party at the national level were more likely than consistent 
Democratic identifiers to approve of Reagan and have a conservative 
ideology. State independents who adopted a national Republican identi- 
fication were more likely than consistent independents to approve of 
Reagan and reject liberalism, while those with a national Democratic 
identification were less likely than consistent independents to approve of 
Reagan and were more liberal. T h e  1987 statewide survey of dual party 
identification also showed that the ideological differences between Demo- 
crats and Republicans were slightly greater at the national level of identi- 
fication than the state level. 
Party IdentiJation and Voting 
Party identification is a useful tool of analysis primarily if it helps to predict 
and explain voting patterns. We lack comprehensive data on voting pat- 
terns of party identifiers in Kentucky. T h e  data that are available from the 
UKSRC surveys should be treated cautiously for several reasons. These 
were not exit polls or surveys conducted immediately after the election but 
were carried out over a longer period of time. (The data on the 1984 
presidential race are even more tentative because they were collected a 
year before the election.) Not all of the preelection surveys contain 
questions designed to identify those most likely to vote, and postelection 
survey respondents may exaggerate their support for the winner. 
Despite these limitations, we can see evidence (table 43) that, as we 
would expect, partisan identifiers are more likely to vote for the candidate 
of that party, and varying defection rates help to explain the outcome of the 
elections. These defection rates are comparable to those occurring at the 
national level in each election. In 1980, when Reagan narrowly carried 
Kentucky, he won support from nearly one-fourth of Democrats, a major- 
312 Political Parties d Primaries 
Table 43. Party Identification and Vote, 1979, 1980, 1984, 1987 
Party Identification 
(Percentages Down) 
Dem. Ind. Rep. 
- 
1980 Presidential 
Carter 73 31 12 
Reagan 24 55 85 
Anderson 3 14 3 
1984 Presidential 
Mondale 63 29 12 
Reagan 37 71 88 
1979 Gubernatorial 
Brown 89 68 21 
Nunn 11 32 79 
1987 Gubernatorial 
Wilkinson 84 7 1 48 
Har~er 16 29 52 
ity of independents, and over four-fifths of Republicans. Four years later, 
when Reagan's margin was larger, he won votes from more than one-third 
of Democrats, over avo-thirds of independents, and 88 percent of Repub- 
licans, 
There are data on only two of the gubernatorial races. In 1979 John Y. 
Brown, running against Louie Nunn, had most Democratic votes, two- 
thirds of the independents, and one-fifth of the Republicans. Eight years 
later Wallace Wilkinson, running against an unusually weak Republican, 
John Harper, had 84 percent of the Democratic votes, 71 percent of 
independent votes, and almost half of the Republican votes. 
One way of making these data on party identification more meaningful 
is to translate them into aggregate voting totals. For the 1980 presidential 
Table 44. Estimate of Voting by Party Identification in 1980 
Presidential Election 
Party Vote Cast 
identi- (in 000's) Percentage Across 
fication Dem. Rep. Ind. Tot. Dem. Rep. Ind. Tot. 
Dem. 500 167 12 679 73.6 24.6 1.8 100 
Rep. 39 314 6 359 10.9 87.5 1.6 100 
Ind. 77 154 13 244 31.6 63.1 5.3 100 
Total 616 635 31 1.282 
Percentage 
Down 
Dem. Rep. Ind. 
81.2 26.3 38.7 
6.3 49.4 19.4 
12.5 24.3 41.9 
100 100 100 
W n g  Patterns in General Elections 313 
election, we have estimated (table 44) the total number of votes cast by 
Democratic and Republican identifiers and by independents for Jimmy 
Carter, Ronald Reagan, and John Anderson. (This estimate is based on the 
actual turnout of party registrants and survey data on the voting prefer- 
ences and registration of party identifiers. It is impossible to rely only on 
the survey data, which appears to exaggerate the Anderson vote.) This 
estimate suggests that half of Reagan's vote came from Republican identi- 
fiers, and the other half came almost evenly from Democrats and indepen- 
dents; almost three-fourths of Carter's vote came from Democrats. 
Because Reagan won the 1980 election in Kentucky very narrowly, this 
suggests that-to be successful-a Republican presidential candidate 
must draw at least half of his vote from outside his own party and needs the 
support of at least one-fourth of the Democrats and about two-thirds of the 
independents. 
Unanswered Questions about Kentucky Voters 
T h e  conventional methods for describing voting behavior fall short of 
explaining voting patterns in Kentucky. Analysis of aggregate voting data 
by county shows that a large proportion of Kentuckians retain their party 
loyalties in most state and local elections, but they act much more inde- 
pendently in national-and particularly presidential-elections. This 
means that a substantial proportion of the voters in recent years has cast 
votes for both Democratic and Republican candidates. T h e  inability of the 
Republican party to become fully competitive in state, legislative, and 
local races results from a shortage of politically experienced, well-funded 
candidates, not from a shortage of potential voters. 
There has been no in-depth study of political attitudes and voting 
behavior in Kentucky; the only available data are standard questions on 
party identification and views on ideology and issues asked periodically in 
statewide surveys. No panel studies have been conducted to measure the 
consistency of voting from one election to the next or from the primary to 
the general election. 
T h e  concept of political identification, conventionally used by politi- 
cal scientists to categorize voters and to explain their voting behavior, is of 
limited use in explaining voting patterns in Kentucky. Although it is 
possible that significant numbers of persons identify with one party at the 
national level and one at the state level, the available voting surveys fail to 
demonstrate this convincingly, except in some metropolitan areas. About 
one-fourth of the voters describe themselves as independents, and we 
need to understand better how these individuals perceive the political 
parties and what factors motivate their voting decisions. 
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Because primary elections continue to be important in the Democratic 
party (and in some local Republican parties) and because there is little 
change in party registration, most Democrats and some Republicans vote 
consistently within the primary of one party while voting more indepen- 
dently in general elections. We know little about how the political parties 
are perceived and evaluated by those persons who vote in Democratic 
primaries and frequently vote Republican in general elections. 
Kentucky politics is in a stage of transition, and these changes affect 
voters in many ways. Many Kentucky voters now living in metropolitan 
counties grew up in rural counties dominated by one party, while others 
have moved in from other states. A new generation of voters has few, if any, 
- 
memories of Kentucky political traditions. They do not know or care how 
rural partisan loyalties were shaped by the Civil War and its aftermath or by 
family loyalties and feuds. They have never heard of the factions in the 
Democratic party; they are unaware of Earle Clements; and they know 
Happy Chandler not as a colorful and controversial politician but as the 
state's number one sports fan. 
Today the voters' perceptions of state candidates are shaped largely by 
television, a medium that encourages independence in voting because it 
reaches across party lines. Republicans as well as Democrats are subjected 
to news coverage and advertisements in the Democratic primary as well as 
the general election campaigns. T h e  advertising campaigns of incumbent 
congressmen (particularly Republicans) emphasize constituent service 
and accessibility rather than partisanship. Television is a medium that 
gives an advantage to the candidate who has mastered its techniques rather 
than to the candidate with an established record of office holding. Because 
most voters no longer have strong loyalties to either parties or candidates, 
they can be very volatile and easily swayed by effective advertising cam- 
paigns, as we saw in the 1987 Democratic primaries. 
Kentuckians are proud of their traditions, and we have been slow to 
recognize that these political traditions are changing. The  trends that have 
affected political parties, campaigns, and voters in the rest of the country 
have begun to have an impact in Kentucky. These trends have increased 
the potential for two-party competition, even though this development 
has not been fully realized in Kentucky. They have changed the character 
of campaign organization, without ending its importance. More significant 
has been the growing importance of television as the forum for political 
communication and television advertising as the vehicle for publicizing 
the candidate's message. Because of these trends, the Kentucky voter has 
changed, becoming more independent and unpredictable in the choice of 
parties and candidates. 
APPENDIX 
Variable 
Motivations for 
involvement in 
primaries 
Ideological 
proximity to 
a candidate 
Interest group 
membership 
First-time 
campaign activity 
Continuity of 
support 
Description of Independent Variables" 
Description 
Four separate scores, based on responses to a series of 13 
Likert-type items. Factor analysis was used to reduce the 13 
items to three underlying dimensions. "Support of a par- 
ticular candidate I believe in" had to be excluded from the 
factor analysis since most respondents so strongly empha- 
sized this reason, thus creating very little variability. T h e  first 
dimension, on which the highest-loading items included 
"certain group-political ties," "social contacts," "excitement 
of campaign," and "work with friends and relatives," clearly 
tapped solidary motivations. T h e  high loadings of "help my 
own political career," "make business contacts," and "obtain 
locallstate job" on the second factor pointed to material 
motivations. Four other items ("work for issues," "influence 
policies of government," "civic responsibility," and "interest 
group goals") formed the third dimension of purposive 
motivation. On the basis of the factor analysis, sets of items 
were combined aditively to form a summary scale for each 
respondent on each dimension. Since the "personal friend- 
ship with a candidate" item did not load highly on any of the 
three dimensions, it was used by itself as an indicator of a 
fourth type of motivation-attraction to or linkage with a 
candidate. 
Derived by subtracting a respondent's self-identified posi- 
tion on a five-point liberal conservative scale from the re- 
spondent's own position on the same scale. 
Separate dummy variables indicating respondent's mem- 
bership in a labor union, teacherleducational group, or busi- 
ness organization (each coded 1 for membership, 0 other- 
wise). 
A dummy variable coded 1 if the respondent's first active 
political involvement was in the 1983 pllmary campaign, 0 
otherwise. 
Separate dummy variables identifying which, if any, of the 
1979 Democratic gubernatorial contenders the respondent 
had supported--George Atkins, John Y. Brown, J t ,  Carroll 
Hubbard, Terry McBrayer, Harvey Sloane, or Thelma 
Stovall. 
*The dependent variable, candidate choice, was tapped via responses to the 
following question: "In 1983, did you support a gubernatorial primary candidate? 
Which one?" 
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